G. N. SABBAHIT, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal by the plaintiff is directed against the judgment and decree dated 30-6-1975, passed by the Civil Judge, Puttur, in ra No. 150 of 1975, on his file, allowing the appeal on reversing the judgment and decree dated 6-11-1973, passed by the Munsiff, Sullia in OS No. 45 of 1972, on bis file, decreeing the suit of the plaintiff as prayed for. ( 2 ) THE plaintfli is a minor and the suit is instituted on behalf of the minor by his next friend who is his maternal grandfather. Plaintiff and defendants 6 to 9 are the children of the 3rd defendant. The 1st defendant is the paternal grandfather of the plaintiff. 12th defendant is the Registrar of co-operative Societies, Mysore. The suit schedule properties are the joint family properties of the undivided Hindu joint family of the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 7. The 1st defendant, the paternal grandfather of the plaintift was the Karta of the family. There was no need to the family to raise debts. B schedule properties were yielding good income. The 3rd defendant is the father of the plaintift and he was employed as Secretary of the defendant co-operative Society. He was residing away from the family. He became spend-tbrift and began to lead immoral life. According to the plaint aver- ments he committed misappropriation and forgery with regard to the funds of the Society of which he was the Secretary and in that connection the society obtained awards against him. They were certified as decrees of the Court and they were put in execution and B shedule properties were attached. The mother of the plaintiff put in claim petition before the executing Court which was rejected and subsequently the plaintiff instituted the present suit with a prayer that the share of the present plaintiff could not be attached in execution of the decree obtained against bis father as he was not bound to discharge the debt, the debt having been incurred for an immoral purpose. There was no obligation on the part of the plaintiff to discharge the said debt. He also sought for partition of the plaint B sbedule properties and claimed his shere along with future mesne rofits and other incidental reliefs. ( 3 ) THE suit was resisted by the concerned defendants. There was no obligation on the part of the plaintiff to discharge the said debt. He also sought for partition of the plaint B sbedule properties and claimed his shere along with future mesne rofits and other incidental reliefs. ( 3 ) THE suit was resisted by the concerned defendants. ( 4 ) THE trial Court raised the following issues as arising from the pleadings for its decision. x x x x x ( 5 ) THE trial Court, appreciating the evidence on record, held under issues 1 and 2 in the affirmative. It answered Issues 3 and 4 in the negative. Under Issue No. 5 it found that the suit was maintainable. It answered issues 10 and 11 in the affirmative. Under Issue No. 9 it held that the guardian was competent to act as guardian and in that view the trial Court passed a preliminary decree in the suit as prayed for. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree , the Co-operative Society arrayed as 12th defendant went up in appeal before the learned Civil Judge, Puttur, in RA No. 150 of 1975, on his file. ( 6 ) THE learned Civil Judge in the course of his judgment raised the following points as arising for his consideration in the appeal. (1) Whether the debts in respect of which decrees have been passed in favour of the appellant and against the 4th respondent are avyavaharika debts ?x X X X X ( 7 ) THE learned Civil Judge, reassessing the evidence on record, answered in the negative under point No. 1. He held in the affirmative under point no 2. He answered points 3 and 4 in the affirmative and in favour of the plaintiff and in that view he allowed the appeal in part and passed the following decree in lieu of the decree passed by trial Court:"1. That the suit of the 1st respondent plaintiff seeking declaration that the decrees in favour of the appellant and against the 4th respondent in ABNSR Nos. 606/68-69. 607/68-69, 608/68-69, 609/68-69, 610|68-69. 611/68-69, 612/68-69 and 613/68-69 are not valid and binding on the share of the 1st respondent in the suit b Sch. properties, be and the same is hereby dismissed. 2. That the suit B Sch. 606/68-69. 607/68-69, 608/68-69, 609/68-69, 610|68-69. 611/68-69, 612/68-69 and 613/68-69 are not valid and binding on the share of the 1st respondent in the suit b Sch. properties, be and the same is hereby dismissed. 