JUDGMENT A. N. Varma, J. - This petition is directed against an order dated 7.1-1982 passed by the learned 13th Additional District Judge, Kanpur, allowing a revision filed by the respondents Nos. 2 to 6, the landlords of the disputed accommodation, against an order dated 23.5.1981 passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Kanpur, whereby the landlords application for review of an order of allotment passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer in favour of the petitioner was rejected. By the impugned order the learned Additional District Judge has also released the accommodation in favour of the landlords on the ground that the same in bona fide required by them for their own use and occupation. 2. The disputed accommodation is a portion of premises No. 83, Cantonment, Kanpur which is admittedly was in the tenancy of one Sri M. R. Mehra. Upon his death his widow was not interested in continuing in occupation of the said premises. The landlords allege that instead of handing over possession to them the widow of Sri Mehra surreptitiously delivered its possession to the petitioner. The petitioner thereupon applied for allotment of the accommodation in his name and succeeded in getting the accommodation allotted to him by an order dated 5.3.1979. The respondents-landlords were not served with any notice under rule 9(3) nor were the mandatory provisions of rule 8(2) of the Rules framed under the U P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting Rent and Eviction) Act. 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) complied with the landlords consequently applied for recall of the order of allotment on the ground that the same had been passed without notice to them. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer, however, dismissed that application of the landlords by an order dated 23.5.1979. Aggrieved by that order the landlords filed a revision which was allowed on 16.2.81 on the ground that no notice was served on the respondents Nos. 2 to 6 herein who were the real landlords of the disputed accommodation and further that mandatory provisions of the aforesaid statute were not complied with. The allotment order dated 5.3.1979 was consequently quashed. Thereafter the petitioner filed a writ petition in this Court and in that petition he obtained an order of stay to the effect that the petitioner shall not be ejected during the pendency of the writ petition. The allotment order dated 5.3.1979 was consequently quashed. Thereafter the petitioner filed a writ petition in this Court and in that petition he obtained an order of stay to the effect that the petitioner shall not be ejected during the pendency of the writ petition. By an order dated 22.7.1982 the said writ petition was dismissed. 3. Meanwhile, on 17.2.1981 the landlords filed an application for release under section 16(1)(h) of the Act on the ground that the landlords needed the accommodation bona fide for meeting the pressing need for a proper accommodation for the family of one of them, namely. Sri Hari Shankar Goel (respondent No. 2 herein) consisting of himself, his wife, his unmarried daughter, two married sons and their wives and five children. The accommodation at present available with Hari Shankar Goel was entirely inadequate and the family was being put to great hardship on that account. This application was contested by the petitioner and in spite of an objection raised on behalf of the landlords that the petitioner as a mere applicant for allotment had no legal right to contest the proceedings for release of the accommodation under section 16(l)(h), allowed the petitioner to file some affidavits and contest the release application for release. 4. By an order dated 23.5.1981 the Rent Control and Eviction Officer rejected the application of the landlords, firstly on the ground that the accommodation at present available with Sri Hari Shankar Goel was sufficient for his need and he ought to be content with it and secondly on the ground that this Court had in the above mentioned writ petition filed by the petitioner permitted him to continue to reside in the disputed accommodation until the disposal of the writ petition. 5. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order dated 23.5.1981 the landlords filed a revision on 27.5.1981 which remained pending for nearly six months. When it became ripe for hearing the petitioner filed an application on 27.11.1981 with a prayer that he was vitally interested in the decision of the revision and consequently he be impleaded in the same was opposite party. Upon this application the court passed the following order : "Objection and disposal on 9.12.1981. The revision on merits will also be heard on the same date. Sd/- Illegible 27.11." 6. Upon this application the court passed the following order : "Objection and disposal on 9.12.1981. The revision on merits will also be heard on the same date. Sd/- Illegible 27.11." 6. On 27.11.1981, according to the order sheet of that date both the revision as well as the petitioner's application for impleadment and the objection of the landlords thereto were heard and 23.12.1981 was fixed for delivery of judgment. The judgment was eventually delivered on 7.1.1982 and the revision was allowed, as already mentioned at the beginning of the judgment. 7. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order the petitioner has approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India with a prayer that the aforesaid order be quashed. 8. The main contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that the court below wrongly rejected the petitioner's application for impleadment on the ground that he had no locus standi to contest the claim of the landlords for release of the accommodation under section 16(l)(b), and, as a result, the petitioner was illegally deprived of the opportunity to participate in the hearing of the revision. 9. Having heard learned counsel for the parties at some length, I find no merits in the above contentions. 