Judgment :- 1. This revision petition arises out of proceedings initiated by the landlord for resumption of part of a holding of 50 cents of land under S.15 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act for short. The tenants are the revision petitioners. Respondents 1 to 7 are members of the landlord¬tarawad. Resumption was sought for, alleging that the landlord tarawad required 50 cents of the holding for the purpose of constructing a building for residential purposes for some members of the tarawad. The tenants resisted the petition on various grounds that the extent of the properties shown in the application as belonging to the tarawad was incorrect, that the tarawad had in its possession more than two acres of land, none of the members had any necessity to construct the residential building in the land sought to be resumed and that the extent of the lands shown as belonging to the tenants was wrong. 2. Finding that the requirement was not bona fide, the Land Tribunal dismissed the application. However, the appellate authority on appeal by the petitioners in the O. A. found the requirement of the landlord to be bona fide and therefore setting aside the order of the Land Tribunal, remitted back the case to the Land Tribunal for fresh disposal. 3. The tenants then took up the matter to this court. This court refused to interfere with the order of remand confirming the appellate authority's decision in regard to the bona fide requirement of the land by the lessor tarawad. A writ appeal filed in the matter was also dismissed by the Division Bench of this court observing 'that all questions excepting the one determined by the appellate authority regarding the question of bona fides is open for consideration by the Land Tribunal. On that basis the Land Tribunal will deal with the matter applying the provisions in S.15 of the K. L. R. Act.' 4. As per order dated 12-10-1977, the Land Tribunal allowed the application for resumption. The tenants-petitioners herein took up the question in appeal before the Appellate Authority (Land Reforms) Trichur. The learned appellate Authority confirmed the order of the Land Tribunal by judgment dated 7-1-1981. As per order dated 12-10-1977, the Land Tribunal allowed the application for resumption. The tenants-petitioners herein took up the question in appeal before the Appellate Authority (Land Reforms) Trichur. The learned appellate Authority confirmed the order of the Land Tribunal by judgment dated 7-1-1981. The appellate authority came to the conclusion that the landlords did not have more than the ceiling area of dry lands so as to disentitle them for resumption, that the passing of Joint Hindu Family System Abolition Act, 1976, will not alter the position of the landlords since there was a partition prior to 1976 and that all conditions necessarily to be found in the order of resumption are there in the order of Land Tribunal. This is challenged in this revision petition. 5. It is contended by the petitioners in these proceedings that the Land Tribunal ought to have found that the possession of paramba in the possession of the petitioners would be less than 50 cents if the area shown in the petition is allowed to be resumed. The petitioners are entitled to be in possession of the maximum area and by the order impugned they will not be in a position to hold upto the maximum. According to the petitioners, in calculating the extent of the properties, the actual point of time for deciding the extent is the time of passing the order and not at the time of initiation of proceeding. It is also contended that the authorities below have gone wrong in finding that the properties covered by Ext. D1 are the individual properties of the then Karanavan of the tarawad of respondents and not that of the tarawad of the respondents. 6. It is strongly contended that the resumption sought for is not permissible in view of S.13 of the Act. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, the combined effect of S.13 and the provisions for resumption in the Act is that resumption is permissible only in respect of those tenancies or deemed tenancies which have been conferred fixity of tenure for the first time by S.13. It is submitted that in respect of tenancies which were enjoying the benefit of fixity of tenure even prior to Act 1 of 1964, resumption is not permissible. This is because, according to Mr. It is submitted that in respect of tenancies which were enjoying the benefit of fixity of tenure even prior to Act 1 of 1964, resumption is not permissible. This is because, according to Mr. Viswanatha Iyer, learned counsel for the petitioners, any other interpretation will go against the letter and spirit of the Act, particularly S.13 and will be divesting such tenants who are enjoying fixity, by resumption, of the vested rights which they had under the prior enactments. The holding of the petitioners, it is contended, is one to which the Cochin Verumpattomdars Act applied and under S.4 thereof, the petitioners are entitled to fixity of tenure. This right has not in any manner been curtailed or divested by the provisions of S.14 to 18 of Act 1 of 1964, on the other hand, it is submitted, it is affirmed by S.13. It is