Judgment :- 1. The short question which arises for consideration is whether the petitioner is entitled to be paid for the periods between the dates of notional promotion and the dates of actual promotion to the grades in question. The petitioner was notionally promoted as Assistant Taluk Supply Officer with effect from 13-2-1968, although.she was actually promoted and worked in that post only as from 16-6-1970. Subsequently she was promoted as Taluk Supply Officer and actually-worked in that post as from 11-4-1972, although in the integrated seniority list of Taluk Supply Officers and Assistant Taluk Supply Officers, as on 1-8-1975, she is shown to have been notionally promoted with effect from 21-7-1971. The question, therefore, is whether the petitioner is entitled to receive arrears of salary for the notional service between 13-2-1968 and 16-6-1970 as Assistant Taluk Supply Officer and 21-7-1971 to 11-4-1972 as Taluk Supply Officer after deducting the salaries paid to her for the work she actually rendered in the lower grades. 2. The petitioner's counsel Shri. K. Sudhakaran, relying upon certain observations of a Division Bench of this Court in O. P. No. 4125 of 1977 and the judgment of V. Khalid, J. in Narayana Menon v. State of Kerala (1978 KLT. 29) to which the Division Bench made a reference with approval, contends that a person cannot be denied salary for the period covered by notional promotion although on account of mistake or negligence on the part of the Government he was not allowed to work in the post. 3. The question which arose in Narayana Menon v. State of Kerala (1978 KLT. 29; O. P. No. 2655 of 1975) has to be understood in the context of an earlier judgment of this Court. Narayana Menon, the petitioner in O. P. No. 2655 of 1975, had earlier approached this Court in O.P. No. 2761 of 1964 complaining of denial of promotion and salary. By the time that case was taken up for hearing, Narayana Menon had retired. Disposing of that case, P. Govindan Nair, J. (as he then was) observed: "Since the petitioner did not admittedly function as an Upper Division Clerk before the Order dated 14-10-1963, Ext. P-2, was passed, the petitioner may not be entitled to salary as an Upper Division Clerk up to that date. In any view it is a matter for the State Government to decide. P-2, was passed, the petitioner may not be entitled to salary as an Upper Division Clerk up to that date. In any view it is a matter for the State Government to decide. But, if he was entitled to promotion on an earlier date, there is no reason at all why his salary as on 14-10-1963 should not be fixed as if he had been promoted on 1-4-1955" After referring to a decision of the Mysore High Court in N.H. Bellary v. The State of Mysore (1962 Mysore 146) which was upheld by the Supreme Court in State of Mysore v. M.H. Bellary (AIR. 1965 S. C. 868). Govindan Nair, J. concluded: "In any view of the matter, it is essential that the salary of the petitioner is fixed with reference to the date on which he would have been promoted, had his name been included in the list at the appropriate time. The petitioner has now retired from service and such fixation is necessary for the purpose of deciding the quantum of the pension payable to him. So I direct that calculation be made of the salaries he should have drawn had he been promoted at the relevant time as envisaged by Ext. P-2 order and the salaries so calculated will be taken to be the salaries for the purpose of determining bis pension." It is thus clear that that Original Petition was disposed of with a direction to determine the salary which the petitioner would have received immediately before his retirement had he been appointed to the higher post at the appropriate time. This direction was made for the purpose of determining the pension payable to the officer. The petitioner in that case was, however, not satisfied with the direction made by the learned judge. Accordingly he approached this Court with W. A. No. 124 of 1966 contending that the Government ought to have been directed to pay him the arrears of salary for the period from the date on which he should have been promoted and the date on which he was actually promoted. Accordingly he approached this Court with W. A. No. 124 of 1966 contending that the Government ought to have been directed to pay him the arrears of salary for the period from the date on which he should have been promoted and the date on which he was actually promoted. Disposing of that appeal after noting that Narayana Menon proposed to move the Government for relief in respect of the difference in salary which he claimed for the aforesaid period, a Division Bench of this Court said: " If the appellant is aggrieved by the orders which the Government pass in the matter, the appellant will be at liberty to move the Court for relief, if so advised." Since Narayana Menon did not get any answer from the Government, he approached this Court again with O.P. No. 2655 of 1975. In the mean time the Government