Judgment :- 1. The petitioners -- a father and his four children were owners of 2.6842 hectares of dry land in Survey No. 197/6-4 of Thrikkakara South Village in Kanayannur Taluk. The petitioners state that in April 1978 the Greater Cochin Development Authority negotiated with the petitioners for the purchase of this property. They allege that it was agreed that the petitioners would sell and the second respondent would purchase the property at the rate of Rs. 1,000/- per cent of land. The property was said to have been measured and also that all the formalities for the purchase of property completed in 1978 itself except the formality of issuing the notification. The petitioners submit that the second respondent then began to delay the proceedings. The petitioners had made the offer to sell the land because they were hard pressed for money. In spite of the fact that the petitioners were pressing for completing the acquisition the second respondent did not act. 2. Two years afterwards, on 2-9-1980, the first respondent issued the notification under S.3(1) of the Kerala Land Acquisition Act, 1961 in respect of the property. Notice in the matter dated 11-9-1980 were received by the petitioners. The notice, a copy of which is Ext. P1, specified that the land is needed for a specified purpose for site and service scheme. 3. After this notice, again the second respondent lapsed into silence. It is alleged that the petitioners approached the respondents (the first respondent is the Land Acquisition Officer and the 2nd respondent as noted earlier, the Greater Cochin Development Authority) several times demanding that the price of the property be paid to them but these requests went unheeded. 4. The petitioners' grievances in the matter and their case before this Court is well summed up in Para.5 of the petition which may be usefully extracted below: "It needs no elaboration to submit that the petitioners are put to great hardship and irreparable injury in view of the attitude of the respondents. For one thing, the respondents are not paying the value of the lands to the petitioners, and for another the petitioners are not able to dispose of the land in view of Ext. P1. In case the respondents want to proceed with the acquisition, in fairness they are liable to pay the present price of the land to the petitioners. For one thing, the respondents are not paying the value of the lands to the petitioners, and for another the petitioners are not able to dispose of the land in view of Ext. P1. In case the respondents want to proceed with the acquisition, in fairness they are liable to pay the present price of the land to the petitioners. Otherwise the petitioners should be permitted to dispose of the land as they like. But the position is, the land belongs to the petitioners; but they are not able to do anything with respect to the land. The respondents, in case they do not require the land, should say so. There is no point in issuing a notification and sleeping over the matter. The respondents could afford to do that, for they lose nothing." 5. The petitioners seek to quash Ext. P1 or payment of land value on the basis of the present day market value. 6. A counter affidavit has been filed in the matter by the Special Tahsildar (L. A.), the Land Acquisition Officer concerned who is the first respondent in the O. P. Though there is a general averment therein that the allegations and averments contained in the O. P. are not fully correct and save those that are specifically admitted are denied no specific denial is made to the averments of the petitioners about the negotiated settlement to take the petitioners' land at Rs. 1,000/- in 1978. Nor is it denied that the property was measured and all the formalities for the purchase of the property except the issue of the required notification was completed in 1978. We find from the counter affidavit that the Government accorded sanction on 16-10-1979 to launch the site and service scheme which included the petitioners' property. The next month itself the Greater Cochin Development Authority makes a requisition for the acquisition of the land. On 3-4-1980 the District Collector, Ernakulam accorded sanction for invoking urgency clause under S.19(4) of the Kerala Land Acquisition Act. But then the notification under S.3(1) of the Kerala Land Acquisition Act is published in the Gazette only after five months, that is on 2-9-1980. 7. It might be noted that as the proceedings had been initiated invoking the urgency clause, enquiry under S.5 of the Act was not necessary. But then the notification under S.3(1) of the Kerala Land Acquisition Act is published in the Gazette only after five months, that is on 2-9-1980. 7. It might be noted that as the proceedings had been initiated invoking the urgency clause, enquiry under S.5 of the Act was not necessary. But in spite of that the Board of Revenue approves the draft declaration under S.6 of the Kerala Land Acquisition Act only on 20-6-1981, nine months after S.3 notification. Then why was the emergency clause invoked. In 1978 petitioners make a negotiated settlement with the respondent for acquisition of the petitioners' land at Rs. 1,000/- per cent. Even dispensing with the formalities under S.5 of the Act, the acquisition was not completed even after five years. 8. In the counter affidavit, it is stated that after S.6 declaration, valuation of property could not be proceeded with because of the filing of the O. P. No stay of further proceedings was given by this Court. Even in the O. P. itself the main grievance of the petitioners was the undue delay in completing the land acquisition proceedings. It might be noted that the emergency clause is to be invoked only in cases of real urgency where public interest does not brook even the minimum time needed to be given a hearing to the owners if they have objection to the hearing. The petitioners had no objection to the invoking of emergency powers because they thought they would get the money they were so in urgent need. But what did really happen? It would appear that the authorities have no time or mind to care for the grievances of small men, Benjamin Disreli said (a very telling passage which Justice Krishna Iyer quotes in State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh, AIR. 1980 SC. 319): "I repeat ...that all power is a trust that we are accountable for its exercise that, from the people, and for the people, all springs, and all must exist." 