JUDGMENT - Jamdar M.S. J: - These proceedings illustrate how judicial action can be frustrated by administrative inaction or negligence. 2. The present proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, were initiated by this Court by an order dated 5th October 1982 on a reference made by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Wardha. 3. The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Wardha, was moved by the Intervener in these proceedings, in whose favour the Chief Judicial Magistrate had passed an order, directing the contemner to release the property consisting of 222 quintals of Mhowra flowers which were purchased by the Intervener from Mahalakshmi Rice Mills, Khariyar Road, Kalahandi, Orissa. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate found that the contemner wilfully defied the said order, not once but repeatedly on 30-4-1981,2-5-1981,4-5-1981,6-5-1981, 7-5-1981, 30-7-1981 and 3-8-1981 and passed order on 30-11-1981 directing that a reference be made under section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. For inexplicable reason, however, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate Shri R.W. Khan kept the matter in cold storage and did not make the reference till 6-7-1982. He sent that reference after he was transferred as Joint Civil Judge, Senior Division, Wardha. However, instead of forwarding the papers to the office of the Nagpur Bench, he forwarded the papers to the Registrar, High Court, Appellate Side, Bombay, through the District Judge, Wardha. Further, even though he styled the reference as one under section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, in the concluding para of his forwarding letter he stated that the reference was made under section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, meaning that it was a reference in respect of criminal contempt, which obviously it was not. By this time, the violations committed by the contemner of the order in question on five occasions till 5-7-1981 had already gone beyond the period of one year contemplated by section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act. 4. The learned District and Sessions Judge, Wardha, mechanically forwarded the papers to the Registrar, High Court, Appellate Side, Bombay. Though he did so promptly and forwarded the papers on the same day on which he received them, he failed to note that it was a judicial matter which should have been forwarded to the office of the Nagpur Bench within the jurisdiction of which the matter arose. The Registry of Bombay made their own contribution to the delay. Though he did so promptly and forwarded the papers on the same day on which he received them, he failed to note that it was a judicial matter which should have been forwarded to the office of the Nagpur Bench within the jurisdiction of which the matter arose. The Registry of Bombay made their own contribution to the delay. From the endorsement appearing on the forwarding letter sent by the District Judge, Wardha, it Appeared that the Registrar, High Court, Appellate Side, Bombay, received the record on 12th July 1982. No steps, however, were taken to forward the record to this Bench for necessary action till 7th September 1982 by which time the remaining two violations of the order in question also went beyond the period of one year contemplated by section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. It Appeared that the concerned officers in the office of the Registrar, High Court, Appellate Side, Bombay, did not apply their mind to the matter and failed to note that it was a reference under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, of which, as contemplated by section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, the Court is expected to take cognizance before expiry of one year from the date or dates on which the contempt was committed. 5. Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, lays down that no Court shall initiate any proceedings for contempt either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. This provision governs proceedings for civil contempt as well as for criminal contempt. As per the definition given in section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, 'civil contempt' means wilful disobedience to any judgment. decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a court. In the present case, the contemner is alleged to be gutlty of wilful disobediertce of the order passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate regarding disposal of the seized property. It is, therefore, 'civil contempt' of the subordinate Court for which the High Court can take action under section 10 read with section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. In the present case, the contemner is alleged to be gutlty of wilful disobediertce of the order passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate regarding disposal of the seized property. It is, therefore, 'civil contempt' of the subordinate Court for which the High Court can take action under section 10 read with section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Admittedly, however, the High Court initiated the proceedings after the expiry of the period mentioned in section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. 6. It was sought to be urged that the term 'court' used in section 20 means in the case of a contempt of a subordinate court, that court and not the High Court, and hence the initiation contemplated by section 20 is the initiation of the proceedings made by the subordinate court before making the reference to the High Court. It is difficult to accept this submission because the proceedings for contempt can never be initiated by a subordinate court even though the alleged contempt is of that court. The position of a person who brings the contempt to the notice of the subordinate court or to the High Court and that of the subordinate court, which makes the reference, is no better than an informer, or a reporter. The subordinate court cannot take any action for contempt for its contempt and what the subordinate court is expected to do is to make a reference to the High Court for initiating proceedings. It is for the High Court to decide whether any action for contempt is called for and, if so, to initiate proceedings for punishing the person guilty