10. Before I take up the submission whether the petitioner has as an applicant for allotment, a right to contest the application of the landlords for the release of the accommodation under section 16(1)(b), I would like to deal with the latter of the two submissions, mentioned above. The submission of the learned counsel was that after the rejection of the petitioner's application for impleadment, he was completely shut out from hearing in the revision and was thereby deprived of a valuable right of demonstrating that the need of the landlord was not bona fide. 11. This submission was countered by the learned counsel for the landlords who submitted that the revisional court did in point of fact hear learned counsel for the petitioner even on the merits of the revision as would be borne out by the impugned judgment itself, irrespective of its opinion as to the locus standi of the petitioner to the contest the claim of the landlords. It was urged that the revisional court disposed of the revision in the alternative, that is, it heard the petitioner's counsel on the merits of the revision on the supposition that the petitioner had such a right to contest. 12. Both sides filed affidavits in this Court on the aforesaid controversy, namely, whether the petitioner's counsel was allowed to participate in the hearing of the revision on merits. On behalf of the petitioner the affidavit of his counsel Sri J.N. Pars has been filed and in this it has been asserted that the learned Additional District Judge allowed the petitioner's counsel to argue only on the application for impleadment and did not permit him to argue the revision on merits. A similar affidavit has been filed by the petitioner himself. In reply, on behalf of the landlords, an affidavit of Sri Santosh Kumar Shukla, Advocate, who was their counsel in the revision before the court has been filed in which the aforesaid assertion of Sri J.N. Pars has been refuted and it has been averred that Sri Pars argued the revision on merits of the revision also. An another affidavit, that of Sri Mohan Lal Misra, Pairokar of the landlords has also been filed on behalf of the landlords in which it has been asserted that Sri Pars had fully argued the revision on merits in his presence and that he was not prevented from addressing the court on the merits of the revision by the Presiding Officer. 13. In addition to the affidavits the parties have also filed copies of the order sheet of the relevant dates. From a perusal of the order sheet of the relevant dates I am clearly of the opinion that the landlords' version that the petitioner's counsel was permitted to argue the revision on merits also seems correct. The same conclusion flows from a perusal of the impugned judgment also. From a perusal of the order sheet of the relevant dates I am clearly of the opinion that the landlords' version that the petitioner's counsel was permitted to argue the revision on merits also seems correct. The same conclusion flows from a perusal of the impugned judgment also. The court has after disposing of the question of locus standi of the petitioner observed thus : "Even presuming for the sake of arguments that the prospective allottee had such a limited right of being heard so as to assist the court by supplying material as has been done by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, the material already supplied by him, to my mind, is not sufficient to hold that the need of the said owner is not bona fide, as hereinafter discussed below." 14. The court then went on to consider the various objections raised on behalf of the petitioner to the grant of the application of the landlords and disposed them of on merits ending the judgment with the conclusion that the landlords needed the accommodation bona fide. 15. Further, the order dated 27.11.1981 quoted above which was passed by the revisional court upon the application of the petitioner for impleadment also fully supports the landlords' version. It expressly says that the revision will be heard on merits also along with the consideration of the application for impleadment (16-C). The same thing is stated in the order sheet of that date, namely, 27.11.1981. It says that 9.12.1981 is fixed for the hearing of the revision along with the application for impleadment and the objections which may be filed by the landlords thereto. Lastly, the order sheet of 9.12.1981 also confirms that the court heard both the parties, both on the application for impleadment as well as the revision itself. 16. From the record of proceedings maintained by the revisional court as well as the observations by the learned Additional District Judge himself, therefore, I am inclined to accept the version of the landlords that notwithstanding the view of the revisional court as regards the locus standi of the petitioner his counsel was allowed to participate in the hearing of the revision on merits and the petitioner's objections were fully considered by the revisional court. 17. 17. It would thus appear that the question whether the petitioner had any locus standi to contest the claim of the landlords becomes purely academic, however, I find that the view taken by the court below is supported by two direct decisions of the Court, one by it Division Bench Sri Kant Dwivedi v. III A.D.J. Hardoi and others, 1981 All. R.C. 49 and the other by a learned Single Judge Raghunandan Lal and others v. D.J. Bulandshahr and others, 1978 All. R.C. 347. 18. In the case of Sri Kant Divivedi (supra) the Division Bench was considering precisely the same controversy and on facts, which seem to bear a striking similarity to these of the present case, approved the following statement of the law in the case of Raghunandan Lal (supra) by brother S.D. Agarwal : "Rule 13, sub-rule ;4) does not lay down anything contrary to section 16 of the Act. Once the tenant vacates the property, then the property reverts to the landlord and thereafter the question as to whether the property should be released or not is a question between the District Magistrate and the landlord. Even if this was not there, then too, in my opinion, the outgoing tenant or the prospective allottee cannot have a right to object to the release of the accommodation in favour of the landlord." The Division Bench observed that the view expressed by S.D. Agarwal, J. was correct and indeed was in consonance with an earlier Full Bench decision of this Court reported in AIR 1965 Allahabad 49. The Full Bench was construing the implications of Rule 6 of the Rules framed under the predecessor Act, namely, U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947. Contextually as well as in language Rule 6 is in pari materia with section IN 1)(b) of the present enactment of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 (See 1982 (Vol. 2) Allahabad Rent Cases 257). 