JUDGMENT Kader, J. 1. The petitioner who is an Inspector of Central Excise, working in Air Customs at Trivandrum Air Port, seeks to quash Ext. P-3 order, dated 8th September 1983 placing him under suspension with immediate effect pending disciplinary proceedings said to have been contemplated against him. This order has been attacked very strongly on several grounds. The main ground urged in support of the petition is that Ext. P-3 order has been passed in an arbitrary and unfair manner and has been grossly vitiated due to the violation of the guidelines issued by the Central Government under R.10 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, hereinafter referred to as the Rules. The counsel submitted that in spite of the counter affidavit filed in pursuance of direction of this Court, it is clear that the third respondent, who issued Ext. P-3 order, has not applied her mind at all to the guiding principles issued by the Government of India. 2. The petitioner entered service on 25th August 1975 as Inspector of Central Excise and claims to have a spotless record of service which has been not disputed. On 15th June 1983, the Additional Collector of Customs, the second respondent herein, served on the petitioner a memo, a copy of which is Ext. P-1, calling for his explanations for the alleged irregularities and dereliction of duty pointed out in Ext. P-1. The petitioner submitted an explanation to this memo, a copy of which is Ext. P-2, on 24th May 1983. According to the petitioner, he has given a detailed explanation for each and every charge and allegation made against him in Ext. P-1. Thereafter till 7th September 1983, the petitioner was working in the Air Customs, Trivandrum Air Port and from 7th September 1983 the petitioner entered on leave. On 15th September 1983, the petitioner received an order of suspension, a true copy of which is Ext. P-3, and immediately thereafter this original petition was filed before this Court. Along with the original petition C.M.P. No. 24281/83 was filed for staying Ext. P-3 suspension order. On 15th September 1983, the petitioner received an order of suspension, a true copy of which is Ext. P-3, and immediately thereafter this original petition was filed before this Court. Along with the original petition C.M.P. No. 24281/83 was filed for staying Ext. P-3 suspension order. After hearing counsel appearing for both parties, my learned brother Chandrasekhara Menon, J. passed an order wherein the learned Judge stated as follows: "However, I would like to know from the officer who has issued the order of suspension as to the reasons or basis which induced that officer to issue the order of suspension that is not at all indicated in the file produced. That officer will file an affidavit on that in this Court within a week from today". In pursuance of this order, the third respondent filed a counter affidavit before this Court on 30th September 1983 praying that the counter affidavit filed may also be treated as the counter affidavit in the main original petition. 3. R.10 of the Rules in Part IV deals with suspension. R.10(1) reads: "The appointing authority or any authority to which it is subordinate or the disciplinary authority or any other authority empowered in that behalf by the President, by general or special order, may place a Government servant under suspension: - (a) Where a disciplinary proceeding against him is contemplated or is pending; or (aa) Where, in the opinion of the authority aforesaid, he has engaged himself in activities prejudicial to the interest of the security of the State; or (b) Where a case against him in respect of any criminal offence is under investigation, enquiry or trial; * * * * It is on the strength of R.10(1)(a) that the petitioner has been placed under suspension. 4. 4. The learned advocate appearing for the petitioner does not dispute the power of the competent authority to pass an order of suspension under R.10(1)(a); but relying on the instructions issued by the Government of India stating the guiding principles for placing a Government servant under suspension and also on the following decisions of this Court in N. Subramonian v. State of Kerala ( 1973 KLJ 31 ); Veeramani v. State of Kerala ( 1974 KLT 630 ) and a decision of the Supreme Court in Mohinder Singh v. The Chief Election Commissioner ( AIR 1978 SC 851 ), strongly contended that on the facts disclosed and the materials available in this case, it is crystal clear that the instructions issued by the Government of India have been thrown to winds and the competent authority has not applied her mind to these guidelines at the time when Ext. P-3 order was passed. The counsel also relying on the decision of the Supreme Court referred to above, contended that if Ext. P-3 or the file relating to the same does not disclose any reason, the competent authority cannot supplement the reason by filing a counter affidavit in a proceedings of this nature. 5. The learned Additional Central Government Standing Counsel on the other hand, contended that there are no statutory guidelines or instruction issued by the Government of India and therefore it may not be proper for this Court to hold that violation of the instructions will vitiate the order and that even if no reason is given in Ext. P-3 order or in the files connected therewith, the competent authority can supplement the reasons by filing a counter affidavit. 