ORDER Gopi Nath, J. - This is a defendants' application in revision directed against the order passed by the II Additional Civil Judge, Kanpur, dated 5-12-1981. By that order, the Addl. Civil Judge rejected application No. 823-C-2 filed by the defendants, and admitted into evidence 4 papers filed by them on payment of Rs. 20/- as costs. The case was fixed for evidence on application No. 460-C-2 filed by the plaintiff. 2. Brief facts giving rise to the revision are as follows : G. S. Nigam, the plaintiff, filed a suit against British India Corporation Ltd. Kanpur and Elgin Mills Co. Ltd. Kanpur (defendants Nos. 1 and 2 respectively) for a declaration that he continued to be a Welfare Officer (grade I) in the employ of the defendants, and for an injunction restraining them from interfering with his right to discharge his duties as such officer. The plaintiff further prayed for a decree in respect of the emoluments which, according to him, had fallen due to him but had been withheld by the defendants. 3. An indenture, purporting to be a sale deed executed by the defendant No.1 in favour of the defendant No. 2, had been executed between them before the institution of the suit. Reliance was placed on this indenture by the defendants. This was filed as paper No. 516-Kha. Prior to the filing of this document, it appears that the purported registered duplicate of the same had been filed, and the plaintiff had challenged its admissibility by means of application No. 460-C-2 on the ground that it was ineffective in law. The original was thereafter summoned by the defendants and was marked as paper No. 516-Kha. By an application the plaintiff objected to the admissibility of this document as well on the same grounds as were raised in respect of its purported duplicate The main objection of the plaintiff to the admissibility of the document was that the registration of the same had been obtained by the defendants illegally. The Sub-Registrar, it was stated, had registered it beyond the period of limitation prescribed by S. 23 of the Registration Act which he had no jurisdiction to do, secondly, the registration contravened the provisions of S. 34 of the said Act as- well and thirdly the document was not properly stamped. The plaintiff filed application No. 619-C to produce evidence on the question of admissibility of the document. The plaintiff filed application No. 619-C to produce evidence on the question of admissibility of the document. This application was allowed by the order dated 29-8-1981, fixing 11th of Sept., 1981 for the production of evidence by the parties. The defendants then filed application No. 820-C praying that the plaintiff be directed to pay proper court-fee on application No. 460-C under the Court- fees Act, as on a plaint challenging a document as ineffective in law, and the case may proceed only after such court-fee was paid by him. This application was filed on 25-11-1981, and the prayer was made on the allegation that since in the application No. 460-C allegations of fraud had been made as to the execution and registration of the indenture dated 27-9-1962 and also as to the payment of stamp duty on it, the application was in the nature of a plaint and required payment of ad valorem court-fee on it. On this application, the court below ordered that the matter of court-fee shall be looked into at the time the issues were framed after the disposal of application No. 460-C. The defendants then moved application No. 823- C-2 praying that the court be pleased to decide the question of court-fee payable on application No. 460-C first before disposing of that application. This application was filed on 5-12-1981. 4. It appears that application Nos. 619-C and 460-C-2 were rejected by the court below by an order dated 18-1-1978. The plaintiff filed a revision against that order, which was numbered as Civil Revision No. 1202 of 1978. This revision was allowed by Hon'ble Yashoda Nandan, J., by his order dated 24-7-1979, and the case was remanded to the court below to decide the plaintiff's objection afresh in accordance with law, bearing in mind the observations made in the order dated 24-7-1979. The material observations in the order were as follows : "The material allegations made in the objection, which was dismissed by the court below Were to the effect that on 27th Sept., 1962 the sale-deed in question was executed and got registered on 13-7-1964 by practising fraud on registration and stamp Act. On the same day the document was duly sealed also with the seal of the two Companies. On 27th Sept., 1962 the stamp duty payable on document under question was Rs. On the same day the document was duly sealed also with the seal of the two Companies. On 27th Sept., 1962 the stamp duty payable on document under question was Rs. 30/- per thousand of valuation of the property and consequently the document was stamped at that rate. On 1st Jan., 1963 the stamp duty was raised to Rs. 45/- per thousand of the sale consideration by means of amendment of the relevant law. On 30th May, 1963 the Collector certified by an endorsement on the document that the requisite duty thereon had been paid as contemplated by S. 32 (1) (b) of the Stamps Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). It was alleged