JUDGMENT Satish Chandra, C.J. - On 7-9- 1965, the Government of India appointed a Committee under S. 15, Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951, (Act No. 65 of 1951), to investigate into the affairs of the Muir Mills Co. Ltd. Kanpur. On receipt of the report of the Committee, the Government of India felt that the Muir Mills Co. Ltd. was being managed in a manner highly detrimental to public interest. On 22-12-1965, it issued a notification under S. 18A of the aforesaid Act appointing an Authorised Controller to take over the management of the whole of the undertaking of the Muir Mills Co. Ltd. Kanpur. The Authorised Controller took over charge of the management on 1-1-1966. 2. On 12-9-1974, the Government of India promulgated the Sick Textile Undertakings (Nationalisation) Ordinance, 1974. The Ordinance was substituted by the Sick Textile Undertakings (Nationalisation) Act, No. 57 of 1974. Under this Act, with effect from the appointed day (which was fixed as April 1, 1974), the undertakings of the Companies mentioned in its Schedule stood transferred to, and vested absolutely in, the Central Government, and thereafter stood transferred to the National Textile Corporation. Entry No. 64 of the Schedule mentioned Muir Mills. The right, title and interest of the undertaking of the Muir Mills Co. Ltd. was acquired on payment of compensation, which is mentioned in column 4 of the Schedule to the Act at Rs. 1,36,60,000/-. Section 39 of the Act declared that this Act is for giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principles specified in cl (b) of Article 39 of the Constitution. 3. By the present writ petition, the Muir Mills Co. Ltd. as well as its managing agent and some of the shareholders challenged the constitutional vires of the Sick Textile Undertakings (Nationalisation) Act, 1974. 4. Sri Raja Ram Agarwal, learned counsel for the petitioners, submitted that - (1) the Act violates the equality clause of Article 14 of the Constitution; (2) the Act usurps the judicial power of the courts; and (3) the Act is a fraud on the Constitution. 5. Having heard learned counsel, we do not find any merit in any of these submissions. 6. It is no longer open to the petitioners to submit that the Nationalisation Act is in conflict with Article 14 of the Constitution. 5. Having heard learned counsel, we do not find any merit in any of these submissions. 6. It is no longer open to the petitioners to submit that the Nationalisation Act is in conflict with Article 14 of the Constitution. As mentioned above, S. 39 of the Act declared that the Act was enacted for giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principles specified in cl (b) of Article 39 of the Constitution. The material part of Article 31-C of the Constitution (which was 'introduced by the Constitution (Twenty- fifth Amendment) Act, 1971) originally provided - "Notwithstanding anything contained in Article 13, no law giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principles specified in cl (b) or cl (c) of Article 39 shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes away or a bridges any of the rights conferred by Article 14 or Article 19 or Article 31............" It may be stated that the constitutional validity of the above mentioned part of the original Article 31-C as introduced by the Constitution (Twenty-fifth Amendment) Act was upheld by the Supreme Court in Kesavananda Bharati's case ( AIR 1973 SC 1461 ). 7. The Sick Textile Undertakings (Nationalisation) Act, 1974, was included in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution by the Constitution (Thirty-ninth Amendment) Act, 1975. Article 31-B of the Constitution provides immunity to the Acts and Regulations specified in the Ninth Schedule from attack based on inconsistency with the fundamental rights. The attack on the validity of Article 31-B was raised but failed in Waman Rao v. Union of India, ( AIR 1981 SC 271 ). 8. Thus, in view of Article 31-B as well as Article 31C of the Constitution, it is no longer open to the petitioners to submit that the Nationalisation Act violated Article 14 of the Constitution. Further, the question whether Article 31C affords complete protection against Article 14 has also been now decided by the Supreme Court in Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Company v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. ( AIR 1983 SC 239 ). There it was held that it cannot be contended that any law seeking the protection of Article 31C must not be a law founded on discrimination. There it was held that it cannot be contended that any law seeking the protection of Article 31C must not be a law founded on discrimination. To make it a condition precedent that a law seeking the heaven of Article 31 C must be non- discriminatory or based on reasonable classification is to make Article 31 C meaningless. If Article 14 is not offended, no one need give any immunity from an attack based on Article 14. Where Article 31C comes in, Article 14 goes out. There is no scope for bringing in Article 14 by a side wind as it were. 9. We did not hear learned counsel for the petitioners submitting that the Nationalisation Act was not covered by the provisions of Article 31C because it did not give effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principles specified in cl. (b) of Article 39 of the Constitution. 10. Article 39, by cl. (b) provides that the State shall, in particular, direct its policy towards securing that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the common good. In Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Co. case ( AIR 1983 SC 239 ) the Supreme Court ruled that the phrase "material resources of the community" occurring in cl. (b) of Article 39 means and includes all resources, natural and man-made, public and private-owned. The expression "material resources of the community" as used in Article 39(b) is not confined to natural resources. It is not confined to resources owned by the public. This expression means all things which are capable of producing wealth for the community. The petitioner company manufactures textiles. Though it is a privately-owned company, but it is covered by the expression "material resources of the community" occurring in cl. (b) of Article 39. 