ORDER Describing themselves as workmen of Selected Fatka Colliery situated within the district of Dhanbad, the opposite party Nos. 2 to 1177 in this Rule filed three applications under S. 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (‘Act’ for short) in this 3rd Central Government Labour Court, Dhanbad against Eastern Coalfields Ltd., the petitioner in this Rule. These three applications were registered as LC No. 8 of 1979, 9 of 1979 and 10 of 1979. In LC No. 8 of 1979 they claimed a total sum of Rs. 66,89,645/- as their wages from May 1, 1976 till the date of their joining the said colliery. In LC No. 9 of 1979 they claimed wages and over time allowance for the month of April 1976 and also claimed train fare bonus and other allowance for the year 1975-76. LC No. 10 of 1979 was for recovery of a sum of Rs. 9,57,125.59 p which they claimed to have deposited under Compulsory Deposit Scheme during the period of colliery was in the hands of Recovery. 2. In refuting their claims the petitioner first contended that some of the applicants were not workmen under the Act and the applications so far as it related to them were not maintainable. The main contention of the petitioner however was that through owing to a Presidential Ordinance, management of colliery was to be taken over by the Custodian from January 31, 1973, the Custodian could not take possession as the colliery was under a Receiver appointment by the Calcutta High Court from before and it was only on October 14, 1976, that the possession could be take over, after the Receiver was discharged. The petitioner asserted that it had been making payment to the workmen who had been working in the colliery on and from October 14, 1976 and it had no liability for anything which might be due from the Receiver. 3. Relying upon Ss. The petitioner asserted that it had been making payment to the workmen who had been working in the colliery on and from October 14, 1976 and it had no liability for anything which might be due from the Receiver. 3. Relying upon Ss. 2 and 3 of the Coal Mines (Taking over of Management) Act, 1973 the Labour Court held that on the from the ‘appointed day’ that is, from January 31, 1973 the management of all coal mines, including the mine in question, stood vested in the Central Government and further held that such vesting could not be said to have been kept in abeyance by the order of this High Court appointing the Receiver in view of S. 12 of the said Act. The Labour Court then considered the provisions of Ss. 2 and 3 of the Coal Mines Nationalisation Act, 1973 and held that on and from May 1, 1973 the right, title and interest of the owner of the mine in question vested absolutely in the Central Government free from all encumbrances and by virtue of sub-s. (1) of S. 14 the applicants become employees of the Central Government on and from the appointed day, that is from 1.5.73 and therefore of the petitioner, which is a Government Company, entitled them to claim their wages and other emolument from the Central Government or the Government Company, as the case might be. The Labour Court therefore found the applicants entitles to wages for the month of April 1976 as claimed in LC No. 9 of 1979; and the wages from 1.5.1976 till the date of their joining the colliery as claimed in LC No. 8 of 1979. As regards refund of the deposits under the Compulsory Deposit Scheme the learned Court held that as the Receiver deducted the amounts to be paid by the applicant from their wages, the petitioner was liable to refund the same to the applicants. The claim of the applicants regarding sick leave, over time wages, train fare the bonus in case No. 9 of 1979 was however rejected With those finding the Labour Court directed the parties to file their respective statements of dues by a date fixed by it. In the meantime, the petitioner moved this Court and obtained the present Rule and an interim order staying the operation of the impugned order. 4. Mr. In the meantime, the petitioner moved this Court and obtained the present Rule and an interim order staying the operation of the impugned order. 4. Mr. Arun Prokash Chatterjee, the learned Standing Counsel appearing for the applicants, raised a preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the writ petitioner. He contended that no part of the cause of action arose within the State of West Bengal as the colliery in question was situated within the State of Bihar, all the applicants were working and residing in the State of Bihar and the impugned order was passed by an authority in Bihar. In all such circumstances this Court has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain this application, argued Mr. Chatterjee. 