Judgment :- 1. In Deputy Labour Commissioner v. Emmanual, 1979 KLT. 392, a Division Bench of this court (Gopalan Nambiyar, C. J and Balagangadharan Nair, J.) held that the Kerala Payment of Subsistence Allowance Act, 1972 (Act 27 of 1973) will override the provisions of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969 (Act 21 of 1969). 2. A contention that the above judgment did not consider "important questions based on S.2(c) of Act 27 of 1973, R.198(6) of the Co-operative Societies Rules and the decision in AIR. 1963 SC. 1561" persuaded Namboodiripad, J. to refer the matter to be heard by a Division Bench. 3. We may straightaway point out that the submission of counsel about the non-consideration of S.2(c) of Act 27 of 1973 and R.198(6) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules, 1969 is not correct. The Division Bench has made specific reference to the section and the rule in Para.3 of its judgment. In the course of its discussion, the Division Bench observed: "The definition of an 'establishment' is given in S.2(c) of the Act. It is unnecessary to refer to the same" The entire R.198(6) had been extracted earlier in the same paragraph of the judgment The effect and impact of that rule had been considered towards the concluding portion of that paragraph, as also in the last sentence in Para.4 of the judgment. 4. The Division Bench examined the scheme, the purpose and the object of the two enactments and came to the conclusion that the Payment of Subsistence Allowance ct must be regarded as a special Act. The decision of the Supreme Court in The U. P. State Electricity Board and another v. Hari Shanker Jain and others, AIR. 1979 SC. 65 was relied on in support of the above conclusion. Apart from the general principles, S.5 gave a very clear indication about the intention of the Legislature to subordinate other enactments covering the same field, to the provisions of the Payment of Subsistence Allowance Act, 1972, except in the limited contingency where the provisions of the other enactments are more advantageous to the workmen. 5. We are in full agreement with the analysis of the scheme of the two enactments as made by the Division Bench. 6. The co-operative movement had been fairly strong in the State of Kerala. 5. We are in full agreement with the analysis of the scheme of the two enactments as made by the Division Bench. 6. The co-operative movement had been fairly strong in the State of Kerala. The former Madras Presidency, of which the Malabar area of the present State forms a substantial part, was one of those provinces, which introduced an Act dealing with Co-operative Societies way back in 1932-34. The establishments run by the Co-operative Societies were not insignificant in number or inconsiderable in efficacy. The Administration Report of the Department for 1973-74 would indicate that 4361 Societies were active in the State at that time. (See Appendix 1). The Report also would indicate how the working of these establishments had permeated into the life and activities of the people, particularly those in the rural areas. It is quite reasonable to think that the Legislature did attach importance to an enduring industrial peace in these establishments. It is quite conceivable that the Legislature also intended to create a sense of security amongst the employees of such societies and protect them from avoidable harassment arising out of long pending disciplinary proceedings, leaving them in the cold. The objects and reasons of the Bill which ultimately became Act 27 of 1973 would give a clue to, and throw light upon, the legislative intent of the Legislature. Having regard to the background of the enactment, we are of the view that it was farthest from the intention of the Legislature to exclude the employees in the service of the numerous Co-operative Societies, from the purview of the Act. 7. The Co-operative Societies Act is a general enactment, made by the State Legislature on the basis of the legislative power contained in Entry 32, List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India. Of the sixteen Chapters of the enactment, only one, Chapter XII, is devoted to deal with the establishment; and that chapter contains only one section, S.80, out of the total 110 sections in the Act. Matters integrally connected with the concept of co-operation are rightly given importance and predominance in the provisions of the Act. That is the marked phenomenon noticeable in the rules also. Chapter XV of the rules deal with establishment. R.180 to 200 cover that field. Matters integrally connected with the concept of co-operation are rightly given importance and predominance in the provisions of the Act. That is the marked phenomenon noticeable in the rules also. Chapter XV of the rules deal with establishment. R.180 to 200 cover that field. Of these rules only one, R.198(6), deals with the situations of suspension and payments due to an employee during the period" of suspension. 8. Payment of subsistence allowance was a specific and important facet of the suspension proceedings on which the Legislature felt it necessary to express itself separately. Going by these indications the special nature of the enactment cannot, therefore, be doubted at all. The conclusion of the Division Bench about the Payment of Subsistence Allowance being a special enactment, is, if we may say so with respect, perfectly justified. 