JUDGMENT 1. - The petitioner Jawahar Lal was initially appointed as a Lower Division Clerk in the office of Executive Engineer, P. W. D. (B & R), Udaipur temporarily for a period of 3 months by the order of the Executive Engineer dated August 13, 1957. He was subsequently transferred as a Lower Division Clerk to the office of the Deputy Commissioner, Excise and Taxation, Udaipur with effect from May 1, 1959. The petitioner w-is later on appointed temporarily as Patrolling Officer Grade III in the Preventive Force in Excise and Taxation Department of the State of Rajasthan against an existing vacancy, by the orders of Commissioner. Excise and Taxation, Rajasthan dated June 12, 1961. By another order passed by the Commissioner, Excise and Taxation, Rajasthan dated December 18, 1961 the petitioner was confirmed on his post as Patrolling Officer Grade III. It appears that subsequently the posts of Patrolling Officers in the Preventive force Organisation were abolished, in implementation of economic measures and so the petitioner was appointed as Inspector Excise Grade III with effect from July 1, 1967 by the order of the Excise Commissioner, Rajasthan, Udaipur dated June 29, 1967. The petitioner was subsequently temporarily promoted to the post of Excise Inspector Grade II by the order of the Excise Commissioner dated March 14, 1974. 2. While the petitioner was working temporarily on the post of Excise Inspector Grade II, the Rajasthan Excise Subordinate Service (General Branch) Rules 1974 (hereinafter called the Rules') were published in the Rajasthan Gazette elated June 6, 1974 and came into force at once. Under the Rules all persons, who were holding posts specified in the Schedule annexed to the Rules, were includes? in the initial constitution of the Rajasthan Excise Subordinate Service A perusal of the Schedule annexed to the Rules goes to show that only the posts of Inspector Excise Grade I and Inspector Excise Grad,- II 2nd Assistant Public Prosecutor of Excise were included in the newly constituted Service, while the post of Excise Inspector Grade III has not been included in the Schedule and the said posts appear to have been abolished. The recruitment to the service in the lowest grade was by way of direct recruitment and by promotion to the posts of Inspector Excise Grade I. Thus so far as the posts of Inspector Excise Grade II were concerned, future appointments were to be made 100% by direct recruitment. Under proviso (iii) to Rule 6, provision was made for appointment to the posts included in the Schedule, of persons working on such posts on ad hoc,officiating or temporary basis from before, January 1, 1972 and who were also working on such posts on the date of coming into force of the Rules, after screening by the Committee constituted under Rule 24. The Committee was requited to adjudge the suitability of such adhoc, officiating or temporary employees for the posts held by them, provided they, possessed the academic qualifications prescribed in the Rules or prescribed qualifications on the basis of which such persons were selected for adhoc, officiating or temporary appointment. The Screening Committee constituted under Rule 24, considered the case of the petitioner for adjudging his suitability for appointment to the post of Inspector Excise Grade II but the Committee did not find him suitable for appointment to the post of Excise Inspector Grade II and the reversion of the petitioner to his original post was recommended. In accordance with the recommendations of the Screening Committee, the Excise Commissioner, Rajasthan. Udaipur by his order dated October 14, 1974 (Ex. 6) reverted the petitioner to the post of Patrolling Officer Grade III held by him earlier. Subsequently it was realised that the post of Patrolling Officer Grade III had already been abolished much earlier and, therefore, the order passed by the Excise Commissioner dated October 14, 1974 was modified by subsequent order dated October 27, 1974 and it was clarified that the reversion of the petitioner was made to the post of Patrolling Officer Grade II and not to the post of Patrolling Officer Grade III, which ceased to exist long ago and was abolished prior to July 1, 1967. 3. 3. Besides, the reversion of the petitioner to the post of Patrolling Officer Grade III, later modified as Patrolling Officer Grade II, the Excise Commissioner, Rajasthan also gave a notice to the petitioner on October 7, 1974 to show cause why he should not be de-confirmed on the post of Patrolling Officer on the ground that the appointment of the petitioner on the post of Patrolling Officer Grade III was initially made in contravention of the Rajasthan Subordinate Service (Recruitment and Other Service Conditions) Rules, 1960. The petitioner thereupon filed the present writ petition in this Court challenging the order of his reversion dated October 14, 1974 as modified by the order dated October 27, 1974 and also the notice issued to him regarding de-confirmation from the post of Patrolling Officer Grade III. After the writ petition was filed by the petitioner, an order of de-confirmation was issued to him in respect of the post of Patrolling, Officer Grade III by the Excise Commissioner. Rajasthan on October 28, 1974 and his confirmation on the post of Patrolling Officer Grade III was withdrawn. The subsequent order dated October 28, 1974 is also being challenged by the petitioner, after amending the writ petition. 