Judgment LALIT MOHAN SHARMA, J. 1. In this writ case, the question for decision is whether the first proviso to Sec. 57-A (1) of the Bihar State Universities Act, 1976 is unconstitutional on the ground that it infringes the fundamental right of the minorities based on religion or language guaranteed under Art.30 of the Constn. The writ application has been filed on behalf of Karim City College, Jamshedpur, through its Governing Body and its Principal. The College is admittedly a minority institution and has been so recognised by the University as indicated by its letter, Annexure 1. 2. The respondent No. 3 was a lecturer in the college and his services were terminated by the Governing Body after initiating a disciplinery proceeding. He moved the Bihar College Service Commission (Respondent No. 2) against this order and the Commission, by the impugned order in Annexure 7 held that the decision about the termination of the petitioners service having not been taken with the approval of the Commission was entirely illegal and cannot be accepted as valid and the respondent No. 3 must be deemed to continue in service. The Commission also sent a letter, Annexure 8, to the Governing Body insisting upon the requirement of such approval. The petitioners have by the present application, challenged the order in Annexure 7. 3. Sec.57-A (1) leaving out the second Proviso which is not relevant is in the following terms: "57A (1). Appointment of teachers of affiliated colleges, not maintained by the State Government shall be made by the Governing Body on the recommendation of the College Service Commission. Dismissal, termination, removal, retirement from service or demotion in rank of teachers of such colleges shall be done by the Governing Body in consultation with the College Service Commission in the manner prescribed by the statutes: Provided that the Governing Bodies of affiliated minority colleges based on religion and language shall appoint, dismiss, remove or terminate the services of teachers or take disciplinary action against them with the approval of the College Service Commission." According to the case of the respondents, minority colleges are governed by the Provo quoted above and not by the main sub-section (1). The question for decision is whether this provision infringes the fundamental right of the minorities. 4. The decisions dealing with the meaning and scope of Art.30 are numerous. The question for decision is whether this provision infringes the fundamental right of the minorities. 4. The decisions dealing with the meaning and scope of Art.30 are numerous. The first important decision given by the Supreme Court is in re: Kerala Education Bill, 1957. ( AIR 1958 SC 956 ). Later the article was considered at considerable length by a Bench of nine Judges in Ahmedabad St. Xavier College V/s. State of Gujarat ( AIR 1974 SC 1389 ). The position appears to be well settled that while the right of the minorities to establish and administer edurational institutions of their choice cannot be violated, the reasonable restrictions by way of regulations for the purpose of ensuring educational standards can be legally placed. As was observed in All Saints High School V/s. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh ( AIR 1980 SC 1042 ), the conditions of service which prescribed minimum qualification for the staff, their pay scales and laying down of sefeguard which must be observed before they are removed from the service, are permissible measures of a regulatory character. These measures are adopted for improving and maintaining the educational standards of the institutions themselves. The question arises as to whether the impugned provision as contained in the proviso to Sec.57-A (1) can be upheld as a permissible regulatary measure. 5. The Proviso challenged in the present case appears to be similar to several provisions which were considered in All Saints High School V/s. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh ( AIR 1980 SC 1042 ). Certain sections of the Andhra Pradesh Recognised Private Educational Institutions Control Act were challenged in their applicability to minority institutions and I propose to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in respect to Secs.3 (1) and 3 (2) of the Act. Sec.3 (1) provided that the service of a teacher employed in any private institution shall not be terminated except with the prior approval of the competent authority and in case of a contravention of this provision, the affected teacher shall be deemed to continue in service, Sec.3 (2) stated that where the proposal to terminate the service of a teacher is communicated to the competent authority, that authority shall, if it is satisfied that there were adequate and reasonable grounds for such proposal, shall approve it. The Supreme Court by majority opinion held Ss.3 (1) and 3 (2) to be violative of Art.30 of the Constn, and, therefore, not applicable to the minority institutions. Mr. Justice Murtaza Fazal Ali observed that the State or any other