9. We do not find anything in the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Municipal Council, Palai, v. T. J. Joseph and others, AIR. 1963 SC. 1561, which would justify a different approach or a different conclusion on the question. That decision dealt with a case of implied repeal. The question was whether the provisions of the Travancore District Municipalities Act, 1116 (providing for halting places and cart stands and levy of fees for their use) were impliedly repealed by the Travancore-Cochin Motor Vehicles Act, 1125 which among others, empowered the Government to determine places at which motor vehicles may stand or halt. The Supreme Court held that the intention of the Legislature appeared to be to allow two sets of provisions to coexist and therefore a repeal could not be implied. 10. On the contrary, the view expressed by the Supreme Court in a later decision reported in The Gujarat State Co-operative Land Development Bank Ltd. v. P. R. Mankad and another, AIR. 1979 SC. 1203, confirms the correctness of the conclusion reached by the Division Bench. The case arose in relation to the applicability to a situation covered both by the Bombay Industrial Relations Act and the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act. Though a larger question also arose for consideration, the question whether the Bombay Industrial Relations Act would prevail over the Co-operative Societies Act on the ground of its being a special enactment, was also considered by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision. Though a larger question also arose for consideration, the question whether the Bombay Industrial Relations Act would prevail over the Co-operative Societies Act on the ground of its being a special enactment, was also considered by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision. The point" was formulated at page 1205 as point No. (iii) reading: "(iii) B.I.R. Act is a special law, dealing with the special subject of industrial disputes which in their nature are essentially different from ordinary Civil disputes between an employer and his employee governed by the Law of Contract. B.I.R. Act provides for a special machinery for adjudication of industrial disputes. As against this, the Co-operative Societies Act of 1925/ or of 1961 is a general enactment and it must yield to the B.I.R. Act whenever the provisions of the latter by their language are clearly applicable to a dispute. (Reference has been made to Jullundur Transport Co-operative Society Ltd. v. Punjab State AIR. 1959 Punj. 34). And it was answered in Para.28 of the judgment which reads: "The matter can be looked at from another angle also. The law of industrial disputes or industrial relations is a special law dealing with rights and obligations specially created by it. As against this, the provision in S.54 of the Act of 1925/S. 96 of the Act of 1961 is a general provision. In accordance with the maxim generalia Specialibus non derogant, therefore, nothing in these general provisions can derogate from B.I.R. Act and the Co-operative Society Act must yield to the special provisions in the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, whenever a'dispute clearly comes within the language of the latter Act." 11. The principles discussed by the Supreme Court in Life Insurance Corpn. of India v. D.J. Bahadur, 1981(1) LLJ.1 would also justify the view taken in 1979 KLT. 392 supra. 12. We may also note that the question has now been set at rest by the anodyne amendment of R.198(6) of the Co-operative Societies Rules with effect from 13-1-1981 by G. O. Ms. 498/80/AD dated 30-12-1980 published as SRO. No. 46/81 in Kerala Gazette No. 2 dated 13-1-1981. 392 supra. 12. We may also note that the question has now been set at rest by the anodyne amendment of R.198(6) of the Co-operative Societies Rules with effect from 13-1-1981 by G. O. Ms. 498/80/AD dated 30-12-1980 published as SRO. No. 46/81 in Kerala Gazette No. 2 dated 13-1-1981. Thereunder the last sentence of R.198(6) (which read "An employee under suspension shall be entitled for subsistence allowance at the rates admissible to State Government employees as prescribed under the Kerala Service Rules") was substituted by the present provision reading: "An employee under suspension shall be entitled to subsistence allowance payable under the Kerala Payment of Subsistence Allowance Act, 1972 (27 of 1973)." 13. In the present case, the petitioner-Co-operative Society placed its Secretary, the 2nd respondent herein, under suspension on 20-12-1976. The period of suspension extended up to 20-1-1978. The suspended employee moved by Ext. P1 dated 28-1-1978 the Authority under the Payment of Subsistence Allowance Act. The Authority repelled the objections of the writ petitioner (Ext. P2) and passed an order on 24-11-1978 (Ext. P3) granting a sum of Rs. 3293.65 by way of subsistence allowance. The main objection related to an alleged alternate employment of the suspended employee. The Authority did not accept that objection. There is no scope for interference with that order under Art.226 of the Constitution. 14. Counsel for the petitioner urged yet another contention: that the application was barred by time, not having been filed within one year of the date on which the claim accrued. It is not seen that this contention was urged before the Authority at the time of arguments. The order of the Authority does not discuss the objection, though vaguely alluded to in Ext.P1. Moreover, barring a few days, the entire period covered by Ext. P1 would come well within the one-year period permitted under the Act. There is no scope for interference with Ext. P3, in the above circumstances. 15. In the result, the original petition fails and it is accordingly dismissed but without any order as to costs. Dismissed.