Judgment :- 1. Offences punishable under S.120-B, 466, 469, 471,109 and 511 of 420 of the Indian Penal Code read with S.34 were taken cognizance of against the two accused, Joly P. George and K. M. Mathew. A petition under S.239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was moved by the 2nd accused for discharging him. The move was opposed by the Prosecution. The Special Court of the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Ernakulam, who heard the matter, dismissed the motion. The 2nd accused has thereupon approached this court with a prayer to set aside the order passed by the learned Magistrate and quash the proceedings against him. 2.The bare facts relevant for the decision may be stated, taking due note of the caution administered by the Supreme Court in State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh, AIR. 1977 SC. 2018 that "unnecessary details in that regard have got to be avoided so that it may not prejudice either the prosecution or the defence". 3. The father of the 1st accused is no more. The petitioner, an employee of the Reserve Bank of India, claims to be the guardian of the 1st accused. The claim is not conceded by the Prosecution, They point out that the mother of the 1st accused is alive and that therefore she is the real guardian. It is unnecessary to pay more attention than a mere mention to this controversy. 4. According to the Prosecution, the 1st accused, as a student in the Pandalam N.S.S. College, undergoing a graduate course in Politics, appeared for and wrote, the examination held in April, 1979 in the paper 'Foreign Government' under Part III optional subjects. Her Register Number was 23963. Later she wrote the Final Year examination also. There are, therefore, two mark lists. She had secured only 10 marks out of 100. That was reflected in the two mark lists. It is alleged that between 25-9-1981 and 3-2-1982 the two accused conspired to obtain a fresh mark list from the University by forging the marks, substituting 40 in the place of 10. The 2nd accused, had made a false document by effecting the alteration in the mark list. That was done in furtherance of a common intention of both the accused. The alteration was so made with the intention of forwarding it to the University and to obtain a fresh mark list with the altered marks by deception. The 2nd accused, had made a false document by effecting the alteration in the mark list. That was done in furtherance of a common intention of both the accused. The alteration was so made with the intention of forwarding it to the University and to obtain a fresh mark list with the altered marks by deception. The 2nd accused forwarded the altered mark list to the University treating it as a genuine document along with the final year mark list of the 1st accused, under cover of a forwarding letter dated 3-2-1982 reading: "From Jolly P. George, Puthenveettil, Charummoodu (P. O.), Kayamkulam, Alleppey Dist. To The Controller of Examinations, University of Kerala. Sir, It is seen from the mark list (Final Year) issued to me that the posting of 2nd year papers mark is only 10 instead of 40. This discrepancy may be looked into and request to do the needful. Register No. 23963 Centre. B. A. Politics (1981 March) Encl. 2nd and 3rd year mark lists. Yours faithfully. Trivandrum, K.M. Mathew 3-2-82 for Jolly P. George 3-2-82." (emphasis supplied) The particularly noteworthy aspect regarding this letter is that the letter has been written for and on behalf of the 1st accused by the 2nd accused. 5. According to the 2nd accused, no incriminating material existed ' in the statements of C. Ws. 8, 22, 23, 30 and 31, the only witnesses who mentioned his name. Of these witnesses, Cw. 31 is the mother of the 2nd accused and her statement only brings out relationship between the two accused. Cws. 22 and 23 are witnesses who speak about the familiarity of the handwriting of the 2nd accused. The statement of Cw. 30 only relates to the production of certain records containing the handwriting of the 2nd accused. An officer of the Kerala University has given statement as Cw.8. The letter referred to above sent by the 2nd accused was received by Cw. 8. 6. The statement of Cw. 30 only relates to the production of certain records containing the handwriting of the 2nd accused. An officer of the Kerala University has given statement as Cw.8. The letter referred to above sent by the 2nd accused was received by Cw. 8. 6. Two other relevant facts, according to the Prosecution, are: (i) The forensic expert has given evidence that there has been tampering with the mark list, raising the marks from 10 to 40, and (ii) If 30 more marks are added, the 1st accused need not write the examination on'Foreign Government' over again; for by the inflation of the marks so made out, the 1st accused would secure 183 marks enabling her to obtain a pass in the final year optional examination. (She would have nevertheless failed in the entire examination, for she had secured only 7 marks in World History instead of the minimum 35 required for a pass). There is, therefore, prima facie evidence about the alteration of 10 into 40 in the final year mark list. 7. The learned Magistrate observed on a perusal of the final year mark list that "one can easily see that the alteration of 10 therein is more difficult than the alteration of the 10 in the second year mark list due to lack of space". 