also pointed out that the landlord entitled to resumption under S.15 is the original landlord of the holding and not one who comes into his place by succession or assignment. Respondents 1 to 7 who have sought resumption are persons who have become owners of the property only by virtue of the assignment of the year 1118 after the coming into force of the Cochin Verumpattomdars Act. 7. It was contended before us with considerable force by Mr. Viswanatha Iyer that in view of the Explanation in S.15 of the Act by which for the purposes of the said section and S.16, "member of his family" shall mean, (i) in the case of a landlord who has granted a lease on behalf of a joint family, member of such family; and (ii) in any other case, wife or husband, as the case may be, or a lineal descendant of the landlord, the applicants for resumption here are disentitled to bring the application. They are not members of the joint family of Govindan Nair, the original lessor. The property concerned had been got in partition by Govindan Nair, his brother and nephew. The lease was by Govindan Nair alone. The lessor's right was assigned to Narayanan Nair who might have taken it on behalf of his tavazhi. This assignment was in 1118, after the Cochin Verumpattomdars Act came into force. The property concerned had been got in partition by Govindan Nair, his brother and nephew. The lease was by Govindan Nair alone. The lessor's right was assigned to Narayanan Nair who might have taken it on behalf of his tavazhi. This assignment was in 1118, after the Cochin Verumpattomdars Act came into force. Narayanan Nair and members of his branch even though they might have been members of the podu tarwad of Govindan Nair have not got the property as members of the podu tarwad but by the assignment of 1118. Therefore, according to Mr. Viswanatha Iyer, they are not members of the joint family of the original lessor, that is the person who has granted the lease. Hence he would contend the application is not maintainable. 8. It is also contended that the order of the authorities below are not in conformity with S.15 and 22 of the Act and R.11 of the Kerala Land Reforms (Tenancy) R.1970. A plea is also taken that the amount of compensation for the entire area of 50 cents ordered to be surrendered is meagre and inadequate. 9. It may be pointed out here that this Civil Revision Petition had come up for hearing before justice Kader, who referred the matter to a Division Bench by the following order: "An important question relating to the interpretation of sub-s. (1) of S.13 and S.15 as a whole of Act 1 of 1964, arises for determination in this revision. A decision on the point is likely to have far reaching consequences. I therefore adjourn this revision to be heard and disposed of by a Division Bench of this Court." 10. S.13 of the Act conferred on tenants right to fixity of tenure in respect of the holding notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law, custom, usage or contract. That also provided that no land from the holding shall be resumed except as provided in S.14 to 22. S.14 to 22 provide for the circumstances and conditions under which land could be resumed from a tenant. It might be noted here that the Act has been passed as a comprehensive legislation relating to land reforms in the State of Kerala. S.132(2) of the Act repeals the Cochin Verumpattomdars Act along with the Travancore-Cochin Prevention of Eviction of Kudikidappukars Act, the Malabar Tenancy Act and the Madras Cultivating Tenants (Payment of Fair Rent) Act. It might be noted here that the Act has been passed as a comprehensive legislation relating to land reforms in the State of Kerala. S.132(2) of the Act repeals the Cochin Verumpattomdars Act along with the Travancore-Cochin Prevention of Eviction of Kudikidappukars Act, the Malabar Tenancy Act and the Madras Cultivating Tenants (Payment of Fair Rent) Act. Further S.132(3) provides that notwithstanding the repeal of the enactments mentioned in sub-s. (2) any decree passed before the commencement of this Act for the eviction of a tenant from his holding, pursuant to which eviction has not been effected, may, on the application of the tenant or the landlord, be reopened and the matter may be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The same sub-section in sub-clause (c) of the same states that where the decree-holder, plaintiff, appellant or petitioner as the case may be, is a person entitled to resumption of land under the Act, he shall have the right to apply in court to allow resumption of the holding or any part thereof to which he is entitled. Sub-clause (c) of subsection (3) of S.132 may be extracted hereunder: "(c)(i) where the decree-holder, plaintiff, appellant or petitioner, as the case may be, is a person entitled to resumption of land under this Act he shall have the right to apply to the court to allow resumption of the holding or any part thereof to which he is entitled; (ii) the application under sub-clause (i) shall be made within one year from the commencement of this Act and shall contain a statement of facts in support of the claims of the applicant and also the names and addresses of all persons who have interest in the holding