JUDGMENT 1. DEBA Prokash Sett has filed this Appeal from Original order Against the order dated 26th February, 1979 passed by the learned Judge, 4th Bench, City Civil Court. adjudicating his claim under Rule 98 of Order 21 of the Civil Procedure Code. An application had been made by the decree-holder respondent, Hari Prosad Malllick, inter-alia, complaining that the appellant and others, without any just cause, had resisted and obstructed execution of a decree for recovery of possession obtained by him against Mrs. Clarice: Munks in respect of the ground floor suite no. 1 of Premises No. 4, Wood street, Calcutta. Hari Prosad Mullick, the said decree-holder has filed a revisional application under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the order dated 21st September, 1982 passed by the learned Judge, 13th Bench, city Civil Court rejecting his objection that the Title Suit No. 678 of 1980 brought by the said Deba Prokash Sett against him, was not maintainable. 2. WE have heard analogously the appeal and the revisional application which involve many common questions of law and fact. For the reasons, presently indicated the appeal preferred by deba Prokash Sett ought to be dismissed and the revisional application presented by Hari Prosad Mullick ought to be allowed in the manner indicated hereinafter. It appears that in August, 1961 Hari prosad Mullick and three others had jointly granted in favour of the afore-said Mrs. Clarice Munks a lease for a period of 21 years of the said suite no. 1 in the ground floor of No. 4, Wood Street, Calcutta. The petitioner, Hari Prasad Mullick has annexed to his revisional application a copy of a registered deed of partition dated 13th February, 1965 purporting to allot exclusively in his share the aforesaid suit property. 3. ON or about 20th July, 1972 Hari prosad Mullick had instituted Title suit No. 780 of 1972 against Mrs. Clarice Munks in the City Civil Court at calcutta, inter-alia, for recovery of possession of the aforesaid suit no. 1 in the ground floor of no. 4, Wood Street, calcutta and on 13th of July, 1973 bad obtained an exparte decree against her. The decree-holder Hari Prosad Mullick, thereafter filed Title Execution case Mo. 93 of 1973 for executing the said decree for recovery of possession against the judgment debtor, Mrs. Clarice Munks. 1 in the ground floor of no. 4, Wood Street, calcutta and on 13th of July, 1973 bad obtained an exparte decree against her. The decree-holder Hari Prosad Mullick, thereafter filed Title Execution case Mo. 93 of 1973 for executing the said decree for recovery of possession against the judgment debtor, Mrs. Clarice Munks. In the said execution case the decree holder had filed an application under order 21 Rule 97 of the Civil Procedure code making the aforesaid judgment debtor the appellant Deba Prokash Sett and another person as opposite parties. The decree holder had prayed for issue of a fresh writ of delivery of possession with police help. The said application was registered as Misc. case no. 93 of 1973. Thereupon, the appellant the said Deba Prokash Sett, had appeared in the said Misc. Case and had prayed that he may be added as an opposite party. After contested hearing in course of which the parties adduced evidence, as already stated, the learned Judge, 4th bench, City Civil Court at Calcutta has allowed the decree holder's application under order 21 Rule 97 of the Code and has permitted him to take possession of the premises with police help. The said order of the trial court in terms of Rule 103 of order 21 of the Civil Procedure code has the force of a decree and the appellant has preferred the instant miscellaneous appeal. In our view, there is no merit in the said appeal preferred by the said Deba Prokash Sett. The learned Judge of the court below has after rightly held that the lease in favour of mrs. Clarice Munks which was entered into after commencement of the- West bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 and was for a term of 21 years was governed by the Transfer of Property Act. The lessee herself and persons claiming under her, inter- alia, were not entitled to protection under the aforesaid Rent Control legislation. 4. MR. Ranjit Kumar Banerjee, learned Advocate, appearing on behalf of. The lessee herself and persons claiming under her, inter- alia, were not entitled to protection under the aforesaid Rent Control legislation. 4. MR. Ranjit Kumar Banerjee, learned Advocate, appearing on behalf of. the appellant, himself has fairly submitted that in view of the long catena of reported cases he is unable to contend that in case of a sub-lease or a sub-tenant who does not enjoy the protection under the Rent Control legislation a decree passed against the lessee would be binding even though such sub-lessee was not made a party in the suit brought by the lessor against his lessee. In the instant case, the lease held by Mrs. Clarice Munks was purported to be terminated by forfeiture and, thereafter, a decree has been obtained by Hari prasad Mullick against her. Therefore, unless the said decree is vitiated by fraud or contusion, the present appellant cannot successfully assail the said decree or can resist or obstruct the decree holder from recovering possession, if necessary, by removing the appellant who claims to be a sub-lessee. The appellant in his petitions filed in the court below did not give particulars of any fraud or collusion vitiating the decree obtained by Hari Prasad mullick against Mrs. Clarice Munks. At the trial no evidence in this behalf was adduced by the appellant on whom the burden of proof lay. In the concluding part of his deposition Satya Prokash sett, the elder brother