Uma Shanker Prasad Srivastava v. Director, Secondary Education Cum Additional Secretary, Govt. Of
1983-09-30
P.S.SAHAY
body1983
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment Prem Shanker Sahay, J. 1. The petitioner, who is the headmaster of Jugal Kishore High School, Bhaisahi, P.S. Chanpattia, has moved this Court against the order of suspension passed by respondent No. 2, the Regional Deputy Director of Education, Tirhut Division, on 9.4.1983, as contained in Annexure-1 2. The petitioner applied for leave, which was granted by the District Education Officer, and he came to Patna for treatment on 17.3.1983 and was examined by a heart specialist. He was advised further examination, which was being conducted at Patna, and the petitioner was staying in Capital Hotel in room No. 4. On the night intervening 23rd and 24th March, 1983 at about 1.30. A.M. he was arrested by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Bettiah. He was taken to Bettiah and he was produced before the Chief Judicial Magistrate on 26. 3. 1963. There the petitioner learnt that he had been arrested in connection with Chanpattia P.S. Case No. 26 of 1983 and Jogapatti P.S. Case No. 20 of 1983. His application for bail was rejected but subsequently he was enlarged on bail by the Sessions Judge. The District Education Officer, by his letter dated 31.3.1983, wrote to the Regional Deputy Director for putting the petitioner under suspension; a copy of that letter is Annexure-2. The District Education Officer, Bettiah, informed the Regional Deputy Director of Education on 13.4.1983 that the petitioner had been released on bail, which is Annexure, The petitioner resumed his duties and information was sent to the Regional Deputy Director in this connection, which is Annexure-4. In spite of all these the order of suspension, as contained in Annexure-1, was passed on 9.4.1983 on the ground that he had been arrested in connection with criminal case. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order the petitioner has moved this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. 3. A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondents 1 to 3 by which the order of suspension was sought to be justified and reliance was placed on Rule 49(a) of the Bihar Subordinate Services (Discipline and Control) Rules and also Rules 99 and 100 of Bihar Service Code. It has also been stated in the counter affidavit that the Regional Deputy Director of Education had been empowered to put headmaster under suspension by the Education Department.
It has also been stated in the counter affidavit that the Regional Deputy Director of Education had been empowered to put headmaster under suspension by the Education Department. Further, it has been stated that the suspension has been approved by the Additional Secretary-cum-Director, Secondary Education; a copy of his letter has been filed and marked Annexure-A. Reply to the counter affidavit has been filed in which a Government Circular dated 28th April, 1981 has been filed, which is Annexure-6, giving the circumstances under which headmaster or a teacher can be suspended in course of surprise inspection. Further it has been stated that the approval has been obtained after the application was filed in this Court. A copy of the letter sent by the Regional Deputy Director of Education to the Director of Secondary Education has been filed, which is Annexure-7, in which it is stated that approval should be given for the order of suspension and if it is not done the department may loose the case which was pending in the High Court. 4. The case was argued on two dates and I felt some difficulty and, therefore, on my request the learned Additional Advocate General and the learned Government Pleader appeared and have assisted me, and I will consider their submissions in detail. Mr. Dhirendra Kumar, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, has submitted that the Regional Deputy Director had no power to suspend the petitioner and, therefore, the order, as contained in Annexure-1, is fit to be quashed. In this connection, he has drawn my attention to the provisions of Bihar Non-government Secondary Schools (Taking over of Management and Control) Act, 1981 (Bihar Act 33 of 1982)(hereinafter referred to as the Taking Over Act). He has drawn any attention to Sec. 4 which lays down the consequences of taking over of management and control. It is the admitted position that the School, of which the petitioner is the headmaster, had been taken over. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has drawn my attention to Section 4 Sub-clause (3) of the Act which reads as follows; 4. (3). The age of superannuation of Headmasters, teachers and other employees of the schools taken over by the State Government shall be 58 years.
Learned Counsel for the petitioner has drawn my attention to Section 4 Sub-clause (3) of the Act which reads as follows; 4. (3). The age of superannuation of Headmasters, teachers and other employees of the schools taken over by the State Government shall be 58 years. The other terms and conditions of their services shall continue to be the same as it was before taking over the management and control of the school until any alteration is made therein by the State Government in the prescribed manner. He has further submitted that the previous ordinances starting from J976 had been repealed under Sec.21 of the Act and in that view of the matter, there was no condition of service till such service conditions are -framed and in this connection he has relied on Section 9 of the Act which reads as follows: 9. The service condition of the Headmaster, teacher and non-teaching staffs of the nationalized secondary schools shall be determined by the State Government. The argument is that the previous ordinances having lapsed there was no power to suspend the petitioner, who was the headmaster, and no such order could be passed till the service conditions were framed. Reliance has also been placed on Annexure-6 by which the authorities have been given the power to suspend, in course of surprise inspection, the headmaster and teachers of a school but that could be done only with the approval of the Director of Education. I may mention here that formerly the stand of the State was that the order of suspension has been passed under the Circular, as contained in Annexure-6, and, therefore, the approval of the Director had been taken by the Regional Deputy Director of Education. But, the learned Additional Advocate General has put forward a different argument in support of the suspension and has submitted that according to Bihar Secondary Education Board Act, 1976 , the power had been vested with the Board and the Board could delegate the power to the subordinate authority. He has placed reliance of Sec. 4 Sub-clauses (4) and (5) of the Act which are as follows: 4(4).