4. The proviso (iii) to Rule 6 of the Rules, with which I am concerned in the present case, runs as under : (iii) the persons who were appointed to the post included in the Schedule on adhoc/officiating/temporary basis before 1-1-1972 and were working as such on the date these rules come into force shall be screened and recommended by a Committee referred to in rule 24 for adjudging their suitability on the posts held provided that they possess the academic qualifications prescribed in these rules either for direct recruitment or promotion of the prescribed qualifications on the basis of which the persons were selected for ad-hoc/officiating/temporary appointment : Provided that a person appointed on adhoc basis shall not be entitled to screening for a post higher than to which he was initially appointed, if a person senior to him on lower post who fulfilled qualifications prescribed for the post was either not given such adhoc appointment or is not entitled to screening under this rule." 5. A perusal of the aforesaid provisions makes it clear that only those persons who were appointed to the posts included in the Schedule on adhoc, officiating or temporary basis before January 1, 1972 and were working on such posts on the date the Rules came into force were eligible for being screened by the Screening Committee constituted under Rule 24, provided they possessed the requisite academic qualifications. As I have already mentioned above, only the posts of Inspector of Excise Grade I, Inspector Excise Grade II and Assistant Public Prosecutor of Excise are included in the Schedule annexed to the Rules. The narration of facts made above, would make it clear that the petitioner, who was appointed as Excise Inspector Grade II in a temporary capacity only on March 13, 1974, was not eligible for appointment on the post under the proviso (iii) to Rule 6. Thus, although the petitioner continued to work in a temporary capacity on the post of Excise Inspector Grade II on the date the Rules came into force, yet as he was not appointed to the said post before January 1, 1972 either on adhoc, officiating or temporary basis, the petitioner was not entitled to be screened by the Screening Committee or considered for substantive appointment to the Service, in accordance with proviso (iii) to Rule 6. The petitioner was appointed as Excise Inspector Grade III with effect from June 1, 1967 but that post has not been included in the Schedule annexed to the Rules. Only those persons who were appointed to the posts included in the Schedule, either in an adhoc, officiating or temporary capacity before January 1, 1972 were entitled to be screened and recommended for substantive appointment under proviso (iii) to Rule 6. As the petitioner did not fulfil the eligibility clause for being screened, as contained in proviso (iii) to Rule 6, he could not have been substantively appointed to the Service after screening even if he would have been found fit, nor he could be included in the initial constitution of the service as he was not holding any of posts specified in the Schedule, in a substantive capacity. Thus, the reversion of the petitioner from the post of Excise Inspector Grade II was fully justified as the could no longer be kept on the said post after the coming into force of the Rules. 6. Thus, the reversion of the petitioner from the post of Excise Inspector Grade II was fully justified as the could no longer be kept on the said post after the coming into force of the Rules. 6. As the petitioner was not eligible for being screened by the Committee constituted under Rule 24, in accordance with proviso (iii) to Rule 6, the Committee was not required to adjudge his suitability for appointment to the post of Excise Inspector Grade II. It is, therefore, not necessary for me to consider whether the Committee was justified in holding that the petitioner was not suitable for the post of. Excise Inspector Grade II or as to whether proper considerations prevailed with the Committee or whether proper material was considered by the Committee while adjudging the suitability of the petitioner for appointment to the post of Excise Inspector Grade II. The petitioner was not eligible for being screened, in accordance with the provisions of the third proviso to Rule 6 and so the Committee should not have considered the case of the petitioner for adjudging his suitability for appointment to the post of Excise Inspector Grade II. Even if the Screening Committee would have adjudged the petitioner as suitable for appointment to the post of Excise Inspector Grade II, yet he could not have been appointed to the said post for the simple reason that the petitioner was not appointed to the post of Excise Inspector Grade II before January 1, 1972, either on adhoc or officiating or temporary basis, as required by the third proviso to Rule 6. The reversion of the petitioner from the post of Excise Inspector Grade II to the post of Patrolling Officer Grade II was, therefore justified. Thus it is not necessary for me to go into the question as to whether the Screening Committee was justified in holding that the petitioner was not suitable for the post of Excise Inspector Grade II. When the petitioner was not eligible for consideration for the said post, the question of suitability was irrelevant and so the reversion of the petitioner to his substantive post was justified. But as the post of Patrolling Officer Grade III had been abolished, the Excise Commissioner rightly reverted the petitioner to the post of Patrolling Officer Grade II by subsequent order dated October 27, 1974. 