JUDGMENT K.N. Misra, J. - This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is directed against the order dated 4-5-1982 passed by S.D.O. Lucknow, Opposite Party No. 3, by which suit for declaration u/s 229-B of U.P. ZA and LR Act, concerning plot Nos. 1252, 218 and 454 situated in village Bargawan, Pargana Bijanore, Tahsil and District Lucknow, was dismissed. 2. None appeared on behalf of opposite party No. 2 although notices was served on them. Sri. U.P. Singh Advocate has put in appearance on behalf of opposite parties Nos. 4 to 10, while learned State Counsel represents opposite parties Nos. 1 and 3. 3. Briefly stated the facts of the case are as follows: Petitioners filed a suit for declaration u/s 229-B of the U.P. ZA and LR Act in the Court of S.D.O. Lucknow on 7-6-1979 seeking declaration to the effect that they are Bhumidhar in possession of the land in suit to the exclusion of the other Defendants, namely, Tej Kishan Dhaon, Pratap Kishan Dhaon, Anand Kishan Dhaon, Rup Kishan Dhaon, Kamla Kishan Dhaon, Jai Kishan Dhaon and Vinay Kishan Dhaon, who have been arrayed as opposite parties Nos. 4 to 10 in the writ petition. A perusal of the plaint (Annexure-2) indicates that the Petitioners claimed Bhumidbari rights over the aforesaid plots on the ground that these plots, together with other land, originally belonged to Sri. H.K. Dhaon the grand-father of Petitioners Nos. 1 and 2. After his death, it devolved upon his sons, namely, opposite parties, Nos. 4 to 10 and Sri. Bijal Kishan Dhaon the deceased father of Petitioners Nos. 1 and 2. It is pleaded in the plaint that a partition suit was filed in the Civil Courts in respect of the properties of Late Sri. H.K. Dhaon including the aforesaid three plots and the said Regular Suit No. 43 of 1960 was decided on the basis of a compromise arrived at by way of family setdement and by decree dated 24-8-1960, passed by learned Civil Judge Mohanlalganj, the aforesaid plots and certain other property fell in the share of Sri. B.K. Dhaon the deceased father of Petitioners Nos. 1 and 2 and husband of Petitioner No. 3. Sri. B.K. Dhaon came in possession as sole Bhumidhar of the aforesaid plots. After his death Petitioners Nos. B.K. Dhaon the deceased father of Petitioners Nos. 1 and 2 and husband of Petitioner No. 3. Sri. B.K. Dhaon came in possession as sole Bhumidhar of the aforesaid plots. After his death Petitioners Nos. 1 and 2 their brother R.K. Dhaon succeeded as Bhumidhars and came in possession of the same. R.K. Dhaon, the third brother of Petitioners Nos. 1 and 2, is said to have died unmarried in September 1971 and his interest in the land in question devolved upon Petitioner No. 3 being his mother. It was further pleaded in the plaint that certain wrong entries in revenue records were made by the Lekhpal in collusion with the Defendants and they asserted their rights over plots Nos. 1252 and 218 on which wrong entries continued in the name of Sri. H.K. Dhaon inspite of the aforesaid decree and also wrong entry continued as Ban jar on plot no 454 also on plot No. 1252 as Parti Jadid. Hence there arose the necessity for filing the suit for declaration. This suit wast filed after serving notice u/s 80 CPC on State Government on 17-10-P77 and Nagar Mahapalika on 19-10-1977. The village is situated within the limits of Nagar Mahapalika Lucknow, hence Nagar Mahapalika was also impleaded as a party. No contest was put in on behalf of opposite party No. 1 and opposite parties Nos. 4 to 10 Opposite parties Nos. 5 to 8 even admitted the claim of the Petitioners by filing written statement dated 30-6-1980. It appears that application was moved on behalf of Nagar Mahapalika in the aforesaid suit on 22-3-1982 wherein it was asserted that the title in the land in dispute is to be decided by the District Judge in Civil Court concerned u/s 18 read with Section 30 (apparently wrongly quoted for Section 31) of Land Acquisition Act that plot No. 218 has been under this scheme and possession taken over. Therefore, further proceedings in the above-noted case be dropped and the suit be consigned to records. Plot Nos. 454 and 1258 of village Burgawan were acquired vide notification in 247/XXXVII-2-15LA-76 dated 29-4-1980. On this application the S.D.O. passed the impugned order dated 4-5-1982, which read as follows: Heard the learned Counsel for N.M.P. None of the parties is present. Since the land has already been acquired, the case cannot proceed. The suit is dismissed, file is consigned to record. On this application the S.D.O. passed the impugned order dated 4-5-1982, which read as follows: Heard the learned Counsel for N.M.P. None of the parties is present. Since the land has already been acquired, the case cannot proceed. The suit is dismissed, file is consigned to record. The Petitioners have challenged this order in the present writ petition. 4. Learned Counsel for the Petitioners contended that since the title suit was filed prior to the aforesaid notification regarding acquisition of land in dispute and, as such, the said suit cannot he held to have become infructuous and it was not liable to be dismissed. Learned Counsel contended that the S.D.O. legally erred in holding that since the land in suit has been acquired and, as such, the case cannot proceed. He urged that since there is no provision under the Land Acquisition Act which would make pending suits liable to be dismissed, upon acquisition of the land in dispute under Land Acquisition Act, the impugned order passed by the S.D.O. is patently erroneous and he has failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in him in law to decide the suit on merits. 