JUDGMENT N.D. Ojha, J. - Respondents 3 and 4 are the landlords of an accommodation of which the Petitioners are the tenants. A suit was instituted by Respondents 3 and 4 against the Petitioners for their ejectment on the ground that they were in arrears of rent for a period of more than four months and had not paid it inspite of a notice of demand having been served on them as contemplated by Section 20(2)(a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). On the first date of hearing of the suit the Respondents made a deposit of Rs. 250/- and claimed the benefit of Section 20(4) of the Act. According to them if this deposit of Rs. 250/-was taken into account along with the deposit of Rs. 792/- made by them u/s 7-C(2) of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as U.P. Act III of 1947) the entire amount which they were required to deposit stood deposited. It does not appear to have been disputed that if the amount of Rs. 792/- deposited by the Petitioners u/s 7-C(2) of U.P. Act III of 1947 was added to the sum of Rs. 250/- deposited by them on the first date of hearing the requirements of Section 20(4) of the Act stood complied with. The benefit of Section 20(4) of the Act, however, was denied to the Petitioners by the Judge, Small Causes, on the ground that since the sum of Rs. 792/- had been deposited by the Petitioners not u/s 7-C(1) of U.P. Act III of 1947 but u/s 7-C(2) of the said Act the said amount could not be taken into consideration. In taking this view reliance was placed on a decision of this Court in Ear Prasad Garg v. Dharam Deo Nagpal 1981 ARC 26 where it was held that it was only the amount deposited u/s 30(1) of the Act that could be deducted from the rent due and not the one deposited u/s 30(2) of the Act. In taking this view reliance was placed on a decision of this Court in Ear Prasad Garg v. Dharam Deo Nagpal 1981 ARC 26 where it was held that it was only the amount deposited u/s 30(1) of the Act that could be deducted from the rent due and not the one deposited u/s 30(2) of the Act. The Judge, Small Causes, seems to have been of the view that since the provisions of Section 7-C(1) and 7-C(2) of U.P. Act III of 1947 were in pari materia with the provisions of Section 30(1) and Section 30(2) respectively of the Act the principle enunciated in the decision of Har Prasad Garg (Supra) was applicable to a deposit made u/s 7-C(2) also. The suit was ultimately decreed by the Judge, Small Causes, for ejectment of the Petitioners and for recovery of arrears of rent and for damages for use and occupation on 6th April, 1981. A revision filed by the Petitioners was dismissed by the District Judge on 2nd March, 1982. It is these two orders which are sought to be quashed in the present writ petition. 2. It has been pointed out by Counsel for the Petitioners that rent had to be deposited by the Petitioners u/s 7-C(2) of the Act III of 1947 inasmuch as a dispute had arisen in regard to the title of the landlords and that the said dispute was finally resolved by the decision of this Court dated 23rd July, 1979, in Second Appeal No. 3812 of 1978 whereby Ram Chandra predecessor-in-interest of Respondents 3 and 4 was held to be the owner of the disputed accommodation. The necessary facts in this behalf are contained in paragraphs 9 and 10 of the writ petition. In the counter affidavit which has been filed on behalf of the landlord-Respondents the fact that deposits were made by the Petitioners u/s 7-C(2) of U.P. Act III of 1947 and also the fact that the dispute between the rival claimants was ultimately decided by judgment of this Court dated 23rd July, 1979, in Second Appeal No. 3812 of 1979 have not been controverted. 3. 3. On these facts it has been stated that in the year 1980 when the suit giving rise to the present writ petition was filed the dispute between the rival claimants stood already decided and Ram Chandra predecessor-in-interest of Respondents 3 and 4 had already been held to be entitled to receive the rent of the accommodation in question. According to him in this view of the matter on the first date of hearing when the deposit of Rs. 250/- was made by the Petitioners it was not only that sum of Rs. 250/- but also the sum of Rs. 792/- which had been deposited by the Petitioners u/s 7-C(2) of U.P. Act III of 1947 which could be forthwith withdrawn by the landlord Respondents and consequently the sum of Rs. 792/- deposited by the Petitioners u/s 7-C(2) deserved to be taken into consideration for determining as to whether the requirements of Section 20(4) of the Act had or had not been complied with. 4. For the landlord-Respondents on the other hand it has been urged by their Counsel that on a plain reading of Section 20(4) of the Act it is apparent that only a deposit u/s 30(4) of the Act is capable of being taken into consideration for determining as to whether the requirements of Section 20(4) of the Act had or had not been complied with and that since any deposit u/s 30(2) of the Act could not be taken into consideration for the aforesaid purpose, as a necessary corollary a deposit u/s 7-C(2) of U.P. Act III of 1947 alone could be taken into consideration and not a deposit u/s 7-C(2) of U.P. Act III of 1947. 