JUDGMENT K.N. Misra, J. - The present writ Petition relates to land of Khata No. 102 of Village Vijaigaon, district Faizabad, which was recorded in the basic year Khatauni in the name of Ram Prasad. An objection was jointly filed by opposite parties Nos. 2 to 5 claiming to be co-tenure holders in the aforesaid holding along with the Petitioner with the allegation that it is ancestral land and they are Bhumidhars in possession. The Consolidation Officer by his order dated 19-4-1974 rejected the objection and maintained the basic year entry in the name of the Petitioner. Against this order opposite party No. 5, Mata Din preferred an appeal impleading opposite parties Nos. 2 to 4 as Respondents. The Settlement Officer, Consolidation allowed the appeal by order dated 10-10-1974 and found that the opposite parties No. 2 to 5 are co-tenure holders along with the Petitioner in the holding in dispute. Against this order, Petitioner preferred revision which was allowed by the Joint Director of Consolidation by order 29-4-1977. He held Petitioner and opposite party No. 5 alone to be co-tenure holders. Petitioner's revision in respect of another holding, Khata Nos. 234 and 249, which are not in dispute in the present writ Petition, was dismissed. The claim of opposite parties No. 2 to 4 in respect of Khata No. 102 in question was rejected merely on the ground that they had not filed any appeal nor they had joined as Appellants in the appeal filed by Mata Din, opposite party No. 5, against the order passed by the Consolidation Officer. The Petitioner was accordingly given 2/3rd. share and 1/3rd share was given to Mata Din in the said disputed holding, Khata No. 102. Opposite parties No. 2 to 4 filed review application against the said order before the Deputy Director of Consolidation, but the same was rejected being not maintainable by order dated 19-9-1978. It appears that after dismissal of review application, the opposite parties No. 2 to 4 on 30-1-1978 filed an appeal before the Settlement Officer, Consolidation against order dated 19-4-1974 passed by the Consolidation Officer. A prayer for condonation of delay was also made. The Petitioner contested the appeal and opposed the application for condonation of delay. The Settlement Officer, Consolidation by order dated 17-3-1980 refused to condone the delay and dismissed the appeal being time barred. A prayer for condonation of delay was also made. The Petitioner contested the appeal and opposed the application for condonation of delay. The Settlement Officer, Consolidation by order dated 17-3-1980 refused to condone the delay and dismissed the appeal being time barred. The opposite parties No. 2 to 4, thereupon filed revision which was allowed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation by order dated 15-12-1980. He condoned the delay and remanded the case to the Settlement Officer, Consolidation for disposing of the appeal on merits. The Petitioner has challenged this order in the present writ Petition. 2. During pendency of this writ Petition, opposite party No. 5 Mata Din died on 27th March, 1982. An application for substitution along with an application for condonation of delay and setting aside abatement was moved by the Petitioner on 19-11-1982. The only ground on which condonation of delay was sought is that the Petitioner was under the impression that since Mata Din is not a contesting party and so no substitution will be required to be made as a matter of fact the Petitioner did not know that substitution will have to be applied within 90 days, the time permitted by law. 3. Learned Counsel for the opposite parties contended that on the aforesaid ground, delay cannot be condoned in moving application for substitution. He urged that the Petitioner's ignorance about the requirement of moving substitution application within 90 days cannot be deemed to be a legally sufficient ground for condoning the delay nor the delay can be condoned on the ground that the Petitioner could not take steps for substitution earlier labouring under the impression that since deceased opposite party No. 5 Mata Din is not a contesting party and as such no substitution of his heirs and legal representatives will be required. He further contended that Mata Din cannot be treated to be a merely a preforma party as he along with opposite parties No. 2 to 4 had claimed co-tenancy rights in the holding in dispute and that the Deputy Director of Consolidation, by the impugned order dated 15-12-1980 has remanded the case to the Settlement Officer Consolidation for disposing the appeal on merits according to law. He, thus, contended that the application for setting aside abatement and condonation of delay deserves to be rejected and no substitution can be ordered of the heirs and legal representatives of deceased opposite party No. 5, Mata Din. 4. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner firstly contended that the provisions of Order 22 Rule 4 will not apply to the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution in view of Explanation appended to Section 141, Code of Civil Procedure, which was inserted by Amendment Act of 1976 (Act No. 104 of 1976) with effect from 1-2-1977. In support of his contention, he referred to a decision in Ram Kala and Others Vs. The Assistant Director, Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, Rohtak and Others, AIR 1977 P&H 87 wherein it is held that Order 22 of the CPC does not apply to writ proceedings. Learned Counsel also referred to an order passed by Hon'ble Sinale Judge of this Court in Civil Misc. Application No. 1884 (W) of 1976 in Writ Petition No. 1253 of 1972, Dinesh Prasad v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Pratapgarh, wherein, while allowing the substitution application, it was observed: ...Though no sufficient explanation has been given for not moving the application early but the application for substitution has got to be allowed because no period of limitation has been prescribed for moving such an application for bringing on record the legal representatives of the Respondent in a writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. 