ORDER K.N. Misra, J. - This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is directed against the orders dated 10-1-1983 (Annexure- 3) passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation. Pratapgarh dated 18 3-82 (Annexure-2) passed by Settlement Officer of Consolidation. Pratapgarh in proceedings under R. 109-A of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Rules thereinafter referred to as the Rules) for giving effect to the order passed in proceedings under S. 9-A(2) of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). Briefly stated. the facts of the case are as follows : Dispute in the present case relates to Khata No. 51 of village Chitra. Pargana Dhingwas, Tahsil Kunda, district Pratapgarh which was recorded in the basic year khatauni in the name of petitioner Bhagauti. Objections under S. 9-A (2) of the Act were filed by Ram Autar father of opposite parties Nos. 3 to 5. Shiv Lal, father of opposite party No. 6, Birjoo, father of opposite party No. 8 and Sunder son of Mahadin claiming co-tenancy rights to the extent of half share in the said holding. These objections were allowed by the Consolidation Officer by order dated 29-11-1973 passed in case No. 5198 under S. 9-A(2) of the Act. This order was, however, not given effect in the relevant record nor any separate chak was carved out in the names of aforesaid objectors. It is not disputed that in respect of.entire land of Khata No. 46, chak was carved out in the name of petitioner Bhagauti. In the year 1978 the village was denotified under S. 52 of the Act. After de-notification, an application was filed by the said objectors on 19-10-1979 under R. 109-A of the Rules claiming that Amaldarmad of the said order be made and in pursuance of it, separate chaks be allotted to them. While this application was pending, the petitioner filed an appeal on 10-4-1980 before the Settlement Officer. Consolidation against the Order dated 29-11- 1973 which was sought to be enforced by the opposite parties in the manner aforesaid. Since there was delay in filing the appeal, an application for condonation of delay was also moved by the petitioner. This appeal was heard and disposed of by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation vide order dated 29-9-1980. He condoned the delay, but while finding no substance on merits, the appeal was dismissed. Since there was delay in filing the appeal, an application for condonation of delay was also moved by the petitioner. This appeal was heard and disposed of by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation vide order dated 29-9-1980. He condoned the delay, but while finding no substance on merits, the appeal was dismissed. In the order it was observed that the petitioner had admitted claim of co- tenancy rights of the objectors and on his admission, the aforesaid order dated 29-11- 1973 was passed by the Consolidation Officer. Petitioner, thereupon, preferred revision which too was dismissed on 4-5- 1981 as not pressed. 2. The aforesaid application under R. 109-A came up for hearing before the Consolidation Officer after the decision of the said appeal and revision. The Consolidation Officer rejected this application holding that it was not maintainable as the village was denotified in the year 1978 and no proceedings were pending on that date. Aggrieved by this order, opposite parties preferred appeal which was allowed by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation vide order dated 18-3.1982 and the case was remanded to the Consolidation Officer for giving effect to the aforesaid order as per report of the Assistant Consolidation Officer to which the alteration-chart dated 30- 6-1981 was appended. The chart for making alteration in the chak appended to the Assistant Consolidation Officer's report was confirmed on the basis of which necessary entries in CH Forms Nos. 40 and 45 were directed to be made. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner filed revision which was dismissed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation by Order dated 10-1-1983. These Orders have been challenged by the petitioner in this writ petition. 3. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at some length and have perused the impugned orders. Learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri Arif Khan contended that since no proceedings were pending concerning land in dispute on the date of de-notification made under S. 52 (I) of the Act, the Consolidation Officer had no jurisdiction to entertain the application under R. 109-A of the Rules for the incorporation and enforcement of the said order dated 29-11-73. Learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri Arif Khan contended that since no proceedings were pending concerning land in dispute on the date of de-notification made under S. 52 (I) of the Act, the Consolidation Officer had no jurisdiction to entertain the application under R. 109-A of the Rules for the incorporation and enforcement of the said order dated 29-11-73. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on a decision in Raja Ram v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, U. P. Lucknow, (1982 Rev Dec 387) : (1982 All LJ 871) wherein it was held that the provisions of S. 52(2) of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act read with R. 109-A of the Rules indicate that the cases or proceedings should be pending under the Act on the date of issue of de-notification under S. 52 of the Act. Since in that case, the order which was sought to be given effect to was passed on July, 23 1965, i.e. seven years before the date of notification under S. 52 of the Act it was held that the application to give effect to that order, having been moved after de-notification under S. 52 (1) of the Act, was not maintainable as no case was pending on the date of de-notification under S. 52 (1) of the Act and so the contesting opposite parties could not invoke the jurisdiction of the consolidation authorities under R. 109-A of the Rules. Learned counsel also referred to another decision in Santosh Kumar v. Board of Revenue, (1981 All LJ 1289) wherein similar view was expressed. 