passed an order stating that he was not entitled to salary for the period of his notional promotion. He was, however, given'fixation benefits'. Referring to the background of that case, Khalid, J. stated: "Before adverting to the authorities cited at the Bar, I would like to observe that no one can be penalised for no fault of his. Suppose a Government servant was reverted illegally or his services wrongly terminated and such reversion or termination is subsequently held to be wrong by a court of law and he is directed to be promoted or reinstated, could it be contended that such Government servant is not entitled to the remuneration for the period during which he was under illegal reversion or illegal termination. The Government cannot take advantage of a mistake committed by them or an order passed by them in illegal exercise of their power" (emphasis supplied) We refer to this observation to show that we are in agreement with the general principle stated by the learned judge. However, having stated thus. Khalid, J. proceeded to consider whether that principle would apply to the facts of that case. However, having stated thus. Khalid, J. proceeded to consider whether that principle would apply to the facts of that case. He held: What the petitioner got was not a notional promotion and it is wrong to call this promotion as 'notional' in the context of the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case" (emphasis supplied) Having come to that conclusion on the basis of the 'peculiar facts and circumstances' which arose in that case, Khalid, J. held that the petitioner was entitled to succeed and the Government was directed to pay the amount due to him as arrears for the period in question. 4. It was to this judgment that the Division Bench in O.P. No. 4125 of 1977, made reference with approval. Referring to the principle stated by Khalid, J. which we have extracted above, the Division Bench stated: "This is a principle stated by our learned brother Khalid, J. in Narayana Menon v. State of Kerala (1978 KLT. 29), a principle concerning which we could not see how any exception could be taken 'We have not been shown the support of any rule or logic to deny the benefit of the salary to the person so promoted" 5. It has to be noticed that the question which arose before the Division Bench was as regards the right of a person to receive salary for the period when he actually worked. In that case the petitioner had been notionally promoted as a High School Assistant with effect from 23-11-1959. But he was actually promoted and worked as HSA only as from 8-11-1966. He claimed arrears of salary for the period subsequent to 8-11-1966. The only relief which he sought in that proceeding was therefore for arrears for the period when he actually worked, and not for the anterior period covered by the notional promotion. The general observation of the Division Bench disposing of that Original Petition must, therefore, be understood in the light of the general principle stated by Khalid, J. in 1978 KLT. 29 as regards the right of a person who was unlawfully prevented from working by an illegal order of the Government, and also with reference to the relief sought by the petitioner before the Division Bench in O.P. No. 4125 of 1977. 29 as regards the right of a person who was unlawfully prevented from working by an illegal order of the Government, and also with reference to the relief sought by the petitioner before the Division Bench in O.P. No. 4125 of 1977. It would not be correct to attribute a wider meaning -- applicable in a wider sphere -- to the observation of the Division Bench. Their observation has to be understood as applicable solely to the reliefs sought by the petitioner. Understood in that limited sense, the decision would be consistent with an earlier decision of the Supreme Court in 5. Krishnamoorthy v General Manager, Southern Rly., (1976)4 S.C.C. 825, which was apparently not referred to or noticed by the Division Bench. 6. In the view we take of the observation of the Division Bench, notwithstanding the submissions of the petitioner's counsel to the contrary, the Division Bench did not express or intend to express any view on the wider question which arises for consideration in the present case, that is, whether or not it can be stated, as a general proposition of law, that a person is entitled to be paid for the period of notional promotion when he did not actually work in the post to which he was so promoted. In the circumstances, we are of the view that the decision, of the Division Bench does not stand in the way of an independent consideration of the question arising in the present case. 7. A distinction must be drawn between cases where a person was unlawfully prevented from working or denied or deprived of his rightful place as a result of an illegal order, the illegality of which was declared by a competent court or is demonstrably manifest and voluntarily admitted by the employer on the one hand, and on the other, cases of