M. D. BHATT, J. ( 1 ) THIS is the revision of the accused Tulsiram who, on his conviction under Section 7 read with Section 16 (l) (a) (i) on the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, has been sentenced to six months RI and to pay the fine of Rs. 1000/- and in default of fine, to further undergo four months RI. ( 2 ) ON 17-8-1979, the Food Inspector had purchased the sample of Soyabean Oil, for analysis, from the applicant-accused, the owner of the particular grocery-shop. The sample was sent to the Public Analyst, who found it as not conforming to the prescribed standard, inasmuch as, cotton-seed oil was found present in the sample (Ex. P-7 ). The applicant-accused, on being prosecuted, abjured the guilt. He denied to have sold any sample of Soyabean oil. He equally denied to have received the copy of the Public Analysts report any time. The trial Court held that the copy of the Public Analysts report had been duly forwarded to the applicant-accused as per the provisions of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and the Rules made there under. Since, the sample was found adulterated, the applicant accused was convicted and sentenced to the extent as stated at the outset. The appeal, though preferred, was dismissed; and hence, now, the present revision. ( 3 ) THE learned counsel for the applicant accused has assailed the conviction on certain legal points. In the first place, it is canvassed that Rule 9-A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, hereinafter referred to as Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules is mandatory. It is, next, urged that the expression immediately used in Rule 9-A is rigid in its implication, connoting atonce or forthwith or without delay; and as such, the copy of the Public Analysts report, having not been immediately forwarded to the applicant-accused after the institution of the prosecution there was dear violation of the tenor of Rule 9-A read with Section 13 (2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, entitling, thus, the applicant-accused to acquittal. Decisions cited in support, are Sabastian v. State1 Chand Roop v. State of Haryana2, State of Maharashtra v. Tukaram Baburao Mane3, K. V. Kunaappa v. The Food Inspector, Kannapuram Panchyyat4, Perumal and another v. Kumbakonam Municipality5, Ashok Trading Co. Katni v. Municipal Council, Katni6 and Devideen v. State of M. P. 7. Decisions cited in support, are Sabastian v. State1 Chand Roop v. State of Haryana2, State of Maharashtra v. Tukaram Baburao Mane3, K. V. Kunaappa v. The Food Inspector, Kannapuram Panchyyat4, Perumal and another v. Kumbakonam Municipality5, Ashok Trading Co. Katni v. Municipal Council, Katni6 and Devideen v. State of M. P. 7. In the same connection it is also pressed that the applicant-accused had not actually received the copy of the Public Analysts report with the requisite advance intimation regarding the exercise of his right for further analysis of the other sample by the Central Food Laboratory, as enjoined by Rule 9-A read with Section 13 (2) of the Act. Learned Government Advocate for the respondent-State has repelled the arguments advanced on the promise that Rule 9-A has to be held to be directory in nature, in the light of the dictum laid down in the recent Supreme Court Case Dalchand v. Municipal Corporation, Bhopal8 which, though relates to the object and scope of the old Rule 9 (j), is equally applicable in full measure for assessing the nature of the present Rule 9-A. ( 4 ) COMING to the question whether Rule 9-A is mandatory or directory, it may be observed that the Full Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court, in Kashmiri Lal v. State of Haryana9, is found to have taken the view in the context of old Rule 9 (j) that Rule 9-A is likewise directory and not mandatory (Also see Food Inspector Chalakudy Municipality and another v. Prahhakaran and others10, at Para 19, alluding to Punjab Full Bench decision for such a view ). It is apparent that this Full Bench decision had not been brought to the notice of the respective learned Judges of the Single Bench in all such particular cases, as have been relied on by the applicants learned counsel. This Full Bench view of the Punjab and Haryana High Court is equally found to be in consonance with the later Supreme Court decision in A. I. R. 1983 S. C. 303 (supra) which too is found to principally relate to Rule 9 (j), now omitted, in relation to Section 13 (2) of the Act. This Full Bench view of the Punjab and Haryana High Court is equally found to be in consonance with the later Supreme Court decision in A. I. R. 1983 S. C. 303 (supra) which too is found to principally relate to Rule 9 (j), now omitted, in relation to Section 13 (2) of the Act. Now, as hereafter discussed, a more