either as owner, lessee or kudikidappukaran; (iii) the court shall dispose of the application as if it were an application for resumption before the Land Tribunal under this Act; (b) notwithstanding anything contained in S. H of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the right conferred on the decree-holder, plaintiff, appellant or petitioner, as the case may be, under sub-clause(i) of clause (c) shall not be deemed to take away or in any manner affect his right to apply for resumption under this Act". These will indicate that there is hardly any basis for the contention of the revision petitioners that in respect of tenancies which were enjoying the benefit of the limited fixity of tenure conferred by the Cochin Verumpattomdars Act, resumption is not permissible. A suit filed by the present applicants for resumption or their predecessors-in-interest, for eviction under S.8(1)(b) of the Cochin Verumpattomdars Act, on the ground that they required the holding or part thereof, except the kudiyirippu, bona fide for building residential quarters for their use will not in any way bar an application for resumption under S.18 of the Act (Kerala Land Reforms Act), 11. Then we shall consider the contention of Mr. Viswanatha Iyer that on a correct interpretation of S.15 the Explanation in the section, the present applicants for resumption have no right to file such application. For understanding his contention it will be useful to extract the relevant statutory provision S.15 of the Act which reads: "15. Resumption for construction of residential buildings A landlord (other than sthani or the trustee or owner of a place of public religious worship) who is not in possession of (any land other than nilam, or is in possession of less than two acres in extent of such land) and who needs the holding for the purpose of constructing a building bona fide for his own residence or for that of any member of his family may resume from his tenant (i) an extent of land not exceeding 20 cents, where resumption is sought on behalf of one person; and (ii) an extent of land not exceeding 50 cents, where resumption is sought on behalf of two or more persons; Provided that, by such resumption, the total extent of land other than nilams in the possession of the landlord shall not be raised above two acres and the total extent of land in the possession of the tenant shall not be reduced below fifty cents. Explanation For the purposes of this section and S.16, 'member of his family' shall mean. (i) in the case of a landlord who has granted a lease on behalf of a joint family, member of such family; and (ii) in any other case, wife or husband, as the case may be, or a lineal descendant of the landlord". Mr. Viswanatha Iyer would point out that the original lessor was Govinda Menon. (i) in the case of a landlord who has granted a lease on behalf of a joint family, member of such family; and (ii) in any other case, wife or husband, as the case may be, or a lineal descendant of the landlord". Mr. Viswanatha Iyer would point out that the original lessor was Govinda Menon. The present applicants claim their right to the lessor's right on the basis of an assignment by Govinda Menon to Narayana Menon who acts on behalf of the tavazhi tarawad of the applicants. If Govinda Menon had given the lease on behalf of his joint family, a member of his family could move the court for resumption. This is not the case here, according to the learned counsel for the petitioners. To the contention raised by the respondent's counsel, Mr. Sankara Menon, that this was not a matter raised as such by the petitioner before the authorities below, Mr. Viswanatha Iyer would submit that what is raised now is a pure question of jurisdiction of the Land Tribunal to direct resumption of the holding on the application of a person who as per the statutory provision is not entitled to move for such relief. The learned counsel would rely on the observations of Lord Watson in Connecticut Fire Insurance Company v. Kavanagh (1892) A. C. 473 at 480 where the learned Law Lord said: "When a question of law is raised for the first time in a court of last resort upon the construction of a document, or upon facts either admitted or proved beyond controversy, it is not only competent but expedient in the interest of justice to entertain the plea. The expediency of adopting that course may be doubted when the plea cannot be disposed of without deciding nice questions of fact in considering which the court of ultimate review is placed in a much less advantageous position than the courts below. But their Lordships have no hesitation in holding that the course ought not in any case to be followed unless the court is satisfied that the evidence upon which they are asked to decide, establishes beyond doubt that the facts if fully investigated would have supported the new plea." (emphasis ours) 12. This is quoted with evident approval inofficial Liquidator v. Burjorjee (AIR. 1932 PC. 118). The proposition of law is certainly unexceptionable. This is quoted with evident approval inofficial Liquidator v. Burjorjee (AIR. 1932 PC. 118). The proposition of law is certainly unexceptionable. But the last sentence in Lord Watsons's