JUDGMENT 1. This is a plaintiff's revision and arises under the following circumstances:- The plaintiffs had filed a suit for redemption of a mortgage against the defendants. That suit was decreed by the trial court on 3-3-75. The defendants went up in appeal, which was accepted by the learned Additional Civil Judge, Udaipur on 20-9-79. Consequently, the plaintiffs suit was dismissed. The plaintiffs then came up before this Court in second appeal. When the summons were issued to the respondents, it was reported on the summons of respondent No. 3 Ambava that he had died. There was some controversy raised about the date of death of Ambava and thereupon this Court directed an enquiry to be made by the Additional Civil Judge. On the receipt of the report of the learned Additional Civil Judge. this Court by its order dated 9-7-81 found that Ambava had died on 20-10-78 and as the application for bringing his legal representatives on record before this Court was made after snore than one and half years, his legal representatives could not be allowed to be impleaded and, therefore, the appeal abated so for as Ambava was concerned. It may be stated here that at that stage, the case was only at the stage of admission. The matter was thereafter ordered to be put up for admission. It further appears that the respondents, who had contested the date of the death of Ambava, then moved an application for review of the order of this Court dated 9.7.81 alleging that the date of death of Ambava was not 25.10.78 but it was somewhere in 1979 but this application was rejected by this Court by order dated 6.11.81. Then the matter again came up before this Court on 20 11.81. The learned counsel for the respondents stated before the Court that since Ambava had died while the appeal was pending before the first appellate court, the decree of that court was a nullity as his legal representatives had not been brought on record and, therefore, that decree may be set aside and the case may be sent back to the lower appellate court leaving it to the appellant before that court to take steps to set aside the abatement. Accordingly, this Court set aside the decree of the learned Additional Civil judges and sent the case back to it to decide the appeal afresh in accordance with law leaving it to the respondents before this Court to take appropriate steps to get the abatement, if any, set aside before that court. It was also directed that the parties would appear before the Additional Civil Judge, Udaipur on 4.1.82. In pursuance of this order, the matter came up before the learned Additional Civil Judge, Udaipur on 4.1.82. The parties appeared before that court on that day and sought an adjournment. The case was then fixed on 25.1.82. On 25.1.82 again the learned counsel for the appellants before the learned Additional Civil Judge prayed for time to make an application for setting aside the abatement. The case was then again adjourned to 12.2.82 On that date, an application for setting aside abatement was filed along with the affidavit of Bhera by Bhera alleging that Ambava had died some- where in 1978 but as the appellants were not required to attend each date of hearing by their counsel, they could not inform him of the death of Ambava in time and, therefore, the application for bringing the legal representative could not be made in time. It was prayed that the abatement may be set aside and the legal representatives may be brought or record. The names of the legal representatives were stated in para 2 of the application. This application was contested by the respondents. After hearing the parties, the learned Additional Civil Judge by his order dated 23.8 82 allowed the application dated 12.2.82 and set aside the abatement. He directed the legal representatives to be brought on record. It is against this order that the present revision has been filed by the plaintiffs. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record. 3. He directed the legal representatives to be brought on record. It is against this order that the present revision has been filed by the plaintiffs. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record. 3. It has been urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners that as no sufficient cause for the delay in filing the application under Order 22 Rule 9 C.P.C. had been made out nor any sufficient cause for the delay after the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for the application under Order 22 Rule 9 C.P.C. had also been put forward, much less proved by the non-petitioners, the learned Additional Civil judge had no jurisdiction to condone the delay and to set aside the abatement. In this connection, he placed reliance upon Ramlal v. Rawa Coalfields Ltd ( AIR 1962 SC 316 ) , Union of India v. Ram Charan (AIR 1968 SC 215) , Sarpanch, Lonand Grampanchavat v. Ramgiri Gosavi (AIR 196 SC 222) . and Shakuntala Devi v. Kuntal Kumari ( AIR 1969 SC 575 ) . He further urged that in any case, even if it was to he held that on account of the fact that the present non-petitioners were not inquired to attend the court on every date of hearing by their learned counsel before the learned Additional Civil Judge and therefore, they could not inform their counsel about the death of Ambava and thus there was sufficient cause for not filing application for substitution of the legal representatives within the prescribed time, there was absolutely no explanation for the delay after the order of this Court remanding the matter to the learned Additional Civil Judge by its order dated 20.11.81. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the non-petitioners urged that on the first place when the learned Additional Civil judge has exercised his discretion in condoning the delay and setting aside the abatement, this Court should not and cannot interfere with that discretion in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction and in the second place a liberal view has to be taken in the matter of delay in substitution of the legal representatives by setting aside the abatement. In this connection, he placed strong reliance upon Bhagwan Swaroop v. Mool Chand 1983 UJ (SC) 313 . 4. I have given my careful consideration to the rival contentions. In this connection, he placed strong reliance upon Bhagwan Swaroop v. Mool Chand 1983 UJ (SC) 313 . 4. I have given my careful consideration to the rival contentions. It is true that a revisional court would not he justified in interfering with the order of a subordinate court specially in matters where the subordinate court has a discretion but it is equally true that where that discretion is exercised in disregard of the settled principles of law and the court exercises jurisdiction, which is not vested in it, this Court can certainly interfere with the order passed by the subordinate court. In the present case, a careful examination of the older passed by the learned Additional Civil judge clearly goes to show that he has completely failed to take into consideration the question of delay after the order of remand passed by this Court with a direction that it will be open to the appellant before the learned Additional Civil judge to apply for setting aside the abatement. There is no dispute on the question that on the death of Ambava on 25-10-78, his appeal before the learned Additional Civil Judge had automatically abated after three months of this date when his legal representatives were not brought on record. The abatement could have been set a said, on an application under Order 22 Rule 9 C.P.C., which was to be made within sixty days of he abatement Admittedly the application under Order 22 Rule 9 C.P.C., was not made within that period and that is why recourse had been had o section 5 of the Limitation Act Now section 5 of the Limitation Act can he called in aid if there was sufficient cause for the delay. This at once gives rise to the question what is meant by sufficient cause. Sufficient cause ordinarily means the cause which was not within the power of the party concerned and it was not on account of his negligence or inaction or want of bonafides. It is true than the term 'sufficient cause' has to be construed libarally but as has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sarpanch, Lonand Grampanchayat's case (supra) the words 'sufficient cause" should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fides is imputable to the applicant. It is true than the term 'sufficient cause' has to be construed libarally but as has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sarpanch, Lonand Grampanchayat's case (supra) the words 'sufficient cause" should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fides is imputable to the applicant. Therefore, it was incumbent upon the learned Additional Civil Judge to have considered the question of sufficient cause and that cause should have been such which could have prevented the appellant before him to have presented the application under Order 22 Rule 9 C.P.C, till the time it was actually presented. It has further been held in Union of India's case (supra) as under:- "The Court is not to invoke its inherent powers under Section 151, C.P.C. for the purposes of impleading the legal representatives of a deceased respondent, if the suit had abated on account of the appellant not taking appropriate steps within time to bring the legal representatives of the deceased party on the record and when its application for setting aside the abatement is not allowed on account of its failure to satisfy the Court that there was sufficient cause for not impleading the legal representatives of the deceased in time and for not applying for the setting aside of the abatement within time." 5. Similarly it was observed in Ramlal's case (sup) a) as under : "In constructing Section 5 it is relevant to hear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the decree-holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties. In other words, when the period of limitation prescribed has expired the decree-holder has obtained a benefit under the law of limitation to treat the decree as beyond challenge, and this legal right which has accrued to the decree-holder by lapse of time should not be light-heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown discretion is given to the Court to condone delay and admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the Court in order that judicial power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown discretion is given to the Court to condone delay and admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the Court in order that judicial power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice. As has been observed by the Madras High Court in Krishna v. Chathappan, ILR 13 Mad 269 . "Section 5 gives the Court a discretion which in respect of jurisdiction is to be exercised in the way in which judicial power and discretion ought to be exercised upon principles which are well understood: the words 'sufficient cause' receiving a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fide