ORDER. U. N. Bhachawat, J. I. The Collector and the Licensing Authority. Gwalior, under the M. P. Foodgrains Dealears Licensing Order, 1965, Gwalior, made a reference under section 15 (3) of the Contempt of Courts Act. 1971 stating that (1) 'Case No. 7/6 x 31 of 1983 under Sec. 6-A of the Essential Commodities Act 1955 had been registered against non-applicants No 2 and 3 trading under the name and style of M/s Rajeshwari Rice and Dal Mill, Dabra, and is pending before him; (ii) non-applicant No.3 had been appearing as an advocate for these non-applicants; (iii) an application dated 7-4-1983, Copy whereof is annexed as annexure I to the said reference was filed by the non applicants stating that the Court of Civil Judge Class II at. Dabra in a Civil Suit, which had been filed in that Court by non-applicants No.2 and 3, relating to the commodity, which is the subject matter of the aforesaid case before the Collector, had ordered the maintenance of status quo, which, in effect. was an injunction against the Collector restraining him from proceeding with the case pending before him, but, despite the intimation and knowledge of this order, the Collector had been proceeding with the case violating that order, which amounted to a contempt of the Court of the Civil Judge Class II, Dabra; so, in case the further proceedings were not stayed, the non-applicants would the constrained to move the Court of the Civil Judge Class 11,Dabra to take action against the Collector under the Contempt of the Courts Act, and (IV) the civil Court did not order the stay of the proceedings in case No.7/6x31 of 1983 before the Collector and. thus, the non-applicants by making the fore-referred application had committed contempt of the Court of the Collector;' consequently a notice under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, was issued of the non-applicants, who filed their respective replies (Annexures 3,4 and 5 to the reference) persisting in their stand that was taken in the fore-referred application ID stead of being contrite and apologetic. 2. This Court had issued a notice again5t the non-applicants to show cause as to why the above reference should not be admitted and proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (for short. hereinafter referred to as 'the Contempt Act') be not taken against them. 2. This Court had issued a notice again5t the non-applicants to show cause as to why the above reference should not be admitted and proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (for short. hereinafter referred to as 'the Contempt Act') be not taken against them. The non applicants have filed there respective replies denying that they committed any contempt and, inter alia, contended that the Collector functioning under section 6-A of the Essential Commodities Act. 1955. in his capacity as a Collector-cum Licensing Authority under the M. P. Foodgrains Dealers Licensing Order, 1965, is not a Court; hence the question of proceeding under the Contempt Act is not warranted. In the alternative. the non applicants have submitted all apology, 3. Since the question whether the Collector and the Licensing Authority functioning under S, 6-A of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, is a Court, is one going to the root of matter and is of genera! importance, we prefer to hear the learned counsel for the non-applicants and the learned Deputy Government advocate for the State, who has been appearing to assist the court in the matter, 4. It Cannot be gainsaid that since the Contempt Act ideals with the subject of 'contempt of Court,-action can be taken under the Contempt Act, when it is a contempt of court and Dot otherwise. The Contempt Act does not define the word Court The question, therefore, arises whether the provision is confined to the ordinary Civil, Criminal and Revenue Courts, established for the three branches of the law, or extends to other Tribunals, ad hoc or permanent, which. though not full-fledged Courts, bear the essential trappings of a Court Whether a. particular authority or a Tribunal for the purpose of the Contempt Act is a Court or not, has not to be determind with reference to the nomenclature but with reference to the functions and duties. This position can be said to be well settled in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Thakur Jugal Kishore Sinha v. The Sitamarthi Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. ( AIR 1967 S.C. 1494 ). Now, in order to exam me the question at hand a reference to the functions and duties of the Collector acting under S.6-A of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, is advisable. Now, in order to exam me the question at hand a reference to the functions and duties of the Collector acting under S.6-A of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, is advisable. section 6•A and other sections of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, So for relevent, read as under:• '6.A. (1) Where essential commodity is seized in pursuance of an order made under section 3 in relation thereto, a report of such seizure shall, without unreasonable delay. be made to the Collector, of the district or the Presidency-town in which such essential commodity is seized and whether or not a prosecution is instituted for the contravention of such order, the Collector, may, if he thinks it expedient so to do, direct the essential commodity so seized to be produced for inspection before him, and if he is satisfied that there has been a contravention of the Order, may order confiscation of- (a) the essential commodity so seized: "6•B (1),No order confiscating any essential commodity, package covering, receptacle, animal, vehicle, vessel or other conveyance shall be made under Sec. 6-A unless the owner of such essential commodity, package covering, receptacle, animal, vehicle, vessel or other conveyance or the person from whom it is seized- (a) h given a notice in writing informing him of the grounds on which it is proposed to confiscate the essential commodity, package, covering, receptacle, animal, vehicle, vessel or other conveyance; (b) is given an opportunity of making a representation in writing within such reasonable time as may be specified in the notice against the grounds of confiscation; and (c) is given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the matter. (2) Without prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (1) no order confiscating any animal. vehicle, vessel, or other conveyance shall be made under Sec. 6-A if the owner of the animal, vehicle, vessel or other conveyance proves to the satisfaction of the Collector that it was used in carrying the essential commodity without the knowledge or connivance of the owner himself, his agent, if any, and the person in charge of the animal. vehicle, vessel or other conveyance and that each of them had taken all reasonable and necessary precautions against such use. vehicle, vessel or other conveyance and that each of them had taken all reasonable and necessary precautions against such use. (3) No order of confiscating any essential commodity, package, covering, receptacle, animal, vehicle, vessel or other conveyance shall be invalid merely by reason of any defect or irregularity in the notice given under clause (a) of sub-section (l), if, in giving such notice, the provisions of that clause have been substantially complied with." 5. In Brajnandan Sinha v. Jyoti Narain ( AIR 1956 S.C. 66 ) in which the question arose as to whether the Commissioner appointed under Public Servants (Inquiries) Act 1850 (XXXVll of 1850) was a Court within the meaning of the Contempt of Courts Act 1952. Bhagwati. J, held in that case that in order to constitute a Court in the strict sence of the term an essential condition was that the Court should have, apart from having some of the trapping of a Judicial tribunal, power to give a decision or a definitive Judgment which has finality and authoritativeness which are the essential tests of a Judicial pronouncement. The same principle had been stated earlier in Bharat Bank Ltd. v. Employees of Bharat Bank Ltd. (AIR 1950 S C. 188)-of course, in different context-and Maqbool Hussain v. State of Bombay (AIR 1953 S. C. 325). where the test of a judicial tribuoal as laid down in a passage from Cooper v. Wilson (1937) 2 K.B. 309 at pp. 340.341 was adopted by the Supreme Court: "A true judical decision pre-supposes an existing dispute between two or more parties, and then involve four requisites: -(I) The presentation (not necessarily orally of their case by tile parties to the dispute; (2) if the dispute between them is a question of fact, the ascertainment of the fact by means of evidence adduced by the parties to the dispute and often with the assistance of argument by or on behalf of the parties on the evidence; (3) if the dispute between them is a question of law, the submission of legal argument by the parties; and (4) a descision which disposes of the whole matter by a finding upon the facts in dispute and the application of the law of the land to the facts so found, including where required a ruling upon any disputed question of law" 6. Reference may also be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Virendra Kumar Satya wadi v. The State of Punjab ( AIR 1956 S.C. 153 ). In that case the question that had arisen was, whether a returning officer acting under sections 33 and 36 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, and deciding on validity or otherwise of a nomination paper was not a Court within the meaning of section 195 (1) (b), 476 and 476-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Here too, the auhorities which were cited in Brijnandan Sinha's case (supra) were reviewed and it was said: “It may be stated broadly that what distinguishes a Court from a quasi-judicial tribunal is that it is charged with a duty to decide disputes in a judicial manner and declare the rights of parties in a definitive judgment. To decide in a judicial manner, involves that the parties are entitled as a. matter, of fight to be heard in support of their claim and to adduce evidence in proof of It. And it also imports an obligation on the part of the authority to decide the matter on a consideration of the evidence adduced and in accordance with law. When a question therefore arises as to whether an authority created by an Act is a Court as distinguished from a quasi judical tribunal, what has to be decided is whether having regard to the provisions of the Act it possesses all the attributes. of a Court We have now to decide whether in view of the principles above stated and the functions and powers entrusted to the returning officer under the Act, he is a Court. The statutory, provision bearing on this matter is S.36. Under S.36 (2) the returning officer has to examine the nomination paper and decide all objections which may he made thereto. This power is undoubtedly judicial in character. But in exercising this power he is authorised to come to a decision after such 'Summary enquiry, if any, as he thinks necessary" That means that the parties have no right to insist on producing evidence which they may desire to adduce in support of their