ORDER For failure to pay the contributions (both employees’ and employer’s shares) and to pay the administrative changes for 6 months, six separate complaints were filed by the Provident Fund Inspector against the petitioners under S. 14(1A) read with S. 14A(1) of the Employees’ Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') Similar six prosecutions were launched for the same six months (December, 1978 to May, 1979) for failure to pay the deposit linked insurance fund contributions and to pay the administrative charges, under 14(1B) read with S. 14(A1) of the Act. As admittedly all these 12 prosecutions were barred by limitation under S. 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the complainant filed identical applications in all the 12 cases praying for condonation of delay in filing the complaints. To appreciate the contentions raised on behalf of the parties in these 12 revisional applications arising out of those 12 complaints, it will be necessary to reproduce the grounds taken in the application for condonation of the delay, which are contained in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the application and read as follows : “1. That according to the present system P.F. contributions are deposited by parties with the State Bank and the E.P.F. Department receive the information of such deposits only when the Bank or the party send a copy of the Challan to the P.F. Department. In case of non-deposit of contributions there is no means for the E.P.F. Department to know the default unless it is verified by inspection of the Books of the defaulting establishment and thereafter proceeding under S 7A of the E.P.F. Act, was started. This takes a very long time. 2. That in the present case the default was detected and proceeding under S 7A were started on 18.6.79 and demand notice issued on 14.3.80” 2. The learned Magistrate condoned the delay provisionally and took cognizance of those complaints and issued process against the petitioners. After entering appearance the petitioners filed applications in the 12 cases contending that the learned Magistrate was not justified in condoning the delay on the grounds urged by the complainant and as such the cognizance was bad. By identical orders the learned Magistrate rejected the said applications of the petitioners and hence these revisional applications. 3. Mr. After entering appearance the petitioners filed applications in the 12 cases contending that the learned Magistrate was not justified in condoning the delay on the grounds urged by the complainant and as such the cognizance was bad. By identical orders the learned Magistrate rejected the said applications of the petitioners and hence these revisional applications. 3. Mr. Dipak Kumar Sengupta, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners, submitted that that the time consumed in disposing of a proceeding under S. 7A of the Act could not be considered a valid ground for condoning the delay as such proceeding had no relevance for prosecution under S. 14 of the Act. Mr. Taher Ali, who appeared on behalf of the complainant in some of the cases, submitted that without initiating a proceeding under S 7A of the Act it could not be ascertained what was the actual amount due from the employers and without such ascertainment prosecution under S. 14 of the Act could not be launched. Mr. Poddar, learned Advocate appearing for the complainant in the other cases, however, contended that though a proceeding under S. 7A of the Act was not a prerequisite for initiating a prosecution under S. 14 of the Act, such determination was felt necessary to give an opportunity to the defaulting employer to payoff the dues by a certain date, and to avoid prosecution. 4. The contention of Mr. Ali cannot be accepted as the determination of the actual amount of the contributions has nothing to do with the default in payment of the contributions within the statutory period. In other words, once an employer fails to pay the contributions within the time statutorily fixed, he violates the provision of the Act and renders himself liable for prosecution and such a prosecution is not dependent upon the quantum of the contributions. That the complainant is fully aware of this position has been made abundantly clear by the averments made in paragraphs 1 and 2 quoted above, wherein it has been specifically stated then after the default was detected, the proceeding under S 7A was started. That the complainant is fully aware of this position has been made abundantly clear by the averments made in paragraphs 1 and 2 quoted above, wherein it has been specifically stated then after the default was detected, the proceeding under S 7A was started. Once the default is detected, time will run for the purpose of Ss 468 and 409 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and consequently it can not be said that the proceeding under S 7A of the Act is essentially required for prosecuting the employer under S 14A of the Act. 5. The contention of Mr. Poddar, that the prosecuting authority may in a given case decide that if the contributions are paid by the defaulting employer after the amount is determined, thereby sparing the authority from initiating the long drawn procedure for realisation of the money as arrears of land revenue, it would not launch any prosecution and may accordingly ask the employer to pay the determined amount by a stipulated date to avoid such prosecution is however of much substance. But then, the applications for condonation of delay do pot disclose any such decision of the prosecuting authority. In fact, the applications only contain the bald statement that the proceedings were started on June 18, 1979 and demand notice was issued on 14.3.80. In absence of any averment therein that the proceedings were initiated to give an opportunity to the petitioners to pay the arrears and that in case of payment no prosecution would be launched, I am unable to hold that the prosecution made out a bona fide case for condonation of the delay in the instant cases. Be it mentioned, that it is admitted that if the time consumed in the proceedings under S. 7A of the Act is not excluded, the complaints would be barred by limitation. 6. For the foregoing discussions, the applications succeed and the impugned proceedings are hereby quashed. The Rules are accordingly made absolute. Rules made absolute.