5. Having heard Counsel for the parties at some length I am of the opinion that on the facts of the instant case the sum of Rs. 792/- deposited by the Petitioners u/s 7-C(2) of U.P. Act III of 1947 deserved to be taken into consideration for determining the question as to whether on the first date of hearing the Petitioners after depositing the sum of Rs. 250/- had or had not complied with the requirements of Section 20(4) of the Act. 792/- deposited by the Petitioners u/s 7-C(2) of U.P. Act III of 1947 deserved to be taken into consideration for determining the question as to whether on the first date of hearing the Petitioners after depositing the sum of Rs. 250/- had or had not complied with the requirements of Section 20(4) of the Act. The object of Section 20(4) of the Act on the face of it seems to be that if the necessary deposit had been made by the tenant on the first date of bearing he is entitled to an order relieving him against his liability for eviction on the ground contained in Section 20(2)(a) of the Act. Simultaneously the object of the said Section 20(4) of the Act also seems to be that the entire amount contemplated by the said Sub-section should be immediately made available to the landlord-Respondents, this inter alia is apparent from the use of the word " unconditionally " in Section 20(4) of the Act. 6. The reason why Sub-section (1) alone and not Sub-section (2) of Section 30 was mentioned in Section 20(4) of the Act is obvious. The deposit u/s 30(1) is made if there is no dispute as to the person who it entitled to receive the rent, namely, the landlord, but the landlord has refused to accept the rent tendered by the tenant. If the rent is deposited under Sub-section (1) of Section 30, the identity of the landlord not being in doubt it can immediately be withdrawn by him as contemplated by Section 30(4) of the Act. On the other hand a deposit under Sub-section (2) of Section 30 is permissible only in that case where a bonafide doubt has arisen about the identity of the person who is entitled to receive the rent. On the other hand a deposit under Sub-section (2) of Section 30 is permissible only in that case where a bonafide doubt has arisen about the identity of the person who is entitled to receive the rent. This deposit in view of Sub-section (5) of Section 30 is to remain in deposit "for the benefit of the person who may be found entitled to it by any competent Court or by a settlement between the parties and the same shall be payable to such person." A deposit under Sub-section (2) of Section 30 cannot be withdrawn by the landlord who has instituted a suit for ejectment against the tenant on the ground contained in Section 20(2)(a) of the Act on the first date of hearing if it has not been decided by that date as to who is the person entitled to the rent deposited as contemplated by Section 30(5) of the Act. Consequently if a deposit u/s 30(2) was to be taken into consideration the object of Section 20(4) of the Act that the landlord should be in a position to withdraw on the first date of hearing the amount deposited u/s 30 would be frustrated. Since the provisions of Section 7-C(1) and Section 7-C(2) of U.P. Act III of 1947 are in pari materia with Section 30(1) and Section 30(2) of the Act the same principle can be applied to the deposits made under Sections 7-C.(l)and 7-C(2) of U.P. Act III of 1947 also. 7. On the facts of the instant case, however, the aforesaid object would not have been frustrated inasmuch as even before the institution of the suit giving rise to the present writ petition the dispute between the rival claimants had deen decided by this Court on 23rd July, 1979, in second appeal No. 3812 of 1978. The result of this decision was that on and after 23rd July, 1979, Respondents 3 and 4 who are the heirs of Ram Chandra were entitled to withdraw the sum of Rs. 792/- deposited by the Petitioners u/s 7-C(2) of the Act. Naturally, therefore, they could have withdrawn the Bald amount even on the first date of hearing of the suit giving rise to the present writ petition and It is for this reason that I am of opinion that on the facts of the instant case the Petitioners were entitled to get the sum of Rs. Naturally, therefore, they could have withdrawn the Bald amount even on the first date of hearing of the