cogent, sound and practical view in the light of the views expressed both in the Full Bench decision of Punjab and Haryana High Court and so also by the Supreme Court and further in the light of Kerala High Court Full Bench decision in 1983 (1) F. A. C. 84 (supra), appears to be that the present Rule 9-A is as directory in nature as old Rule 9 (j) was and the term immediately used in Rule 9-A has to be construed not in its literal sense with all its inflexible rigor and rigidity, but has to be used with due elasticity, according to the facts and circumstances of each case in the backdrop of consequent prejudice or otherwise, to the person prosecuted. ( 5 ) IT is worthwhile to reproduce the old Rule 9 (j) and the present Rule 9-A, before proceeding to consider the import and intent of the expression immediately to be more precise immediately after as used in Rule 9-A of Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules which has been substituted for Rule 9 (j) vide Notification No. GSR 4 (E) dated 4-1-77 w. e. f. 4-1-77: Rule 9 (j) to send by registered post. a copy of the report received in Form III from the Public Analyst to the person from whom the sample was taken within ten days of the receipt of the said report. However, in case the sample conforms to the provision of the Act or Rules made there under, then the person may be informed of the same and report need not be sent. (Emphasis provided) Rule 9-A. Local (Health) Authority to send report to person concerned. However, in case the sample conforms to the provision of the Act or Rules made there under, then the person may be informed of the same and report need not be sent. (Emphasis provided) Rule 9-A. Local (Health) Authority to send report to person concerned. The Local (Health) Authority shall immediately after the institution of prosecution forward a copy of the report of the result of analysis in form III delivered to him under sub-rule (3) of Rule 7 by registered post or by hand, as may be appropriate; to the person from whom the sample of the article was taken by the Food Inspector, and simultaneously also to the person, if any, whose name, address and, other particulars have been disclosed under Section 14-A of the Act. (Emphasis provided) ( 6 ) NOW, on going through the decisions cited by the applicants learned counsel, it is observed that some of these decisions, for construing the word immediate or immediately, have primarily relied on the definitions of these words as given in Lexicon Webster Dictionary Encyclopaedic Edition (Vol. I) at page 478 and Blacks Law Dictionary Fifth Edition at page 575 which have actually been reproduced, verbatim in Perumals case (supra), and on this basis, these rulings cited, have held Rule 9-A as mandatory the term immediately connoting atonce, without delay or forthwith. ( 7 ) CLOSE scrutiny of the recent Supreme Court decision in A. I. R. 1983 S. C. 303 (supra), dispells all confusion and doubt, if there be any, in the matter of principles to be kept in view for determining the nature of the particular provision of the Statute, the dictum as laid down in this decision in relation to Rule (j), now omitted, found to apply on all fours, for determining the nature of the new provision viz. Rule 9-A as to whether it is mandatory or directory. The following observations of his lordship 0. Chinappa Reddy J. in Dalchands case, deserve pertinent attention: There are no ready tests or invariable formulae to determine whether a provision is mandatory or directory. The broad purpose of the statute is important. The object of the particular provision must be considered. The link between the two is most important. The following observations of his lordship 0. Chinappa Reddy J. in Dalchands case, deserve pertinent attention: There are no ready tests or invariable formulae to determine whether a provision is mandatory or directory. The broad purpose of the statute is important. The object of the particular provision must be considered. The link between the two is most important. The weighing of the consequence of holding a provision to be mandatory or directory is vital and, more often than not, determinative of the very question whether the provision is mandatory or directory: Where the design of the statute is the avoidance or prevention of public mischief, but the enforcement of a particular provision literally to its letter will tend to defeat that design, the provision must be held to be directory, so that proof of prejudice in addition to non-compliance of the provision is necessary to invalidate the act complained of. Reiterating the well settled principle that quite often many rules, though couched in language which appear to be imperative, are no more than mere instructions to those entrusted with the task of discharging statutory