JUDGMENT N. D. Ojha, J. - The dispute giving rise to the present writ petition relates to a shop. The said shop was allotted in favour of the Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd., respondent No. 3, by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer on 19th March, 1971. Subsequently an application was made by the petitioner asserting that it was really he who was the tenant of the shop in question and that he was carrying on business in the said shop as an agent of the Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. He made a prayer for modification of the order of allotment accordingly. His application was allowed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer on 17th February, 1972. A review application was filed against that order by the Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. but the said application was dismissed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. Aggrieved by that order the Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. filed an appeal before the District Judge under Section 18 of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as U. P. Act 11(1 of 1972) but the said appeal was dismissed as not maintainable. The Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. thereafter instituted writ petition No. 4289 of 1973 in this Court with the prayer to quash the aforesaid orders. This writ petition was allowed on 16th December, 1975, and the aforesaid orders which were dated 17th February, 1972, 8th December, 1972, and 22nd May, 1973, were quashed. A copy of the aforesaid order of this Court has been filed as Annexure I to this writ petition. The original record of the writ petition No. 4289 of 1973 was also sent for to find out the array of the parties inasmuch as there appeared to be some typing mistake in the array of respondent No. 2 in the copy of the order (Annexure I to the writ petition). A perusal of the original record of the aforesaid writ petition indicates that the Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. A perusal of the original record of the aforesaid writ petition indicates that the Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. was the petitioner in that case, the District Magistrate, Meerut, was respondent No. 1, the Kiraya Niyantran Evam Nishkashan Adhikari Meerut (Prescribed Authority) (hereinafter referred to as the Rent Control and Eviction Officer) (Prescribed Authority) was respondent No. 2 and the present petitioner Moti Lal Kichlu was respondent No. 3. One of the questions which came up for consideration before this Court in the aforesaid writ petition was as to whether the Rent Control and Eviction Officer (Prescribed Authority) was right in taking the view in the order impugned in that case that the petitioner was the tenant of the shop in question notwithstanding. The order of allotment dated 19th March, 1971, having been passed in favour of the Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. It was brought to the notice of this Court that a suit had already been instituted by the Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. for a declaration that the petitioner was not the tenant of the shop in question and the said suit was pending. While dealing with the question of jurisdiction of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer (Prescribed Authority) to record a finding as to whether the petitioner was or was not the tenant of the shop in question it was held by this Court: "Linked with the above another question which arises for determination is whether the Rent Control and Eviction Officer could go into the question of tenancy rights while rejecting the application filed by the petitioner on 8th of December, 1972 ? U. P. Act No. III of 1947 did not confer any such jurisdiction on the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. Therefore, in deciding the application for the review of the order made by the petitioner, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer could not hold that as the respondent No. 3 was paying rent to the landlord, the respondent No. 3 was the tenant of the premises and not the petitioner. In doing so the Rent Control and Eviction Officer assumed the authority or power of a civil court which it does not have. In doing so the Rent Control and Eviction Officer assumed the authority or power of a civil court which it does not have. The dispute between the petitioner and the respondent No. 3 of tenancy rights could be adjudicated only by a civil court and not by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, a statutory body with a limited jurisdiction. The order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer dated 8th of December, 1972, is, therefore, liable to be quashed on thing round as well." 2. The petitioner preferred a special appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 16th December, 1975 before a Division Bench of this Court which was dismissed on 15th February, 1978, by an order a copy whereof has been filed as Annexure 1 to the counter-affidavit of Raj Kumar. It was inter alias observed by the Division Bench in its order dated 15th February, 1978 : "On these facts and for the reasons given by the learned Single Judge in the judgment under appeal we hold that the amended allotment order which bears the date February 17, 1972, was rightly quashed." The reasons given by the learned Single Judge for quashing the amended order of allotment were thus obviously affirmed by the Division Bench. I am informed that the suit filed by the Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. against the petitioner for declaration that he was not the tenant of the shop in dispute is still pending. Even so, an application was made by respondent No. 2 M/s. Rajkumar Nirajkumar for allotment of the shop in dispute on the ground that since the Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd., who was the tenant of the shop in question, was not actually occupying the said shop and it was in actual occupation of the petitioner who was not its tenant the said shop should be deemed to he vacant under Section 12 of U. P. Act 13 of 1972. The Prescribed Authority (Delegated Authority), Meerut, respondent No. 1 by its order dated 1st September, 1982, held that a vacancy had occur- red in respect of the shop in question as contemplated by Section 12 of the Act. In arriving at this conclusion the Prescribed Authority has recorded a finding that the Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. The Prescribed Authority (Delegated Authority), Meerut, respondent No. 1 by its order dated 1st September, 1982, held that a vacancy had occur- red in respect of the shop in question as contemplated by Section 12 of the Act. In arriving at this conclusion the Prescribed Authority has recorded a finding that the Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. was not actually occupying the shop in question but it was being occupied by the petitioner and that since the order of allotment dated 19th March, 1971, was in favour of the Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. the occupation of the petitioner was that of a trespasser. It is this order of the Prescribed Authority which is sought to be quashed in the present writ petition. 