bona fide or innocent errors, which means errors not unreasonably and wilfully or maliciously committed by the employer. (See the principle stated by Lord Denning M.R. in Education Sec. v. Tameside, (1976)3 WLR. 641, 652-653). (See the principle stated by Lord Denning M.R. in Education Sec. v. Tameside, (1976)3 WLR. 641, 652-653). In the case of the former, the declaration or admission of illegality may, in given circumstances, wipe out the break in service or the offending act altogether as if it never occurred, and the employee may be entitled to the full benefits of the service which he is in law deemed to have rendered uninterruptedly in the grade in which he was entitled to be. That is not so in the latter where a bona fide error of omission in an otherwise valid order made within jurisdiction is subsequently corrected 8. The decision of the Supreme Court in The State of Mysore v. M. H. Bellary (AIR. 1965 SC. 868) relied on by Khalid, J., was a case where a person who went on deputation was denied his rightful place when he returned to the parent department. The Supreme Court held that an officer reverting to the parent department is at once entitled to be placed in the time scale at the point at which he would have reached, and to the promotions which he would have received, on the basis of seniority-cum-merit, had he not left the parent department. The Court rejected the contention of the State that "an officer who after serving on deputation is reverted to his parent department is entitled to nothing more than the increments allowable in the time scale applicable to the substantive appointment which he held at the time of the transfer." The Court stated: The service of an officer on deputation in another department is treated by the rule as equivalent to service in the parent department and it is this equation between the services in the two departments that forms the basis of R.50 (b). So long therefore as the service of the employee in the new department is satisfactory and he is obtaining the increments and promotions in that department, it stands to reason that that satisfactory service, and the manner of its discharge in the post he actually fills, should be deemed to be rendered in the parent department also so as to entitle him to promotions which are open on seniority¬cum-merit basis...." The principle of this decision is that an officer reverting to the parent department has to be restored to the position which he would have occupied had he not been sent on deputation. From the time of reversion he has to be paid all the emoluments attached to the post which he has a right to occupy. This is Warranted by the relevant rule which was considered by the Supreme Court. 9. It must be remembered that the Supreme Court was dealing with a case of reversion of an officer after deputation and no question arose for payment of any arrears for the period anterior to the date of reversion. The claim related only to the posterior period (See AIR. 1962 Mysore 146 from which AIR. 1965 SC. 868 arose). The claim of the petitioner before Khalid, J. was of a different nature. What the petitioner wanted was arrears of salary for the period between the date of notional promotion, i.e., 1-4-1955 and the date of substantive promotion, i.e., 14-10-1963. While the Supreme Court dealt with the case of an officer whose only contention was that he should, on reversion to the parent department, be appointed to the post to which he was in law entitled to reach had he not been deputed and be paid the salary therefor as from the date of reversion; the petitioner before Khalid, J. claimed salary for the period he did not work in the post to which he was only notionally promoted. In the former case, the officer actually worked in the department to which he was attached on deputation and was paid therefor, and that service, being equated to the service in the parent department, was counted towards his service in the parent department for the purpose of increments and promotion. Yet no question arose for arrears for the period anterior to reversion. Yet no question arose for arrears for the period anterior to reversion. In the case before Khalid, J. the petitioner did not work in any equated post; but was, like the officer in the Supreme Court case, compensated by the Government for the wrong placement by giving him increments and promotions. But his further contention for excess salary which he would have drawn in the higher post had he been substantively-and not notionally-promoted on the earlier date does not derive any support from any of the Supreme Court decisions cited at the bar. 10. The petitioner's counsel has referred to cases where a person, on account of disciplinary proceedings, was prevented from working by an order of suspension, or, reversion or termination by dismissal, removal or otherwise, and the illegality of the order was either declared or admitted. In all those cases it was held that a person who was the victim of such an illegal order