duties for public benefits, his lordship has struck a modest note of warning and caution that the negligence of those to whom public duties are entrusted cannot, by statutory interpretation, be allowed to promote public mischief and cause public inconvenience and defeat the main object of the statute. With this note of caution, his lordship, further dwelling on the significance of period of ten days as situated in Rule 9 (j) has finally observed, to the following effect: It is as well to realize that every presumption of a period within which an act must be done, is not the prescription of a period of limitation with painful consequences if the act is not done within that period. Rule 9 (j) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, as it then stood, merely instructed the Food Inspector to send by registered post copy of the Public Analysts Report to the person from whom the sample was taken within 10 days of the receipt of the Report. Quite obviously the period of 10 days was not a period of limitation within which an action was to be initiated or on the expiry of which a vested right accrued. Quite obviously the period of 10 days was not a period of limitation within which an action was to be initiated or on the expiry of which a vested right accrued. The period of 10 days was prescribed with a view to expedition and with the object of giving sufficient time to the person from whom the sample was taken to make such arrangements as he might like to challenge the Report of the Public Analyst, for example, by making a request to the Magistrate to send the other sample to the Director of the Central Food Laboratory for analysis. Where the effect of noncompliance with the rule was such as to wholly deprive the right of the person to challenge the Public Analysts Report by obtaining the report of the Director of the Central Food Laboratory, there might be just cause for complaint, as prejudice would then be writ large. Where no prejudice was caused there could be no cause for complaint. I am clearly of the view that Rule 9 (j) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules was directory and not mandatory. It may also be stated that Kashmirilals case (supra) incidentally is also found to have taken a similar view with a forth right practical approach and with reasoning, in no way different from the one taken by the Supreme Court. ( 8 ) RULE 9 (j), now omitted, as well as Rule 9-A as now later substituted, are intrinsically connected with section 13 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, which too has under, gone a complete change by the Amending Act No. 34 of 1976, in the matter of procedure in relation to the Public Analysts report after the institution of the prosecution. The underlying purpose behind the amended provision of section 13 of the Act and also behind the substitution of Rule 9 (j) by Rule 9- A of PFA Rules, is obviously none other but to expedite the trial, to safeguard the interest of the persons prosecuted, and to minimise the chances of their harassment and equally so, to reduce the number of prosecutions by limiting them, only to genuine cases. The basic object of Rule 9 (j), now omitted, and of section 13, as it originally stood, is, in no way, in conflict with section 13 as now amended and the new Rule 9-A, except that, the amended provisions, now, are a step forward, to achieve the goal of expeditious trial and avoidance of harassment to the prosecuted persons, and with this end in view, the loopholes in the old provisions have been tried to be plugged, both in the interest of prosecution as well as the persons prosecuted. What is now contemplated by Rule 9-A read in connection with the amended section 13 of the Act, is that after the institution of the prosecution, the person prosecuted is made aware of the Public Analysts adverse report, so that, the person prosecuted, if he so chooses, may take appropriate steps, to defend himself by getting the sample of the article of food analyzed by the Central Food Laboratory at the earliest before the prosecution proceedings against him make any further head-way. Just as the period of ten days as stipulated in Rule 9 (j) for sending of the Public Analysts report by the Food Inspector to the vender, is not held by the Supreme Court to be any period of limitation within which, an action is 467 to be initiated or on the expiry of which a vested right accrues, the express immediately in the present Rule 9-A also does not connote any limitation period, non-observance of which, may have the effect of rendering the prosecution in fructuous or time barred. ( 9 ) IT may well be remembered, as of expressed by the legal realists and jurisprudential liberals that law is not a brooding omnipresence; and one must look at practical effects. Definitions