that the sale deed was presented for registration on 13th June, 1963 when the registration became barred by S. 23 of the Registration Act. It was alleged that in order to get over the difficulty of limitation on 13th July, 1964 the signatures of the Secretaries and Treasurers of the second defendant were appended to the document, which was unauthorised and illegal The document was ultimately got registered on 13th July, 1964 without any additional stamp duty being paid thereon as according to the applicant it became necessary on account of the increased stamp duty payable with effect from 1st Jan., 1963. Irrespective of the merties of the case those objections to the admissibility of the document were based, as already stated on the grounds that it was under-stamped and that its registration was illegal and in violation of the requirements of the Registration Act. The trial court while dismissing the objection filed by the applicant, has not said a single word with regard to the objection raised by the applicant regarding the deficiency in the stamps affixed to the sale deed. As far as the objection with regard to the illegality in the registration is concerned, the court below took the view that since the suit was not for cancellation of the sale deed in question, it was not open to the plaintiff to challenge the admissibility of the document on the ground that its registration had not been done in accordance with the requirements of law....... The mere fact that the document whose admissibility was under challenge bearing endorsement of registration, did not debar the court from going into the question raised by the plaintiff regarding the illegal fashion in which registration of the document was obtained." The court below was directed to decide the questions of sufficiency of stamp and legality of registration. 5. After the case was sent back to the court below, the defendants on 11-9-1981 filed an objection to the application No. 460C. This objection is paper no. 798-C and its copy has been marked as Annexure No. 5 to the affidavit filed in support of the stay application dated 5-1-1982 moved by the applicant in this court. The prayer in 798-C was that the plaintiffs application be rejected with costs. The application No. 823-C thereafter came up for consideration before the court below. That application, as seen earlier, prayed that the plaintiff be directed to pay ad valorem court-fee on the application 460-C before it be considered on merits. The court below by an order dated 5-12-1981 rejected this application on the ground that the application 460-C was a mere application, and not a plaint in a suit, and it did not require payment of ad valorem court-fee under S. 7 (4) (a) of the Court-fees Act. The four documents produced by the defendants were admitted in evidence, and the case was fixed for production of evidence on application No. 460-C on 1712-1961. Aggrieved by the order, the defendants have come up in revision. They have challenged the order as to the rejection of the application No. 823-C, and the fixing of the case for evidence on the application No. 460-C. 6. Learned counsel for the applicants submitted that the allegations made in the application No. 460-C-2 were as in a plaint involving cancellation of a sale-deed, the application accordingly required payment of ad valorem court-fee. As regards fixing of date for evidence, the objection was that the controversy related only to the exhibiting of document under Q. XIII, R. 4, read with R. 13, Civil P. C. as added by this Court, production of evidence accordingly was not called for in that regard. The opposite party, on the other hand, submitted that the controversy involved, related to admissibility of document, and Rr. The opposite party, on the other hand, submitted that the controversy involved, related to admissibility of document, and Rr. 3, 6, 7 (2) and 13 of O. XIII were attracted to it, and the court below rightly permitted evidence to be produced. 7. We shall take up the question of court-fee first. 8. The sale-deed dated 27-9-1962 was produced and relied upon by the defendants. The plaintiff challenged its admissibility on the ground that its registration was obtained illegally, and it was insufficiently stamped. The document was challenged as ineffective in law. The plaintiff could not be said to be asking for a declaration that the document be adjudged void, or praying for its cancellation. There is a distinction between a defence raised that a document was ineffective in law and a claim made that it be declared void. In the Vishnu Pratap Sugar Works (P) Ltd. v. Chief Inspector of Stamps, U. P. ( AIR 1968 SC 102 ) this distinction was pointed out as follows : ".........It is clear from the plaint when read as a whole that though the appellant- company alleged that the Acts were void and therefore non est for the reasons set out therein, it did not seek any declaration that they were void........" To challenge a deed as void is not necessarily to claim a declaration that it be declared void. In Smt. Gulab Dei v. Chief Inspector of Stamps, U.P. Lucknow, ( AIR 1967 All 153 ) it was observed a defence raised that a document is ineffective in law is not equal to seeking a declaration that the document is void. Application No. 