4. There is no dispute with the proposition of law laid down in the aforesaid decisions. In the present case however, it is not disputed that the order dated 29-11-1973 was not enforced nor incorporated in relevant records prepared during the consolidation operations although by said order, separate chak was to be carved out in favour of the opposite parties in respect of share in the aforesaid holding, Khata No. 51. Perusal of the order dated 29-11-1973 also indicates that specific direction was given by the Consolidation Officer while determining shares of the parties that the record of the case be consigned after Amaldaramad of the said order. The case file was, therefore, to be consigned only after due enforcement and Amaldaramad of the said order by the consolidation authorities. Perusal of the order dated 29-11-1973 also indicates that specific direction was given by the Consolidation Officer while determining shares of the parties that the record of the case be consigned after Amaldaramad of the said order. The case file was, therefore, to be consigned only after due enforcement and Amaldaramad of the said order by the consolidation authorities. The Consolidation Officer, in his order dated 19-1-1982, by which he has rejected the application filed by the opposite parties under R. 109-A of the Rules has accepted that the aforesaid Order dated 29- 11-1973 has not yet been enforced. It is, therefore, evident that the proceedings in respect of said land as contemplated in the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act and Rules were not concluded in terms of said order itself on the date of de-notification made under S. 52 (1) of the Act as Amaldaramad of it was not done by then and thus, for that reason the record could not be consigned. Those proceedings, having not been conducted and concluded as was required, the same would, thus he deemed to be pending on the date of de-notification so as to attract the provisions of S. 52 (2) of the Act pertaining to land in dispute. 5. It was enjoined on the consolidation authorities under Rr. 27 to 39 to have enforced the orders passed in proceedings under S. 9-A in accordance with the procedure prescribed therein. It is well settled that no party shall suffer on account of any error or omission committed by the concerned Authorities, Court or Tribunal and whenever such error or omission is pointed out and brought to the notice of the concerned Authorities, Court or Tribunal, it would be bound to correct the error and make repair of the damage done so that party should not suffer for no fault on his part. R. 27 of the Rules prescribes that the consolidation Lekhpal shall note in CH Form 11 the orders of the Assistant Consolidation Officer and the Consolidation Officer passed under S. 9-A with regard to :- (i) rights in and liabilities in regard to the land, (ii) valuation of plot, trees, wells and other improvements, and (iii) partition of joint holdings (i) .in the basic khatauni, (ii) Khasra Chakbandi in CH Form 2-A, and (iii) the relevant column of the revised Annual Register in CH Form II (as soon as it has been prepared) (respectively?). He shall enter case numbers, the date of order and its operative portion in the records aforesaid. The correctness of the entries made by the Consolidation Lekhpal shall be attested by the Consolidator. The Assistant Consolidation. Officer shall also check at least 20 per cent of the entries to ensure that they have been correctly made. 6. Thus it is evident that in accordance with this Rule, the aforesaid order dated 29- 11-1973 should have been recorded in the basic year Khatauni; Khasra Chakbandi in CH Form 2-A and the relevant column of the revised Annual Register in CH Form II. The case number, date of the order and its operative portion in the said record should have been incorporated. Sub-s. (1) of R. 27- A further requires that the Settlement Officer Consolidation shall cause to be prepared by the Consolidation Lekhpal a statement in CH Form No. 7 to show amount of land revenue payable on new holdings and apportionment or alteration, if any, in the amount of land revenue on existing holdings, where this may be necessary in view of the orders passed under S. 9-A. The Assistant Consolidation Officer and Consolidation Officer are required by this Rule to check the accuracy of such entries. R. 28 of the Rules further provides that a revised annual register in CH Form 11 shall then be prepared by the Consolidation Lekhpal incorporating all the orders relating to rights in, and liabilities in respect of land passed by the Assistant Consolidation Officer under sub-sec. (1) of S. 9-A and also the orders passed by the Settlement officer, Consolidation, under R. 27-A. Details of the operative portion of the orders passed in partition and amalgamation cases shall be recorded in the appropriate column of the register. This record is also to be checked by the aforesaid consolidation authorities. (1) of S. 9-A and also the orders passed by the Settlement officer, Consolidation, under R. 27-A. Details of the operative portion of the orders passed in partition and amalgamation cases shall be recorded in the appropriate column of the register. This record is also to be checked by the aforesaid consolidation authorities. R. 29 of the Rules provide that where, as a result of orders passed under Ss. I land 48, it is found necessary, supplementary CH.Form 7 shall be prepared in the manner prescribed under R. 27-A to show alterations in the land revenue on the holdings since the preparation of the original CH Form 7 under R. 27-A. It is not disputed that no such action was taken by the consolidation authorities as was required to be done by the aforesaid rules in respect of land in dispute in which opposite parties were held to be co-tenure-holders having 'h share therein. Their names were to be separately recorded and the land revenue was to be separately apportioned and separate chaks were to be carved out in their names in enforcement of the said order dated 29-11-1973. It, therefore, cannot be said that proceedings in respect of land in dispute were not pending on the date of de-notification especially in view of the fact that no action, as was required to be taken in accordance with the provisions of Rr. 27 to 29 of the Rules, was taken by the consolidation authorities. In this view of the matter, I find that provisions of sub-sec. (2) of S. 52 of tie Act would be applicable. 