7. But as the post of Patrolling Officer Grade III had been abolished, the Excise Commissioner rightly reverted the petitioner to the post of Patrolling Officer Grade II by subsequent order dated October 27, 1974. 7. The other contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner was that the order of de-confirmation of the petitioner was wholly unjustified. It may be recalled that the petitioner was appointed as a Patrolling Officer Grade III on June 12, 1961 and was confirmed on that post on December 18, 1961. The notice issued to the petitioner to show cause why he should not be de-confirmed was given on October 7, 1974, more than 12 years after the order of confirmation was passed. Moreover, in the show cause notice issued to him, no reasons were assigned as to why the petitioner was sought to be de-confirmed nor the material which was proposed to be considered against the petitioner was disclosed so as to enable him to give an effective reply to the show cause notice. The notice dated October 7, 1974 stated that it was decided to de-confirm the petitioner as a Patrolling Officer Grade III, in accordance with the Government Order No. F. 1 (4) FD/Rules/69 dated February 2, 1971 and it was also stated that the appointment of the petitioner on the post of Patrolling Officer Grade III was made initially in contravention of Rajasthan Subordinate Services (Recruitment and other Service Conditions) Rules, 1960 (hereinafter called "the 1960 Rules"). It may be observed that the Government order dated February 2, 1971, on the basis of which the petitioner was desired to be de-confirmed, was not in existence on December 18, 1961 when the petitioner was confirmed on the post of Patrolling Officer Grade III. The notice dated October 7, 1974 failed to point out the infirmity, if any, in the order of confirmation of the petitioner on the post of Patrolling Officer Grade III. A mere vague and general statement that the initial appointment of the petitioner on the post of Patrolling Officer Grade III was in contravention of the 1960 Rules can be of no avail unless it is pointed out as to which provision of 1960 Rules was contravened. A mere vague and general statement that the initial appointment of the petitioner on the post of Patrolling Officer Grade III was in contravention of the 1960 Rules can be of no avail unless it is pointed out as to which provision of 1960 Rules was contravened. Thus, although a notice was given to the petitioner to show cause why he should not be de-confirmed on the post of Patrolling Officer Grade III, yet as any specific reason which the Excise Commissioner desired to take into consideration for the purpose of de-confirming the petitioner and in respect of which the petitioner could have been called upon to submit his reply was not indicated, it cannot be held that any effective notice was given to the petitioner in this matter. As a matter of fact, it was almost impossible for the petitioner to give any reply to such a vague notice which merely stated that the initial appointment of the petitioner as Patrolling Officer was not in accordance with the relevant Rules II was the duty of the Excise Commissioner to point out the specific infirmity in the initial appointment of the petitioner on the post of Patrolling Office Grade III or the infirmity attached to his confirmation on the said post. At least the Rule or provision which was alleged to have been contravened in making the appointment of petitioner or his confirmation should have been clearly pointed out so that the petitioner could give an effective reply. The order of de-confirmation passed by the Excise Commissioner on October 28, 1974 is equally vague and indefinite so far as the cause or reason for such de-confirmation is concerned. 8. In (1) State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Devi and others (AIR 1967 SC 126,) their Lordships of the Supreme Court laid down the following principles in respect of such matters : "But the decision of the State could be based upon the result of an enquiry in manner consonant with the basic concept of justice. An order by the State to the prejudice of a person in derogation of his vested rights may be made only in accordance with the basic rules of justice and fair play. An order by the State to the prejudice of a person in derogation of his vested rights may be made only in accordance with the basic rules of justice and fair play. The deciding authority, it is true, is not in the position of a judge called upon to decide an action between contesting parties, and strict compliance with the forms of judicial procedure may not be insisted upon.' 