of contempt of the subordinate court. All that the subordinate court can do is to make a reference. The subordinate court may do so on its own motion or being moved by the party aggrieved, but the subordinate court is not competent to take any action against the contemner and hence cannot initiate any proceedings for that purpose. It is, therefore, difficult to accept the submission that the court contemplated by section 20 is the court of which contempt is committed and in a case where the contempt is of subordinate court, it would be a sufficient compliance of section 20 if the subordinate court initiates proceedings for the purpose of making a reference to the High Court. It is, therefore, difficult to accept the submission that the court contemplated by section 20 is the court of which contempt is committed and in a case where the contempt is of subordinate court, it would be a sufficient compliance of section 20 if the subordinate court initiates proceedings for the purpose of making a reference to the High Court. Simply because the subordinate court is moved by the party aggrieved and the subordinate court holds inquiry for the purpose of making a reference to the High Court, it cannot be said that the subordinate court had initiated proceedings for contempt; The proceedings for contempt can be said to be initiated only after the High Court decides to take action against the contemner and initiates the proceedings by issuing notice to the contemner to show cause why action under the Contempt of Courts Act should not be taken against him. The proceedings will be deemed to be initiated only when the High Court passes an order calling upon the contemner to show cause and not till then. 7. It was next urged that section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 would be applicable to proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, and hence by virtue of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the delay which was caused without any fault of the person in whose favour the order in question was passed deserves to be condoned. Sub-section (2) of section 29 of the Limitation Act, 1963, lays down that where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period was the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. It is contended that the application to the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act are not expressly excluded by the Contempt of Courts Act, which is a special law, and hence by virtue of section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act can be validly invoked for condonation of delay for a sufficient cause. It cannot be disputed that the Contempt of Courts Act is a special law dealing with contempts of court. There is also nothing in the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, which expressly excludes application of the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act as contemplated by section 29(2). But the question would be whether absence of such provision expressly excluding the application of sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act necessarily leads to the conclusion that the said provisions are applicable even in a matter arising out of a statute which is a complete Code in itself. 8. The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, which lays down what amounts to contempt of Court, defines civil and criminal contempts, provides forum for taking action for contempt of Court, regulates the procedure which the Court exercising powers-under the Contempt of Courts Act is expeeted to follow while dealing with civil and criminal contempts, defines and limits the powers of the courts in punishing for contempt of court, provides for an appeal as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, and prescribes the limitation for actions for contempt. It is, therefore, crystal clear that the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is a complete Code in itself. 9. In support of the proposition that section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, is applicable to the proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, reliance was sought to be placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in (Vidyacharan Shukla Vs. Khubchand Baghel and others)1, in which the question that fell for consideration of their Lordships was whether section 29(2) of the Limitation Act-applies to an appeal under section 116-A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, and whether the appellant was entitled to exclude the time required for obtaining copy of the order under section 12(2) of the Limitation Act. Their Lordships answered the question in the affirmative. Their Lordships answered the question in the affirmative. It was contended relying on this decision that even though section 116-A(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, which' is a special Act, prescribed a different period of limitation for an appeal under section 116-A(1) of the said Act, provision of section 12 (2) Of the Limitation Act was made applicable by virtue of section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act. It is, however, pertinent to note that the majority decision was based on the position that though the right of appeal was conferred by section 116-A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, it was still an appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure and to attract Article 156 of the First Schedule of the Limitation Act, it was not necessary for an appeal to be an appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure in that the right to prefer the appeal should be conferred by the sard Code. 10. This decision was analysed by the Supreme Court in the case of (K. Venkateswara Rao and another Vs. Bekkam Narasimha Reddi and others)2. In that case, the question for consideration was whether the Limitation Act was applicable to an election petition under the Representation of People Act, 1951, as amended in 1966. While dealing with this question, reference was made to Vidyacharan Shukla's case (cited supra) and the view expressed in that decision was analysed as follows: . “The majority view was that though the right of appeal was conferred by section 116-A of the Act of 1951 it was still an appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure and to attract Article 156 