should not be penalised by denying him the salary and other benefits which he would have earned had he not been subjected to the vice of that order. See for ex. the decision of the Supreme Court in Devendra Pratap v. State of Uttar Pradesh (AIR. 1962 SC. 1334) where the illegality was declared by a civil court, or, in State of Bihar v. Abdul Majid (AIR. 1954 SC. 245) where the illegality was admitted by the employer himself. These are in fact the cases which Khalid, J. bad in mind when he observed that a person who was prevented from working by an illegal order of the Government shall not be denied his salary. To this effect one of us (Kochu Thommen, J.) held in Joseph v. State of Kerala (1976 KLT. 607): ....If the petitioner's services had not been thus unjustifiably terminated, he would have been in service and would have been working for the entire period. It was by a wrong action on the part of the Government that the petitioner had been prevented from working. It was so declared by this Court and the decision was not challenged. 607): ....If the petitioner's services had not been thus unjustifiably terminated, he would have been in service and would have been working for the entire period. It was by a wrong action on the part of the Government that the petitioner had been prevented from working. It was so declared by this Court and the decision was not challenged. Having thus accepted the decision of this Court on this point as final, the Government cannot now say that it is entitled to take advantage of a wrong action and deny the petitioner his salary for the period during which he was willing to work but was unjustifiably kept out of service." Apparently it was with reference to that principle that the Division Bench made the general observation relied on by the petitioner's counsel. 11. The petitioner's counsel has placed before us certain decisions of "the Punjab High Court. Charan Dass v. State, of Punjab, 1980 (3) SLR. 702, supports the petitioner's claim for arrears. In that case the learned judge relied on the decision of the same High Court in K. K Jaggia v. State of Haryana (1972 (1) SLR. 578) where it was held, as in Devendra Pratap v. State of Uttar Pradesh (AIR. 1962 SC. 1334), that a person who had been dismissed by an illegal order and reinstated in service subsequently was entitled to be paid arrears of salary, etc. The learned judge also referred to a decision of the Mysore High Court in B. S. Bhima Rao v. State of Mysore, 1970 SLR. 198 which was again a case of suspension consequent upon an illegal order. The facts in Charan Dass v. State of Punjab (1980 (3) SLR. 702), as in the present case, do not, in our view, warrant the application of the principle followed in 1972 (1) SLR.578 or in 1970 SLR. 190, for there was no question of any illegal order preventing the officer from working. With great respect, we do not agree with the general observation contained in 1980 (3) SLR. 702. Nor do we think that the subsequent decisions of the Punjab High Court in D.P. Singla v. State of Punjab (1983 (1) SLR, 648) and in Asha Rani v. State of Haryana (1983 (1) SLR. 400), relied on by the petitioner, advance his case. Again Jagmohan Lal v. State of Haryana, 1981 (3) SLR. 702. Nor do we think that the subsequent decisions of the Punjab High Court in D.P. Singla v. State of Punjab (1983 (1) SLR, 648) and in Asha Rani v. State of Haryana (1983 (1) SLR. 400), relied on by the petitioner, advance his case. Again Jagmohan Lal v. State of Haryana, 1981 (3) SLR. 425 (Punjab), which was a case of termination and reinstatement, and K.M. Subramaniam . State, AIR. 1971 Mad. 202, which was a case of reversion that was declared illegal, do not, for the reasons stated by us, help the petitioner. 12. We have already referred to S. Krishnamoorthy v. General Manager, Southern Rly, (1976) 4 S.C.C. 825. In that case the Supreme Court held that the officer was entitled to be appointed to the cadre of Traffic Inspector. The Court directed that he should be appointed with effect from the date on which he approached the High Court with his grievance, that is, December 20, 1967. But the Court stated that, for the purpose of fitment, his service in that cadre as from 1-1-1959 should be taken into account. Speaking for the court, this is what Krishna Iyer, J. stated: "...Plainly put, he will be drawing a salary on December 20,1967 on the basis of a notional appointment as traffic inspector as on January 1,1959" The Court then went on to say: "...We make it clear that while seniority is being notionally extended to him from January 1, 1959, the appellant will not be entitled to any salary qua traffic inspector prior to December 20,1967" The Court thus categorically denied his claim for salary for the notional period of his appointment, but held that as from December 20,1967 when he approached the High Court he was entitled to be substantively absorbed into the cadre and receive salary. 