9. Here we find small men not significant people in terms of power or money ready to give their land for a public purpose only for getting some money probably for utilisation for some urgent purpose. The authorities concerned want the land. Here we find small men not significant people in terms of power or money ready to give their land for a public purpose only for getting some money probably for utilisation for some urgent purpose. The authorities concerned want the land. Apparently they indicate taking of urgent steps by invoking emergency provisions really misleading the owners who think they will get the value of their land in a short time: months pass. The owners find the acquisition proceedings have not been completed and they are deprived of the means of getting money for meeting their urgent demands. They cannot sell the land because of the initiation of acquisition proceedings. And the proceedings go at a snail's pace. And the value of the money goes down day by day. 10. Such an attitude of the authorities can only be described as arbitrary something repugnant to the basic spirit of the Constitution. And I do not think the courts are helpless in such matters when the aggrieved citizens approach this Court in such circumstances. The extraordinary jurisdiction that is given to the Court under Art.226 is to step in in such circumstances. 11. It is difficult for this court in the circumstances of the case not to find legal malice in the action or inaction of the authorities respondents herein in the concerned proceedings. I would here quote Justice Krishna Iyer in AIR. 1980 SC. 319, the case already referred to: "The question then, is what is mala fides in the jurisprudence of power? Legal malice is gibberish unless juristic clarity keeps it separate from the popular concept of personal vice. Pithily put, bad faith which invalidates the exercise of power sometimes called colourable exercise or fraud on power and often times overlaps motives, passions and satisfactions is the attainment of ends beyond the sanctioned purposes of power by simulation or pretension of gaining a legitimate goal." 12. See what a Division Bench of this Court said in Mammu alias Kunhammed Keyi v Tahsildar and Land Acquisition Officer, Tellicherry (1965 KLT.1021) (I am only quoting the head-note which summaries the decision): "In the present case the notification under S.3 is dated 20-5-1963. The direction under sub-s. (4) of S.19 was made on 23-6-1963. The Notice under S.9, however, was published in the Kerala Gazette as required by sub-s. (5) of that section only on 21-1-1964. The direction under sub-s. (4) of S.19 was made on 23-6-1963. The Notice under S.9, however, was published in the Kerala Gazette as required by sub-s. (5) of that section only on 21-1-1964. The dates are significant and belie the story of any extreme urgency as the foundation for the action under sub-s, (4) of S.19. An order is vitiated by mala fides if it is passed by an authority without applying its mind at all, eventhough there is no evidence of any personal ill-will, corrupt motive, or other improper purpose. Such is the direction impugned in this case; and the same and all the other proceedings subsequent thereto cannot but be quashed." 13. Chief Justice Govindan Nair, speaking for another Bench in Damodara Menon v. P.A. (L.A.) To Dist. Collector, Ekm., (1975 KLT. 537) at page 541: "It is clear from the provisions in S.19(4) of the Act that the special direction contemplated by that section is that the provisions of S.5 shall not apply. This of course can be taken only in cases of urgency as visualised by sub-s. (1) of S.19. But the object of sub-s. (4) of S.19 is to dispense with the enquiry under S.5 enabling a declaration being made under S.6 and possession being taken of the land after the expiry of 15 days from the publication of the notice mentioned in sub-s. (1) of S.9, even in cases where no award had been passed by the Collector. Dispensing with the enquiry and expediting the declaration under S.6 of the Act are intrinsically linked with the urgent need to take possession. We would like to add in this connection that in cases of urgency steps must be taken to have the notification under S.3 published as early as possible in the Gazette as required by S.3 of the Act. It is notorious that there is often considerable delay in getting a notification under S.3 of the Act published in the Gazette. If it is found necessary to direct dispensation with S.5 depriving a citizen of his right to object to his land being compulsorily acquired ills only fair and just that there should be a speeding up of the procedure under the Act. If it is found necessary to direct dispensation with S.5 depriving a citizen of his right to object to his land being compulsorily acquired ills only fair and just that there should be a speeding up of the procedure under the Act. Possession can be taken only after a notification under S.3 and after public notice under S.9 and 19(1) of the Act and unlike under the Central Act 1894 the Collector is obliged under the Act to state his reasons in writing before taking possession under the special provisions in S.19 of the Act. If no urgent steps will be taken under the Act and if the authorities can act leisurely there can be no justification for. dispensing with the enquiry under S.5.(emphasis mine) In this view, I would allow the O.P. giving the following directions. The respondents can proceed with the land acquisition proceedings in continuance of Ext. P1 on the basis that as far as the fixation of the market value of the acquired land is concerned (only in respect of the land in this case) Ext. P1 would be deemed to have been issued on this day which would enable the petitioners to get the prevailing market price for the land. If the respondents find it difficult to proceed on such basis, Ext. P1 and further proceedings consequent on that will stand quashed leaving it open to the respondents to initiate fresh land acquisition proceedings, if they so consider it necessary, in respect of the land of the petitioners. The O.P. is disposed of accordingly. No costs.