ORDER K.P. Singh, J. - In order to appreciate the points involved in the present writ petition it is necessary to mention the following 2. Habbu and Buddhu in the above pedigree were co-sirdar's of plot No. 116 measuring 0.56 acre situate at Bilram, Tahsil Kasganj, District Etah. Habbu filed a suit under S. 229-B of the U. P. Z. A. and L R. Act against Abbas claiming himself to he the sole heir of Buddhu. According to him Abbas was not the son of Buddhu; Habbu died during the pendency of the suit and Smt. Hamidunnisa was substituted in place of the plaintiff. 3. In the suit Abbas had put forward a claim that he was son of Buddu and he was rightly entitled to succeed Buddhu. On the death of Habbu he became sole sirdar of the disputed land. He denied that Snit. Hamidunnisa was sister of Habbu and Buddhu. Thus he asserted that the plaintiffs suit for declaration of adhivasi right in possession should he dismissed. 4. The trial Court dismissed the plaintiffs suit and accepted the contention of Abbas. The lower appellate Court also confirmed the judgment of the trial Court. In second appeal the plaintiff has succeeded as is evident from the impugned judgment of the second appellate Court dated 22-9-1981. 5. It is noteworthy that the petitioner is transferee of Abbas (defendant in the suit). The aforesaid petitioner did not get himself impleaded after having purchased the interest from Abbas. Against the judgment of the second appellate Court the petitioner has approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 are successors-in-interest of Hamidunnisa who had appeared as plaintiff in the suit on the death of Habbu. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended before me that the second appellate Court has exceeded its jurisdiction in disturbing the finding of fact recorded by the first two Courts. According to him the impugned judgment of the second appellate Court should he quashed. 7. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite party has submitted in reply that the petitioner cannot maintain the present writ petition as he has failed to get himself impleaded in the litigation before the subordinate Courts. According to him the impugned judgment of the second appellate Court should he quashed. 7. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite party has submitted in reply that the petitioner cannot maintain the present writ petition as he has failed to get himself impleaded in the litigation before the subordinate Courts. The second submission raised on behalf of the contesting opposite party is that the finding of fact recorded by the first appellate Court stood vitiated in law as the first appellate Court ignored an important piece of evidence, hence the second appellate Court was fully justified in interfering with the judgment of the first appellate Court. 8. I have considered the contentions raised on behalf of the parties. 9. As regards the maintainability of the writ petition at the instance of the petitioner, my attention has been drawn to the rulings reported in, AIR 1955 SC 376 Jugal Kishore Saraf v. Raw Cotton Co. Ltd, AIR 1958 SC 394 ; Smt. Saila Bela Dassi v. Smt. Nirmala Sundari Dassi and AIR 1979 SC 1066 Zila Singh v. Hazari, and it has been emphasised that the petitioner being transferee of Abbas a tenant, is fully entitled to maintain the writ petition. The rulings relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner are based upon the provisions of S. 146 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The aforesaid section reads as below : "Save as otherwise provided by this Code or by any law for the time being in force, where any proceedings may be taken or application made by or against any person then the proceedings may be taken or the application may be made by or against any person claiming under him." S. 141 of the Civil Procedure Code reads below : "The procedure provided in this Code in regard to suits shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings in any court of civil jurisdiction. Explanation :- In this section, the expression "Proceedings' includes proceedings under Order IX. but does not include any proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution." 10. Explanation :- In this section, the expression "Proceedings' includes proceedings under Order IX. but does not include any proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution." 10. In AIR 1979 SC 1066 Zila Singh v. Hazari their Lordships of the Supreme Court have referred to the rulings reported in AIR 1955 SC 376 and AIR 1958 SC 394 and they have emphasised as below in paragraph 14 of their judgment : "That section 146 was introduced for the first time in Civil Procedure Code, 1908 with the object of facilitating the exercise of rights by persons in whom they came to be vested by devolution or assignment and being beneficent provision should be construed liberally so as to advance justice and not in a restricted or technical sense. Viewed from this angle the present appellants must succeed because they purchased land from pre-emptor Neki and the validity of the sale being now beyond dispute, they are persons claiming under Neki whose right to execute the decree was never disputed and therefore the appellants claiming under the vendor Neki would be able to maintain an application for execution under S. 146 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The appellants are thus entitled to execute the decree for possession." 