JUDGMENT V.K. Mehrotra, J. - In this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, petitioner M/s. Durga Talkies has assailed the decision of the District Magistrate, Farrukhabad dated February 7, 1982 refusing to extend the benefit of remission in the Entertainment tax payable by the petitioner in terms of the Scheme contained in the Government Order dated November 10, 1978 and the affirmance of that decision by the State Government through its order of March 5, 1983. The petitioner had approached the State Government under Section 36 (2) of the Entertainment and Betting Tax Act, 1979 (for brief, the Act of 1979) because, when it came to this Court earlier, the writ petition filed by the petitioner against the order of the District Magistrate was dismissed in limine by this Court on April 8, 1982 on the view that it had a right to approach the State Government under that provision. 2. On November 10, 1978, the Secretary to Government, U.P. addressed a communication to all the District Magistrates in U.P. saying that in order to encourage construction of permanent cinema houses in U.P. in the rural and semi urban areas where the number of permanent cinema houses was very low as compared to other States, the State Government had decided to grant remission in entertainment tax to newly constructed permanent cinema houses which satisfied the conditions laid down in the communication. It was also said that under the Scheme, the power to grant the exemption under Section 6 (3) of the U.P. Entertainment and Betting Tax Act, 1937 (briefly, the Act of 1937) was being delegated to the District Magistrates. 3. The Scheme, as contained in the Government order of November 10, 1978 is substantially this. In municipal or non-municipal areas, with a population of not more than fifty thousand as recorded in the last census where there were no permanent cinema houses, exemption from entertainment tax would be available in respect of films exhibited in the newly constructed cinema house where such a cinema house was at a distance of at least five kilometres from a pre-existing permanent cinema house and would be available only in respect of such permanent cinema bouses which had obtained an exhibitor's licence during the period between the date of the communication and December 31, 1981. The entertainment tax would be realised, in respect of films exhibited in the cinema houses to which the benefit of the scheme is extended, for a period of two years in the manner that in the first year a sum of Rs. 25,000/- or 25 percent of the amount of entertainment tax otherwise payable, whichever was higher, would be realised while during the second year it would be Rs. 50,000/- or 50 percent of the amount of tax payable, whichever was higher. Surcharge would, however, be payable at the normal rates. The District Magistrate shall issue the exemption order in a proforma which was enclosed with the communication. This proforma, inter alia, mentioned the manner in which the amount of entertainment tax payable by an Exhibitor, to whom the benefit of the Scheme has been extended, was to be calculated and deposited. 4. The case of the petitioner is that in view of the Scheme, it constructed a permanent cinema hall and on its completion applied for grant of a licence under the Cinematograph Act on August 24, 1981. This licence was granted on December 14, 1981. After the grant of licence, exhibition of films was started an the petitioner forthwith. On December 28, 1981, the petitioner made an application on the prescribed form to the District Magistrate for remission of entertainment tax in terms of the Government Order dated November 10, 1978. The District Magistrate, however, did not grant it. The petitioner had, therefore, to send a notice to him as well as the State Government in that regard. In reply to the notice so given the stand taken by the District Magistrate was that the petitioner was not entitled to the remission because under the Scheme the first permanent cinema hall built in an area alone was entitled to the benefit of the Scheme and, inasmuch as, on November 4, 1981 a permanent cinema hall (Bhagwati Talkies) had been given a licence and that the hall being at a distance of about 200 yards from the petitioner talkies, the petitioner could not claim benefit of the Scheme. 5. At that stage, the petitioner approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution but was asked to assail the decision of the District Magistrate before the State Government in a revision. When the State Government declined to intervene, the present writ petition was filed as has been said earlier. 5. At that stage, the petitioner approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution but was asked to assail the decision of the District Magistrate before the State Government in a revision. When the State Government declined to intervene, the present writ petition was filed as has been said earlier. 6. In a counter affidavit sworn by Brij Behari Lal, an upper Division Assistant in Finance (Entertainment Tax) Section of the Secretariat at Lucknow, the plea taken on behalf of the respondents is that the benefit of the Government Order was to be given to the first permanent cinema to whom a licence was granted and not to the second cinema and that, in as much as the petitioner's licence for a permanent cinema was admittedly the second in that area, within a distance of about 200 yards from Bhagwati Talkies to whom the licence was granted on November 4, 1981, the petitioner was not entitled to the benefit of the Scheme. 