authority cannot under cover of adopting regulatory measures destroy the administrative autonomy of the minority institutions or to interfere with the core of the management of the institution so as to render the right of administration of management nugatory or illusory. It is the inherent and fundamental right of the institution to deal with its employees or teachers and take necessary action against them. The State could have taken care to make proper rules giving sufficient powers to the management in the manner it was to act and which was not done. The induction of the outside authority over the head of the institution and making its decision final and binding on the institution was an interference which could not be upheld. Chief Justice Chandrachud agreed with the conclusion of Mr. Justice Murtaza Fazal Ali so far as these two sub-sections were concerned. The Chief Justice was invited by the respondent to read down Ss.3 (1) and 3 (2) so as to preserve their universal application, but the suggestion was rejected. Mr. Additional Advocate General, appearing on behalf of the State in the present case also attempted to save the impugned Proviso by a similar argument. He contended that the Statutes framed under Sec.59 read with Sec.34 of the Universities Act give adequate guidelines for the exercise of power by the College Service Commission. 5A. It was pointed out by Mr. Basudeva Prasad, appearing for the petitioner, that no Statutes have been framed after Sec.57A was inserted in the Act by an amending Act. The Statutes are coming for a long time and do not purport to give any guideline for the exercise of the power of the Commission under the impugned Proviso. Mr. Additional Advocate General was not able to place before us any Statute in this regard. On the other hand, it may be observed that while the Statutes are referred to in the main part of sub-sec.(1) as applying to the Colleges in general, such a reference is omitted in the Proviso. Mr. Additional Advocate General was not able to place before us any Statute in this regard. On the other hand, it may be observed that while the Statutes are referred to in the main part of sub-sec.(1) as applying to the Colleges in general, such a reference is omitted in the Proviso. In view of the language of the Proviso, which does not put any limitation on the power of the Commission, it is not possible to read it down as suggested. 6. Mr. Sarojendu Mukherji, appearing for the respondent No. 2, urged that since the Commission is a high powered authority, consisting of six members, it must be presumed that it could not be interfering with the decision of the Governing Body on, unjustified grounds. Referring to the decision in The Ahmedabad St. Xaviers College Society V/s. State of Gujarat ( AIR 1974 SC 1389 ), Mr. Mukherji suggested that a distinction in the present case from a case where the power of interference is given to a single person should be made. I am afraid, the power of an outside authority to interfere with the management of a minority institution cannot be upheld on the ground that the authority is constituted of several respectable members. 7. Mr. A.K. Lal appearing for the respondent Not. 3 adopted the argument addressed by Mr. Additional Advocate General and added that when respondent No. 3 was appointed in the college, it was not a minority college and it was only in 1971 that it was recognised as such by Annexure 1. There is no such averment in any of the affidavits filed by the respondents. It was, therefore, not possible to allow the respondent No. 3 to urge this point. Mr. Lal attempted to build his argument on the basis of the letter, Annexure 1, sent by the Deputy Registrar of the University to the Principal of the college informing him that the Syndicate in its meeting held on 30-8-1979 recognised the college as one established by minority community. There is no merit in this contention. It has to be observed that the college was not clothed with the character of a minority institution by Annexure 1 - the letter merely recongnised the minority status of the college. It must, therefore, be presumed that the college must be coming as a minority institution from before. 8. There is no merit in this contention. It has to be observed that the college was not clothed with the character of a minority institution by Annexure 1 - the letter merely recongnised the minority status of the college. It must, therefore, be presumed that the college must be coming as a minority institution from before. 8. For the reasons mentioned above I hold that the first Proviso to Sec. 57A (1) is ultra vires being violative of Art.30 and the impugned order in Annexure 7 is consequently without jurisdiction and fit to be quashed. As observed above, it has not been claimed by any of the respondents that the main part of sub-section (1) of S.57A applies to minority institutions. 9. The writ application is accordingly allowed and the order in Annexure 7 is quashed. There will be no order as to costs. A.P.SINHA, J. 10 I agree.