G. N. SABHAHIT, J. ( 1 ) THIS Criminal Revision is filed under S. 397 of the Code of Criminal procedure against the order dt. 26-2-1982 made by the Taluka Magistrate Malavalli in case No. KDR 1 of 1981-82 ordering the release of the respondent from his debt as per s. 4 (a) of the Karnataka Debt Relief Act, (hereinafter refered to as the Act') ( 2 ) ONE Prasannappa, son of channappa of Huskur Village, applied to the Tahasildar and Taluka magistrate, Malavalli, alleging that he was a debtor under the Act. He further averred that he has a house in Huskur Village and that it was mortgaged in favour of Jayappa, son of Malakappa of the same village by a registered mortgage deed dt. 15-10-1974. Hence, he prayed that he should be put back in the house free of mortgage as the debt stands extinguished under the provisions of the Act. His application was submitted to the Taluka Magistrate on 24-4-1979. ( 3 ) THE Taluka Magistrate on hearing, by his order dt. 10-3-1980 made in Case No. KDR 9 of 1979- 80 held :"in view of the above facts it is construed that Sri Prasannappa belongs to the weaker Section of the Society and eligible for relief under S. 3 (e) and 4 (e) of of the KDR Act, 1976, Therefore the mortgaged property of the petitioner held by respondent is ordered to be released of the mortgage forthwith. "aggrieved by the said order the respondent came up in writ before this Court in writ petition no. 6776 of 1980 and this Court, by its order dt. 7-1-1981, on hearing allowed the writ petition and set aside the impugned order of the Taluka magistrate dt. 10-3-1980 and remitted the matter back to the Taluka Magistrate for fresh enquiry and disposal in accordance with law. Thereafter, the taluka Magistrate took it on file and has passed the impugned order dt. 26-2-1982. It is against that order that the present criminal revision petition is instituted before this court. ( 4 ) A preliminary point was raised before me as to the maintainability of the revision petition on the Criminal side of this Court and arguments were heard at some length on the aspect. 26-2-1982. It is against that order that the present criminal revision petition is instituted before this court. ( 4 ) A preliminary point was raised before me as to the maintainability of the revision petition on the Criminal side of this Court and arguments were heard at some length on the aspect. ( 5 ) THE preliminary question, therefore, that I am called upon to decide on the facts of the case is : 'whether a Criminal revision Petition lies against the order of the Taluka Magistrate made under Ss. 3 (e) and 4 (f) of the act by the Taluka Magistrate malava iii ? ( 6 ) THE learned Counsel appearing for the Revision- Petitioner invited my attention to S. 397 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which reads :"calling for records to exercise powers of revision,- The High Court or any sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or his local jurisidiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when calling for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement, that he be released on bail or on his own bond pending the examination of the record. "an explanation is added to this section, which reads:"all Magistrates, whether Executive or Judicial, and whether exercising original or appellate jurtsidiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this sub-section and of S. 398. " ( 7 ) THE learned Counsel appearing for the revision-Petitioner submited that since the Taluka magistrate is an executive Magistrate he becomes an Inferior Court within the meaning of S. 397 (1) of the code of Criminal Procedure and as such, any order passed by him is obviously revisable by the High court under S. 397 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. ( 8 ) AS against that, the learned counsel appearing for the other side argued that the Taluka Magistrate is merely an authority designate under the Act and he has not discharged any criminal function in the proceeding. ( 8 ) AS against that, the learned counsel appearing for the other side argued that the Taluka Magistrate is merely an authority designate under the Act and he has not discharged any criminal function in the proceeding. So, he submitted that such a designated authority would not become an inferior criminal Court for the purpose of s. 397 (1) of the code of Criminal procedure. ( 9 ) I have to therefore consider whether the Taluka Magistrate functioning under the provisions of the Act, 1976, can be styled as an inferior Court for the purpose of s- 397 (1) of the Code of Criminal procedure. ( 10 ) IT is an accredited practice in matters of Legislation that under any special Act a special Tribunal may be created for the speedy disposal of matters whenever necessary and while creating in the statutory Tribunal it may be an altogether new statutory creation or it may be by designating an existing authority to perform the functions. ( 11 ) WHEN an existing authority is designated to function as a tribunal under any special statute, it is obvious that the authority functions as a Tribunal under the special Legislation as a designated authority. ( 12 ) THE question came up for consideration before the High Court of Bombay in the Case, V. B. D''monte v. Bandra Borough Municipality (A. I. R. 1950 Bom. 397 ). There, the question was whether an application in revision made against an order of a magistrate under S. 110 of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act (XVIII of 1925) lies on the Civil or Criminal side of the High Court A Full bench of that High Court consisting of Hon'ble the Chief Justice