460-C challenged the admissibility of the sale-deed and prayed that it be not exhibited. The application made no prayer for either the document to be declared void or for its cancellation. Hon'ble Yashoda Nandan, J. also in his order dated 24-7-1979 observed that the objections to the admissibility of the document in question had to be considered by the court below with reference to the grounds raised in that behalf. The main grounds were that the document was under-stamped and that its registration had been illegally obtained. The application No. 460-C thus was a mere application challenging the admissibility of the document and praying that the same be not exhibited for the reasons stated therein. The main grounds were that the document was under-stamped and that its registration had been illegally obtained. The application No. 460-C thus was a mere application challenging the admissibility of the document and praying that the same be not exhibited for the reasons stated therein. Application No. 460-C could accordingly not be construed as a plaint in a suit praying for adjudging void a document or for its cancellation. It was accordingly not liable to be charged with ad valorem court-fee. The court below rightly observed that ........ On such miscellaneous application court-fee payable is Rs. 1.50. Application 460-C-2 will not be covered under S. 7 of the C. F. Act..... Application 823-C-2 is accordingly rejected". No error, much less an error of jurisdiction, exists in this Order and no interference is called for in it. 9. As regards the fixing of date for evidence on application No. 460-C, it may be observed that that request had already been granted by allowing the plaintiffs application No. 619-C on 29th of Aug. 1981. The question as to what kind of evidence was to be led and what would be its relevancy or effect could be considered at the time of the production of the evidence, and not at this stage. In the order of Hon'ble Yashoda Nandan, J., dated 24-7-1979 a direction was given to the court below to decide the plaintiffs objection to the admissibility of the deed in accordance with law bearing in mind the observations made in that order. In Ram Rattan v. Bajrang Lal ( AIR 1978 SC 1393 ) it was observed that it was the duty of the court to determine the question of admissibility of documents with reference to the provisions of the Stamp Act and the Registration Act before the suit was finally heard. The objections raised were that the registration of the document in question was obtained by practising fraud on Registration and Stamp Acts. If the plaintiff wanted to substantiate those allegations by producing evidence, the order of Hon'ble Yashoda Nandan, J., dated 24-7-1979 would seem to permit the same. The nature of that evidence or the relevancy or effect of the same is not a question at issue at this stage. If the plaintiff wanted to substantiate those allegations by producing evidence, the order of Hon'ble Yashoda Nandan, J., dated 24-7-1979 would seem to permit the same. The nature of that evidence or the relevancy or effect of the same is not a question at issue at this stage. Sri V. K. S. Chaudhari, learned counsel for the applicants, urged that there was no fraud on Registration or Stamp law, and the document was properly stamped and validly registered. This question is not involved in the revision, and it is not necessary to consider it. The instant revision is concerned only with the correctness of the order passed on application No. 820-C-2 and the fixing of date for evidence on application l No. 460-C. None of the two orders touches on registration or the stamp duty paid. No error thus exists in the impugned order of the court below, and no interference is called for in it. Further, the impugned order does not amount to a case decided, nor does it involve any question of jurisdiction. These two questions shall be dealt with hereafter. 10. S. 115, Civil P. C. provides for the record of a case decided by the subordinate court to be called for by the High Court for passing such orders as it deems fit if it finds that the subordinate court has committed an error of jurisdiction in deciding the same. The Section reads : "115. Revision. 10. S. 115, Civil P. C. provides for the record of a case decided by the subordinate court to be called for by the High Court for passing such orders as it deems fit if it finds that the subordinate court has committed an error of jurisdiction in deciding the same. The Section reads : "115. Revision. - (1) The High Court may call for the record of any case which has been decided by any Court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal -lies thereto, and if such subordinate court appears - (a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or (b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or (c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity, the High Court may make such order in the case as it thinks fit : Provided that the High Court shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding, except where - (a) the order, if it had been made in favour of the party applying for revision, would have finally disposed of the suit or other proceeding, or (b) the order, if allowed to