11. Technically the provisions of S. 146 of the Code of Civil Procedure read with S. 141 thereof may not apply to writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution, but I see no reason why the principle underlying the abovementioned provisions of S. 146 would not apply to the writ petitions. Viewing from this angle I think that the petitioner being transferee of the defendant in the suit is entitled to maintain the writ petition against the judgment of the second appellate Court. The submission of the learned counsel for the contesting opposite party in this regard is not acceptable to me. 12. On merits the perusal of the impugned judgment indicates that the second appellate Court has re-appraised the evidence on record in arriving at its conclusion. The only question involved in the present writ petition at present is whether, Abbas was son of Buddhu as mentioned in the pedigree. The first two Courts recorded a finding to the effect that Abbas was son of Buddhu in the above pedigree, whereas the second appellate Court disturbed that finding. The only question involved in the present writ petition at present is whether, Abbas was son of Buddhu as mentioned in the pedigree. The first two Courts recorded a finding to the effect that Abbas was son of Buddhu in the above pedigree, whereas the second appellate Court disturbed that finding. In pars 7 of its judgment the second appellate Court has observed as below : "........ At least copies of the death register prove that Nanhi, admitted mother of the defendant, died as wife of Abdullah and a son was born to Abdul on 18-9-36 copy of birth register which lend support to the plaintiffs case. This paper was not properly appraised by both the Courts below..........." 13. On enquiry the learned counsel for the contesting opposite party could not satisfy me that there was any admission on the part of the present petitioner or Abbas to the effect that Nanhi, mother of Abbas, was wife of Abdullah. Hence I think that the second appellate Court has not approached the problem from correct angle and it has exceeded its jurisdiction in appraising the evidence. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite party has tried to support the impugned judgment on the ground that the first appellate Court had ignored the important piece of evidence, but he has not been able to point out to him (me) as to what evidence has been ignored by the first appellate Court. 14. The learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the ruling reported in AIR 1980 All 174 , Smt. Aina Devi v. Bachan Singh and has contended that the first appellate Court has rightly relied upon Ekka licence and electoral roll of 1955 as well as oral evidence on records and has rightly recorded finding in favour of Abbas. The learned counsel for the petitioner also could not indicate as to whether the entry in electoral roll of the year 1955 was connected with Abbas, by oral evidence, nor any other evidence has been led in the case to connect the entry of Ekka licence with the person concerned. In this connection it is proper to mention the ruling reported in 1962 Rev Dec 110 : (1962 All LJ 1094) Mukhtar Ahmad Khan v. Board of Revenue wherein it has been indicated as below : "........ In this connection it is proper to mention the ruling reported in 1962 Rev Dec 110 : (1962 All LJ 1094) Mukhtar Ahmad Khan v. Board of Revenue wherein it has been indicated as below : "........ Mere filing of a birth certificate by the opposite party may be sufficient to prove that a son was born in the village to the person named therein but that will not per se prove that the birth entry relates to a particular person ................ The mere possibility of the entry relating to the petitioner will not be enough. The connection between the birth entry to be relied upon with the particular person to whom it is sought to apply must be established by evidence aliunde." 15. Before me the learned counsel for the petitioner did not challenge the finding regarding plaintiff being sister of Habbu and Buddhu. Since the second appellate Court has disturbed the finding of fact to the effect that Abbas was son of Buddhu without indicating that the finding suffered from mistakes of law contemplated by the provisions of S. 331 of the U. P. Z. A. and L. R. Act read with S. 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, I think that the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. In the circumstances of this case it appears proper to me that the judgment of the second appellate Court should be quashed and the second appellate Court should be asked to re-examine the claims of the parties afresh in accordance with law. It would be open to the petitioner to get himself impleaded in the second appeal and it would also be open to the petitioner to raise all legal points before the second appellate Court. 16. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and the impugned judgment of the second appellate Court dated 22-9-1981 is hereby quashed and the second appellate Court is directed to re-examine the claims of the parties in accordance with law. Parties are directed to hear their own costs.