Chagla and Bavdekar and Shah, JJ. , examined the question and came to the conclusion that a Criminal Court may be constituted as a Court designated and Civil jurisdiction may be conferred upon that Court. If a Criminal Court exercises that jurisdiction, then, it is not necessarily an inferior criminal Court within the meaning of the Code of Criminal Procedure; and if a right of revision is given from a decision of such a Court, then, that revision application is civil in its. If a Criminal Court exercises that jurisdiction, then, it is not necessarily an inferior criminal Court within the meaning of the Code of Criminal Procedure; and if a right of revision is given from a decision of such a Court, then, that revision application is civil in its. character and not criminal and that an application in revision made against an order of a Magistrate under S. 110 of the Bombay Municipal boroughs Act, 1925, therefore, lies on the Civil side and not on the criminal side of the High Court as the subject-matter of the decision of the Magistrate namely, rates and taxes, is purely a civil matter. ( 13 ) THE Supreme Court of India had also an occasion to consider the aspect in the case, the Dargah Committee, Ajmeer v. . The State of Rajasthan, (AIR 1962 S. C. 574 ). Therein proceeding under S. 234 of the Regulation before a Magistrate by the Municipal committees for recovery of expenses incurred by it in carrying out the repairs to the bui Iding under S. 222 (4), from the owner of the building, was to be considered-whether it was a criminal Proceeding or a Civil Proceeding and whether the Magistrate recovering the amount as an authority designate becomes an inferior Criminal Court for the purpose of revision before the High Court. A Bench consisting of Hon'ble the Chief justice Gajendragadkar, as he then was, Hon'ble Mr. Justice K. N. Wanchoo, Hon'ble Mr. Justice K. L. Das Gupta and Hon'ble Mr. Justice t. L. Venkatarama Aiyar, considered the aspect at length. Hon'ble the chief Justice P. P. Gajendragadkar, speaking for the Bench, at para-6. of the judgment has ruled inter alia thus;"in any event it is difficult to hold that the Magistrate who entertains the application is an inferior criminal Court. The claim made before him is for the recovery of a tax and the order prayed for is for the recovery of the tax by distress and sale of the movable property of the defaulter. If at all, this would at best be a proceeding of a Civil nature and not Criminal. The claim made before him is for the recovery of a tax and the order prayed for is for the recovery of the tax by distress and sale of the movable property of the defaulter. If at all, this would at best be a proceeding of a Civil nature and not Criminal. That is why, we think, whatever may be the character of the proceeding, whether it is purely ministerial or judicial or quasijudicial the Magistrate who entertains the application and holds the enquiry does so because he is designated in that behalf and so he must be treated as a person designate and not as a Magistrate functioning and exercising his authority under the Code of Criminal Procedure. He cannot therefore be regarded as an inferior criminal Court. "in the course of the judgment, their lordships, have referred to the Full bench decision of the Bombay High court in the Case, V. B. D'monte v. Sandra Borough Municipality, (A. I. R. 1950 Bom, 397), referred to above, approvingly. ( 14 ) THIS Court, by a Division bench, relying on the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court, has reiterated the position in the case, The state v. G. L. Udyawar (1963) 14 S. T. C. 628) by observing thus :"the power of the Magistrate to take proceedings for recovery of and tax assessed or any other amount due under the Act from a dealer as if it were a fine imposed by him, accrues to the Magistrate by virtue of S. 13 (3) (b) of the Act and not under any provisions of the code of Criminal procedure. Such proceedings are mere recovery proceedings and the magistrate does not function or exercise his authority under the Code of Criminal Procedure. Though the Procedure for the recovery of such amount may be the same as for the recovery of any fine imposed by him, he is competent to recover the amount of tax, only because he is designated under the Act to recover the same. " ( 15 ) THIS proposition is followed by this Court, by a division Bench, consisting of Govinda Bhat, J. , as he then was, and Jagannatha Shetty, j. , in the case of M/s Mohanlal Premchand v. Commercial Tax Officer, 1971 (1) mys. L. J. 72. " ( 15 ) THIS proposition is followed by this Court, by a division Bench, consisting of Govinda Bhat, J. , as he then was, and Jagannatha Shetty, j. , in the case of M/s Mohanlal Premchand v. Commercial Tax Officer, 1971 (1) mys. L. J. 72. Wherein Jagannatha shetty, J. in para 5 of the judgment, has observed:"the Magistrate entertains the application because he is an authority designated for the purpose. " ( 16 ) THE learned Counsel appearing for the revision-petitioner invited my attention to a Single Judge decision of this Court in the case of kalegowda v. Tahsildar Kanakapura (1979) 2 Kar. L. J. 391 ). Therein, it is no doubt true that his Lordship Swami j. has ruled that when the Act designates the Executive Magistrate for discharging the functions under the Karnataka Debt Relief Act, the same cannot be discharged by the tahsildar though the same person performs the duties of both. ( 17 ) THERE can be no quarrel with the proposition of law so laid down and that is not relevant for the purpose of deciding the question at issue in the present case, It is not