stand, would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made. (2) The High Court shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any decree or order against which an appeal lies either to the High Court or to any court subordinate thereto. Explanation - In this section, the expression "any case which has been decided" includes any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding. State Amendment. Uttar Pradesh. For S. 115 of the Civil P. C. 1908 (5 of 1908), as amended in its application to Uttar Pradesh, the following section shall be substituted namely. :- "115. Revision. State Amendment. Uttar Pradesh. For S. 115 of the Civil P. C. 1908 (5 of 1908), as amended in its application to Uttar Pradesh, the following section shall be substituted namely. :- "115. Revision. - The High Court in cases arising out of original suits or other proceedings of the value of twenty thousand rupees and above, including such suits or other proceedings instituted before the commencement of the Civil P. C. (Uttar Pradesh Amendment) Ordinance, 1978, and the District Court in any other case, including a case arising out of an original suit or other proceedings instituted before the date of such commencement, may call for the record of-any case which has been decided by any court subordinate to such High Court or District Court as the case may be, and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such subordinate court appears - (a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or (b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested;. or (c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity, the High Court or the District Court, as the case may be, may make such order in the case as it thinks fit : Provided that in respect of cases arising out of original suits or other proceeding of any valuation decided by the District Court, the High Court alone shall be competent to make an order under this section : Provided further that the High Court or the District Court shall not under this section, vary or reverse any order including an order deciding an issue, made in the course of a suit or other. proceeding, except where,- (i) the order, if so varied or reversed would finally dispose of the suit or other proceeding; or (ii) the order, if allowed to stand, would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made. Explanation - In this section, the expression "any case which has been decided" includes any order deciding an issue in the course of a suit or other proceeding". 11. In the original Code of Civil Procedure, 1859, there was no provision corresponding to S. 115 of the Code. The revisional power of the High Court was brought into existence for the first time in the Code of 1861. 11. In the original Code of Civil Procedure, 1859, there was no provision corresponding to S. 115 of the Code. The revisional power of the High Court was brought into existence for the first time in the Code of 1861. The Code of 1882 conferred the revisional power on the High Court substantially in the same terms as were contained in S. 115 of the Code of 1908, with the exception of cl. (c) of S. 115. The meaning of the words "case decided" attracted considerable attention by Courts, and had been explained from time to time. Controversy raged as to whether the words "case decided" meant the decision of the whole' case or a part of it as well. That controversy is now settled by the decision in S. S. Khanna v. F. J. Dillon ( AIR 1964 SC 497 ) which lays down that the decision of even a part of a case amounts to the decision of a case within the meaning of the words "case decided" in S. 115. The real question, however, is what does the decision of a case or a part of it actually mean? It means the adjudication on a controversy as to the rights and obligations of the parties in the suit. The adjudication may be express or implied. See Ramdass v. Smt. Subhash Bakshi, (AIR 1977 Him Pra 18). But it must necessarily touch on the right or obligation in controversy in the suit in order to constitute it a case decided. See Manohar Lal v. Valerior (Cawnpore) Pvt. Ltd. ( AIR 1980 All 327 ); Maheshwari Oil Mills v. M/s. Girjanath Durga Saran. ( AIR 1980 All 265 ); Smt. Shanti Kaur v. Smt. Haseen Jahan Begum (1976 (2) All LR 694); and Badrinath Gupta v. Estates Officer (Controller of Aerodromes) (AIR 1977 J & K 38). In Baldevdas Shivlal v. Filmistan Distributors (India) Pvt. Ltd. ( AIR 1970 SC 406 ) it was held that a case may be said to be decided, if the Court adjudicated for the purposes of 'the suit some right or obligation of the parties in controversy. This view was reiterated in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra ( AIR 1978 SC 47 ). See also Sabitri Debi v. Baikuntha Das (AIR 1979 Orissa 140). This view was reiterated in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra ( AIR 1978 SC 47 ). See also Sabitri Debi v. Baikuntha Das (AIR 1979 Orissa 140). The controversy as to whether interlocutory orders would be covered by the words, case decided' stands resolved by the amendment made in section 115 by the Civil Laws Amendment Act of 1978 which provides that."the decision of an issue may itself amount to the decision of a case. But the power of the High Court under S. 115 is very limited. See D.L.F. Housing and