7. A reading of the Scheme contained in the communication of November 10, 1978 (Annexure-'I' to the writ petition) leads to the conclusion that the State Government as well as the District Magistrate were in error in thinking that the Scheme was meant to apply only to the very first permanent cinema house licenced in an area of the kind envisaged in it. We have noticed the relevant terms of the Scheme earlier. We may, however, mention once again that the Government Order expressly mentions that remission or exemption from entertainment tax to the extent mentioned in it was with a view to encourage construction of permanent cinema house in an area where, at that time, there existed no permanent cinema house. The power to grant exemption was to be exercised by the District Magistrate, as provided in condition No. 1 contained in Paragraph 2 of the communication, where a new permanent cinema house was constructed in an area from the limits where there was no permanent cinema house existing at that time at-least to a distance of about five kilometres. The power to grant exemption was to be exercised by the District Magistrate, as provided in condition No. 1 contained in Paragraph 2 of the communication, where a new permanent cinema house was constructed in an area from the limits where there was no permanent cinema house existing at that time at-least to a distance of about five kilometres. The feeling of the respondents that under the Government Order of November 10, 1978 only the first permanent cinema house to be licenced was to be entitled to remission in the entertainment tax is not substantiated by the recitals contained in that order, nor is the view that the existence of Bhagwati Talkies, which was admittedly granted a licence on November 4, 1981, at a distance of about 200 yards from the petitioner Talkies disentitled the latter from remission in entertainment tax sustainable on (the language used in the Government Order. The reference to the existence of a permanent cinema hall at a distance of at least five kilometres in condition No. 1 of Paragraph 2 of the communication relatives to a pre-existing permanent cinema hall on the date of the order, namely, November 10, 1978. This is made clear by the recital that the benefit was to be extended to a new permanent cinema hall which was constructed in an area where at that time(If there was no permanent cinema hall and which did not have at that time (PPT)no permanent hall (within at least five kilometres from its limits). 8. During the course of the bearing of the petition, it was noticed that the Government Order of November 10, 1978 referred to Section 6 (3) (of the 1937 Act) while that Act had been repealed by the Act of 1979. The learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel, appearing for the respondents attempted to urge that the Government Order of November 10, 1978 had ceased to exist on account of the repeal of the 1937 Act and the petitioner could not, therefore, seek any relief on its basis. This submission cannot be accepted for Section 37 of the 1979 Act expressly provides, in the proviso to sub-section (2) that! This submission cannot be accepted for Section 37 of the 1979 Act expressly provides, in the proviso to sub-section (2) that! "..............all rules made, notifications published, powers conferred and other things done......................under in force on the commencement of this Act shall,' so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, be deemed to have been made, published, conferred or done under this Act." 9. The said Act refers to the 1937 Act while 'this Act refers to the 1979 Act. A power, akin to the one contained in Section 6 (3) of the 1937 Act, is contained in Section 11 (1) of the 1979 Act. Nothing could be pointed out by the Additional Chief Standing Counsel in the 1979 Act to show that the grant of remission in the payment of entertainment tax envisaged in the Government Order of November 10, 1978 was inconsistent with any provision of the Act of 1979. Besides, the Government has itself been treating the Order made by it on November 10, 1978 to be subsisting for it is under that order alone that the claim of the petitioner was considered by the respondents and it is under that order alone that exemption from entertainment tax has been allowed to Bhagwati Talkies. This has been asserted in Paragraph 19 of the rejoinder affidavit sworn by Jai Prakash Agrawal on March 11, 1983 in reply to the counter affidavit of Brij Behari Lal on behalf of the respondents. It has not been shown that this assertion is incorrect. 10. In conclusion, we allow the writ petition. The respondents are directed ; to extend the benefit of the scheme contained in the Government Order dated November 10, 1978 to the petitioner forthwith for the period of two years commencing from the date on which licence under the Cinematograph Act was given to the petitioner, namely December 14, 1981. 10. In conclusion, we allow the writ petition. The respondents are directed ; to extend the benefit of the scheme contained in the Government Order dated November 10, 1978 to the petitioner forthwith for the period of two years commencing from the date on which licence under the Cinematograph Act was given to the petitioner, namely December 14, 1981. The claim of the petitioner in regard to refund of the amount which it had to deposit by way of entertainment tax, in contravention of the scheme, for the period commencing from December 28, 1981, on which date an application was made by the petitioner in the prescribed form, as alleged by it in Paragraph 7 of the writ petition, shall be considered and disposed of by the District Magistrate within two months of the date on which a certified copy of the judgment is filed before him the petitioner. 11. The petitioner will be entitled to its costs.