is imputable to the appellant." "It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done: the application for condoning delay has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant. It cannot justify art enquiry as to why the party was sitting idle during all the time available to it. In this connection we may point out that considerations of bona fides or due diligence are always material and relevant when the Court is dealing with applications made under S 14 of the Limitation Act. In dealing with such application, the Court is called upon to consider the effect of the combined provisions of Sections 5 and 14. In this connection we may point out that considerations of bona fides or due diligence are always material and relevant when the Court is dealing with applications made under S 14 of the Limitation Act. In dealing with such application, the Court is called upon to consider the effect of the combined provisions of Sections 5 and 14. Therefore, in our opinion, considerations which have been expressly made material and relevant by the provisions of of Section 14 cannot to the same extent and in the same manner be invoked in dealing with applications which fall to be decided only under Section 5 without reference to Section 14. In the present case there is no difficulty in holding that the discretion should he exercised in favour of the appellant because apart from the general criticism made against the appellant's lack of diligence during the period of limitation no other fact had been adduced against it. Indeed, as we have already pointed out, the learned judicial Commissioner rejected the appellant's application for condonation of delay only on the ground that it was appellant's duty to file the appeal as soon as possible within the period prescribed, and that, in our opinion, is not a valid ground." 6. Therefore, it is abundantly clear that unless sufficient cause was shown for the delay, the learned Additional Civil Judge had no jurisdiction to set aside the abatement under Order 22 Rule 9 C.P.C. with the help of section 5 Limitation Act. The learned Additional Civil Judge has, of course, observed that the cause shown by the appellant before him for the delay was sufficient but in arriving at that finding, he has absolutely failed to take into consideration the delay which has occurred after the order of remand by this Court upto the date of the filing of the application. He has merely taken into consideration the sufficient cause, which was shown for not filing application under Order 22 Rule 9 C P C. till the matter was pending before him at the first instance, namely. that the appellant had been asked by their counsel not to appear on all the dates of hearing and, therefore, they could not inform the learned counsel about the death of Ambava. Now if this cause is taken to he sufficient. that the appellant had been asked by their counsel not to appear on all the dates of hearing and, therefore, they could not inform the learned counsel about the death of Ambava. Now if this cause is taken to he sufficient. This can only explain the delay till the appellant before the Additional Civil Judge came to know of the death of Ambava or the fact that the appeal had abated on account of his death but even thereafter they did not move the application under Order 22 Rule 9 C P.C. with promptitude and went on unnecessarily delaying the matter It may be recapitulated here that the fact of the death of Ambava had come to notice before this Court when the report was made on the summons sent in the name of Ambava. Thereafter the appellant before this Court in the second appeal moved an application for bringing his legal representatives on record. That application was opposed tooth and nail by the present non-petitioners and it were they who had asserted that Ambava had died much earlier than on the date alleged by the appellant before this Court. On that an enquiry was held and this Court came to the finding that Ambava had died on 25-10-78. When this date was ascertained at the instance of the present non-petitioners themselves, it was for them to have arisen from their slumber and should have immediately asked for the remand of the cast to the first appellate court before which the abatement had taken place but they did not do anything of that sort .On the other hand, they made an application before this Court for reviewing the order dated 9-7-81. That request was rejected on 6-11-81. Thereafter again they kept silent. It was on 20-11-81 that the learned counsel for the present non-petitioners came-forward with the request that the decree of the learned Additional Civil judge be set aside and the matter maybe sent back to him for considering she question of abatement and no this, the matter was remanded with a direction that the parties would appear before the learned Additional Civil Judge, Udaipur on 4.1.82. One could have expected the present non-petitioners to have presented the application for setting aside abatement before the learned Additional Civil judge on 4-1-82 still this was not done. One could have expected the present non-petitioners to have presented the application for setting aside abatement before the learned Additional Civil judge on 4-1-82 still this was not done. Not only this thereafter the case was adjourned to 25-1-82 without making any application for setting aside abatement and on 25-1-82 also no such application was moved. It was only on 12-2-82 that this application was moved but unfortunately in this application, no ground at all for this inordinate delay, not to speak of a sufficient ground was at all shot, it. When no such ground for this inordinate delay was shown, there was no question for consideration of such a ground by the learned Additional Civil judge and in the absence of any such sufficient ground, the learned Additional Civil judge was left with no jurisdiction to condone the delay and set aside the abatement. 