Construction Co. (P) Ltd. v. Sarup Singh, AIR 1971 SC 2324 ); Managing Director (MIG) Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. Balanagar, Hyderabad v. Ajit Prasad Tarway, ( AIR 1973 SC 76 ); Brij Gopal Mathur v. Kishan Gopal Mathur ( AIR 1973 SC 1096 ); and K. Balasubramania Chetty v. N.M. Sambandamoorthy Chetty ( AIR 1975 SC 818 ). Some right or obligation in controversy has to be adjudicated upon by an order in order to constitute it as an order deciding a case. Any order, passed during the progress of the suit which does not have the effect of adjudicating upon a right or obligation in controversy would not amount to a 'case decided'. This, to our mind, has been made clear by the State amendment to the Explanation added to S. 115. This refers to any order including an order deciding an issue as an order deciding a case, which, to our mind, means an order deciding an issue or any order similar in nature to that. An issue arises when a material proposition of fact or law is asserted by one party and is denied by the other with reference to a right or obligation in controversy. See O. XIV, R. 1, Civil P. C. Hence an order on such a matter or a matter similar in nature alone would he covered by the expression "case decided". 12. Admissibility of a document for want of registration was not found to be a matter relating to rights or' obligations of parties, and an order passed in respect of it was not held to be a case decided. See Chhakkan v. Zaheer Hasan (1979(5) All LR 495) : (AIR 1980 NOC 39). An order regarding admission of evidence in appeal was again not found to be a matter relating to rights or obligations of parties in controversy. See Chhakkan v. Zaheer Hasan (1979(5) All LR 495) : (AIR 1980 NOC 39). An order regarding admission of evidence in appeal was again not found to be a matter relating to rights or obligations of parties in controversy. See Smt. Shansi Kaur v. Smt. Haseen Jahan Begum (1976(2) All LR 694). 13. Interlocutory orders passed during the progress of a case or proceeding may be of two kinds- (i) those which decided an essential part of the case, and (ii) those which are mere steps for the progress of proceedings. This was pointed out by the Supreme Court in the cases of Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, ( AIR 1978 SC 47 ) and V.C. Shukla v. State through C.B.I. ( AIR 1980 SC 962 ). Orders passed merely for the progress of the proceeding are not orders deciding a case, and they would not fall within the expression 'case decided' under S. 115, Civil P. C. In the Central Bank of India Ltd. v. Gokal Chand, ( AIR 1967 SC 799 ) it was held that orders by way of steps taken towards the final adjudication of the case only regulate the procedure, and do not affect any right or obligation of the parties. Hence orders for summoning of witnesses, issue of commissions for examination of witnesses, discovery, production and inspection of documents and inspection of premises, fixing a date yf hearing, judging the admissibility of a document or the relevancy of a question are not orders deciding a case as they only regulate the procedure and do not decide any right or obligation. This case was referred to with approval in V. C. Shukla's case (supra). 14. The Explanation to S. 115 makes two points clear :- (i) that decision of a part of a case may amount to the decision of a case, and (ii) that the nature and the impact or effect of the order shall determine whether it would amount to deciding a case. The mere passing of an order would not have that effect. The mere passing of an order would not have that effect. This position seems to have been made clear by the second proviso to S. 115 which reads : "Provided further that the High Court or the District Court shall not under this section, vary or reverse any order including an order deciding an issue, made in the course of a suit or other proceeding, except where, - (i) the order, if so varied or reversed, would finally dispose of the suit or other proceeding; or (ii) the order, if allowed to stand, would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made". The legislative intent seems to be that the order passed even on an issue would not be interfered with if it does not have the effects contemplated above. 15. Learned counsel for the applicants relied upon Mangal Chand Chauhan v. Ratan Lal Nahata, (AIR 1981 Gauhati 93) to contend that orders of even trivial nature shall, in view of the Explanation, fall within the purview of S. 115. With great respect, I find myself unable to agree with that view. In Badrinath Gupta v. Estates Officer Controller of Aerodromes) (AIR 1977 J and K 38) it was held that an interlocutory order in order to amount to a case decided has to be on a substantial question arising between the parties. The expression "case decided" has to be construed with reference to the various parts of S. 115 keeping in mind the scope of the revisional powers of the High Court. That power is very limited. Two conditions have to be fulfilled before an order can be called in question (i) the order must amount to a case decided; and (ii) it must suffer from a jurisdictional error. Even then the High Court may refuse to interfere, if it does not find the case a fit one for interference. The Civil