Judgment :- 1. The question of law on which this appeal was admitted reads: "Whether or not Cochin Act XVIII of 1114 is impliedly repealed by the subsequent enactments in force in Kerala on the subject of relief to agriculturist-debtors." In view of the importance of the question a learned judge before whom the appeal came for hearing in the first instance referred it to a Bench. The first defendant-respondent joined a kuri conducted by the plaintiff-appellant, bid his ticket at the 8th draw and on receiving the prize executed a bond Ext. Al dated 7-11-1966 to secure the due payments of the future instalments. However he committed default from the 10th instalment. The plaintiff brought the suit for recovery of the defaulted instalments with interest at 12 per cent per annum from the date of default. So far as material the contentions raised by the first defendant were that the interest claimed in the plaint was excessive and that he was entitled to the benefits under the Agriculturists Debt Relief Act. 2. The learned trial judge held that even if the first defendant was an agriculturist within the Kerala Agriculturists Debt Relief Act, 1970 the Kerala Act still the Act had no application as the kuri terminated only on 30-3-1973 and not within a year prior to its commencement. He had an alternative contention that in any event he should get benefits of S.14 of the Cochin Agriculturists Relief Act, Act XVIII of 1114 the Cochin Act. The learned judge rejected the contention on the ground that he has not specifically pleaded this benefit in the written statement nor given any evidence with the result that the plaintiff had no opportunity to meet the plea or call evidence. The learned judge thus granted the plaintiff a decree in terms of the plaint with interest at 6 per cent from the date of suit and costs. 3. On appeal the only contention raised on behalf of the first defendant concerned the denial or the benefits of S.14 of the Cochin Act. The learned District Judge disagreed with the Subordinate Judge and found that the first defendant had pleaded its benefits. 3. On appeal the only contention raised on behalf of the first defendant concerned the denial or the benefits of S.14 of the Cochin Act. The learned District Judge disagreed with the Subordinate Judge and found that the first defendant had pleaded its benefits. On the merits he held that S.14 of the Cochin Act was prospective and that it had not been repealed expressly or impliedly by the subsequent legislations granting relief to indebted agriculturists as contended by the plaintiff and that as an agriculturist he was entitled to the benefits of S.14. Accordingly the decree of the trial court was modified in so far as it related to interest. 4. Although counsel for the appellant contended that for want of specific pleading the first defendant could not be heard to claim the benefit of S.14 of the Cochin Act, we are not impressed with the contention. Apart from the circumstance that this plea was urged in the courts below and was considered, no doubt differently by them which is sufficient to entitle it to consideration, the written statement is comprehensive to cover this plea also. The first defendant did contend that he was entitled to the benefits of Agriculturists Debt Relief Act but without specifying the Act. Admittedly the chitty transaction on which the suit is based is outside the scope of the Kerala Act, the current statute. The only other provision of which the first defendant could claim benefits was S.14 of the Cochin Act. His contention for the benefits of S.14 of the Cochin Act cannot in the circumstances be discountenanced for want of pleading. 5. The substantial question in the appeal on which it was admitted and which has been referred to a Bench turns upon whether S.14 of the Cochin Act has been repealed by the Kerala Act. Counsel were agreed that the Cochin Act or S.14 has not been expressly repealed by the Kerala Act or any earlier enactment. The arguments before us were also whether or not the Cochin Act has been impliedly repealed by the Kerala Act, the appellant contending that it has been so repealed and the respondent denying it. On this controversy the first point to be considered is when a repeal by implication of one enactment by a subsequent enactment results. The arguments before us were also whether or not the Cochin Act has been impliedly repealed by the Kerala Act, the appellant contending that it has been so repealed and the respondent denying it. On this controversy the first point to be considered is when a repeal by implication of one enactment by a subsequent enactment results. The conditions under which this happens are well established even though it is not easy to tell in a given situation whether it has so happened or not. We might refer to some leading authorities before proceeding to decide whether S.14 of the Cochin Act has suffered an implied repeal by the Kerala Act. Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 12th edition, observes: "A later statute may repeal an earlier one either expressly or by implication. But repeal by implication is not favoured by the courts. (191) If, therefore, earlier and later statutes can reasonably be construed in such a way that both can be given effect to, this must be done." (ibid) "If, however, 'the provisions of a later enactment are so inconsistent with or repugnant to the provisions of an earlier one that the two cannot stand together,' the earlier is abrogated by the later," (193) The following passages from Craies on Statute Law, 7th edition, page 348, are worth reproduction: "Parliament, in the exercise of its supreme legislative capacity, can extend, modify, vary, or repeal Acts passed in the same or previous sessions. It is, consequently, a matter of daily business for the courts to consider the exact effect of later upon earlier enactments, in order to see whether they can wholly or in part stand together. The rule of law on the subject was thus stated by North J. in Re Williams: 'The provisions of an earlier Act may be revoked or abrogated in particular cases by a subsequent Act, either from the express language used being addressed to the particular point, or from implication or inference from the language used."' At Page 366-67 the learned author states: "Where two Acts are inconsistent or repugnant, the later will be read as having impliedly repealed the earlier. The court leans against implying a repeal, 'unless two Acts are so plainly repugnant to each other that effect cannot be given to both at the same time, a repeal will not be implied. The court leans against implying a repeal, 'unless two Acts are so plainly repugnant to each other that effect cannot be given to both at the same time, a repeal will not be implied. Special Acts are not repealed by general Acts unless there is some express reference to the previous legislation or unless there is a necessary inconsistency in the two Acts standing together.' 