7. I shall now come to the authority relied upon by the learned counsel for the non-petitioner, namely. Bhagwau Swaroop's case (supra) as also the authority relied upon by the court below, namely: (b) M/s Mohatta Brothers, Ahmedabad v. Sheth Chaturbhaidas Chimanlal (AlR 1982 Guj 96) . Taking the last authority first, it may be seen that ill that case, the learned single judge of the Gujarat High Court observed as under : "Therefore, if it appears from the facts on record that the delay has not caused any prejudice to the party opposing the application for condonation of delay, in the sense that the said party has not taken any irreversible steps on the basis that the litigation has come to an end because of inaction on the part of the plaintiff to take steps within the period of limitation for setting aside the abatement, the Court should not take a technical view and refuse to condone the delay on the pedantic approach that every days delay is not explained. If on the other hand the inaction on the part of the plaintiff is indicative of his desire to abandon the cause or give up the litigation, the Court would be justified in refusing to condone the delay." 8. If on the other hand the inaction on the part of the plaintiff is indicative of his desire to abandon the cause or give up the litigation, the Court would be justified in refusing to condone the delay." 8. It may at once be stated that it would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case as to whether to delay in filing the application under Order 22 Rule 9 C. P. C. or section 5 Limitation Act should be condoned or should not be condoned. In the present case. as already stated above, the delay on the part of the present non-petitioners amounts almost to inaction and, therefore, this authority is not of' any avail to them in the Supreme Court authority, has Lordship Desai J while considering the question of condoning the delay observed - "As there is some negligence on behalf of the appellants in moving the application in time. original second respondent it Mool Chand must he compensated by awarding him costs". On the basis of these observations, it has been strenuously urged that the negligence, if any, on the part of the non-petitioners should not entail a refusal of the application it s 5 Limitation Act. I am unable to agree with this contention in the facts and circumstances of the case. According to the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to above in that case, there was only some negligence. Now some negligence' cannot be equated to absolute - negligence or inaction on the part of the non- petitioners and, therefore, this authority also cannot be applicable to the facts of the present case. It may be added that here the party is guilty not merely of negligence but also appears to be guilty of lack of bona tides. As I have already pointed out at the earliest stage when the present petitioners applied for substitution of the legal representatives of the deceased Ambava before this court, they oppose.l the application tooth and nail and averred that Ambava had died much earlier than on the date stated by the present petitioners. That contention, of course, was found to be correct and the present petitioners' application for substitution of the legal representatives was dismissed. That contention, of course, was found to be correct and the present petitioners' application for substitution of the legal representatives was dismissed. Then the present non-petitioners took a somersault and had applied for review of that order on the ground that Ambava had died not on the date alleged by theta but thereafter as alleged by the present petitioners. This was done with a view to avert the position that since it was found that Ambava hid died pending the appeal before the first appellate court, the decree granted in favour of the non-petitioners would automatically come to an end being against a dead person. Thereafter the non-petitioners took the position that the matter may be remanded to the first appellate court reserving their right to apply for setting aside the abatement and when the matter went before the first appellate court, they did not make the application for setting aside the abatement on 4. 1. 82 as also on 25. I. 82 and moved the application only on 12. 2. 82 without mentioning any reason for this inaction for all these days. In these circumstances, there was no ground whatsoever, not to speak of sufficient case for setting aside the abatement. The learned Additional Civil judge had, therefore exercised his jurisdiction in setting aside the abatement improperly and, therefore, this Court will have to interfere with that order. 9. For the reasons stated above, this revision is accepted. The order of the learned Additional Civil ,Judge, Udaipur dated 23. 8. 82 is set aside. The parties will be free to agitate the question whether the abatement of the appeal so for as Ambava is concerned, will result in part abatement or the appeal would totally abate. The parties are directed to appear before the learned Additional Civil Judge, Udaipur on 2. 9. 83. The record may be returned immediately. *******