2. That the suit B Sch. properties, described here below, be divided by metes and bounds, in final decree proceedings, having due regard to the nature of the soil, water facilities and convenience of enjoyment, into 20 fair and equal shares and one such share be allotted to the 1st respondent-plaintiff. In so far as the decree relates to estates paying assessment to the Government, the actual partition shall be effected by the Dy. Commissioner, South Kanara district, or any Gazetted Officer subordinate to the Dy. Commissioner, in accordance with the directions in the decree and in accordance with the provisions of Section 54 and Order XX, rule 18 (1) of C. P. C. In so far as the decree relates to other properties, the partition shall be effected through a Commissioner appointed by the Court or any other convenient mode, in accordance with the decree, on the application made by the 1st respondent-plaintiff. 3. That the decrees obtained by the appellant against the 4th respondent in ABNSR Nos. 606/68-69, 607/68-68, 608/68-69, 609/68-69 610/68-69. 611/68-69, 612/68-69 and 613/68-69 are binding not only on the share of the 4th respondent but also on the share of the 1st respondent-plaintiff and the share of respondents NGS. 7 and 8 in the suit B Sch. properties. 4. The 4th respondent is liable to pay future mesne profits to the 1st respondent-plaintiff from the date of decree till the date of delivery of separate possession of l/20th share of the 1st respondent plaintiff in the suit B Sch. properties. An enquiry shall be conducted regarding the same under Order XX, Rule 12 (1) (b) of the c. P. G. 5. The 1st respondent-plaintiff shall pay to the appellant costs of the suit incurred both in this Court and in the trial Court. There shall be no order as to costs of the other respondents in this court as well as in the trial Court. "aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the plaintiff has instituted the present second appeal before this Court. There shall be no order as to costs of the other respondents in this court as well as in the trial Court. "aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the plaintiff has instituted the present second appeal before this Court. ( 8 ) THE learned Advocate appearing for the appellant straneously urged before me that the Court below was not justified in holding that the debts created under the awards in question were not Avyavaharika debts and as such they were binding on the share of the plaintiff. According to him there was evidence to show that the debt was Avyavaharika not only in the awards but also in the depositions of PW 1 and DW 1. Hence, he submitted that the court below was not justified in not exempting the share of the plaintiff in realising the debt of the father by putting the awards into execution. ( 9 ) AS against that, the learned Advocate appearing for the Society argued supporting the judgment and decree of the 1st Appellate Court. ( 10 ) THE sole point, therefore, that arises for my consideration in this appeal is: whether the 1st appellate Court was justified in holding that the debts covered by the awards were not Avyavaharika debts ? ( 11 ) THE learned Advocate appearing for the appellant invited my attention to the contents of ABN awards in Exts. P-2 to P-S to show that the liability was fixed on the father of the plaintift who was the Secretary of the Society because of irregularities, namely, commissions and omissions in maintaining the accounts. He further invited my attention to the evidence of PW 1 and dw 1, who deposed that the father of the plaintift incurred debts for immoral purposes. Hence, he submitted that the evidence on record is sufficient to hold that the debt was incurred for immoral purposes and as such it was Avyavaharika and not binding on the plaintiff. ( 12 ) AS against that, the learned Advocate appearing for the Society invited my attention to Section 43 of the Indian Evidence Act and urged that the reasoning given in those awards could not be made the basis for deciding the nature of the debt incurred in the present proceeding. ( 12 ) AS against that, the learned Advocate appearing for the Society invited my attention to Section 43 of the Indian Evidence Act and urged that the reasoning given in those awards could not be made the basis for deciding the nature of the debt incurred in the present proceeding. He further invited my attention to a decision of the Supreme Court of India in the case S. M. Jakati v. S. M. Borkar [ air 1959 SC 282 ], for the proposition that the contents and reasoning of the judgment rendered in some other proceedings could not be made the basis for deciding the nature