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act, it was not necessary for an appeal to be an appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure in that the right to prefer the appeal should be conferred by the said Code. In our view, sub-section (2) of section 116-A empowered the High Court to treat an appeal under that section presented to it as if it were an appeal from an original decree passed by a court within the local limits of its civil appellate jurisdiction. Consequently, the jurisdiction, powers and authority of the High Court would be the same as in an appeal from an original decree of a lower court. Consequently, the jurisdiction, powers and authority of the High Court would be the same as in an appeal from an original decree of a lower court. In other words, in entertaining the appeal and disposing of it the High Court would exercise the same powers as were available to it in an appeal from a decree of a lower court. To such an appeal the powers of the High Court under section 12 of the Limitation Act would necessarily be attracted. From this analysis it is clear that the dicta in Vidyacharan Shukla's case has a limited application and does not govern all proceedings under the Special Acts which are complete Codes in themselves. 11. The specific question that arose for consideration in K. Venkateswara Rao's case was whether the delay in impleading a party to the election petition could be condoned by invoking section 29 (2) read with section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Negativing this submission, Their Lordships observed as follows in para 14 of the judgment: “ It is well settled that amendments to a petition in a civil proceeding and the addition of parties to such a proceeding are generally possible subject to the law of limitation. But an election petition stands on a different footing. The trial of such a petition and the powers of the Court in respect thereof are all circumscribed by the Act. The Indian Limitation Act of 1963 is an Act to consolidate and amend the law of limitation of suits and other proceedings and for purposes connected therewith. The provisions of this Act will apply to all civil proceedings and same special criminal which can be taken in a Court of law ' unless the application thereof has been excluded by any enactment: the extent of such application is governed by Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act. In our opinion however Limitation Act, cannot apply to proceedings like an flection petition inasmuch as the Representation of the People Act is a complete and self-contained code which does not admit of the introduction of the principles or the provisions of law contained in the Indian Limitation Act”. 12. In our opinion however Limitation Act, cannot apply to proceedings like an flection petition inasmuch as the Representation of the People Act is a complete and self-contained code which does not admit of the introduction of the principles or the provisions of law contained in the Indian Limitation Act”. 12. The question of applicability of the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by virtue of section 29(2) of the said enactment, to proceedings under Special Acts which are complete Codes, was elaborately examined by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in (Hukumdev Narain Yadav Vs. LalitNarain Mishra)3, which was also a case which arose out of an election petition. While dealing with this question, Their Lordships explained the meaning of word “expressly excluded” appearing in section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act in the light of the provisions of the special enactment, which does not contain the words 'expressly excluding the provisions of the Limitation Act', but which is a complete Code in itself. The relevant observations which appear in para 17 are as follows: “It is contended before us that the words “expressly excluded” whould mean that there must be an express reference made in the special or local law to the specific provisions of the Limitation Act of which the operation is to be excluded. As usual the meaning given in the Dictionary has been relied upon, but what we have to see is whether the scheme of the special law, that is, in this cast the Act, and the nature of the remedy provided therein are such that the Legislature intended it to be a complete code by itself which alone should govern the several matters provided by it. If on an examination of the relevant provisions it is clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily excluded then the benefits conferred therein cannot be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the Act. In our view, even in a case where the special law does not exclude the . If on an examination of the relevant provisions it is clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily excluded then the benefits conferred therein cannot be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the Act. In our view, even in a case where the special law does not exclude the . • provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by an express reference, it would nonetheless be open to the Court to examine whether and to what extent the nature of those provisions or the nature of the subject-matter and scheme of the special law exclude their operation.” Their Lordships have also observed in para 18 that the applicability of these provisions (sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act) has, therefore, to be judged not from the provisions of the Limitation Act but by analysing the provisions of the Special Act for ascertaining whether it is a complete Code in itself which does not admit of the application of any of the provisions of the Limitation Act mentioned in section 29(2) of that Act. 13. We have already demonstrated above, how the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, is a self-contained Code. Looking to the scheme of the Act and especially the wording of section 20, it is clear to us that the bar of limitation prescribed by section 20 is absolute, making provisions of sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act via section 29(2) of the said enactment, inapplicable to proceedings of contempt. 