observations quoted above which we have given emphasis gives the reply to the learned counsel's argument. It is true that in the application for resumption, the applicants refer to the assignment of the right of Govinda Menon to Narayana Menon. But what exactly is the nature of the assignment, is it an assignment of a joint family right to a particular tavazhi of the same family, are all questions that could be decided on a proper investigation of the relevant facts which the parties may have raised if such questions had been properly put into issue at the earliest stage of the controversy. If the first lease was by the joint family as such and if the joint family assigns such right to a particular tavazhi within that family, even then on Mr. Viswanatha Iyer's interpretation of S.15, Explanation, a member or some members of that tavazhi could apply for resumption. 13. It may also be noted that in finding that the applicants require resumption for bona fide residential purposes, the appellate authority had proceeded on the basis that it is as members of tarawad a joint family they require resumption. The bona fides of the necessity has been confirmed by this court earlier in an original petition which was affirmed by a Division Bench in a writ appeal. In such circumstances, on the ground of constructive res judicata (a question which might and ought to have been raised), it is extremely doubtful whether the present petitioners could raise the question of the right of the applicants to get resumption, on the ground that they are not members of the lessor's joint family, in case they establish the circumstances and conditions which would entitle them to get resumption. No doubt, it is true that the High Court had left open the questions other than that of bona fides in the decision in the writ appeal. But, then the question of a person's entitlement to resumption on the ground that he is a member of the lessor's joint family is inextricably bound up with the question of bona fide necessity for resuming the land. But, then the question of a person's entitlement to resumption on the ground that he is a member of the lessor's joint family is inextricably bound up with the question of bona fide necessity for resuming the land. However, we need not go to find a final answer to this problem in view of what we have said in the last paragraph and also on our interpretation of the explanation to S.15. 14. S.15 lays down that a landlord who is not in possession of any land other than nilam or is in possession of less than two acres of such land and who needs the holding for the purpose of constructing a building bona fide for his own residence or for that of any member of his family may resume from his tenant an extent of land not exceeding 20 cents, where resumption is sought on behalf of one person, and an extent of land not exceeding 50 cents, where resumption is sought on behalf of two or more persons, provided that by such resumption the total extent of land other than nilam in the possession of the landlord shall not be raised above two acres and the total extent of land in the possession of the tenant shall not be reduced below fifty cents. As explanation it is added that for the purpose of the said section and S.16, 'member of his family' shall mean in the case of a landlord who has granted a lease on behalf of a joint family, member of such family and in any other case, wife or husband as the case may be or a lineal descendant of the landlord. As noted earlier, Mr. Viswanatha Iyer would urge that the applicants for resumption who claim under an assignment from Govindan Nair, the original lessor are not members of Govindan Nair's joint family on whose behalf the lease was granted, nor are they, his lineal descendants. In short, the learned counsel's contention is that when the lease is granted on behalf of a joint family, only the members of that family could claim resumption. Not by the assignee of the lessor's right or by the members of the assignee's joint family even if the assignment is taken on behalf of the assignee's joint family. 15. A literal construction of the provision would certainly be helpful to this contention. Not by the assignee of the lessor's right or by the members of the assignee's joint family even if the assignment is taken on behalf of the assignee's joint family. 15. A literal construction of the provision would certainly be helpful to this contention. But when such literal construction is given some absurdities would arise. Under S.2(29) of the Act, 'landlord' means a person under whom a tenant holds and includes a land owner. Under S.2(43) person shall include a company, family, joint family, association or other body of individuals whether incorporated or not, and any institution capable of holding property. Therefore if lease is given on behalf of a joint family property, the landlord is the joint family. A literal construction of clause (1) of the Explanation to S.15 that'in the case of a landlord, who has granted a lease on behalf of a joint family, a member of such family' would lead to the anomalous result that the landlord would be the person who grants the lease on behalf of the joint family and not the joint family as such. When, the word 'person' is defined to include a joint family and when the tenant is really holding joint family property which can only mean that he is holding under the joint family, the joint family is the landlord. The individual who grants such a lease on behalf of the family is only a representative of the joint family, its Manager. Therefore, a reasonable interpretation of the expression'in the case of a landlord who has granted a lease on behalf of a joint family' would be 'in the case when the landlord is a joint family'. It may also be noted that there is no rhyme or reason why an assignee landlord joint family and its members should be deprived of the benefit of the Section. 