are to be functional the laws words can have different meanings according to the purpose to be served. So with substance and procedure Charles Rembar, in his celebrated book The Law of the Land (publication Simon and Schuster New York) has quoted the realist analysis of Felix Frank further-famous teacher of the Law and prominent Justice of the Supreme Court, in these words: Matters of substance and matters of procedure are much talked about in the books as though they defined a great divide cutting across the whole domain of law. But, of course, substance and procedure are the same key words of very different problems. But, of course, substance and procedure are the same key words of very different problems. Neither substance nor procedure represents the lame invariants. Each implies different variables depending upon the particular problem for which it is used And so the question is not whether a statute of limitations is deemed a matter of procedure in some sense. The question is whether such statutory limitation is a matter of substance in the aspect that alone is relevant to our problem, namely, does it significantly affect the result. . . . ? ( 10 ) IDENTICAL approach is equally discerned in the salient observations in A. I. R. 1983 S C. 303 (supra), as quoted earlier. Keeping that in view, I am of the opinion that the term immediately as used in Rule 9-A is just relative term, quite flexible and elastic, with no definitive rigidity; and it has to be understood in the light of overall objective of the particular statute, both with regard to substance and procedure,-touch-stone, being always the result achieved or to be achieved. And as such, for purposes of the present statute viz, the PFA Act in relation to Rule 9-A read with section 13, the sole test would be whether or not, any prejudice has been caused to the person prosecuted, in face of the delay that may have been occasioned in forwarding to him the copy of the Public Analysts report by the local Health Authority. If the least minimum delay has the effect of irretrievable prejudice. Rule will be mandatory, if not, the Rule would apparently be directory. In case of articles of food, which are subject to fast deterioration and decomposition, a delay of few days may be fatal depriving the person prosecuted, to avail of the opportunity to get the other sample analyzed by the Central. Food Laboratory; while in case of other articles of food, which from their very nature, do not deteriorate and decompose so fast, delay of many days or even a few months in forwarding the copy of the Public Analysts report may not prove fatal at all to the detriment of the person concerned. Food Laboratory; while in case of other articles of food, which from their very nature, do not deteriorate and decompose so fast, delay of many days or even a few months in forwarding the copy of the Public Analysts report may not prove fatal at all to the detriment of the person concerned. Thus, the term immediately in Rule 9-A, being a relative and flexible term determinative according to exigencies and the nature of the article of food, conclusion appears to be irresistible that Rule 9-A is not mandatory, and is only directory in nature, in the same way as the old Rule 9 (j) was. ( 11 ) IT may equally be emphasized that it could never be the object or the statutes, like the present one viz, the PFA Act, relating to grave offences of anti-social nature affecting public health, to promote public mischief, by permitting the law-breakers to brazenly get away with the crime perpetrated, under the facade of hairsplitting gimmicks of hollow procedural technicalities. Provisions of such statutes have to be viewed as a legal realist in a broad spectrum, to sub serve the larger interest of Society, with due safeguards, of course, for protection of the innocent. ( 12 ) CONSIDERING equally the time schedule, envisaged in the scheme of the provisions of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and the Rules there under, more particularly, Rules 7 (3), 9-A, and 17 and Sections 11 (3), 13 (2) and 14-A, as has been elaborately discussed in paras 10 to 15 of 1983 (1) F. A. C. 84 (supra), Rule 9-A has to be treated simply as directory in nature and in no case, mandatory. ( 13 ) THEN again, even on considering the expressions immediately after as used in Rule 9-A in the context of the scheme of the statute, the view that this provision could be, and is, only directory and nothing beyond, is fortified by the following decisions, which are found to discuss and explain the true significance of this very expression, though in connection with certain other statutes. ( 14 ) IT has been observed in Umberger v. Koop, that immediately is not a word of precise signification and does not necessarily import the exclusion of