14. There is another aspect of the matter and that is whether section 20 prescribes a period of limitation or imposes a condition precedent for initiation of a proceeding under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Section 20 does not contemplate of institution of any proceeding which involves filing of an application. What section 20 contemplates is initiation of the proceedings by the Court which the Court can do suo motu or otherwise. As observed above, proceedings are initiated only when the Court takes cognizance of the complaint and decides to take action for contempt by passing an order directing issue of show cause notice to the contemner. The Court may act on its motion. As observed above, proceedings are initiated only when the Court takes cognizance of the complaint and decides to take action for contempt by passing an order directing issue of show cause notice to the contemner. The Court may act on its motion. The Court may act in case of civil contempt of the subordinate Court on a reference by the said Court, and in case of criminal contempt on a motion made by the Advocate General or any person with the consent in writing of the Advocate General or by such Law Officer, described in clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 15, or on a reference by the subordinate Court. Further, the court is not bound to take action for contempt and may decide not to take any action. It is only when the court decides to take action and takes steps in that direction, obviously by issuing notice to the contemner that the proceedings will be deemed to have been initiated within the meaning of section 20. Section 20 does not contemplate institution of any proceeding and hence there is no question of prescribing a limitation for instituting a proceeding. For this reason also, section 29(2) of the Limitation Act cannot be invoked. Section 20 operates as a jurisdictional bar and prevents the court from initiating proceedings after the expiry of the period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. In a sense it is a condition precedent to an action for contempt. 15. The application of mind by the Court amounts to initiation of proceeding within the meaning of section 20 and the date on which the Court applies its mind is the terminus a quo for the period of limitation provided in section 20. In this context we can fruitfully quote the observation of the Supreme Court appearing in para 8 of the judgment in the case (Baradakanta Mishra Vs. Mr. Justice Gatikrushna Mishra, C.J. of Orissa High Court)4: “The exercise of contempt jurisdiction being a matter entirely between the Court and the alleged contemner, the Court, though moved by motion or reference, may in its discretion, decline to exercise its jurisdiction for contempt. It is only when the Court decides to take action and initiates a proceeding for contempt that it assumes jurisdiction to punish for contempt. It is only when the Court decides to take action and initiates a proceeding for contempt that it assumes jurisdiction to punish for contempt. The exercise of the jurisdiction to punish for contempt commences with the initiation of a proceeding for contempt, whether suo motu or on a motion or a reference. That is why the terminus a quo for the period of limitation provided in section 20 is the date when a proceeding for contempt is initiated by the Court.” 16. This view of ours finds support also in the decision of the Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in (Dineshbhai A. Parikh Vs. Kripalu Co-operative Housing Society Nagarvel, Ahmedabad and others)5. This is what the learned Judges have observed while pointing out the distinction between 'instituting a proceeding' and 'initiating a proceeding' The relevant observations appear in para 11 of the judgment: “Initiation of proceedings, for civil contempt as well as for criminal contempt can be done by a court on its own motion in addition to what we have stated earlier. When the court takes action or takes the first step in that direction, it does not institute proceedings. Proceedings are instituted by a litigant and not by the court. A Court merely initiates proceedings. We, therefore, find that section 20 is such that it does not contemplate institution of a petition or an application by a private individual for taking action under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. It merely contemplates initiation of proceedings by a court on its own motion or otherwise. The fetter which section 20 places on the jurisdiction of the court is that the court shall not initiate any proceedings for contempt either on its own •motion or otherwise after the expiration of a period of one year from the date on which contempt is alleged to have been committed. Since there is no application or petition before the court in such proceedings, the question of condoning delay does not arise. We are in respectful agreement with these observations and also with the view that what section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, provides is not the period of limitation as is ordinarily understood but it is a condition precedent of Court's powers under that Act. 17. We are in respectful agreement with these observations and also with the view that what section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, provides is not the period of limitation as is ordinarily understood but it is a condition precedent of Court's powers under that Act. 17. In (N.Venkataramanappa v. D.K. Naikar and another)6 the Division Bench consisting of V.S. Malimath and D.B. Lal, JJ., held that section 20 operates as an absolute bar to initiation of contempt proceeding whether suo motu or at the instance of complainant after expiry of one year's limitation. They have also held that the starting point of limitation is the date on which contempt is alleged to have been committed and not the date of knowledge of the complainant. In the present case before us, starting points of limitation were the dates on which the contemner is alleged to have violated tine order of the court and the terminus a quo for the purpose of section 20 would be one year from those dates. Admittedly, that period had already expired when the proceedings in this case were initiated by issuing a notice to the contemner. Initiation of the present proceedings itself was bad in law and without jurisdiction. 18. In the result, the notice issued to contemner is discharged and the contempt proceedings are quashed. Contempt proceedings quashed. ----