5. Mr. Bhaskar Gupta, appearing for the petitioner for the other hand submitted that as the impugned order was communicated to the petitioner at its registered office at Sanctoria, in the district of Burdwan, within the jurisdiction of this Court, and as this communication was a part of the cause of action this Court had jurisdiction, to entertain and hear the petition. While, in support of his contention, Mr. Chatterjee relied upon the Full Bench decision of this High Court in the case of Bansi v. Governor General of India in Council, reported in AIR 1952 Cal. 35 Sri Gupta relied upon a judgment of a learned Judge of this Court in the case of Serajuddin & Co., v. State of Orissa, reported in AIR 1971 Cal. 414 and a judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Union of India v. Hindustan Alluminium Corpn. Ltd., reported in AIR 1983 Cal. 307 (1983 (1) CHN 183). 6. In the case of Bansi (supra) it was held that the facts constituting the cause of action must precede the suit and as a notice of claim under S. 77 of the Railways Act need not precede a suit for a refund or for compensation, the service of such notice could not form part of the cause of action. The above judgment, in my view, is of no assistance to Mr. Chatterjee in the facts of the instant case. The above judgment, in my view, is of no assistance to Mr. Chatterjee in the facts of the instant case. The cause of action, according to the above quoted judgment, must precede the Writ application and it has therefore only to be ascertained whether the service of the impugned order which undoubtedly preceded the filing of the instant Writ application is a part of the cause of action in the instant case. 7. In the case Serajuddin (supra) an order revoking a mining lease passed in Orissa, but served in Calcutta, was challenged in this Court and a similar point was raised on behalf of the respondents. While repelling the contention this Court held that when the effective order was served in Calcutta this Court acquired territorial jurisdiction to entertain the Writ application under Article 226(A) of the Constitution of India as by such service a part of cause of action arose within the territorial limits of this Court. The principle so laid down, in my view, aptly applies in the instant case. There cannot be any manner of doubt that the impugned order is an effective order and if this order is allowed to stand the petitioner would have to pay to the workers, though the amount is yet to be quantified. This order was served upon the petitioner within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court and consequently it must be held that a part of the cause of action arose within the territorial limits of this Court. 8. In the case of Union of India v. Hindustan Aluminium Corpn. (supra) a Division Bench of this Court held that the question of jurisdiction is to be determined on the basis of the statements and allegations made in the Writ application ; and since in the present Writ application the petitioner has averred that the order was served upon it in the District of Burdwan, this Court is competent to entertain the application. 9. In assailing the order passed by the Labour Court, Mr. Gupta first contended that having regard to the pleadings of the parties the Labour Court was not competent to deal with the issues involved in an application under S. 33(2) of the Act. Mr. Gupta submitted that a proceeding under S. 33C(2) was in the nature of an execution proceeding. wherein the Labour Court calculated the money due or computed the amount of any benefit. Mr. Gupta submitted that a proceeding under S. 33C(2) was in the nature of an execution proceeding. wherein the Labour Court calculated the money due or computed the amount of any benefit. This calculation or computation, according to Mr. Gupta, followed from the existing right to the money or benefit in view of its being previously adjudged or otherwise duly provided for but investigation relating to the workman's right to the relief or the liability of the employer, including the question whether the employer was at all liable or not, was outside the scope of the said section and such investigation could only be made in a reference under S. 10 of the Act Mr. Gupta submitted that whether there was any relationship of employer and employee between the petitioner and the applicants at the material time was in dispute and its adjudication involved a detailed investigation into the scope and interpretation of the various of the Nationalisation Act in the context of the appointment of a Receiver by the High Court in respect of the colliery in question. from before In other words, Mr. Gupha argued, the very right of the applicants to receive the amounts claimed from the petitioner and the corresponding liability if any, of the petitioner to pay the said amounts were the principal questions involved in the applications and those questions could not be answered within the limited scope of an application under S. 33C(2) of the Act. In support of his contention Mr. Gupta relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of C.I.W.T.I. Corpn. v. Workmen, reported in AIR 1974 SC 1604 wherein the scope of an application order S. 33C(2) of the Act was considered. 