7. There is yet another reason for up- holding the orders passed by opposite parties Nos. 1 and 2. It is not disputed that against the order dated 29-11-1973, petitioner had filed an appeal on 10-4-1980 and along with this appeal, an application for condonation of delay was also filed. The delay was condoned, but the appeal was heard and dismissed on merits vide order dated 29-9-1981. Thereupon revision was dismissed on 4-5-1981 as not pressed. In this view of the matter, the order dated 29-11-1973 would be deemed to have merged in the order in appeal as well as in revision. The delay was condoned, but the appeal was heard and dismissed on merits vide order dated 29-9-1981. Thereupon revision was dismissed on 4-5-1981 as not pressed. In this view of the matter, the order dated 29-11-1973 would be deemed to have merged in the order in appeal as well as in revision. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that as no appeal was pending on the date of de-notification and as such the opposite parties would not be entitled to get benefit of S. 52(2) of the Act. I am unable to agree with this contention. 8. It is now well settled that an appeal or revision can be filed even after de-notification against an order which was passed prior to that date although limitation for filing the appeal or revision had already expired. Such appeal or revision would be maintainable in view of the provisions contained in S. 53-B of the Act which makes S. 5 of the Limitation Act applicable to the proceedings under the Act. This question came up before me for consideration in a case reported in Shyam Narain Rai v. Dy. Director of Consolidation, (1981 RD 307) : (1981 UPLT NOC 207) wherein it was held that : "The aggrieved person can file an appeal, revision or restoration application even after de-notification along with an application under S. 5 of the Limitation Act explaining the delay in taking the aforesaid steps." 9. In this view of the matter I am of the opinion that the appeal which was filed by the petitioner was maintainable. The delay was condoned and the appeal was heard and dismissed. The aforesaid order, dated 29-11- 1973, therefore, would be deemed to have merged in the appellate order. Learned counsel, however, contended that the opposite parties had filed an application under R. 109-A of the Rules on 19-10-1979 and since on that date no appeal was filed by the petitioner and as such the orders passed in appeal would not give any benefit to the opposite parties nor it would make the application maintainable, which on that date could not be entertained as no proceedings were pending on the date of notification concerning the land in dispute. I am unable to agree with this contention as well. 10. I am unable to agree with this contention as well. 10. Firstly, because in view of what has been said above, the proceedings would be deemed to have been pending on the date of de-notification concerning enforcement of the said order pertaining to the land in dispute and hence the application under R. 109-A of the Rules was maintainable and could be entertained. But apart from it, the Consolidation Officer, who came to decide this application on 19-1-1982, could very well consider the subsequent events happening after the filing of aforesaid application under R. 109-A of the Rules. It is not disputed that appeal was filed on 10-4- 1980 along with an application for condonation of delay. The delay was condoned. This is not a case where the appeal was dismissed as time barred and it was not decided on merits so as not to result in merger of the order appealed against in the appellate order. But since this appeal was decided on merits after condoning delay hence the aforesaid order merged in appellate order. It is well settled that limitation does not destroy a right. It only bars a remedy in Court. The right remains but it cannot be enforced by judicial process except by recourse to S. 5 of the Limitation Act. Thus, if delay is condoned in filing appeal, it would be deemed as if brought within limitation. In this view of the matter, since the appeal could be filed even after de-notification seeking condonation of delay, as observed above, the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, in my opinion committed no error in entertaining the appeal and in deciding it on merits after condoning the delay. Since delay in filing the appeal was condoned, it would in law be taken as if filed within limitation and the same would be deemed to be pending on the date of de-notification so as to attract provisions of S. 52(2) of the Act. Although appeal was filed after the filing of application under R. 109-A, that will make no difference. The said subsequent event of filing appeal and its disposal on merits after condoning the delay deserved to he noticed and should have been taken into consideration by the Consolidation Officer while passing orders on the application filed by the opposite parties under R. 109-A of the Rules. The said subsequent event of filing appeal and its disposal on merits after condoning the delay deserved to he noticed and should have been taken into consideration by the Consolidation Officer while passing orders on the application filed by the opposite parties under R. 109-A of the Rules. Since appeal could be filed after de-notification by invoking provisions of S. 5 of the Limitation Act, the proceedings concerning the land in dispute would be deemed to be pending on the date of de-notification once the delay was condoned. The application for enforcement of said order, therefore could not be rejected as was done by the Consolidation Officer. 11. In view of what has been said above, I am of the opinion that no error has been committed by the Settlement Officer. Consolidation and Deputy Director of Consolidation in passing the impugned order, which in my opinion do not suffer from any error of fact law or jurisdiction so as to call for interference by this Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. 12. The Writ Petition, being devoid of merits is accordingly dismissed. In the circumstances of the case the parties are directed to hear their own costs. 13. The ad interim order of stay dated 2- 2-1983 is hereby vacated.