5. With due respect to the Hon'ble Judge, I am unable to subscribe to said view because of a Division Bench decision in Nand Kishore's case 1968 AWR 755 taking the view that a substitution application is to be moved within 90 days. Reference may also be made to an express provision on the point contained in Rule 38-A of Chapter VIII of the Allahabad High Court Rules, which provides that: 38-A. The provisions contained in Rules 1 to 6 and 9 of Order XXII and in Order XXXII of the CPC shall, so far as may be and with necessary modifications and adaptions, apply to special appeals, writ Petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution and Tax Acts References (and Revisions) falling under Chapter IX, XXII and XXVII of these rules. 6. 6. This provision was added to the Rules vide Notification No. 310/VIII-C-169, dated August 3, 1964, published in U.P. Gazette, dated 5th December 1964. Exactly similar question, as one in hand, cropped up before Division Bench in Nand Kishore v. Deputy Director of Consolidation 1968 AWR 755 , wherein, considering the aforesaid Rule 38-A, it was observed that: ...Under Article 225 of the Constitution the Court has jurisdiction toframe rules for regulating its business. The Court, therefore, has framed Rule 38-A under that provision and if the effect of that rule is to make the provisions of the Limitation Act applicable to substitution proceedings arising out of or in a writ Petition that rule of limitation will govern the substitution application. We must therefore find out whether our Rule 38-A requires that a substitution application must be made in the period provided by the Indian Limitation Act. Rule 38-A refers to Order XXII Rule 3(2) CPC also. Beyond that it provides for no other period of limitation. In our opinion it is implicit in Rule 38-A that the period of limitation within a substitution application under that rule should be made is the one provided by the Indian Limitation Act. When Rule 38-A refers to Order XXII, Rule 3(2), it clearly adopts the rule of limitation envisaged by that rule, i.e. the one provided by the Limitation Act. This is, in our opinion the clear meaning and intention of Rule 38-A. It was further observed that: We answer the question by saying that the application for substitution in a writ Petition should be made within 90 days and if not made within that period, and the cause of action does not survive in favour of the remaining Petitioners, it will be deemed to have abated. 7. It appears that the aforesaid Division Bench decision and Rule 38-A was not brought to the notice of the Hon'ble Judge in Dinesh Prasad's case (supra) wherein inspite of the fact that sufficient explanation was not given for not moving the application early, the application for substitution was allowed merely on the ground that no period of limitation has been prescribed for moving a substitution application under Article 226 of the Constitution. In view of express provision contained in Rule 38-A and in view of the decision of the Division Bench in Nand Kishore's case (supra), I am of the opinion that application for substitution in writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is required to be moved within 90 days under Order 22 Rule 3, Code of Civil Procedure. The said Rule 38-A has not been deleted and the Explanation to Section 141, Code of Civil Procedure, inserted by Amendment Act No. 104 of 1976, will make it inapplicable to the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. It would have been a different matter if provision of Order 22 Rule 3 would not have been made applicable by adding Rule 38-A of Chapter VIII of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952, which were framed under Article 225 of the Constitution for regulating business of the Court. The Full Bench decision in Ram Kala and Others Vs. The Assistant Director, Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, Rohtak and Others, AIR 1977 P&H 87 has no doubt expressed the view that Order 22 of the CPC does not apply to writ proceedings, but it appears that this view has been taken as no rule similar to Rule 38-A exists in the Rules of High Court of the said High Court. I am, therefore, unable to subscribe to the view expressed in Ram Kala's case (supra) in view of what has been said in the Division Bench decision of this Court in Nand Kishore's case (supra), which has been followed by N.D. Ojha, J. in Devi Prasad v. State of U.P. 1982 ARC 617. I am in respectful agreement with the view expressed in the aforesaid Division Bench decision of this Court. 8. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner next contended that the Petitioner has indicated the reason for not moving substitution application earlier to the effect that he was not aware that substitution will have to be applied for within 90 days, the time permitted by law and that he was under the impression that no substitution will be required to be made as Mata Din was not a contesting party. It is not disputed that Mata Din died on 27th March, 1982 and the Petitioner became aware about his death on that very day. It is not disputed that Mata Din died on 27th March, 1982 and the Petitioner became aware about his death on that very day. The only ground shown in the application for not moving the application for substitution is that he was not aware about the requirement of moving substitution application within 90 days. It was urged by learned Counsel that it cannot be presumed that every person knows law and as such since the Petitioner was ignorant about the requirement of law regarding moving of substitution application within 90 days and therefore the delay in moving the application deserves to be condoned. In support of his contention he referred to a decision of Supreme Court in M/S. Moti lal Padampat Sugar Mills. Co. Ltd. v. The State of Uttar Pradesh 1979 ALJ 368. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in aforesaid decision, while dealing with the question whether the claim of the Appellant to exemption from sales tax could be sustained only on the doctrine of promisory estoppel or not observed that: ...There can be no waiver unless the person who is said to have waived is fully informed as to his right and with full knowledge of such right, he intentionally abandons it. 9. Further dealing with the matter it was observed that in fact in the Petition as originally filed, the right to claim total exemption from sales tax was not based on the plea of promissory estoppel which was introduced only by way of amendment. Moreover, it must be remembered that there is no presumption that every person knows the law. It is often said that every one is presumed to know the law, but that is not a correct statement; there is no such maxim known to the law. 10. There is no dispute with the proposition laid down in the aforesaid decision. But it is not argued here by learned Counsel for the opposite parties that a presumption should be drawn that every body knows law. What has been urged is that the well settled rule is that ignorance of law is no excuse; a maxim of very different scope and application. But it is not argued here by learned Counsel for the opposite parties that a presumption should be drawn that every body knows law. What has been urged is that the well settled rule is that ignorance of law is no excuse; a maxim of very different scope and application. In the present case the question which is required to be determined is whether the ignorance about the requirement of moving application for substitution within 90 days would or would not be deemed to be a sufficient cause for condoning the delay u/s 5 of the Indian Limitation Act. It is well settled that if substitution of legal heirs and representatives is not made within limitation, a valuable right accrues to the party which cannot be lightly interfered with unless sufficient cause is shown for setting aside the abatement by condoning the delay. Whether ignorance about the requirement regarding moving an application for substitution would be taken to be a sufficient cause or not for condoning the delay is the sole material question for consideration in the present case. This question did not arise for consideration nor it was dealt with by the Supreme Court in M/s. M.P. Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. The State of Uttar Pradesh (supra). It has, therefore, no direct bearing on the point under consideration. 11. Exactly similar question cropped up for consideration in AIR 1929 74 (Nagpur) . In said case, three out of thirteen legal representatives filed an application on 12th December, 1928 stating, "that they were not aware that an application for substitution of legal representatives of the deceased Appellant had to be made within 3 months of his death;" and prayed that, in the circumstances, the delay in making the application be condoned. In short, the applicants pleaded ignorance of law, and put forward this ignorance of law as sufficient cause for not making the application earlier. Referring to several decisions and placing reliance upon Full Bench decision of this Court in 12 Allahabad 461 ( 1890 (12) All 461), it was held that: ...Ignorance of law cannot be sufficient excuse for not filing the application in time and therefore, the abatement cannot be set aside. 12. Referring to several decisions and placing reliance upon Full Bench decision of this Court in 12 Allahabad 461 ( 1890 (12) All 461), it was held that: ...Ignorance of law cannot be sufficient excuse for not filing the application in time and therefore, the abatement cannot be set aside. 12. In P.V. Dehadria v. Navin Kumar Nanda 1967 AWR 251 D.S. Mathur, J. observed that: What the Appellant says is that he had come to know of the death of Smt. Rani Nanda early in Feovuary, 1962, but he being ignorant of the law did not inform his Counsel that Smt. Rani Nanda was dead; and that it was in the end of March, 1962 that he gave the information to his Counsel when the present applications were made. Ignorance of taw is no excuse. Further, if the Appellant did not know the law it was necessary for him to communicate all the facts to his Counsel so that he may take all the legal steps. 13. It was, thus, held that the benefit of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not available on the ground of ignorance of law. In the present case it is admitted that the Petitioner was aware about the death of opposite pary No. 5 Mata Din having occurred on 27th of March, 1982 leaving behind his five sons. The Petitioner should have, therefore, approached his Counsel telling him about the said fact and the learned Counsel should have thereupon taken steps for substitution of the deceased opposite party No. 5 Mata Din. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the Petitioner has not acted negligently. There is no other explanation forthcoming except the one indicated above as to why he did not proceed to move application for substitution within limitation. He also took no care to intimate this fact to his Counsel although he had come to know about the death of opposite pary No. 5 Mata Din on 27th March, 1982. 14. In view of what has been said above, I am of the opinion that ignorance of law regarding requirement for moving an application for substitution within 90 days cannot be taken to be a sufficient ground for condoning delay in moving application for substitution. 14. In view of what has been said above, I am of the opinion that ignorance of law regarding requirement for moving an application for substitution within 90 days cannot be taken to be a sufficient ground for condoning delay in moving application for substitution. I further find that no case is made out for condoning the delay and for setting aside the abatement and as such substitution cannot be ordered of the heirs and legal representatives in place of deceased Mala Din. The applications are accordingly rejected and the writ Petition is ordered to abate so far as opposite party No. 5, Mata Din is concerned.