10. Mr. Arun Prokash Chatterjee, on the other hand, contended, relying upon the language of S. 33C(2), that the enquiry thereunder also related to the question whether a workman was entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which was capable of being computed in terms of money and as such the Labour Court was to first decide the question of entitlement and then to quantify or compute the same, as the case might be; and that necessarily meant that the questions raised in the present case could be decided by the Labour Court. Mr. Mr. Chatterjee further submitted that, in the instant case there was no need even of such detailed enquiry as the language of S. 3 and S. 14 of the Nationalisation Act, was plain and unequivocal to indicate that the applicants were the employees of the petitioner at the material time and as such they were entitled to their wages from the petitioner, more particularly when it was not the case of the petitioner that the applicants could not be provided with job due to strike, layoff, retrenchment, closure or lock out. In support of his contention Mr. Chatterjee relied upon a latter judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of S.M. & P. Ltd, v. Presiding Officer Labour Court, reported in AIR 1975 SC 1745 which also related to interpretation of S. 33C(2). 11. In the case of CIWT Corpn. (supra) the Supreme Court first observed as under : “In a suit, a claim for relief made by tile plaintiff against the defendant involves an investigation directed to the determination of (i) the plaintiff's right to relief; (ii) the corresponding liability of the defendant, including, whether the defendant is, at all, liable or not; and (iii) the extent of the defendant's liability, if any. The working out of such liability with a view to give relief is generally regarded as the function of an execution proceeding Determination no. (iii) referred to above, that is to say, the extent of the defendant's liability may sometimes be left over for determination in execution proceedings. But that is not the case with the determination under heads (i) and (ii). They are normally regarded as the functions of a suit and not an execution proceeding. Since a proceeding under S. 33C(2) is in the nature of an execution proceeding it should follow that an investigation of the nature of determinations (i) and (ii) above is, normally, outside its scope. It is true that in a proceeding under S. 33C (2), as in an execution proceeding, it may be necessary to determine the identity of the person by whom or against whom the claim is made if there is a challenge on that score. It is true that in a proceeding under S. 33C (2), as in an execution proceeding, it may be necessary to determine the identity of the person by whom or against whom the claim is made if there is a challenge on that score. But that is merely ‘incidental’ To call determinations (i) and (ii) 'incidental' to an execution proceeding would be a perversion, because execution proceedings in which the extent of liability is worked out are just consequential upon the determinations (i) and (ii) and represent the last stage in a process leading to final relief. Therefore, when a claim is made before the Labour Court under S. 33C(2) that court must clearly understand the limitations under which it is to function. It cannot arrogate to itself the functions say of an Industrial Tribunal which alone is entitled to make adjudications in the nature of determinations (i) and (ii) referred to above, or proceed to compute the benefit by dubbing the former as ‘incidental’ to its main business of computation. In such cases, determinations (i) and (ii) are not ‘incidental’ to the computation. The computation itself is consequential upon and subsidiary to determinations (i) and (ii) as the last stage in the process which commenced with a reference to the Industrial Tribunal. It was, therefore, held in State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur v. R.L. Khandelwal, 1968 2 Lab LJ 589 (SC), that a workman cannot put forward a claim in an application under S. 33C(2) in respect of a matter which is not based on an existing right and which can be appropriately the subject matter of an Industrial Dispute which requires a reference under S. 10 of the Act.” 12. It then went on to consider its earlier judgment in the case of Central Bank of India Ltd. v. P.S. Raja Gopalan, reported in AIR 1964 SC 743 and further observed as follows : “In any event the question is not one which the Labour Court could be expected to deal with in a proceeding under S. 33C(2), the principal business whereunder is just computation of a benefit demonstrably existing. In short the problems raised are appropriate for determination in an industrial dispute on a reference under S. 10 of the Act and cannot be regarded as merely ‘incidental’ to the computation under S. 33C(2)”. 