5. In reply the learned State Counsel, referring to the provisions of Sections 18 and 31 of the Land Acquisition Act, contended that for determining the dispute between the claimants in respect of the land in dispute, the Collector has to refer the case to Civil Courts for determination of any dispute as to title, to receive compensation, or as to apportionment of the same. In other words, it was contended that since the disputed question of title, with regard to the land under acquisition, was to be referred under Sections 18 and 31 of the Land Acquisition Act, and as such the suit, which was although pending since prior to the notification under Land Acquisition Act, could not be determined and deserved to be dismissed. I am unable to agree with this contention. It is not disputed that the present suit was filed prior to the aforesaid notification for acquisition of plot No. 454. It is also not disputed that other two plots in Suit Nos. 1252 and 218 are not subjected to acquisition proceedings and only one plot, namely, 454 is under acquisition by the aforesaid notification. The present suit was filed in respect of aforesaid plot No. 454 and other plots on 7-6-1979. It is also not disputed that other two plots in Suit Nos. 1252 and 218 are not subjected to acquisition proceedings and only one plot, namely, 454 is under acquisition by the aforesaid notification. The present suit was filed in respect of aforesaid plot No. 454 and other plots on 7-6-1979. It was pending on the date when the notification dated 29-4-1980 was made in respect of plot No. 454, The suit was filed before the competent Court u/s 229-B of UP ZA and LR Act and in this suit title of the disputed land was to be determined. There is no provision under the Land Acquisition Act or under U.P. ZA and LR Act which would make such pending suits infructuous in respect of the land notified for acquisition. In the absence of any such provision in the aforesaid relevant enactments, I am of opinion that the suit could not be dismissed merely because one of the plots in suit was notified for acquisition under Land Acquisition Act. The title of the parties could be adjudicated upon on merits in the aforesaid suit which was pending on the date of notification. Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act provides that: Any person interested who has not accepted the award may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court, whether his objection be to the measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation, the persons to whom it is payable, or the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested. The application moved for reference u/s 18 of the Act is required to contain the grounds on which objection to the award is taken. The provisions contained in Section 18 of the Act would relate to objection to the award by the person interested. If anyone contests the claim of the person in whose favour the award has been given, he can also apply for determination of his claim. The provision contained in Section 31 requires that on naming an award u/s 11, the Collector shall tender payment of the compensation awarded by him to the persons interested entitled thereto according to the award, and shall pay it to them unless prevented by some one or more of the contingencies mentioned in Sub-section (2) of Section 31 of the Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 31 of the Act, inter alia, provides that: If they shall not consent to receive it, or if there be no person competent to alienate the land, or if there be any dispute as to the title to receive the compensation or as to the apportionment of it, the Collector shall deposit the amount of the compensation in the Court to which a reference u/s 18 would be submitted. Third proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 31 of the Act provides that nothing herein contained shall affect the liability of any person, who may receive the whole or any part of any compensation awarded under this Act, to pay the same to the person lawfully entitled thereto, (Emphasis-herein in italics-mine). This proviso indicates that even after the return of award the person who receives the compensation would be bound to pay the same to the person lawfully entitled to such compensation and, as such, the person to be entitled to such compensation can, therefore, be determined even after the award is made under the Act. There is thus no bar to the filing of the suit for declaration of title in respect of the land in dispute under acquisition by a person claiming to be lawfully entitled to it. When such a declaration of title can be secured by filing title suit, after making an award, I find it difficult to accept that already pending title suit will become infructuous on the publication of notification regarding acquisition of land in suit. In the absence of any provision making such suits to abate or to have become infructuous, the pending title suit on the date of notification have got to be decided on merits irrespective of notification regarding acquisition of land in suit. The final decision in the said pending title suit will be binding on the parties and the person who is held to be tenure-holder/owner of the land in question will be entitled to compensation awarded in respect of the land under acquisition. The S.D.O., therefore, acted illegally in dismissing the suit merely because one of the plots in suit was acquired. He has apparently over-looked to consider that two other plots in suit Nos. 1252 and 218 were not subject-matter of acquisition in Land Acquisition proceedings. The S.D.O., therefore, acted illegally in dismissing the suit merely because one of the plots in suit was acquired. He has apparently over-looked to consider that two other plots in suit Nos. 1252 and 218 were not subject-matter of acquisition in Land Acquisition proceedings. The suit is, therefore, liable to be decided on merits in respect of all the three plots in suit. 6. The impugned order dated 4-5-1982 appears to have been passed behind the back of the Petitioners and on the application moven on behalf of Nagar Mahapalika. This erroneous order would not have been passed if the S.D.O. would have given hearing to the Petitioners before passing the said order. 