3. A preliminary objection has been raised by counsel for respondent No. 2 that the writ petition was not maintainable in view of the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Hari Swarup v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, 1982 A.R.C. 809 where it was held that a writ petition against an order declaring vacancy simpliciter was premature. For the petitioner on the other hand it has been urged that the Prescribed Authority who was also it party in Writ Petition No. 4289 of 1973 as respondent No. 2 had no jurisdiction to go into the question as to whether the petitioner was the tenant of the shop in question or respondent No. 3 was the tenant of the said shop in view of the decision of this Court in the aforesaid writ petition, relevant portion whereof has already been quoted above and consequently it was it fit case in which a writ of prohibition may be issued directing the Prescribed Authority not to pass any order of allotment in respect of the shop in dispute till the question as to whether the petitioner was or was not the tenant of the said shop has been finally decided by the civil court. 4. Having heard counsel for the parties at some length I am of opinion that there is substance in the submission made by counsel for the petitioner. 4. Having heard counsel for the parties at some length I am of opinion that there is substance in the submission made by counsel for the petitioner. It is true that in view of the decision of this court in the case of Hari Swarup (supra) it would not be possible to entertain this writ petition for issuing a writ of certiorari inasmuch as for that relief the writ petition would be premature. The distinction between a writ of certiorari and a writ of prohibition is well established. A writ of certiorari issues after an order is passed for quashing the said order if it suffers either from a manifest error of law or error of jurisdiction. In East India Commercial Co. v. Collector of Customs, AIR 1962 Supreme Court 1893 while laying down the scope of a writ of prohibition it was held that a writ of prohibition is an order directed to an inferior Tribunal forbidding it front continuing with a proceeding therein on the ground that the proceeding is without or in excess of jurisdiction or contrary to the laws of the land, statutory or otherwise. There can be no manner of doubt that if in view of the order passed by this Court in Writ Petition No. 4289 of 1973 the Prescribed Authority had no jurisdiction to determine the question as to whether it was the Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. or the petitioner who was the tenant of the shop in question the action of the Prescribed Authority in making an inquiry as to whether the petitioner was or was not the tenant of the shop in question and his finding recorded in the impugned order that the petitioner was not the tenant of the shop in question and his possession was that of a trespasser would he without jurisdiction. In view of the findings recorded in Writ Petition No. 4289 of 1973 which have already been quoted above there seen, to he no doubt that so far as the facts of the instant case are concerned the Prescribed Authority did not have the jurisdiction to decide the question as to whether it was the Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. or the petitioner who was the tenant of the shop in question. This question could be decided only by the civil court. Ltd. or the petitioner who was the tenant of the shop in question. This question could be decided only by the civil court. As seen above a suit is already pending in the civil court for a declaration as to whether the petitioner was or was not the tenant of the shop in question. It is only if it was ultimately decided by the civil court that it was the Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. which was the tenant of the shop in question and not the petitioner that it would he open to the Prescribed Authority to take the view that the possession of the petitioner was that of a trespasser. In case it is ultimately held by the civil court that it was really the petitioner who was the tenant of the shop in question and in the meantime the Prescribed Authority is permitted to treat the shop in question as vacant by holding that the possession of the petitioner was that of a trespasser and to allot the said shop in favour of respondent No. 2 or any other person and thereafter dispossess the petitioner from the said shop in pursuance of the order of allotment the petitioner would obviously he put to a great prejudice and that too in proceedings which would be wholly without jurisdiction. On the facts of the instant case it is apparent that a case for issuing a writ of prohibition has been clearly made out. 5. Counsel for the respondent No. 2 in this connection submitted that the order of allotment dated 19th March, 1971, had been passed not under U.P. Act 13 of 1972 but under the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as U.P. Act 13 of 1947) and consequently those observations were not binding on the Prescribed Authority while he was exercising jurisdiction under U.P. Act 13 of 1972. I find it difficult to accept this submission either. The Prescribed Authority was a party as already seen above to Writ Petition No. 4289 of 1973. The decision in that Writ Petition is clearly binding on all the parties to the writ petition, namely, the Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. the District Magistrate, the Prescribed Authority and the petitioner. The Prescribed Authority was a party as already seen above to Writ Petition No. 4289 of 1973. The decision in that Writ Petition is clearly binding on all the parties to the writ petition, namely, the Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. the District Magistrate, the Prescribed Authority and the petitioner. The mere fact that the application riving rise to the impugned order was made under section 16 of U.P. Act of XIII of 1972 would in my opinion not entitle the Prescribed Authority to ignore the order passed by this Court in Writ Petition No. 4289 of 1913 and proceed to decide the question as to whether the petitioner was or was not the tenant of the shop in dispute. In so far as the facts of this case arc concerned the observation made by this Court in its order dated 16th December, 1975, in writ petition No. 4289 of 1973 that since the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was a statutory body with a limited jurisdiction it had no jurisdiction to decide the question as to whether the petitioner or respondent No. 3 was the tenant of the shop in dispute was binding on the Rent Control and Eviction Officer not only while exercising his power under U.P. Act 13 of 1947 but also while acting under U.P. Act 3 of 1972. 6. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed and the Prescribed Authority/Delegated Authority, Meerut, respondent No. 1, is directed not to take steps for the allotment of the shop in question till the dispute as to whether the petitioner or the Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. respondent No. 3 as the tenant of the shop has been decided by the civil court where the suit in this regard is already pending. In the circumstances of the case, however, the parties shall bear their own costs.