13. In short the problems raised are appropriate for determination in an industrial dispute on a reference under S. 10 of the Act and cannot be regarded as merely ‘incidental’ to the computation under S. 33C(2)”. 13. In the case of S. M. & P. Ltd. (supra) the case of CIWT Corporation (supra) was not considered but the case of Central Bank of India (supra) was considered and relied upon. In that case the question was whether the workmen were entitled to retrenchment compensation under S. 25 For the proviso to S. 25FFF(1) of the Act. Repelling the contention that such question could not be decided in an application under S. 33C(2), the Supreme Court held that it was competent to the Labour Court to decide whether the case before it was a case of retrenchment compensation or the proviso to sub-s (1) of S. 25FFF was attracted on closure of the establishment. The Supreme Court observed that the question, even according to the employer, fell under S. 25FFF and therefore in deciding that question the Labour Court had necessarily to decide whether the proviso had been satisfied. When the Supreme Court's attention was drawn to item No. 10 of the 3rd Schedule to the Act which details matters falling within the jurisdiction of Industrial Tribunal, the Supreme Court observed as follows : “We do not consider that the reference to Item No. 10 of the Third Schedule to the Act can decide the matter one way or the other. The item reads as follows : “10. Retrenchment of Workmen and closure of Establishment.” It does not say that all questions arising out of retrenchment of workmen and closure of establishments have to be decided by Industrial Tribunal. Logically if the contention is to be accepted, even if the question of retrenchment is not disputed the Labour Court will not be competent to decide the question of compensation payable in a case of retrenchment because it raises a question of jurisdiction. This entry should therefore be held to refer to cases where the right to retrench workers or to close an establishment is disputed and that question is referred for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal. This entry should therefore be held to refer to cases where the right to retrench workers or to close an establishment is disputed and that question is referred for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal. In that case the Tribunal will be competent to decide whether the closure or retrenchment was justified and whether the retrenched workmen would be reinstated or the workers in the establishment purported to have been closed should be continued to be paid on the basis that the so called closure was no closure at all. In the present case the workmen do not ask for reinstatement. They accept the termination of their services and ask for compensation. The only dispute is about the compensation whether it is to be paid under S. 25-F or 25FFF, Item 10 of Third Schedule will not cover such a case.” 14. From the above passage it is clear that in that case the right of workmen to receive retrenchment compensation was not under dispute; and the only dispute was whether it would attract the main provision of S. 25FFF(1) or the proviso thereof. In other words, according to the judgment in the case of CIWT Corporation (supra) the question was ‘incidental’. 15. Considering the facts of the instant case, particularly the important questions, bona fide raised by the petitioner, it has to be decided whether there was a relationship of employer and employee between the petitioner and the applicants at the material time and such a dispute cannot be said to be of a nature which could be decided in the applications under S. 33C(2). The case of S. M. & P. Ltd. (supra) does not come in aid of the applicants as there was no such dispute in that case. On the contrary, in my considered view, the decision in the case of CIWT Corporation (supra) aptly applies, as the present case involves an investigation directed to the determination of the applicants right to relief and the corresponding liability, if at all, of the petitioner and such an investigation is impermissible in an application under S. 33C(2) of the Act. Since the first contention of Mr. Gupta succeeds I need not deliberate or decide upon the other contentions of Mr. Gupta. 16. In the result the application is allowed and the Rule is made absolute. Since the first contention of Mr. Gupta succeeds I need not deliberate or decide upon the other contentions of Mr. Gupta. 16. In the result the application is allowed and the Rule is made absolute. Let a writ of Certiorari issue quashing the impugned order and a writ of Mandamus issue permanently restraining the respondents from giving effect to or from acting in terms of the impugned order. There will be no order as to costs. Application allowed; impugned order quashed.