6. It is not disputed that instructions have been issued by the Government of India laying down the guiding principles for placing a Government servant under suspension. This has been admitted in the counter affidavit. These instructions issued by the Government of India were read out in the Court. In the light of the principles stated in the decisions cited and the guiding principles issued by the Government of India, it would appear that suspension is not the general rule and only in exceptional cases it should be resorted to. A preliminary scrutiny or enquiry has to be made to find out whether a prima facie case has been made out. A preliminary scrutiny or enquiry has to be made to find out whether a prima facie case has been made out. There must be serious allegations of misconduct and the competent authority should be prima facie satisfied that the allegations are true. Although the power given under the relevant rule is of wide import, the power of suspension is to be sparingly exercised. This power should not be exercised in an arbitrary or vindicative manner. Therefore, before passing an order of suspension against a member of a service under the Government of India the competent authority should take into account, all the relevant materials available, the nature of the charges, the circumstances of the case, the necessity or desirability of placing the public servant under suspension, bearing in mind the guiding principles laid down by the Government of India. Instruction No. 2 reads: "(2) Limiting number of suspended officials to the minimum: In spite of a series of instructions issued from time to time for limiting the number of officials under suspension and also reducing the periods of suspension, it is observed that quite a good number of officials continue under suspension for prolonged durations. In order to keep the number of officials under suspension to the barest minimum and also to reduce the period of suspension to the minimum possible term, the following instructions on the subject are being reiterated for guidance and strict compliance. In order to keep the number of officials under suspension to the barest minimum and also to reduce the period of suspension to the minimum possible term, the following instructions on the subject are being reiterated for guidance and strict compliance. (a) An official may be placed under suspension only in the following circumstances:- (i) Where the continuance in office of the Government servant will prejudice investigation, trial or any inquiry (e.g., apprehended tampering with witnesses or documents); (ii) Where continuance in office of the Government servant is likely to seriously subvert discipline in the office in which he is working; (iii) Where the continuance in office of the Government servant will be against wider public interest, e.g. if there is a public scandal and it is considered necessary to place the Government servant under suspension to demonstrate the policy of the Government to deal strictly with officers involved in such scandals, particularly corruption; (iv) Where preliminary enquiry into allegations made has revealed a prima facie case justifying criminal or departmental proceedings which are likely to lead to his conviction and / or dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement from service; and (v) Where the public servant is suspected to have engaged himself in activities prejudicial to the interest of the security of the State. (b) Even in the above circumstances, an official may be placed under suspension only in respect of misdemeanour of the following type: (i) An offence of conduct involving moral turpitude; (ii) Corruption, embezzlement or misappropriation of Government money, possessing of disproportionate assets, misuse of official power for personal gains; (iii) Serious negligence and dereliction of duty resulting in considerable loss to Government; (iv) Desertion of duty; and (v) Refusal or deliberate failure to carry out written orders of supervisory officers. * * * *" The reasons stated in the counter affidavit is that prima facie a case warranting disciplinary action was made out and that it was considered that the misconduct was of such an order as to require initiation of disciplinary proceedings for considering major penalty under R.14 read with R.11 of the Rules. In para 9, it has been stated that the nature and type of offence prima facie made out was of such a grave import that suspension alone could serve the purpose. In para 9, it has been stated that the nature and type of offence prima facie made out was of such a grave import that suspension alone could serve the purpose. The respondents placed reliance on clause (iv) of instruction No. 1 which reads: "(1) (iv) Where allegations have been made against the Government servant and the preliminary inquiry has revealed that a prima facie case is made out which would justify his prosecution or his being proceeded against in departmental proceedings, and where the proceedings are likely to end in his conviction and / or dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement from service". Clause (e) of instruction No. 2 clearly states that while placing an official under suspension, the competent authority should consider whether the purpose cannot be served by transferring the official from his post to a post where he may not repeat the misconduct or influence the investigations, if any, in progress and that if the authority finds that the purpose cannot be served by transferring the official from his post to another post, then he should record reasons therefore before placing the official under suspension. The counsel appearing for the petitioner, pointed out that this clause of instruction No. 2 has not at all been considered or even adverted to by the competent authority and no reasons as enjoined therein has been recorded in this case. 7. This court has occasion to construe R.10 of the Kerala Civil Services (Classifications, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1960 (Kerala) in N. Subramonian v. State of Kerala ( 1973 KLJ 31 ). This rule and R.10 of the rules is identical. In Subramonian's case ( 1973 KLJ 31 ) it is admitted that there were no guidelines or instructions issued by the Government stating the principles governing suspension of the Government servants. Even then, while construing the scope of the power under R.10, Balakrishna Eradi, J. as he then was held that it is mandatory that before an officer can be validly placed under suspension the competent authority passing the order must address its mind to all the relevant aspects and come to the bona fide conclusion that for either of "the two reasons" or "both" referred to in that decision