ORDER.- These two revision cases arise out of C.C. No. 13 of 1982 in which the petitioners were charged for an offence punishable under section 34 (1) of the Andhra Pradesh Excise Act (XVII of 1968). 2. The case of the prosecution is that P.W. 3 had credible information that illicitly distilled arrack is being transported in the Auto-rickshaw bearing No. AAT 1584 and P.W. 1 and P.W. 3 have stopped the autorickshaw driven by A-1 in which A-2 to A-4 were found carrying 40 litres of the illicitly distilled arrack. After making panchanama as required under law, that arrack has been seized and a charge-sheet has been laid against them. Both the Courts below have concurrently found that A-1 was driving the autorickshaw and A-2 to A-4 were found present in it carrying 40 litres of illicitly distilled arrack. Admittedly they did not possess any licence as required under the Excise Act. The trial Court convicted them and awarded minimum sentence of two years and a fine of Rs. 200 each and in default to undergo a further sentence of one month. The conviction and sentences were confirmed by the appellate Court. 3. Sri Lakshman Sarma, learned Counsel appearing for Sri M.S.K. Sastry and Sri Anil Kumar, learned Counsel for petitioners in both the revisions, contended that P.W. 3 did not comply with the mandatory requirement under section 55 of the Act and as such the conviction and sentences are vitiated by law. Sri Anil Kumar further contended that there is discrepancy with regard to the place of seizure in the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 3. With regard to this contention that there is discrepancy with regard to the place of seizure, I cannot accede to this contention. Both the Courts have considered this aspect and accepted the evidence of P.W. 3 and held that the arrack was seized under panchanama, Exhibit P-1 which was attested by L.W. 2, though P.W. 2 turned hostile. In view of the concurrent finding of fact based on evidence, it is not open to me to interfere lightly with this finding in these revisions. 4. In view of the concurrent finding of fact based on evidence, it is not open to me to interfere lightly with this finding in these revisions. 4. With regard to the contention of Sri Sarma that the mandatory requirement as envisaged under section 55 of the Act has not been complied with, the learned public prosecutor contended that P.W. 3 has stated in his evidence that he had credible information and that on that basis he proceeded to that spot and stopped the vehicle and seized the illicitly distilled arrack from the possession of.A-2 to A-4 from the vehicle driven by A-1. Therefore the contention is not tenable. 5. Section 55 postulates that: “55. Power to search without warrant. -Whenever the Commissioner or a Collector or any police officer not below the rank of an officer-in-charge of a police station or any excise officer not below the rank of an Excise Sub-Inspector has reason to believe that an offence under section 34 , section 35 , section 36 or section 37 has been, is being or is likely to be committed, and that a search warrant cannot be obtained without affording the offender an opportunity of escape or of concealing evidence of the offence, he may, after recording the grounds of his belief- (a) at any time by day or by night enserand search any place and seize anything found therein which he has reason to believe to be liable to confiscation under this Act; and (b) detain and search and, if he thinks proper, arrest any person found in such place whom he has reason to believe to be guilty of such offence as aforesaid.” 6. The Legislature confided in the Magistrate under section 54 of the Act, if upon information and after such an enquiry if any, as be thinks necessary has reason to believe that an offence under sections 34 , 45 , 36 or 37 has been, is being or is likely to be committed, to issue a warrant for the search of any place …….. which are used for the commission of such offence or in respect of which such offence has been, is being or is likely to be committed, are kept or concealed. 7. which are used for the commission of such offence or in respect of which such offence has been, is being or is likely to be committed, are kept or concealed. 7. It is common knowledge that the offences like transportation of illicitly distilled arrack would be committed in secrecy when the entire world is asleep, and if the rigour of the requirement to obtain warrant from a Magistrate is insisted upon, there would be likelihood of the offenders being escaped or the evidence relating to the commission of offence would be concealed. Therefore the imperative need to take expeditous action to prevent commission or de section thereof was recognised and in those exceptional cases the power to search without a warrant was conferred on the Commissioner or a Collector or any officer not below the rank of an officer in charge of the police station or any Excise Officer not below the rank of the Excise Sub-Inspector in respect of these offences. But the stated officer officers if he/they to has have reason to believe that an offence under these sections has been, is being or is likely to be committed and the search warrant cannot be obtained without affording the offender an opportunity to escape or of concealing the evidence he may, after recording the grounds of the belief under the circumstances stated in clauses (a) and (b) of section 55 is given power to enter at any time and search any place /or detain and seize anything found therein which he has reason to believe to be liable to confiscation under this Act, etc. 8. It is now well-settled legislative practice to incorporate the language, “has reason to believe that an offence has been, is being or is likely to be committed.”, in all Regulatory measures entailing with penal consequences or procedural codes. Undoubtedly the power to search and consequent seizure without warrant is an arbitrary power confided under section 55 of the Act on the executive authority. Arbitrary action is a negation of the principle of fair play. Therefore, to be in conformity with the rights conferred on a citizen under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution, due procedure has to be adopted and it should also be fair, just and reasonable, lest of necessity be branded as arbitrary and oppressive leading to capricious exercise