case. There is no machinery provided for summoning of witnesses or of compelling production of documents in an enquiry under S.30, The returning officer is entitled to act 'sno motu' in the matter. There is no machinery provided for summoning of witnesses or of compelling production of documents in an enquiry under S.30, The returning officer is entitled to act 'sno motu' in the matter. When one compares this procedure with that prescribed for trial of election Petitions by the Election Tribunal under Ss. 90 and 92 of the 'Act, the difference between the two becomes marked. While the proceedings before the Election Tribunal approximate in all essential matters to proceedings in civil Courts, the proceedings tinder S.36 present a different picture. There is no 'lis', in which persons with opposing claims are entitled to have their rights adjudicated in a judicial manner, but an enquiry such as is usually conducted by and 'an hoc' tribunal entrusted with a quasi• judicial Power. In other words, the function of the returning officer acting under S.36 is judicial in character but he is not to act judicially in Discharging it. We are of opinion that the returning officer deciding on the validity of a nomination paper is not a Court for the purpose of S.195 (1) (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure' and the result is, that even as regards the charge under S.193, the order of the Magistrate was not appeal ble, as the offence was not committed in or ID relation to any proceeding in a Court." 7. If, in the light of the aforesaid authorities, we examine the functions and. power entrusted to the Collector under Section 6-A of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, it indicates that they do not make him a 'Court' 8. On reading Secs. 6.A and 6-B of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, extracted hereinbefore in para. 4 of this order, it is apparent that the Collector has been entrusted with quasi judicial power. There is no machinery provided for the summoning of witnesses or of compelling production of documents. It is also significant to note that there is no lis. The expression' . . . . the Collector may, if he thinks it expedient so to do, direct the essential commodity so seized to be produced for inspection before him. is very significant. This goes to show that the Collector was entitled to act suo motu under S.6-A. Further, the Collector does not give a final authoritative judgment. In this respect, Sec. 6-C (2) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 needs a look. is very significant. This goes to show that the Collector was entitled to act suo motu under S.6-A. Further, the Collector does not give a final authoritative judgment. In this respect, Sec. 6-C (2) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 needs a look. It reads as under: "6-C. (1)******* (2) Where an order under Sec. 6-A is modified or annulled by the State Government, or where in a prosecution instituted for the contravention of the order m respect of which an order of confiscation has been made: under Sec. 6-A, the person concerned is acquitted, and in either case It is not possible for any reason to return the essential commodity seized, such person shall, excel-' as provided by sub-section (3)of Sec. 6-A be paid, the price. therefore as if the essential commodity had been sold to the Government, with reasonable interest calculated from the day of the seizure of the essential commodity; and such price shall be deter mined- (i) in the case of food-grains, edible oilseeds or edible oils, in accordance with the provisions of sub-section(3-B) of Sec. 3, (ii) in the case of sugar, in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (3-C) of Sec. 3; and (iii) in the case of any other essential Commodity in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (3) of Sec. 3." The fore-extracted sub-section 6-C (2)goes to show that inspite of the fact that the order of confiscation is Confirmet by the appellate authority in appeal under Sec. 6-C (1), if the prosecution for contryvention of the order, in respect of which the order of confiscation has been made, has resulted in acquittal, the petitioner would be entitled to the price of the goods under the clear terms of Sec. 6-C (2). The goods are not liable to confiscation if the prosecution end, in acquittal. The confiscation proceedings are made subject to the result of any prosecution that may be launched. 9. In the light of the foregoing discussion, we are of the opinion that Collector acting under Sec. 6-A of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, is not a Court for the purpose of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. 10. Before parting with the order, we would like to observe on the ground of propriety. The profession of law is a noble profession; to maintain this, the persons in the profession are required to act and behave nobody. 10. Before parting with the order, we would like to observe on the ground of propriety. The profession of law is a noble profession; to maintain this, the persons in the profession are required to act and behave nobody. Use of intemperate language in the discharge of the professional function by a lawyer affects the nobility adversely. The language used in the application Annexure 1) filed before the Collector is intemperate and rather reflects an attempt to bully; but we are happy that during the Course of the arguments, realising this, the learned counsel on behalf of non-applicant No.1 and the non-applicant himself were contrite for this. 11. In the result, the reference is dismissed.