the officer cannot be allowed to function in any post in the service until the enquiry is concluded. It has also observed: "Although suspension is not one of the punishments enumerated in R.11 of the Kerala Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, an order of suspension is not to be lightly passed against a Government servant, for the reality cannot be ignored that an order of suspension brings to bear on the Government servant consequences far more serious is nature than several of the penalties made mention of in R.11. It has a disastrous impact on the fair name and good reputation that may have been earned and built up by a Government servant in the course of many years of service. The damage suffered by the Government is largely irreversible because the denigration and disgrace visited on him by the order of suspension is seldom wiped out by his being subsequently exonerated from blame and reinstated in service. Hence it is imperative that the utmost caution and circumspection should be exercised in passing orders of suspension under R.10 resulting in such grave consequences to the Government servant concerned. It is also necessary to remember that the power of suspension is to be sparingly exercised and that is not meant to be used as a mode of giving expression to any displeasure felt by the appointing authority or the Government in respect of any act of commission or omission on the part of the officer." 8. A Division Bench of this court in Veeramani v. State of Kerala ( 1974 KLT 630 ) also had occasion to consider similar rules under Police Departmental Enquiries, Punishment and Appeal Rules, 1958 (Kerala). It is not disputed that there were no guidelines or instructions prescribed or issued by the Government regarding suspension of an officer under the Police Departmental Enquiries, Punishment and Appeal Rules, 1958. While dealing with the relevant rules, the Division Bench observed that there should be some guidelines in determining when an order of suspension could and should be passed, that an order of suspension should be passed only if it is necessary or desirable and that such necessity or desirability will arise when the charge against a servant are of a serious nature and keeping him in service will not be conducive to discipline or the maintaining of the efficiency or the honesty of the administration. The Division Bench observed that the competent authority, before ordering suspension, must be satisfied that it is necessary or at least desirable to keep a member of a service under suspension having regard to the serious allegations of misconduct and the attendant circumstances. While considering the consequences of an order of suspension, it was observed as follows: "The passing of an order of suspension of any public servant is a matter of important consequences not only so far as the public servant is concerned but as regards the satisfactory discharge of the duties by the members of service and therefore so far as the public interest is concerned, it affects the reputation of the public servant and is unjustifiably passed it affects his morale apart from the fact that it deprives him of his full emoluments and the right to work. It affects the efficiency of the service as well as security of service. As far as the Police Force is concerned, demoralising it and making it ineffective and inefficient has the result of rendering the rule of law envisaged by the Constitution a mockery. This being so it is necessary that such power is exercised with caution and only for valid reasons and not for extraneous considerations." 9. The counsel for the petitioner strongly contended that the facts disclosed in memo do not disclose any grave or serious misconduct or any criminal tendency or any offence involving moral tarpitude and that even according to the officer of the Customs, who dealt with the matter, it was only an irregularity and dereliction of duty. The learned Additional Central Government Standing Counsel was good enough to place the files before me and I have gone through the relevant files including the report of the Assistant Collector. As pointed out by my learned brother in C.M.P. No. 24281 of 1983, it cannot be said that the report of the Assistant Collector does not disclose serious charges against the petitioner. I do not think, it is proper for me to go into the merits of these allegations and express any opinion at this stage, when a disciplinary proceeding is contemplated against the petitioner. I do not think, it is proper for me to go into the merits of these allegations and express any opinion at this stage, when a disciplinary proceeding is contemplated against the petitioner. The question for consideration is whether in the light of the guiding principles laid down by the Government of India for placing a Government servant under suspension and the principles enunciated in the decision referred to above, the charges made against the petitioner are so grave as to warrant the suspension of the petitioner. The other contention raised by the counsel that the order is vitiated by mala fide does not appear to be sustainable on the materials on record. So what is important for decision is whether the competent authority has applied his or her mind to the guiding principles issued by the Government of India for placing a Government servant under suspension. The contention of the counsel appearing for the respondents is that these rules or principles issued by the Government of India cannot have any statutory force. It is true that these are not rules framed under a Statute. What then to consider is what is the effect of such rules. The effect of similar rules or instructions issued by the Government came up for consideration before a Full Bench of this Court in Chandrasekharan Nair v. Secretary to Government of Kerala ( 1961 KLT 229 (FB)). Following a Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in Nagarathnammal v. Ibrahim Saheb ( AIR 1955 Mad. 305 ) the Full Bench held: "Once the Government have chosen to frame rules, they have to respect and comply with those rules until the rules are altered or deleted............They have to follow the rules as along as they are in force and their power to delete the rules should not cloud the issue of their obligation to respect the said rules." The particular rule, the Full Bench was dealing with was a rule framed by the Government under Part II of the Madras Elementary Education Act. It may be noted that the above dictum was given by the Full Bench after noticing that the rules containing in Part II were not purported to be made under any statute and were executing directions having no statutory basis. 