13. This is the decision of the Supreme Court which, as we stated earlier, would conflict with the observation of the Division Bench in O. P. No. 4125 of 1977, unless the latter is read in the context of the issues, and confined to the facts, of that case. We are fortified in saying so because all that the Division Bench has finally stated in the operative part of the judgment is: "...We therefore allow the Original petition and direct that the petitioner's pay be refixed in the grade of High School Assistant in accordance with Ext. We are fortified in saying so because all that the Division Bench has finally stated in the operative part of the judgment is: "...We therefore allow the Original petition and direct that the petitioner's pay be refixed in the grade of High School Assistant in accordance with Ext. P5...." 14. If the decision of the Division Bench is so understood, it would be in perfect harmony with R.23 of the Kerala Service Rules which says: "23(a) Subject to any exceptions specifically made in these rules, an officer shall begin to draw the pay and allowances attached to his tenure of a post with effect from the date he assumes the duties of that post, and shall cease to draw them as soon as he ceases to discharge those duties" (emphasis supplied) 15. It is, therefore, clear that, subject to certain exceptional cases, no government servant is entitled to be paid for work which he has not done. The case of a person kept out of work or denied or deprived of his rightful place by an illegal order which upon the declaration or admission of its illegality becomes wholly destitute of legal efficacy is one of the exceptions. Another exception is where the authority has acted malevolently such as where the authority is shown to have deliberately and wilfully denied the officer his due promotion or other benefits with intent to injure him or where the authority has in disobedience of a direction of a competent court, denied the officer what has been held to be his due: in all such cases different considerations arise. 16. There may be cases, where on account of some mistake in the. method of reckoning a person's length of service, seniority and the like -- innocent errors which are not uncommon in matters of administration - - the authority makes an honest attempt to do justice to the concerned officers by proper readjustment of promotions and ranks. A person so rewarded cannot justifiably claim salary for the period when he actually did not work in the higher post, albeit for no fault of his. This is, unavoidable and, absent malice, it must be endured with grace. Any other view would not only impose an undue burden on the economy of the State, but might even considerably inhibit any honest endeavour to redeem the plight of the officers whose promotions have been innocently overlooked. 17. This is, unavoidable and, absent malice, it must be endured with grace. Any other view would not only impose an undue burden on the economy of the State, but might even considerably inhibit any honest endeavour to redeem the plight of the officers whose promotions have been innocently overlooked. 17. The petitioner has no case that the authorities have acted less than honestly or fairly. The petitioner was heard before the integrated seniority list of Taluk Supply Officers and Assistant Taluk Supply Officers as on 1-8-1975 was finalised. The finalisation of the list was on the basis of various representations made by parties as well as the guidelines and principles laid down by this Court in O. P. No. 396 of 1978 and connected cases. It is by a proper application of the mind and with the utmost care and caution that the final list was prepared in which various dates have been assigned to the officers. No authority can claim that the list prepared in respect of a large number of persons can in all cases be perfect. It is quite possible that even in the final list mistakes have crept in. But these are accidental and unintentional, and at some point of time the list must necessarily become final. The mistakes in the earlier list were brought to the notice of the authorities by means of representations and in some cases by writ proceedings. Wherever a mistake was seen, it is stated to have been corrected. It was one of those mistakes which was corrected in the case of the petitioner also. She was, in our opinion, fairly dealt with by notionally promoting her to the cadre of Assistant Taluk Supply Officer and to the higher cadre of Taluk Supply Officer with effect from anterior dates, as a result of which, she earns higher salary and other benefits. Her seniority, for the purpose of increments and promotions, has been fully taken into account. To demand more is, in our view, unjustified. 'In the circumstances, we see no merit in the challenge against Ext. P5. Subsequent to Ext. P5 the final gradation list was published. But she has not challenged that list. For the reasons stated, the Original Petition is dismissed. We do not, however, make any order as to costs. Issue carbon copies of this judgment to the parties on the usual terms.