suit giving rise to the present writ petition and It is for this reason that I am of opinion that on the facts of the instant case the Petitioners were entitled to get the sum of Rs. 792/- deposited by them u/s 7-C(2) of U.P. Act III of 1947 adjusted towards the deposit contemplated by Section 20(4) of the Act. 8. This fact is not in dispute that if the sum of Rs. 792/- deposited by the Petitioners was added to the sum of Rs. 250/- deposited by them on the first date of hearing the entire amount contemplated by Section 20(4) stood deposited. As such the Petitioners were apparently entitled to an order relieving them against their liability for eviction on the ground contained in Section 20(2)(a) of the Act and the suit was liable to be dismissed. On the dismissal of the suit for ejectment the landlord Respondents were apparently not entitled to any decree for use and occupation of the accommodation till the date of delivery of possession. 9. At this place it may be pointed out that in the impugned orders the Judge, Small Causes, and the District Judge have made observations that since Respondents 3 and 4 were not substituted in place of their predecessor-in-interest Ram Chandra after his death in proceedings u/s 7-C(2) of U.P. Act III of 1947 and the deposits continued to be made in favour of dead person the Petitioners were not entitled to get any benefit because of the aforesaid deposits made by them. I find it difficult to agree with this view. On the plane language of Section 7-C(2) and 7-C(5) of U.P. Act III of 1947 it is apparent that when a dispute arose about the title to receive the rent of the accommodation under his tenancy, the Petitioners became entitled to deposit the rent u/s 7-C(2) of U.P. Act III of 1947. This deposit, strictly speaking, was not to be in the name of any of the claimants to the said accommodation but for the benefit of and being paid over to such of the claimants who was ultimately found to be entitled to receive the rent thereof. This deposit, strictly speaking, was not to be in the name of any of the claimants to the said accommodation but for the benefit of and being paid over to such of the claimants who was ultimately found to be entitled to receive the rent thereof. As such the deposits made in proceedings u/s 7-C(2) of U.P. Act III of 1947 by the Petitioners would not become invalid simply because Ram Chandra predecessor-in-interest of Respondents 3 and 4 had died and Respondents 3 and 4 had not been substituted in his place when some of the various deposits were made. All the deposits were made by the Petitioners for being paid over to the person ultimately found to be entitled to those deposits and in view of Sub-section (6) of Section 7-C of U.P. Act III of 1947 the effect of the rent being deposited as aforesaid was that "it shall be deemed that the rent has been duly paid by the tenant to the landlord." 10. In view of the aforesaid discussion it is apparent that Ram Chandra, having been found by this Court in Second Appeal No. 3812 of 1979 to be the owner of the accommodation in dispute, was held to be entitled to receive the rent deposited by the Petitioners u/s 7-C(2) of U.P. Act III of 1947 and on his death, Respondents 3 and 4 who were his heirs became apparently entitled to receive the same. In this connection it is of significance that the Petitioners do not appear to have raised any dispute about the right of Respondents 3 and 4 to receive the rent after the death of Ram Chandra. Indeed when they made a prayer for the sum of Rs. 792/- deposited by them u/s 7-C(2) of U.P. Act III of 1947 being treated as a part of the deposit u/s 20(4) of U.P. Act XIII of 1972 they took a positive stand that the sum of Rs. 792/- be treated as a deposit made "unconditionally" u/s 20(4) of U.P. Act XIII of 1972 and thereby agreed in its forthwith withdrawal by Respondents 3 and 4. I accordingly hold that there is absolutely no impediment whatsoever in the sum of Rs. 792/- be treated as a deposit made "unconditionally" u/s 20(4) of U.P. Act XIII of 1972 and thereby agreed in its forthwith withdrawal by Respondents 3 and 4. I accordingly hold that there is absolutely no impediment whatsoever in the sum of Rs. 792/- aforesaid being forthwith withdrawn by Respondents 3 and 4 and I have no doubt that on an application being made by Respondents 3 and 4 in this behalf the Court where the aforesaid sum of Rs. 792/- stands deposited will permit them to withdraw the same. 11. In the result the writ petition succeeds and is allowed and the impugned orders dated 6th April, 1981, and 2nd March, 1982, passed by the Judge Small Causes, Mirzapur, and the District Judge, Mirzapur, respectively are quashed. In the circumstances of the case, however, there shall be no order as to costs.