10. It may be noted that the above dictum was given by the Full Bench after noticing that the rules containing in Part II were not purported to be made under any statute and were executing directions having no statutory basis. 10. As regards the reasons for the suspension and the applicability of the guidelines prescribed by the Government of India, the learned advocate appearing for the respondent submitted that although the files do not contain reasons, in the counter affidavit filed by the 3rd respondent sufficient reasons have been stated to justify the suspension. Admittedly the Government of India has issued instructions laying down the guiding principles for placing a Government servant under suspension. The relevant rules have been extracted in one of the above paragraphs, so, this is not a case where there is no rule or guideline framed or laid down by the Government. May be that the guidelines and instructions have not been prescribed or laid down under any statute, even then the Government and the competent authorities are bound to follow the same as long as they are in force. Ext. P-3 does not contain any reason as such. This defect was sought to be explained by the counsel stating that Ext. P-3 is in the prescribed form. Then the question is whether the file contains any reason or any indication, whether the guidelines stated by the Government of India have been considered or even adverted to by the authority concerned, who issued Ext. P-3. There is considerable force in the contention of the counsel for the petitioner that an officer cannot be permitted to supplement reasons by filing a counter affidavit in a proceeding of this nature when such reasons are absent either in the order or in the relevant files. It was pointed out by the counsel for the petitioner that although this was only an irregularity and dereliction of duty, at the stage of Ext. P-1, it has been now developed as a very serious and grave misconduct involving criminal tendencies and that this should not be allowed. It is seen from the file that on 7th September 1983, this matter was duly considered by one of the highest authorities and found only that prima facie there appeared to be a case of gross negligence and dereliction of duty. On 8th September, 1983 the competent authority who issued Ext. It is seen from the file that on 7th September 1983, this matter was duly considered by one of the highest authorities and found only that prima facie there appeared to be a case of gross negligence and dereliction of duty. On 8th September, 1983 the competent authority who issued Ext. P-3 found that there appeared to be gross irregularity and negligence in the performance of official duty warranting proceedings under R.14 C.C.S. (Classification and Appeal) Rules and therefore she considered it necessary to place both the officers under suspension immediately. It is now not disputed that this is the only reason given in the files. The files do not show or even indicated that the authority/authorities concerned have applied his or their mind to the instructions issued by the Government of India stating the guiding principles for placing a Government servant under suspension. It is true that some more reasons have been given in the counter affidavit wherein the offence has been described as a very serious one almost amounting to criminal tendency. In Mohinder Singh's case (AIR 1978 SC 85), the Supreme Court has observed that when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. Otherwise an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to court on account of a challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought out. In Gordhandas Bhanji's case ( AIR 1952 SC 16 ) it was observed: "Public orders, publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority cannot be construed in the light of explanations subsequently given by the officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was in his mind or what he intended to do. Public orders made by public authorities are meant to have public effect and are intended to affect the actings and conduct of those to whom they are addressed and must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself." 11. On a due consideration of the materials on record, the counter affidavit filed and the arguments addressed on behalf of the parties and on going through the files made available, I am satisfied that Ext. On a due consideration of the materials on record, the counter affidavit filed and the arguments addressed on behalf of the parties and on going through the files made available, I am satisfied that Ext. P-3 is unfair and vitiated inasmuch as the competent authority who passed that order has not applied her mind to the instructions issued by the Government of India stating the guiding principles for placing a Government servant under suspension. This order cannot therefore be sustained. 12. In the result, this O.P. is allowed and Ext. P-3 is hereby quashed. But this order will not stand in the way of the competent authority or authorities, taking appropriate action in this regard against the petitioner in accordance with law. This order also does not necessarily mean that the petitioner should be posted in the same place, pending further action and enquiry. Issue carbon copy of this judgment to the Central Government Standing Counsel free of charge and to the counsel for the petitioner on the usual terms, if applied for in that behalf.