of power. Therefore, to be in conformity with the rights conferred on a citizen under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution, due procedure has to be adopted and it should also be fair, just and reasonable, lest of necessity be branded as arbitrary and oppressive leading to capricious exercise of power. With a view to meet the constitutional mandate of sections 54 and 55 of the Act have been introduced as built in safeguard to the citizens to protect against ill-founded or frivolous prosecution or harrassment. The authority wielding such power has to decide; himself whether the conditions prescribed have been satisfied. With a view to obviate such an action, the Legislature has couched in the peremptive language to comply procedural steps envisaged under the above sections under given circumstances. Section 54 of the Act requires the Magistrate to issue warrant only upon such information or material gathered after such enquiry and if he thinks necessary. It is obvious that it would be done after due consideration of the material placed before him or upon his satisfying on such enquiry that there is reason to believe that an offence under the aforesaid section/sections, has been, is being or is likely to be committed, then only he issues a warrant. If such is the case and when an exception is engrafted that under emergent circumstance where there is a possibility of the offenders to escape or concealment of the evidence of the offence, the power is given to the officers mentioned in section 55 he/they cannot be put on a higher pedestal than the judicial authority. Therefore the concerned authority under section 55, if has reason to believe that the offence under the stated section/ sections has been, is being or is likely to be committed, he is permitted to take recourse to such an action of search and seize if necessary only after recording the grounds of their belief. Therefore at that stage, the reasonable grounds of belief would be though subjective, there should exist circumstances relevant to the aforesaid inference which is sine quo non for the action. The existence of the circumstances to form a reasonable belief is a condition fundamental in making up his mind to believe that an offence has been or is being or is likely to be committed. The existence of the circumstances to form a reasonable belief is a condition fundamental in making up his mind to believe that an offence has been or is being or is likely to be committed. Therefore the existence of the grounds on which the belief could be founded is objective and the words are intended to serve in some sense as a condition limiting the exercise of an otherwise arbitrary power. The power to seize must be exercised bona fide and in good faith. Thus the officer exercising the power under section 55 must have, in his possession, material by way of some definite information so that he can be said that he had thought over the matter diligently and with care and it has been found expedient to take immediate action to prevent the commission of the offence under the section provisions referred to above without a warrant being obtained from the Magistrate. Recording reasons in such circumstances, therefore, is a condition precedent to search or detain and seize the offending articles and to serve, not only as a limitation to the exercise of power but also gives assurance when challenged to show that he brought to bear upon his mind the relevant facts and had applied his mind thought over the matter and thereafter took action to prevent the commission of the offence under the aforesaid section provisions. 9. Section 124 of the Evidence Act postulates that no public officer shall be compelled to disclose communications made to him in official confidence when he considers that the public interest would suffer by the disclosure. In this case when offence of carrying on or doing business in transporting illicitly distilled arrack is being committed, P.W. 3 has credible information but he did not record the source of information. The disclosure of the names of the informents would endanger not only the persons that gave the information but also affects public interest in preventing the commission of such offences. Therefore quite rightly as admitted by P.W. 3, he did not mention the sources of information in the G.D. but he categorically stated in his cross-examination that he has credible information that the auto-rickshaw is being plied containing illicitly distilled arrack. Therefore quite rightly as admitted by P.W. 3, he did not mention the sources of information in the G.D. but he categorically stated in his cross-examination that he has credible information that the auto-rickshaw is being plied containing illicitly distilled arrack. The work “credible information” demonstrates that the information furnished is not only reliable and dependable but also posits that an assurance of an offence punishable under any of the sections has been, is being, or is likely to be committed. That information which has been recorded in the G.D. by P.W. 3 is, therefore, sufficient to lead P.W. 3 to believe that an offence under section 34 (a) is being committed and it is in full compliance with section 55 of the Act. 10. Sri Sarma, learned Counsel for the petitioner relied upon a decision reported in K.L. Subbayya v. State of Karnataka1. There, it was specifically admitted that the Inspector who searched the car had not made any record of any grounds on the basis of which he had a reasonable belief and on that admission that Supreme Court interfered with the conviction since the condition precedent required by sections 53 and 54 of the Mysore Excise Act was not complied with and allowed the appeal. But on the fact in this case, in view of the categorical evidence of P.W. 3 that he has credible information that an offence under section 34 of the Act is being committed and it was recorded in the G.D. the above decision is distinguishable. Under these circumstances, I do not think that the contention of Sri Sarma is well-founded. Accordingly it is rejected. The sentence being minimum specified under the Act. I have no discretion to interfere with the same, in view of the decision in State of Andhra Pradesh v. S.RRangadamappd2. Therefore, the revision cases merit no consideration. Accordingly they are dismissed. R.S.R. ----- Revisions dismissed.