of the appellant, was constrained to admit "as Mrs. Munks is agreeable to execute any document on receiving payment, I do not think that Title Suit between the petitioner and Mrs. Munks is collusive". In view of this statement the appellant can no longer contend that he had any right to resist the execution of the decree in question. The learned Judge has rightly found that there is nothing to show that the decree obtained by Hari prosad Mullick was fraudulent or collusive. Hari Prosad Mallick was not bound to make Deb Prokash Sett the sublessee, a defendant in his suit, against mrs. Munks. Therefore, mere omission to add the sub-lessee as a defendant in the said suit brought by Hari Prosad mullick was not fraudulent. No secret arrangement has been proved between the d0ecree-holder and the judgment debtor. Hari Prosad Mallick was not bound to make Deb Prokash Sett the sublessee, a defendant in his suit, against mrs. Munks. Therefore, mere omission to add the sub-lessee as a defendant in the said suit brought by Hari Prosad mullick was not fraudulent. No secret arrangement has been proved between the d0ecree-holder and the judgment debtor. In this connection, the court below had rightly relied upon the observations of the Supreme Court in Rupchand v. Raghubanshi A. I. R. 1964 S. C. 1889, regarding the extent of a right of a sublessee to challenge an exparte decree for ejectment passed against the head lessee. In the above view, the claimant deb Prokash Sett had no just cause for resisting or obstructing the execution of the aforesaid decree. The First Miscellaneous Appeal preferred by Deb Prokash Sett accordingly fails. T. We now proceed to consider the re-visional application filed by Hari Prosad Mullick. Under orders of our learned brother, His Lordship the Hon'ble mr. Justice A. K. Janah dated 10th December, 1981, the court below has heard as a preliminary question whether title suit no. 678 of 1980 instituted by Deb prokash Sett against the petitioner Hari prosad Mullick is maintainable in view of the amended provisions contained, in rules 101 and 103 of Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The learned Judge of the court below was patently wrong in holding that in view of section 15 of the General Clauses Act read with section 97 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 (Act 104 of 1976), the suit in question was maintainable and not hit by the amended rule 101 of Order 21 of the Civil Procedure Code. Presumably, the attention of the learned Judge of the court below was not drawn to sub-section (3) of section 97 of the Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 which made the amended provisions of the Code applicable to suits, appeals and proceedings pending at the date of commencement of the amended provisions, i.e., 1st of february, 1977. In fact, the aforesaid misc. case no. 353 of 1974 was decided by the learned Judge 4th Bench, City civil Court according to the amended provisions of rules 97 to 103 of Order 21 of the Code. In fact, the aforesaid misc. case no. 353 of 1974 was decided by the learned Judge 4th Bench, City civil Court according to the amended provisions of rules 97 to 103 of Order 21 of the Code. The appellant himself had also preferred the aforesaid Fist Miscellaneous Appeal on the footing, as if the order complained of in appeal was a decree. The learned Judge of the court below who passed the order complained of in the revisional application had failed to appreciate the special facts of the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Shesh Kumar Pradhan Sheshdeo v. Keshbo s/o narayan Aghariya and others A. I. R. 1980 M. P. 166. In the said reported case not only the proceedings were pending from before the commencement of the code of Civil Procedure. (Amendment)Act, 1976, but the order complained of in the High Court had been passed also before the commencement of the Civil procedure Code (Amendment) Act, Our attention has been drawn to the recent division Bench decision of the Madhya pradesh High Court in Dattatray v. Mangal and another A. I. R. 1933 M. P. 82, which had considered and explained the said decision in the case of Shesh kumar Prodhan Sheshdeo vs. Keshbo s/o Narayan Aghariya and others (supra), and their two other earlier decisions. The said latter Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court has held that if an order is passed by an executing court after 1st February, 1977 disposing of an application under Order 21 rule 97 of the Code which was pending on that date, the order passed by the executing court would be appealable under the provisions of the amended Code and the aggrieved party has no right to file a suit under the provisions of the Code as it stood before its amendment. The Division Bench also held that in view of section 97 (3) of the Amendment Act, the amended code would be applicable to proceedings and suits pending at the date of its commencement. We respectfully agree with the observations made in the said reported decision and by applying the ratio of the said decision hold that the suit brought by Deb Prosad Sett challenging the adjudication made in Misc. We respectfully agree with the observations made in the said reported decision and by applying the ratio of the said decision hold that the suit brought by Deb Prosad Sett challenging the adjudication made in Misc. Case No. 93 of 1973 was not maintainable in view of the provisions of Order 21, Rule 101 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 8. In the instant case, we are not required to consider the wider question whether a person can at all institute a suit for establishing that he is not bound by decree passed against a third party. The