JUDGMENT.- The petitioners are brothers. Petitioner No. 1 obtained a licence under clause (3) of the Andhra Pradesh Kerosene (Licensing and Distribution) Order 1965 (hereinafter called “the Kerosene Distribution Order”), to distribute kerosene as a retail dealer to the consumer public. On 10th January, 1977, P.W. 3, the Inspector of Police, Vigilance Cell visited the shop of the petitioner at 5 p.m. and found the second petitioner, brother of the licensee distributing kerosene to the consumer public. The opening stock balance of kerosene in the shop was shown in the stock book to be one hundred and eightly litres. But on actual verification it was found to be containing one hundred and thirteen litres. Thereby there was a shortage of sixty seven litres. When explanations were called for from the petitioners, it was stated by them that due to rush of transaction of business, they could not maintain the bills in the proper order, but they in fact distributed kerosene to the consumer public and therefore they did not contravene the conditions of the licence issued under the above Kerosene Distribution Order. Thereafter P.W. 3 gave a report and P.W. 2, the Sub-Inspector of Police, Prathipadu having jurisdiction issued the first information report Exhibit P-1. After investigation, P.W. 4, the Sub-Inspector of Police, Prathipadu laid the report, which was taken on file by the trial Magistrate. The Magistrate framed a charge against the petitioners under section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act read with clause (8) of the Kerosene Distribution Order. On adduction of evidence and consideration thereof and having been satisfied with the same, the Magistrate held that the petitioners have committed the offence punishable under section 7 , Essential Commodities Act and convicted them for an offence under section 7 (1) (a) (i) and sentenced them toundergo simple imprisonment for six months and also pay a fine of Rs. 2,000. In default of payment fine, two months simple imprisonment was awarded. As against the said conviction and sentences, the petitioners went in appeal to the Sessions Court. The Court of Sessions Division, East Godavari at Rajahmundry, while confirming the conviction, altered the same from section 7 (1) (a) (i) into section 7 (1) (a) (ii) but reduced the sentence of simple imprisonment from six months to three months while confirming the sentence of fine. The Court of Sessions Division, East Godavari at Rajahmundry, while confirming the conviction, altered the same from section 7 (1) (a) (i) into section 7 (1) (a) (ii) but reduced the sentence of simple imprisonment from six months to three months while confirming the sentence of fine. As against the altered conviction under section 7 (1) (a) (ii), and sentence, the above revision case has been filed. 2. Though Sri M.S.K. Sastry, the learned Counsel for the petitioners initially made a feeble attempt to canvass the correctness of the factual finding, he fairly did not pursue the contention on facts, but laid great stress on the question of law. The question of law he argued is this: The trial Court convicted the accused for an offence under section 7 (1) (a) (i). The sentence provided under section 7 is only one year. If that conviction is to be upheld, then the complaint has to be laid within one year from the date of detection of the crime. Admittedly the crime was detected on 10th January, 1977, whereas the report was laid of 16th June, 1979, by which time more than one year has elapsed. As a consequence, the learned Magistrate ceased to have any jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence unless satisfactory explanation has been given by the prosecution. In this case there is no explanation given. Therefore this conviction is without jurisdiction. Alternatively, the learned Counsel contended that when the appeal was filed, the appellate Court has to consider only the legality of the conviction made under section 7(1) (a) (i) in exercise of its power under section 386 (b) (ii) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The appellate Court altered only the conviction while maintaining the sentence. It has no power to alter the very basis of the prosecution, viz., the charge which was not framed by the trial Court. In other words, the learned Counsel contends that the appellate Court convict the accused for a higher offence when the trial Court convicted them for a lessor offence. This was done only with a view to cause prejudice to the petitioners to avoid the bar of limitation pleaded by them. Therefore the learned Counsel contends that the appellate Court, apart from committing illegality in the disposal of the appeal, has not adverted to this correct legal position. This was done only with a view to cause prejudice to the petitioners to avoid the bar of limitation pleaded by them. Therefore the learned Counsel contends that the appellate Court, apart from committing illegality in the disposal of the appeal, has not adverted to this correct legal position. In support of these contentions, the learned Counsel relied upon The State of Andhra Pradesh v. Thadi Narayana1 and Lakhan Mahto and others v. State of Bihar2. He further contends that when the petitioners v ere convicted for a lesser offence under section 7(1)(a) (i) , it must be deemed that they have been convicted for an offence under section 7 (1) (a) (ii) of the Essential Commodities Act. In support of this contention, he relied upon Amanda Kishore Mohanty v. State3. 