8. Various contentions were urged on behalf of the 2nd accused in support of a plea of discharge under S.239; that the final year mark list, even with the corrections, would only be that of a 'failed mark list', suggesting thereby that no purpose was achieved by the ingenious exercise referred to by the prosecution; that there was no difficulty for the two accused to correct the ten marks into forty even in the final mark list, suggesting thereby that if such a story were true, the two accused need not have sent the altered mark list to the University when the purpose could be easily achieved otherwise. These pleas did not appeal to the learned Magistrate. He observed, as noted earlier, that by the alteration in the marks, if undetected, the candidate was relieved of the obligation to write the examination on the paper 'Foreign Government'. These pleas did not appeal to the learned Magistrate. He observed, as noted earlier, that by the alteration in the marks, if undetected, the candidate was relieved of the obligation to write the examination on the paper 'Foreign Government'. The suggestion of the Prosecution is that when the mark lists are forwarded along with the letter referred to above, the University feeling that it could not disown the 40 marks in the second year mark list would make a corresponding alteration in the final year mark list, "in order to escape a further irregularity in its records being made published". The Magistrate concluded with the observation: "There is probability of this and in that case the forwarding of these two mark lists with a forwarding letter to the University for getting a correction of the final year mark list can only be regarded as a product of an intelligent conspiracy." 2. The view taken by the learned Magistrate cannot be characterised as an impossible view on the materials before him and at that stage. Counsel for the petitioner (2nd accused) submitted that he did not dispute the authorship of the letter, and that the evidence of Cws. 22, 23 and 31 would not be very material in that background. Having regard to the close relationship, was there anything wrong, in an uncle writing a letter for and on behalf of the niece, whose father is no more, requesting the University to look into the discrepancy and 'to do the needful'?-queried counsel. Here again, the facts are that the 1st accused herself is a major and of the age of 23; and according to the Prosecution, the marks in the subject 'Foreign Government' in the mark list issued for the second year are altered or forged. It is unnecessary to be more definite about the ultimate position at this stage. 10. Elucidation of the scope of the section is derivable from the decision of the Supreme Court in AIR. 1977 SC. 2018 supra. Though the observations are made with reference to S.227 and 228 of the Criminal Procedure Code, they have equal bearing on the interpretation of S.232, despite marginal variations. As stated therein, "at the beginning and the initial stage of the trial the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged". As stated therein, "at the beginning and the initial stage of the trial the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged". Nor is any weight to be attached to the probable defence of the accused. It is not obligatory for the judge at that stage of the trial to consider in any detail and weigh in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The standard of test and judgment which is to be finally applied before recording a finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not exactly to be applied at the stage of deciding the matter. At that stage, the court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. It has been further clarified that though suspicion cannot take the place of proof of guilt at the conclusion of the trial, "at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the Court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, then it is hot open to the Court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused". 11. The learned Magistrate made a further reference to a contention of the Prosecution about the two accused adopting the above methodology. He observed: " If the first accused is accused, she can very well defend that she is innocent and that the mark lists were altered and forwarded by the second accused. If the second accused is accused, he can defend that he as a guardian only forwarded the tampered mark list without knowing its tampering nature and only for a genuine verification. And that in fact is now the plea as revealed from the argument of the counsel for the second accused". This observation was subjected to severe attack by counsel for the petitioner. And that in fact is now the plea as revealed from the argument of the counsel for the second accused". This observation was subjected to severe attack by counsel for the petitioner. A possible defence, which may be taken by another accused, according to counsel, was not a matter to be considered while disposing of an application under S.239, Cr.P.C. He drew particular attention to the provision obtaining in S.239 which enables the court to examine the accused for the limited purpose of the exercise of the power thereunder, and contrasted it with the absence of such a provision in S.227 and 245 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In other words, under S.239 the Magistrate is enabled not only to consider the police report and the documents sent with it under S.173 but also to make an examination of the accused. Under S.227, the consideration is confined to the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith. Under S.245, the Magistrate has to advert to the evidence that may be produced in support of the prosecution. It is not necessary to consider at length this interesting argument, for even without that additional reasoning, the order of the learned Magistrate can be sustained. The conclusion reached by the learned Magistrate, however, cannot be characterised as an impossible view. It is one thing to say that before expressing such a view the learned Magistrate could have availed of the additional facility of having the accused examined as envisaged in S.239. It is totally different to say that the view expressed without such an examination is vitiated merely because that enabling power of examination of the accused had not been invoked and the accused had not actually been examined. 12. I do not find any ground whatever to entertain this petition. It is accordingly dismissed. Dismissed.