7. It is contended that the Petitioners have remedy available to them against the impugned order by going up in appeal or revision and, therefore, this Court should not interfere with the impugned order. Existence of an alternative remedy is not absolute bar to entertaining writ petition. This Court, in exercise to powers under Article 226 of the Constitution, will not hesitate in entertaining the petition and consider the validity of an order which has been passed by a subordinate Court refusing to exercise jurisdiction in deciding the case on merits by taking an altogether erroneous view of law. When there is a patent error in exercise of jurisdiction and the Court has refused to decide the case on merits by erroneously holding that the suit is not maintainable as the land in suit has been acquired, this Court would not refuse to interfere merely on the ground that the Petitioners have got a remedy to file appel or revision against the impugned order. No doubt, it would be correct to say that where the suit would not be entertainable or that it would abate and be liable to be dismissed having become infructuous on account of happening of certain event legally taking away jurisdiction of the Court to deal with the matter and decide the suit on merits, there would be no occasion for interference by this Court in exercise of its extra-ordinary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. But, where the error in refusing to exercise jurisdiction by the Court is quite apparent and it does not involve determination of any disputed question of fact, this Court would not hestitate in interfering with the order in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In such an apparent matter of refusal to exercise jurisdiction by Court to decide the case on merits by taking an altogether erroneous legal view, it would be inapt and also not in the interest of justice to direct the party to have recourse to normal statutory remedy against the impugned order, which is likely to consume more time, before appellate and revisional Court. The existence of alternative remedy is no absolute bar. Writ shall issue to correct the jurisdictional error of inferior Court or tribunal although appeal would lie to a statutory appellate authority or tribunal. See State of U.P. v. Mohammad Nooh AIR 1958 SC 86 . In another decision Assistant Collector of Central Excise Vs. Jainson Hosiery Industries, AIR 1979 SC 1889 the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the question sounded a note of caution observing that unless High Court is satisfied that the normal statutory remedy is likely to be too dilatory or difficult to give reasonable quick relief, it should be loath to act under Article 276. In the present case, I find that the error in exercise of jurisdiction is quite apparent on the face of the record. The remedy regarding filing appeal or revision, available to the Petitioners, would certainly take longer time to decide the matter. The proceedings regarding acquisition of one of the plots in suit are also pending, and so it would serve better the ends of justice if the suit which has been dismissed apparently on erroneous grounds be restored and decided on merits expeditiously. In that view of the matter, it appears to be fit case for exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution specially when the impugned order is per se unwarranted in law and the Court below has, by taking an erroneous view, wrongly refused to exercise jurisdiction vested in it. The title suit of the Petitioners could not be dismissed as has been done by the impugned order. 8. The title suit of the Petitioners could not be dismissed as has been done by the impugned order. 8. The Petitioners have averred that they had applied for correction of papers on the basis of decree passed in Regular Suit No. 43 of 1960 and had obtained Naib Tehsildar's report dated 7-7-1962, contained in Annexure-3, and order for correction of papers was passed by S.D.O. Lucknow Sri. I.V. Tyagi on 31-7-1962, a copy of which is annexed as Annexure-4. Learned Counsel for the Petitioners also referred to two decrees passed in ejectment suits in favour of the Petitioner's father Sri. R.K. Dhaon in respect of plot No. 1252, but since all these orders were not incorporated in the relevant records and as such the name of the Petitioner's father was not recorded as Bhumidhar over the aforesaid plots in suit. The Petitioners were, therefore, compelled to file the present suit for declaration of their Bhumidhari rights in the land in suit. He further contended that the Petitioner's title stands established by the above referred evidence and they, deserve to be declared as Bhumidhars of the land in suit. No doubt the aforesaid clinching relevant evidence prima facie goes to establish Bhumidhari title of the Petitioners in the plots in suit, but this will be considered by the S.D.O. while deciding the suit on merits. 9. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is hereby allowed. The impugned order dated 4-5-1982, passed by S.D.O. Lucknow, contained in Annexure-1 to the writ petition, is hereby quashed and the S.D.O. Lucknow is directed to restore the case to its original number and decide it on merits after giving full opportunity of hearing to the parties. 10. In the circumstances, parties shall bear their own costs.