19. Sri G.N. Varma, learned counsel for the petitioner, placed reliance on a decision of this Court Smt. Kanti Khare v. K.P. Asthana and others, 1982 All. W.C. 638 in support of his contention that the petitioner was, in any case, entitled to he heard on merits of the revision on principles of natural justice. This decision is clearly distinguishable. 19. Sri G.N. Varma, learned counsel for the petitioner, placed reliance on a decision of this Court Smt. Kanti Khare v. K.P. Asthana and others, 1982 All. W.C. 638 in support of his contention that the petitioner was, in any case, entitled to he heard on merits of the revision on principles of natural justice. This decision is clearly distinguishable. It was not concerned at all with the question whether an applicant for allotment has a right to be heard even in a matter relating to landlord's application for release under section 16(l)(h). The decision cited by the learned counsel is hence of no assistance. The contention of the learned counsel for the landlords, on the other hand, is supported by authorities quoted above which are directly on the point. 20. It would thus be apparent that the view taken by the revisional court is supported by good authority and I see no ground for taking a different view. In any case, this controversy need not detain me further, as in my opinion, the petitioner was heard in the revision on merits and has thus not been prejudiced in any way by the conclusion reached by the revisional court as regards his locus standi. 21. In the end, a feeble attempt was made by the learned counsel to challenge the correctness of the finding of the revisional court on the question of bona fide need, but the learned counsel was unable to point out any manfest error. He, however, submitted that the revisional court committed an illegality in interfering with the said finding which was one of fact-recorded by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. 22. I am unable to accept this contention. The revisional court has held that the Rent Control and Eviction officer imported irrelevant and extraneous considerations such as that even if the accommodation already in occupation of Sri Hari Shankar Goel was not sufficient for his large family, he could construct additional accommodation for satisfying his need as the landlords seemed to be men of substantial means. The revisional court has held that the Rent Control and Eviction officer imported irrelevant and extraneous considerations such as that even if the accommodation already in occupation of Sri Hari Shankar Goel was not sufficient for his large family, he could construct additional accommodation for satisfying his need as the landlords seemed to be men of substantial means. The revisional court has further pointed out on the basis of, the reports of the two Commissioners appointed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to make a local inspection of the building in occupation of Sri Hari Shanker Goel that the first floor construction in the building where Sri Goel is presently residing cannot be said to be habitable or fit for being used as a residence. The revisional court has examined the need of the landlords in depth and has rightly concluded that the landlords bona fide requires the disputed accommodation for the residence of the large family of Sri Goel. 23. Further, I find that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer committed a gross error in disposing of the landlords' application also on the ground that under an interim order passed by this Court in the above mentioned writ petition filed by the petitioner, the petitioner has been permitted to continue to reside in the disputed accommodation. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer ought not to have taken this fact into consideration as the interim order passed by this Court had nothing to do with the merits of the landlords' claim for release under section 16(1)(b). Further, the said writ petition has since been dismissed by this Court. 24. Moreover, the approach, too, of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was manifestly unsustainable in law. In an application for release under section 16(1)(b) all that is required to be considered is whether the landlord bonafide requires the disputed accommodation for his own residence etc. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer is not required to assess the sufficiency of the accommodation with which the landlord ought, in his opinion, to be satisfied. The enquiry required to be made is whether the need set up by the landlord is bona fide or malafide. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer is not required to assess the sufficiency of the accommodation with which the landlord ought, in his opinion, to be satisfied. The enquiry required to be made is whether the need set up by the landlord is bona fide or malafide. That this should be the approach has been repeatedly stressed by this Court both in construing Rule 6 of the Rules framed under the U.P. Act No. III of 1947 as well as section 16(l)(b) of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. See Jai Prakash Vashisht v. D J. Meerut and another, 1982 All. R.C. (Vol. II) p. 257 and Rent Control and Eviction Officer v. Dr. M.M. Laloraya and others, AIR 1972 Allahabad 559. 25. My opinion, therefore, is that the revisional court has committed no error in setting aside the finding of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer on the question of bona fide need of the landlords. In any case, the conclusions of fact reached by the revisional court on this issue being perfectly just and proper-indeed the learned counsel was entirely unable to point out any error of fact in the said finding-no interference seems justified under Article 226 of the Constitution. 26. In the premise, the petition fails and is dismissed with costs.