P. C. has provided for an appeal from a decree, and a second appeal from the appellate decree. It also provides for appeals from orders. No second appeal has been permitted from an appellate order. But any error, defect or irregularity in such an order affecting the decision of the case can be made the subject of a ground of objection in an appeal against the decree. It also provides for appeals from orders. No second appeal has been permitted from an appellate order. But any error, defect or irregularity in such an order affecting the decision of the case can be made the subject of a ground of objection in an appeal against the decree. Therefore such orders can be corrected only after the entire case has been disposed of. 16. There is yet a range of orders which suffer from jurisdictional errors and need immediate correction, and against which no appeal lies. The Code has provided for a revision against them and invested the High Court with suo motu powers of correction besides their being challenged by a party. This is to ensure correction of grave errors of jurisdiction immediately. See Ram Dass v. Smt. Subhash Bakshi (AIR 1977 Him Pra 18). Such errors are of three kinds, namely : (a) where the subordinate court appears to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law; or (b) Where the subordinate court appears to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested; or (c) where the subordinate court appears to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. Cls. (a) and (b) are not at all attracted in the instant case. It does not fall under cl. (c) either. CL (c) relates to a procedural illegality or irregularity. See Keshardeo Chamria v. Radha Kissen Chamria ( AIR 1953 SC 23 ). In D.L.F. Housing and Construction Co. (P). Ltd. v. Sarup Singh ( AIR 1971 SC 2324 at p. 2327) it was held as follows : "........ The words "illegality" and "with material irregularity" as used in this clause (cl. (c)) (brackets supplied) do not cover either errors of fact or of law; they do not refer to the decision arrived at but merely to the manner in which it is reached. The errors contemplated by this clause may, in our view, relate either to breach of some provision of law or to material defects of procedure affecting the ultimate decision, and not to errors either of fact or of law, after the prescribed formalities have been complied with". Errors of procedure also thus must ultimately affect the final decision in the case, i. e. must touch upon the right or obligation of the parties, in order to fall under cl (c). Errors of procedure also thus must ultimately affect the final decision in the case, i. e. must touch upon the right or obligation of the parties, in order to fall under cl (c). The impugned order in the instant case refers to two matters- (i) the question of court-fee, and (ii) the fixing of date on application No. 460-C. As regards the court-fee, we-have already observed that the impugned order suffers from no error. Further, a defendant has normally no right in the matter of court fee. See Hari Narain v. Williams ( AIR 1976 All 441 ). As regards the fixing of date for evidence on appln. No. 460-C, it was only a routine matter, and was only a step towards the final adjudication of the controversy involved. Hon'ble Yashoda Nandan, J, in his order dated 24-7-1979 clearly observed that the question of admissibility of the document had to be decided by the court below. It accordingly fixed a date for evidence in pursuance of the order of this Court. The order neither amounts to a case decided nor does it suffer from a jurisdictional error. 17. Sri V. K S. Chaudhari, learned counsel for the applicants, submitted that order may amount to a case decided as it was similar to the one which was set aside by this Court by its order dated 24-7-1979. Hon'ble Yashoda Nandan J, in his order dated 24-7-1979 had observed that it was not contended before him by the learned counsel for the opposite party that the order impugned in that case was not a case decided. It was, in a way, conceded before him that the order impugned in that case was a case decided. No decision was given in the earlier case on the question as to when does an order amount to a case decided. The decision in the earlier case would not bar the decision of that question in the instant case. The impugned order in the instant case does not amount to a case decided nor does it suffer from any jurisdictional error. 18. The applicants moved an application for conversion of this revision into a writ petition. That request has been refused by a separate order passed on the application which was moved on 1st Mar. 1983. The impugned order in the instant case does not amount to a case decided nor does it suffer from any jurisdictional error. 18. The applicants moved an application for conversion of this revision into a writ petition. That request has been refused by a separate order passed on the application which was moved on 1st Mar. 1983. The request for treating this revision as an application under S. 151 of the Civil P. C. for, a clarification of this Court's earlier order dated 24-7-1979 passed by Hon'ble Yashoda Nandan, J., has also been rejected by the same order. 19. In the result, the revision fails and is dismissed with costs.