He has placed reliance of Sec. 4 Sub-clauses (4) and (5) of the Act which are as follows: 4(4). The Bihar Secondary Education Board constituted under the Bihar Secondary Education Board Act 1976 (Bihar Act 25 of 1976) and the Bihar Secondary Education Board (Second amendment) Ordinance 1980 (Bihar Ordinance No. 82 of 1980) shall be dissolved from the date of the promulgation of this ordinance and thus the post, tenure and appointment of the chairman shall be deemed to have expired. At the same time the members of the said Board shall vacate their respective posts. (5) The office of the Bihar Secondary Education Board established Immediately before the promulgation of this ordinance and all its movable and immovable assets and properties owned and possessed by the said Board including land, buildings, documents, books and. registers and the posts of all officers and employees of the said Board shall be deemed to have been transferred to the State Government and the deputation of Government employees shall be deemed to have been terminated. Employees on deputation to the said Board and every officer and other employees appointed by the Board shall function under the control of the Director with such designation as the State Government may determine. The tenure, emoluments and terms and conditions of services of the officers and employees appointed by the said Board shall be the same as they were before the dissolution of the said Board and shall, continue to function as such unless such tenure, terms and conditions of service are altered by the State Government in the prescribed manner. 5. According to the provisions of Sec. 4(4) of the Act the function of the Board and the Chairman comes to amend but under Sub-section (5) every officer and other employees appointed by the Board have to function under the control of the Director with such designation as the State Government may determine. The terms and conditions of the services of the officers and employees under the Board are to continue unless the conditions are so altered by the State Government in the prescribed manner, which, according to him, is also Section 9. It is stated that now rules regarding service conditions have. been framed on 9.6.1963 but the learned counsel, appearing on behalf of the petitioner, has submitted that this rule has not been published.
It is stated that now rules regarding service conditions have. been framed on 9.6.1963 but the learned counsel, appearing on behalf of the petitioner, has submitted that this rule has not been published. Be that as it may, in my opinion, it will not be necessary to consider this point in view of the other submissions made by the learned Additional Advocate General. According to the proviso to Sec. 47 of the 1976 Act the Board and the delegated officer, who will be the Regional Deputy Director of Education, have been given the power to suspend any subordinate officer. This provision according to the learned Additional Advocate General will be applicable in the instant case because of the provisions contained in Sec. 4 Sub-clauses (4) and (5) of the Act, which have been quoted above. It has been submitted that by resolution of the Board dated 26th January, 1978, a copy of which has been produced before me, the Regional Deputy Director of Education have been authorised under Sec. 47 of the 1976 Act lo suspend headmaster or any teacher of the School. This delegation will hold the field unless new rules regarding service conditions are framed. It may be mentioned that the order of suspension was passed on 9.4.1983 in the instant case and the rules have been framed subsequently on 9.6.1983. Therefore, it has been rightly contended by the learned Additional Advocate General that the Regional Deputy Director of Education has the power to suspend under the provisions of Sec. 47 of 1976 Act read with Sec. 4 of the Taking Over Act. In this view of the matter, it is very difficult to accept the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner that by the provisions of the previous Act and the Ordinances have been wiped out by the repeal and it was confined only to Section 4 Sub-clause (3) of the Taking Over Act. The position has been made clear by the subsequent provisions of the same Act which have been discussed earlier. If the contention of the learned Counsel is accepted then there will be complete vacuum from the date of the taking over of the Act and till the time new service conditions are framed under Section 9 of the Act. The decision in the case of Shyam Narain Singh V/s. The State of Bihar and Ors. (1), decided on 3rd.
If the contention of the learned Counsel is accepted then there will be complete vacuum from the date of the taking over of the Act and till the time new service conditions are framed under Section 9 of the Act. The decision in the case of Shyam Narain Singh V/s. The State of Bihar and Ors. (1), decided on 3rd. September 1981 do not help the petitioner at all, rather it supports the contention raised on behalf of the State where it has been held that the Government is competent to pass the orders regarding suspension, removal or dismissal of a Head master or a teacher of a nationalized School till the service conditions are determined in accordance with Section 9 of the Act. 6. Thus on a careful consideration of the submissions made at the Bar, I am of the opinion that the respondent No. 2 was competent to pass the order of suspension. I therefore find no merit in this application and it is, accordingly dismissed. But, in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.