11. It was next urged that this Court had on 27-12-1957, passed an order in a Company Petition that all sums advanced or arranged by the J. K. Commercial Corporation Ltd to the Muir Mills shall be a first charge on the products and goods of the mills, or on any new assets which come into existence after the taking over of the mills by the said J. K. Commercial Corporation, or subsequent charge where such goods or assets are pledged elsewhere. This order was clarified further by the High Court on 4th May. This order was clarified further by the High Court on 4th May. 1971, as meaning that the charge extended in relation to all sums advanced or arranged by the J. K., Commercial Corporation Ltd. to the mills from 27-10-1957 to 8-11-1964 and from 1-4- 1965 to 21-12-1965. Learned counsel stated that the Nationalisation Act has virtually rendered nugatory the aforesaid direction by the High Court, inasmuch as it has transferred and vested all the assets and properties of the undertaking of the Company in the Central Government free from encumbrances. 12. We are unable to agree. Section 3 of the Nationalisation Act provides that on the appointed day every sick textile undertaking and the right, title and interest of the owner in relation to every such sick textile undertaking shall stand transferred to, and shall vest absolutely in, the Central Government. Section 4 provides the general effect of vesting. Its sub-sections (4) and (5) are material and relevant. They state- "(4) Every mortgage of any property which has vested under this Act in the Central Government and every person holding any charge, lien or other interest in or in relation to any such property shall give, within such time and in such manner as may be prescribed, an intimation to the Commissioner of such mortgage, charge, lien or other interest. (5) For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the mortgage of any property referred to in sub-s. (2) or any other person holding any charge, lien or other interest in, or in relation to, any such property shall be entitled to claim, in accordance with his rights and interests, payment of the mortgage money or other dues, in whole or in part, out of the amount specified in relation to such property in the First Schedule, but no such mortgage, charge, lien or other interest shall be enforceable against any property which has vested in the Central Government." 13. The effect of these provisions is that the charge has been transferred from the goods and properties of the undertakings which has been acquired to the compensation which has been given in lieu thereof. The petitioners charge is enforceable against the compensation provided for the acquisition of the undertaking of the Muir Mills Co. The effect of these provisions is that the charge has been transferred from the goods and properties of the undertakings which has been acquired to the compensation which has been given in lieu thereof. The petitioners charge is enforceable against the compensation provided for the acquisition of the undertaking of the Muir Mills Co. Ltd. Such transfer of the subject of the petitioners' charge has been occasioned because of the acquisition of the undertaking of the Company by the Central Government. In view of the changed situation the charge was justifiably transferred to the compensation which was payable to the erstwhile owners of the Undertaking of the. Muir Mills Co. Ltd. Such a legislation cannot be deemed to be usurpation of the judicial power of the Courts. On the other hand, sub-ss. (4) and (5) respect Court's decision. They do not obliterate the obligation created or imposed by the Court's decision. They only provided for an alternative enforcement of the charge created in favour of the petitioners by the Court's order. The Nationalisation Act cannot hence be characterised as reversing the decision of the Court or usurping judicial power. 14. In the end, learned counsel submitted that the Nationalisation Act constituted a fraud on Constitution it was a piece of colourable legislation. The submission was that the Muir Mills Co. Ltd. had been taken over by the Central Government in 1966, and it was being run by Authorised Controller since then. If it became a sick undertaking, it was the fault of the Authorised Controller and not of the owners. There was no justification for acquiring it. The action of the Parliament in enacting this Act so as to acquire the (undertaking of the Mills Company was, in the circumstances, mala fide and so colourable exercise of legislative power. 15. The doctrine of colourable legislation does not involve any question of bona fides or mala fides on the part of the legislature. The doctrine confines itself to the question of competency of a particular legislature to enact a particular law. 16. In K.C. Gajapati Narayan Deo v. State of Orissa ( AIR 1953 SC 375 ) Mukherjea, J. observed that the whole doctrine of colourable legislation is based upon the maxim that you cannot do indirectly what you cannot do directly. The doctrine confines itself to the question of competency of a particular legislature to enact a particular law. 16. In K.C. Gajapati Narayan Deo v. State of Orissa ( AIR 1953 SC 375 ) Mukherjea, J. observed that the whole doctrine of colourable legislation is based upon the maxim that you cannot do indirectly what you cannot do directly. If a legislature is competent to do a thing directly, then the mere fact that it attempted to do it in an indirect or disguised manner cannot make the Act invalid. His Lordship further held that the enquiry must always be as to the true nature and character of the challenged legislation and it is the result of such investigation and not the form alone that will determine as to whether or not it relates to a subject which is within the power of the legislative authority. 17. We did not hear learned counsel to even whisper that the Nationalisation Act was not within the legislative competence of Parliament. In the situation on question of bona fides or mala fides really arose for consideration. The wisdom of the Act is a matter of State policy which is for the legislature or Parliament to decide. This is not a matter of judicial review. There is no merit in this submission either. 18. The various points urged in support of the writ petition having failed, the same is dismissed with costs.