16. Willes J. said in Christopher sen v, Lotinga (1864) 33 L.J.C.P.121 at 123: "The general rule is stated by Lord Wensleydale in these terms-viz, "to adhere to the ordinary meaning of the words used, and to the grammatical construction, unless that is at variance with the intention of the legislature, to be collected from the statute itself, or leads to any manifest absurdity or repugnance, in which case the language may be varied or modified so as to avoid such inconvenience, but no further". "I certainly', continued Willes J.'subscribe to every word of the rule, except the word 'absurdity', unless that be considered as used there in the same sense as 'repugnance' that is to say, something which would be so absurd with reference to the other words of the statute as to amount to a repugnance". 17. Craies in his work on Statute Law quotes Jessel M. R. in Horti v. Tamplin (1881) 8 QBD. 847 at 253: "Any one who contends that section of an Act of Parliament is not to be read literally must be able to show one of two things-either that there is some other section which cuts down its meaning, or else the section itself (if read literally) is repugnant to the general purview of the Act". Craies then refers to an old case Miller v. Salomons (1852) 7 Ex 475 at 553. The relevant passage in Craies at pages 88 and 89 (Sixth Edition) is extracted below: "The Treason Act, 1766, c.i., gave a form of oath which it was required should be taken by certain persons. The form of oath contained the name of King George and made no provision for the necessary alteration in the name of the sovereign at his death. It was argued in Miller v. Salomons (1852) 7 Ex. 475 at 553. that as the form of the oath mentioned the name of King George only, the obligation to administer it ceased with the reign of that sovereign, because it was applicable to no other than to him. "I think", said Parke B. in his judgment "this argument cannot prevail. It is clear that the legislature meant the oath to be taken always thereafter, and as it could not be taken in those words during the reign of a sovereign not of the name of George, it follows that the name George is merely used by way of designating the existing sovereign and the oath must be altered from time to time in the name of the sovereign. This is an instance in which the language of the legislature must be modified, in order to avoid absurdity and inconsistency with its manifest intentions". 18. In this case if the interpretation put forward by Mr. This is an instance in which the language of the legislature must be modified, in order to avoid absurdity and inconsistency with its manifest intentions". 18. In this case if the interpretation put forward by Mr. Viswanatha Iyer is accepted, in regard to joint family property the individual, who is in management and who actually leases out the property will be the landlord under the Act and not the joint family as such while the definition of the term "landlord" and "person" in S.2 of the Act would make it clear that as regards leases of joint family properties the landlord is the joint family as such. 19. We pointed out earlier that there is no rhyme or reason why an assignee landlord joint family or its members should be deprived of the rights under S.15. If the assignment of the landlord's right is to an individual, his wife or husband or a lineal descendant of his can take advantage of the provision in the said section. What is the logic in depriving such benefit to the members of a joint family which takes the assignment of a landlord's right. 20. Lord Macmillan said in Altrincham Electric Supply Co. v. Sale Urban District Council (1936) 154 LT. 379 at 388: "I do not doubt that, if the language of an enactment is ambiguous and susceptible of two meanings, one of which is consonant with justice and good sense while the other would lead to extravagant results, a Court of law will incline to adopt the former and reject the latter even though the latter may correspond more closely with the literal meaning of the words employed". Lord Justice Brett said in R. v. Tonbridge Overseer (1818) 13 QBD. 343: "If the inconvenience is not only great, but what I may call an absurd inconvenience, by reading an enactment in its ordinary sense, whereas if you read it in a manner in which it is capable, though not in the ordinary sense, there would not be any inconvenience at all, there would be reason why you should not read it according to its ordinary grammatical meaning". In Baliram v. Sitabai (AIR. 1935 Nag. 168) it