all interval of time or space, but its meaning must be determined by the context in which it was used and the purpose for which the statute using the word was enacted, (Also see Hillside Land Co. v. North Bergen p. 12, Howell v. Gaddis13, John B. Stevens and Co. v. Frankfort Marine, Accident and Plate Glass Ins. Co. 14, Martin v. Pifer15, Chicago, B. and Q. R. R. v. Richardson Country16, Harmon v. Farm Bureau Mut Aulorpobile Ins. Co. 17. ( 15 ) IN Guerra v. State18, it is observed that, immediately is a term of relative significance which never designates an exact portion of time and is used with more or less latitude by universal consent, according to the subject to which it is applied. ( 16 ) IT has, again, been pertinently pointed out in Coburn v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Cc. 19, that provision that notice must be given immediately or forthwith or as soon as possible means that the notice must be given within a reasonable time under the circumstances of the case, and what is a reasonable time is a question of law when the facts are undisputed and the inferences certain, but where the facts are disputed or the inferences uncertain, it is a question for the jury. (Also see Commonwealth v. Mayhew20, People v. Mc Fadden21, Pybus v. Mitford22, Thompson v. Gibson23, R v. Aston24. Long Bell Petroleum Co. v. Hayes25. People v. Bjanda26 and State v. Bitz27. ( 17 ) THE term immediately has been interpreted to mean within reasonable time in Aetna Cas and Sur. Co. of Partford, Corp. v. Martin Ky. ,28 in connection with the notice of the claim to be forwarded by the insured to the insurer (See also State v. Aponymous, Com. P1. 29 ). ( 18 ) SOME of these pronouncements relate to the cases of issue of notices immediately after the happening of the particular event, as is the situation in the present case, where copy of the Public Analysts Report is required to be forwarded immediately after the institution of the prosecution. P1. 29 ). ( 18 ) SOME of these pronouncements relate to the cases of issue of notices immediately after the happening of the particular event, as is the situation in the present case, where copy of the Public Analysts Report is required to be forwarded immediately after the institution of the prosecution. ( 19 ) THUS, the words immediately after as found prefixed before the words institution of prosecution, in Rule 9-A connote simply this much, that the copy of the Public Analysts report has to be forwarded within such convenient time as maybe reasonably requisite for doing the thing or with reasonable promptness, having regard to all the circumstances of the particular case. The question what would be the reasonable time would, hence a question of fact in the backdrop of the particular circumstances of the case, the paramount consideration being one of Tprejudice to the person concerned and availability or otherwise of reasonable opportunity for exercising his particular right, without rendering the same nugatory or in fructuous. ( 20 ) HOLDING Rule 9-A, thus, as directory in nature, it is to be seen, in the instant case, whether there has been substantial compliance of this Rule within the broad based scope of the term im mediately after as mentioned in this Rule. ( 21 ) THE unchallenged testimony of P. W. 1 Food Inspector Shrivastava shows that the Local (Health) Authority had sent the copy of the Public Analysts report to the applicant accused by registered post, the other copy having been received by him too, vide endorsement No. 749 dated 21-12-1981. B-File of the record of the trial Court contains at page 16, the copy of the notice dated 17-12-1979, sent to the applicant-accused with copy of Public Analysts report annexed. This notice is also found to direct the applicant-accused to make an application to the Court within a period of ten days from the dale of the recorded to the copy of the report, to get the sample of the article analysed by the Central Food Laboratory, as is enjoined by Sub-section (2) of Section 13 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. Considering the scheme of the Statute, mention of period of ten days in Sub-section (2) of Section 13, and then again, mention of period of five days in Subsection (2-A) ibid, appear, likewise, to be directory, requiring compliance, only within a reasonable time as circumstances may permit, with no literal rigidity connoting any limitation-period. At page 17 of B-File of the record of the trial Court, one finds the postal receipt dated 17-12-1979 evidencing the despatch of the registered letter to the applicant-accused. Thus, the factum of forwarding of the copy of the Public Analysts report together with the requisite intimation, by registered post on 17-12-1919, is found to be duty proved. Rule 9-A enjoins only the forwarding