3. The learned Public Prosecutor on the other hand contended that the trial Court has committed an error in applying section 7 (1) (a) (i). In fact the record discloses that the offence under section 7 (1) (a) (ii) has been proved. He sought to support one judgment of the appellate Court on the ground that the intendment of the Act is only to prevent contravention of the provisions of the Essential Commodities Act and when the Distribution Order is contravened, it amounts to contravening the provisions of the Act. Therefore, the conviction altered by the appellate Court is perfectly legal. 4. Upon these respective contentions, the question that arises for consideration is: What is the charges against the accused which are put on notice and what is the evidence adduced in this case: The first charge framed by the trial Court is this: “Firstly.-That on 10th January, 1977, at about 5 p.m. it was found that there was a shortage of 67 litres of Kerosene when the stocks were compared with the stock register and also failed to issue receipts for sales conducted by you and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 7 of Essential Commodities Act read with clause (8) of Andhra Pradesh Kerosene Licensing and Distribution Order and within my cognizance.” A reading of this charge would disclose that the petitioners, while distributing kerosene under the Keosene Distribution Order , did not account for the shortage of sixty seven litres of kerosene the stock which was in their custody and thereby they committed an offence under clause (6) of the Keosene Distribution Order. The object of the Kerosene Distribution Order by regulating distribution through licensing system is to make available to the consumer public the essential commodity. Admittedly kerosene is an essential commodity. This Order has been issued under section 3 (2) of the Essential Commodities Act. Therefore the question is: What is the relevant provision of the Act that would be applicable to the facts of this case. Clause 3 of the Kerosene Distribution Order postulates that “No person shall carry on business as a dealer except under and in accordance with the terms and conditions of the licence issued in this behalf of the licensing authority.”Dealer“has been denned under clause 2 ( a) as”a person carrying on the business and selling kerosene, whether wholesale or retail and whether in conjunction with any other business or not, and includes his representative or agent“. Clause 8 of the order postulates that”no holder of licence issued under this Order or his agent or. servant or any person acting on his behalf shall contravene any of the terms and conditions of the licence and if any such holder or his agent or servant or any person acting on his behalf contravenes any of the said terms and conditions then without prejudice to any other action that may be taken against him, the licence may be cancelled or suspended-“Form ‘B’ issued under clause 4 (2) requires a licensee to give a declaration, wherein he has to state that subject to the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Kerosene (Licensing and Distribution) Order, 1965 he is authorised to purchase, sell or store kerosene for sale. Condition (3) thereof postulates the details to be given with regard to the quantity of the stock on each date, etc. Condition 7 (2) (i) directs that the licensee shall issue to every consumer a correct receipt or invoice, as the case may be, giving his name, address and licence number of the consumer, the date of transaction, the quantity sold, the price per litre, etc. A consideration of the above relevant provisions would establish that under this regulatory measure, the petitioners are legally bound to account for the stock of kerosene supplied for distribution and the balance in his possession. Admittedly petitioner No. 1 obtained licence as dealer. If he fails to comply with or to maintain the records, it would be a contravention of the Kerosene Distribution Order. Admittedly petitioner No. 1 obtained licence as dealer. If he fails to comply with or to maintain the records, it would be a contravention of the Kerosene Distribution Order. Both the Courts below concurrently found as a fact that the petitioner No. 1 contravened the conditions of the order. I agree and affirm the same. If so, what is the relevant provision of the Essential Commodities Act that is applicable to the facts, has to be considered. 4. Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act was brought on statute to regulate production, supply, distribution, etc., of the essential commodities. Section 3 (2) (d) empowers the State Government, in exercise of the power under section 5 on Delegation of the powers of Central Government read with section 3 , to issue Kerosene Distribution Order with a view to securing equitable distribution and availability at fair prices of the kerosene, which is an essential commodity, regulating the conditions and imposing the prescribed conditions subject to which the distribution is to be made. Therefore the Kerosene Distribution Order has been issued under section 3 (2) (d) of the Essential Commodities Act. 5. In view of this factual position, what is the charge under which the petitioner should be put on trial is the question. Undoubtedly, the charge framed by the Magistrate is merely under section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act read with clause 8 of the Kerosene Distribution Order. Therefore, we have to see what are the facts which constitute the charge. The facts have been clearly stated as extracted earlier in the first charge. From these facts, the next question to be considered is whether the offence would fall under section 7 (1) (a) (i) or under section 7 (1) a) (ii) of the Essential Commodities Act, which read thus: “7. Penalties.-(1) If any person contravenes whether knowingly intentionally or otherwise, any order made under section 3. From these facts, the next question to be considered is whether the offence would fall under section 7 (1) (a) (i) or under section 7 (1) a) (ii) of the Essential Commodities Act, which read thus: “7. Penalties.