was said that if a benevolent interpretation is possible without doing violence to the spirit of the enactment the Courts are bound to resort to it in order to obviate inconvenient or unjust consequences. In Baliram v. Sitabai (AIR. 1935 Nag. 168) it was said that if a benevolent interpretation is possible without doing violence to the spirit of the enactment the Courts are bound to resort to it in order to obviate inconvenient or unjust consequences. Chief Justice Rajamannar for a Bench in Vanguard Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Eraser and Ross (AIR. 1959 Madras 336 at 339) quotes the following passage from what Blackburn, J. said in R. v. Ramsgate (1827) 6. B. & C. 712 at p 717: "It is,1 apprehend, in accordance with the general rule of construction that you are not only to look at the words, but you are to look at the context, the collocation and the object of such words relating to such matter, and interpret the meaning according to what would appear to be meaning intended to be conveyed by the use of the words under the circumstances". 21. In the light of this discussion we think we are right in the view that we have taken on the interpretation of the first clause of the Explanation in S.15. We do not think that the orders of the authorities are in any way not in conformity with the statutory provisions. 22. In respect of the contention that the actual point of time for deciding the extent is the time of passing the order and not at the time of initiation of proceedings, the contention is met with in the light of the decision of of this court in Annamma Thomas & Others v. Saramma Mathai (1976 KLT. 656). There the court was considering the right of resumption under S.16 of the Act. Justice Viswanatha Iyer in that decision said that by S.16 of the Act a vested right is obtained by the landlord to ask for resumption. There is a corresponding duty on the part of the tenant to surrender the extent held by him in excess of the ceiling area subject to the limitation imposed on the landlord by S.16, namely that he cannot ask for resumption of an extent which would exceed the ceiling area available to him. This right of resumption continued to be in force unaltered from 1-4-1964. This right is not a creature of determination by the Tribunal. This right of resumption continued to be in force unaltered from 1-4-1964. This right is not a creature of determination by the Tribunal. The determination is only a measure of the right and only quantifies something already there depending as it does solely on pre-existing facts. The determination is only the machinery for enforcing the obligation. The ceiling area provided for under S.82 was effective from 1-4-1964 and was being given effect to so far as the right of a landlord to resume land from the tenant is concerned. It may be that until the notified date he had no obligation to surrender the excess land to the State. But that did not enable him to resist the landlord's application for resumption. That obligation fastened on him the moment the right of the landlord was exercised by him by filing an application for resumption. That statutory obligation to the landlord can be discharged only by surrendering the land to the landlord. The tenant cannot get out of this obligation by any conduct on his part which will be a negation of the right of the landlord to resume. So we will have to consider the extent of the properties at the time of the initiation of the proceedings. The passing of the Joint Hindu Family System Abolition Act, 1976 will not in any way alter the rights of the landlords in the matter so as to disentitle them for resumption. There is also no necessity to take note of the partition deed Ext. D9 which was in 1973. 23. The petitioners have also not succeeded in establishing that the amount of compensation for the entire area of 50 cents ordered to be surrendered is meagre and inadequate. What the appellate authority has stated in his matter may be extracted here: "S. 20 of the Act prescribes that compensation for the improvements belonging to the tenant or a solatium of an amount equal to the value of gross produce from the land resumed for a period of two years whichever is greater will be paid to the tenant. The Land Tribunal has stated that there is no evidence to show that any improvements of the tenants existed on the land. As such, there is no reason to interfere with his decision in the absence of any evidence adduced in this court". 24. The Land Tribunal has stated that there is no evidence to show that any improvements of the tenants existed on the land. As such, there is no reason to interfere with his decision in the absence of any evidence adduced in this court". 24. We find no reason to interfere with the impugned order. CRP. is dismissed In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. Dismissed. Immediately after the judgment was delivered, Mr. T. L. Viswanatha Iyer, learned counsel for the petitioner, made an oral motion for leave to appeal in the Supreme Court. As we are not satisfied that the case involves substantial question of law of general importance, and the said question needs to be decided by the Supreme Court, leave refused. Leave refused.