of the debt. ( 13 ) THE Supreme Court of India in the aforesaid decision in para 11 of the judgment has ruled thus;"in the case now before us the appellants have attempted to prove that the debt fell within the term 'avyavaharika' by relying upon the payment order and findings given by the Dy. Registrar in the payment order where the liability was inter alia based on a breach of trust ;:any opinion given in the order of the Dy. Registrar as to the nature of the liability of defendant No. 1 M. B. Jakati cannot be used as evidence in the present case to determine whether the debt was 'avyavaharika' or otherwise. The order is not admissible to prove the truth of the facts therein stated and except that it may be relevant to prove the existence of the judgment itself, it will not be admissible in evidence. Section 43 of the Evidence Act, the principle of which is, that judgments, excepting those upon questions of public and general interest, judgments in rent or when necessary to prove the existence of a judgment, order or decree, which may be a fact in issue, are irrelevant. It was then submitted that the pleadings of respondent No. 1 himself show that the debt was of an immoral or illegal nature. In his written statement, respondent No. 1 had pleaded that the liquidator of the bank bad charged befendant No. 1 with misfeasance because he was grossly negligent in the discharge of his duty and responsibility as managing director and that after a thorough enquiry the Dy, registrar held misfeasance proved and ordered a contribution of rs. 15,100 by him. In his written statement, respondent No. 1 had pleaded that the liquidator of the bank bad charged befendant No. 1 with misfeasance because he was grossly negligent in the discharge of his duty and responsibility as managing director and that after a thorough enquiry the Dy, registrar held misfeasance proved and ordered a contribution of rs. 15,100 by him. As we have said above the translation given by Colebrooke of the term 'avyavaharika' is the nearest approach to its concept i. e. , any debt for a cause repugnant to good morals. The managing director of a Bank of the position of defendant no. 1 who should have been more vigilant in investing the monies of the Bank cannot be said to have incurred the liability for a cause "repugnant to good morals". Thus, the Supreme Court of India has made it clear that the contents of an arbitration award cannot be made the basis in a regular suit instituted by the son to prove that the debt in question was Avyavaharika. It has to be independently proved. The Supreme Court has further pointed out that negligence in the matter of maintaining the accounts does not partakes the nature of Avyavaharika debt. ( 14 ) SECTION 69 of the Kar. Co-operative Societies Act fixes liability on the Secretary if he is negligent in the matter of discharging his duties. That enables the arbitrator to create liability against the Secretary. It is that way that the awards are passed against the Secretary, as rightly pointed out by the learned Civil Judge, creating liability for the first time in the awards, and the same cannot be described as Avyavabarika debts in the sense that they are repugnant to good morals. It is a case merely of negligence and of civil liability. Hence, the learned Civil Judge was justified in holding that the debt are not proved as incurred for purposes repugnant to good morals. ( 15 ) IT is true, the learned Advocate invited my attention to the oral evidence of PW 1 and DW 1. But the witnesses have given opinion evidence. Opinion evidence is admissible only in the case of expert witnesses. ( 15 ) IT is true, the learned Advocate invited my attention to the oral evidence of PW 1 and DW 1. But the witnesses have given opinion evidence. Opinion evidence is admissible only in the case of expert witnesses. The opinion of PW 1 that these debts were incurred for immoral purposes would not be admissible in evidence and the documentary evidence on record would show that the liability was incurred because of the negligence and a civil liability was created under Section 69 of the Kar. Co-operative Societies Act. Hence, I am satisfied that the plaintiff has failed to establish that the debts in question were incurred for immoral purposes and as such were not binding on his share on the doctrine of pious obligation. ( 16 ) IN the result, therefore, I am constrained to hold that this appeal is devoid of merits and is liable to be dismissed and I dismiss the same. ( 17 ) ON the peculiar facts of the case, I make no orders as to costs in this appeal. Appeal dismissed. --- *** --- .