-(1) If any person contravenes whether knowingly intentionally or otherwise, any order made under section 3. (a) he shall be punishable- (i) in the case of an order made with reference to clause (b) or clause (i) of sub section (2) of that section, with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year and shall also be liable to fine, and (ii) in the case of any other order, with imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years and shall also be liable to fine: Provided that in the case of a first offence, if the Court is of opinion that a sentence of fine only will meet the ends of justice, it may, for reasons to be recorded, refrain from imposing a sentence of imprisonment and in the case of second or subsequent offence, the Court shall impose a sentence of imprisonment and such imprisonment shall not be less than one month……” 6. The above clause (1) or clause (i) of sub- section (2) of section 3 , mentioned in section 7 (1) (a) (i) refers to the orders issued for collecting any information or statistics with a view to regulating or prescribing any of the aforesaid matters ( section 3 (2) (h)) and for requiring a person engaged in the production, supply or distribution of, or trade and commerce, in any essential commodity to maintain and produce for inspection such books, accounts and records relating to their business and to furnish such information relating thereto, as may be specified in the Order. ( Section 7 (2) (i). Therefore, the first charge does not relate to any of these acts referable to in clause (h) of sub- section (2) of section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act. The specific gravamen of the charge made against the petitioner is “to account for the distribution of sixty-seven kilo litres of kerosene as contemplated under the Kerosene Distribution Order.” As stated earlier, it. would apply specifically to orders issued under section 3 (2) (d) of the Essential Commodities Act. Therefore it would fall under section 7 (1)(a) (i). 7. The specific gravamen of the charge made against the petitioner is “to account for the distribution of sixty-seven kilo litres of kerosene as contemplated under the Kerosene Distribution Order.” As stated earlier, it. would apply specifically to orders issued under section 3 (2) (d) of the Essential Commodities Act. Therefore it would fall under section 7 (1)(a) (i). 7. Under those circumstances, the question then immediately arises for consideration is: Whether the learned Sessions Judge is justified in altering the conviction from section 7 (1) (a) (i) into section 7 (1) (a) (ii) As stated earlier, the learned Magistrate ought to have taken these factors into consideration while rendering his judgment. He did not advert to these facts but merely applied a wrong provision of law to base the conviction. The appellate Court considered the correct provision of law and applied it and maintained the conviction. It may be noted here that the appellate Court did not enhance the sentence already imposed by the Magistrate. On the other hand, he reduced the sentence. Therefore, the question is: Whether he has got power to do so? Sri Sastry, learned Counsel for the petitioner relied upon section 386 (b) (ii) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and contended that the Sessions Judge has got the power merely to alter the conviction. I am not disposed to accede to this contention. Section 221 (2) of the Code, postulates that if in any case the accused is charged with one offence and it appears in evidence that he committed a different offence for which he may have been charged under the provisions of sub- section (1), he may be convicted of the offence which is shown to have been committed, although he was not charged with it. In view of this unambiguous and specific provision, I see no illegality committed by the lower appellate Court. 8. The contention of Sri Sastry that the appellate Court has no power to alter the charges for which the accused were acquitted is devoid of any substance on the facts of this case. In this case, as stated earlier, the charge is under section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act. Under these circumstances, there is no prejudice caused to the petitioner by altering the conviction into one under section 7(1) (a) (a) from section 7 (4) (a) (i). In this case, as stated earlier, the charge is under section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act. Under these circumstances, there is no prejudice caused to the petitioner by altering the conviction into one under section 7(1) (a) (a) from section 7 (4) (a) (i). The decision relied upon by he learned Counsel for the petitioners have no application to the facts of this case. Therefore, they need not be considered in extenso. 9. Thus viewed, I am of the opinion that the lower appellate Court has correctly appreciated the legal position and applied the same to the facts of his case and maintained the conviction of the accused. The petitioners have already undergone the sentence of simple imprisonment for a period of seven days. In view of the facts in this case, I am of the view that the imprisonment for the period already undergone by them would meet the ends of justice, subject to sentencing them to pay a further sum of Rs. 1,000 each apart from the fine already imposed by the Magistrate at Rs. 2,000 each. The fine amount of Rs. 2,000 each is reported to have been paid. In default of payment of the (now imposed) i.e., Rs. 1,000 by each of the petitioners they shall undergo simple imprisonment for 15 days. Subject to those modification, the criminal revision case is dismissed. R.S.R. ----- Criminal revision dismissed; sentence modified.