'He is, however, under a duty to give the person against whom an enquiry is held an opportunity to correct or to controvert any evidence in the possession of the authority which is sought to be relied upon to his prejudice For that purpose the person against whom an enquiry is held must be informed of the case he is called upon to meet, and the evidence in support thereof. The rule that a party to whose prejudice an order is intended to be passed is entitled to a hearing applies alike to judicial tribunals and bodies of persons invested with authority to adjudicate upon matters involving civil consequences. It is one of the fundamental rules of our constitutional set up that every citizen is protected against exercise of arbitrary authority by the State or its officers. Duty to act judicially would, therefore, arise from the very nature of the function intended to be performed, it need not be shown to be supper-added. If there is power to decide and deter mine to the prejudice of a person, duty to act judicially is implicit in the exercise of such power. If the essentials of justice be ignored and an order to the prejudice of a person is made, the order is a nullity. That is a basic concept of the rule of law and importance thereof transcends the significance of a decision in any particular case." (emphasis added) 9. Thus, not only that a person, to whose prejudice an order is proposed to be passed, should be afforded an opportunity of hearing but the aforesaid case clearly laid down that such a person must be informed about the case he is called upon to meet and the evidence in possession of the authority which is sought to be relied upon to his prejudice. In the present case, the petitioner was left in the dark and although he was given an opportunity to show cause, but it was not disclosed to him as to what infirmity was attached to the order of his appointment or the order of his confirmation. The person cannot be left guessing as to what possible infirmity could have been attached to his appointment or confirmation, but he should be clearly made aware of the alleged infirmity. If a specific rule was contravened, the petitioner should have been informed as to which particular rule was violated and in what manner. If such information would have been supplied to the petitioner, it would have enabled him to present his side of the picture and to produce such material as he might have in his possession or power or to point out such material which might have supported his defence. I am of the view that the essential principles of natural justice, as pointed out by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Binapani's case were not fulfilled in the present case and merely a bald opportunity to show cause could not have been sufficient until the reasons which the authority had in mind for de-confirming the petitioner on the post of Patrolling Officer Grad. III were conveyed to him and the material which the said authority had in its possession to the prejudice of the petitioner was disclosed to him. Thus, in my view the order of de-confirmation of the petitioner on the post of Patrolling Officer Grade-III was passed in utter disregard to the principles of natural justice and deserves to be set aside. 10. Moreover, as pointed out by me above, the de-confirmation of the petitioner was brought about on a consideration which was non-existent at the relevant time, inasmuch as the notification of the Finance Department dated February 2, 1971, referred to in the order of de-confirmation dated October 28, 1974, neither existed at the time of the initial appointment of the petitioner on the post of Patrolling Officer Grade III on June 12, 1961 nor it existed at the time of his confirmation on the said post on December 18, 1961. How can a person be de-confirmed with reference to a notification which come into existence almost 12 years after the order of confirmation was passed ? How can a person be de-confirmed with reference to a notification which come into existence almost 12 years after the order of confirmation was passed ? The view taken by the Excise Commissioner and the procedure adopted by him, while proceeding to de-confirm the petitioner from the post of Patrolling Officer Grade III, was contrary to the principles of natural justice and as such the same deserved be to set aside. 11. In the result, the writ petition is partly allowed. The notice dated Oct. 7, 1974 issued by the Excise Commissioner and the order of de-confirmation dated October 28, 1974 passed in consequence of the aforesaid notice are quashed. The petitioner would, therefore, continue to hold the post of Patrolling Officer Grade II, to which he was reverted by the order of the Excise Commissioner dated October 14, 1974 as modified by the order dated October 27, 1974. The other prayers made in the writ petition are disallowed. The parties are left to bear their own costs of this writ petition. *******