disputed on the facts of the present case, that it is the Taluka magistrate of Malavalli who has passed the order. The simple question is : 'whether the Taluka Magistrate, who has passed the order, is an inferior Court for the purpose of S. 397 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure ? ( 18 ) S. 3 (e) of the Act, 1976 defines a small farmer. S. 4 speaks of relief from indebtedness. The simple question is : 'whether the Taluka Magistrate, who has passed the order, is an inferior Court for the purpose of S. 397 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure ? ( 18 ) S. 3 (e) of the Act, 1976 defines a small farmer. S. 4 speaks of relief from indebtedness. It reads ;"notwithstanding anything in any law for the time being in force or in any contract or instrument having force by virtue of any such law and save as [otherwise expressly provided in this Act, with effect from the date of commencement of this section,- (a) every debt advanced before the commencement of this section including the amount of interest, if any, payable by the debtor to the creditor shall be deemed to be wholly discharged;s. 4 (f) of the Act states :"every mortgage executed by the debtor in favour of the creditor shall stand redeemed and the mortgaged property shall be released in favour of such debtor and where the creditor fails to do so the Sub-Divisional Magistrate or any other Executive Magistrate authorised by the State Government in that behalf, having jurisdiction over the place where the mortgaged property is situate may, suo motu or on application of the debtor and after such inquiry as he may deem fit put the debtor in possession of the mortgaged property. "s. 5 (2) of the Act states :"on receipt of such statement and after such summary inquiry conducted in the manner provided in the Karnataka Land Revenue act 1964 as he considers necessary, the sub-divisional magistrate or the Executive Magistrate, as the 'case may be, shall, by order determine which of the debtors are entitled to relief under S. 4 and direct the creditor to produce on or before the date specified in the order the articles pledged by such debtors. "sub-sec. (3) of that Section empowers the sub-divisional Magistrate or the Taluka Magistrate, as the case may be, to recover possession of articles from the creditor and for that purpose he is enabled to exercise the same powers as are invested in him under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, regarding search and seizure. Sub-sec. (4) speaks of delivery of such article seized to the debtor. Sub-sec. Sub-sec. (4) speaks of delivery of such article seized to the debtor. Sub-sec. (5) speaks of issue of a certificate to that effect to the debtor and also delivery of possession of the property to the debtor by using such force as may be necessary. Sub-sec. (6) states : "every order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate or any other executive Magistrate, as the case may be, under this Section shall be final. " ( 19 ) IT is settled law, however, that merely because the sub-section says that the order of the sub-divisional Magistrate shall become final, it does not mean that the High Court has no power of revision in its supervisory jurisdiction. That only means that no appeal lies against the order made by the Sub-Divisional magistrate or the Taluka Magistrate, as the case may be. (vide ILR 14 calcutta 64= 7 CWN 433, 1937 ALJ 1101= 1937 AWR 1081; A. I. R. 1932 Oudh 210 (FB); A. I. R. 1965 Kerala 284 (FB): a. I. R. 1941 All. 131 (FB) and A. I. R. 1972 Mysore 17) ( 20 ) THUS reading the relevant provisions, it becomes amply clear that the Taluka Magistrate becomes an authority designate under the above provisions of the Act to decide whether the petitioner concerned is a debtor and to issue certificate of discharge of the debt under the Act and put the debtor in possession of the mortgaged property after declaring that the mortgage debt is extinguished. The Taluka Magistrate does not get his authority under the code of Criminal Procedure. The functions that he discharges are not criminal in nature. It is a Civil proceeding. That being so, it Is manifest that he does not become an inferior Criminal Court for the purpose of S. 397 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. ( 21 ) THAT the nature of proceeding before the Taluka Magistrate is a civil Proceeding is emphasised by sub-sec. (2) of S. 5 of the Act wherein it is stated that the Taluka Magistrate shall conduct a summary inquiry in the manner provided in the Karnataka land Revenue Act, 1964, and by no stretch of inference can it be held that the enquiry that he conducts and the order that he passes is criminal in nature. It is a beneficial relief that he orders under the provisions of the Act. It is a beneficial relief that he orders under the provisions of the Act. ( 22 ) THEREFORE, I have no hesitation to hold, following the principle laid down by the Supreme Court of india in the case, The Dargah committee, Ajmeer, v. The State of Rajasthan, ( AIR 1962 SC 574 ), quoted above, that the Taluka magistrate functioning under the provisions of the Act is an authority designate under the Act and he does not constitute an inferior Criminal court for the purpose of S. 397 (I) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. That being so, I sustain the preliminary objection and hold that the revision petition on the criminal side of this Court would not lie against an order passed by the Taluka Magistrate functioning under the Act, 1976. and the Criminal Revision Petition, therefore, is dismissed as not maintainable. --- *** --- . .