of the Public Analysts report which obviously has been duly complied with in the instant case, and as such, it is absolutely immaterial, whether or not, the applicant-accused had actually received the same. ( 22 ) NOW, prosecution, in the instant case is found to be instituted on 29-11-1979. Forwarding of the copy of the Public Analysts report being of the date 17-12-1979, the time gap between the institution of the prosecution and the forwarding of the report is 18 days. Anyway, this gap of 18 days is not found to cause any prejudice, whatsoever, to the applicant-accused; for, it did not deprive him. of the opportunity to move the Court for getting the other Sample of the article viz. Soyabean oil, examined further, by the Central Food Laboratory. ( 23 ) IT may also be remembered that before the prosecution could progress any further, for evidence before the charge, the copy of the Public Analysts report had already been forwarded to him. Soyabean oil, being not such a article of food which, like milk and other articles, could deteriorate and decompose fast, the gap of 18 days could not be construed as such delay which could frustrate the, exercise of the applicant-accuseds right in getting the said sample further analyzed by the Central Food. Laboratory. Soyabean oil, being not such a article of food which, like milk and other articles, could deteriorate and decompose fast, the gap of 18 days could not be construed as such delay which could frustrate the, exercise of the applicant-accuseds right in getting the said sample further analyzed by the Central Food. Laboratory. The expression immediately therefore, being a flexibly and relative term, open for construction according to the nature of the article and the other attending circumstances, the time-lag of 18 days in the instant case of Soyabean oil, is apparently covered within the company of immediately showing, thus, substantial compliance of Rule 9-A. ( 24 ) THE further fad that despite the for warding of the copy of the Public Analysts report even after 18 days of the institution of the prosecution, the applicant-accused too did not choose, any time whatsoever during the course of trial, to move the Court for getting the other sample analyzed by the Central Food Laboratory, is another circumstance, negativing the contention of the applicants learned counsel regarding deprivation of his any such right. Lack of any action on the applicants part in this regard did not entitle him to raise any grievance regarding any prejudice caused to him by depriving him of this right under Section 13 (2) of the Act. (See Ramdhan Singh v. State of ( 25 ) VIEWED from another angle too, the applicant-accused can have no scope for grievance in the matter of compliance of Rule 9-A. Rule 9-A permits delivery of the copy of the Public Analysts report by hand also. Trial Courts order-sheet dated 29-11-1979 shows that it had directed the delivery of copies of all documents to the applicant-accused. The written complaint on record, for instituting prosecution on record, shows the list, of documents annexed, including the copy of the Public Analysts report. Remarks Column of this order-sheet shows the applicants learned counsels signatures with endorsement copy received indicating thereby that he had received all such copies, as the trial Court had specifically directed to be furnished. Had the applicants learned counsel, not received the copy of the Public Analysts report, he would have naturally protested in this regard. Remarks Column of this order-sheet shows the applicants learned counsels signatures with endorsement copy received indicating thereby that he had received all such copies, as the trial Court had specifically directed to be furnished. Had the applicants learned counsel, not received the copy of the Public Analysts report, he would have naturally protested in this regard. Thus, delivery of the copy of the Public Analysts report on the date and at the time of the institution of the prosecution, is equally found to satisfy the requirement of Rule 9-A, so far as the term immediately as mentioned therein is concerned, (see 1981 (1) F. A. C. 47 (supra ). ( 26 ) THUS, the arguments, pressed by the applicants learned counsel, being without any substance, and the sample of Soyabean oil sold to the Food Inspector being proved to be adulterated, the order of conviction as passed by the Courts below, does not call for any interference. The sentence too, as awarded, is quite appropriate in the circumstances. ( 27 ) THE accuseds revision, hence, is dismissed and the order of conviction and sentence as passed against him by the lower appellate, Court, is maintained in toto. The applicant accused, do immediately surrender to his bail for undergoing the sentence, as awarded. Revision dismissed. .