precise question before us is when the executing court has already investigated the complaint of resistance or obstruction made against a person and has come to the finding that he has no just cause to resist or obstruct execution of the decree, whether such an unsuccessful resistor or obstructor can institute an independent suit challenging the determination made under the provisions set out in rules 97 to 103 of order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The language of the statute in clearly against the contention of the plaintiff/opposite party that the suit brought by him is maintainable. Under the unamended Rule 103 of Order 21 of the Code any party not being a judgment debtor against whom an order is made under rule 98 and 101 could institute a suit to establish the right which he claims to present possession of the property. The civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1976 has substituted the said Rule 103 of order 21 under which such orders are to be treated as decrees, i.e., as adjudications conclusively determining the rights of the parties with regard to all matters specified in Rule 101 of Order 21 of the Code. Under the amended provisions of Rule 101 of Order 21 of the Code all questions (including the questions of right, title or interest in the property) arising between the parties to a proceeding on an application under Rule 97 or rule 99 and relevant to the adjudication of the application shall be determined by the court dealing with the application and not by a separate suit. For this purpose the legislature by, inter- alia, using the expression "be deemed to have jurisdiction to decide such questions under rule 101 of Order 21 has introduced a legal fiction and has overridden any contrary law and has vested the executing court with powers greater than those conferred by section 47 of the Code. 9. Plainly the object of enacting these new provisions under Rules 97 to 103 is to avoid delay and prolongation of proceeding relating to execution of decree for recovery of possession of immovable property by providing for conclusive adjudication of all questions arising between the parties to the application under the said provisions. When questions have been determined by the executing court a separate suit would be barred. In the instant case such determination has been already made in the aforesaid Misc. case under Order 21 rule 97 of the Code. We have already affirmed the order of the trial court upon the said application. 10. We are unable to accept the submission of Mr. Ranjit Kumar Banerjee that the scope of the instant suit was not covered by the provisions of Order 21 Rules 97 to 101 of the Code. In the trial court both parties and the court itself had proceeded an the basis that the suit was substantially in terms of the repealed rule of 103 of order 21 of the Code. The trial court was obviously of the view that the suit was maintainable because of the saving provisions provided in section 97 (2) of the Civil procedure Code (Amendment) Act 1976. We set out hereunder prayer (a) made in the suit brought by the opposite party Deb prokash Sett: declaration that the premises No. 4/a, Wood Street, Calcutta-16 still being a joint property, Title Suit No. 780 of 1972 at the instance of the defendant no. 1 alone excluding the other co-sharers (the owners of the said premises and the lessors of the registered lease deed dated 1.8.61 in favour, of defendant no. 3, as mentioned in para 1 of the plaint) against the defendant no. 3, along without impleading the plaintiff an accepted sub-lessee on the ground of forfeiture of the lease for non-payment of rent beyond the scope of the said registered deed of Lease was illegal and the decree passed in the said exparte against the defendant along was collusive, fraudulent procured by the defendant no. 3, along without impleading the plaintiff an accepted sub-lessee on the ground of forfeiture of the lease for non-payment of rent beyond the scope of the said registered deed of Lease was illegal and the decree passed in the said exparte against the defendant along was collusive, fraudulent procured by the defendant no. 1 in fraud of the lease under plaintiff and as such is illegal and not binding on the plaintiff and title execution case no. 93 of 1973 for execution of the said decree against the plaintiff and the order for police help passed in misc. case no. 353 of 1974 for executing the said decree against the plaintiff are all illegal and the said Execution case is not maintainable as against the plaintiff and the said decree is not executable as against the plaintiff. Alternatively the plaintiff has had become a direct tenant under the original lessors of the registered lease deed dated 1.8.61 of defendant no. 3, after the decree passed against the defendant no. 3, in title suit no. 78 of 1972 on the same terms and conditions as the plaintiff has been holding his sub-lease under the defendant no. 3. " 11. The said relief claimed in the suit can no longer be granted. Therefore, to that extent the principal prayer made and the consequential reliefs claimed on the basis of such principal prayer must be held not at all entertainable in a separate suit. We accordingly make the Rule absolute, set aside the order complained of in revision. The matter is remitted back to the trial court to pass appropriate orders In accordance with law. No separate order is necessary on the alternative application. The alternative application is disposed of. 12. The appeal is dismissed without any order as to costs. Let usual communication be sent, to the court below. No formal decree need be prepared. Appeal dismissed. Re visional application allowed.