'The latest expression of the will of parliament must always prevail. Before coming to the conclusion that there is a repeal by implication the court must be satisfied that the two enactments are so (page 366) inconsistent or repugnant that they cannot stand together before they can, from the language of the later, imply the repeal of an express prior enactment-ie., the repeal must, if not express, flow from necessary implication. To determine whether a later statute repeals by implication an earlier, it is necessary to scrutinise the terms and consider the true meaning and effect of the earlier Act. Until this is done it is impossible to ascertain whether any inconsistency exists between the two enactments." (367) The following passage from Dr. Lushington's judgment in India (1864) 33 Q. Adm.193 extracted at pages 372-73 is worth reproduction: The prior statute would, I conceive, be repealed by implication if its provisions were wholly incompatible with a subsequent one; or if the two statutes together would lead to wholly absurd consequences; or if the entire subject-matter were taken away by the subsequent statute. Perhaps the most difficult case for consideration is where the subject-matter has been so dealt with in subsequent statutes that, according to all ordinary reasoning, the particular provision in the prior statutes could not have been intended to subsist, and yet, if it were left subsisting, no palpable absurdity would have been occasioned." It is thus observed in Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th edition. Volume 44, Para.966: "Repeal by implication is not favoured by the courts, for it is to be presumed that Parliament would not intend to effect so important a matter as the repeal of a law without expressing its intention to do so. Volume 44, Para.966: "Repeal by implication is not favoured by the courts, for it is to be presumed that Parliament would not intend to effect so important a matter as the repeal of a law without expressing its intention to do so. However, if provisions are enacted which cannot be reconciled with those of an existing statute, the only inference possible is that, unless it failed to address its mind to the question, Parliament intended that the provisions of the existing statute should cease to have effect, and an intention so evinced is as effective as one expressed in terms. The rule is, therefore, that one provision repeals another by implication if, but only if, it is so inconsistent with or repugnant to that other that the two are incapable of standing together." A few passages from American Text Books are also useful as they lay down the same principles. Crawford on the Construction of Statutes, Para.137, says: "Such repeals (implied repeals) have been divided into two general classes; those which occur where an act is so inconsistent or irreconcilable with an existing prior act that only one of the two can remain in force, and these which occur when an act covers the whole subject of an earlier act and is intended to be a substitute therefor." At Para.306 it was observed: "And usually one of two questions will arise: (1) Whether the new law is intended as a substitute for the old; or (2) whether the new is irreconcilably inconsistent with the old, so that the former is thereby terminated. In brief, the problem will be simply to determine what is the legislative intention whether the old law shall cease or whether it shall be supplemented." In Para.310 the learned author refers to the presumption against implied repeal and in Para.311 he states that to constitute implied repeal "There must be what is often called 'such a positive repugnancy between the provisions of the old and the new statutes that they cannot be reconciled and made stand together'. In other words, they must be absolutely repugnant, or irreconcilable." Sutherland on Statutes and Statutory Construction, 3rd edn., deals with implied repeals in Para.2011 onwards. It is unnecessary to extract them for they only discuss the points already noted from the other authors. We might however refer to Para.2016 where the learned author criticises the presumption against repeal by implication. In other words, they must be absolutely repugnant, or irreconcilable." Sutherland on Statutes and Statutory Construction, 3rd edn., deals with implied repeals in Para.2011 onwards. It is unnecessary to extract them for they only discuss the points already noted from the other authors. We might however refer to Para.2016 where the learned author criticises the presumption against repeal by implication. The author says: "Since it is from the subject-matter of new legislation that the extent of repeal is to be sought, it is submitted that the presumption against implied repeal often serves as a cumbersome method for determining legislative intent, which in many cases produces unsatisfactory results. Instead, the emphasis in the first instance belongs upon the purposes and. objects behind the expression of the new statute with fair consideration to surrounding conditions and former legislation." We might cite a few passages from two decisions of the Supreme Court although they only re-state the principles already extracted by us from the leading text books. In Northern India Caterers (Private) Ltd. v. State of Punjab, AIR. 1967 SC. 1581, it was observed: "Even where the later Act does not contain such express words, if the co-existence of the two sets of provisions is destructive of the object with which the later Act was passed, the Court would treat the earlier provision as impliedly repealed. A later Act which confers a new right would repeal an earlier right if the fact of the two rights co-existing together produces inconvenience, for, in such a case it is legitimate to infer that the legislature did not intend such a consequence." Their Lordships had referred to various authorities including Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes and Dr. Lushington's observations in The India, (1864) 33 L J. Adm. 193. In Delhi Municipality v. Shiv Shankar, AIR. 1971 SC. 815 (818), it was stated: "To determine if a later statutory provision repeals by implication an earlier one it is accordingly necessary to closely scrutinise and consider the true meaning and effect both of the earlier and the later Statute. Until this is done it cannot be satisfactorily ascertained if any fatal inconsistency exists between them. 1971 SC. 815 (818), it was stated: "To determine if a later statutory provision repeals by implication an earlier one it is accordingly necessary to closely scrutinise and consider the true meaning and effect both of the earlier and the later Statute. Until this is done it cannot be satisfactorily ascertained if any fatal inconsistency exists between them. The meaning, scope and effect of the two statutes, as discovered on the scrutiny, determines the legislative intent as to whether the earlier law shall cease or shall only be supplemented." The Supreme Court referred to Paine v. Stater (1883) 11 QBD.120, which is mentioned in page 366 of Craies. 6. The point that now requires to be considered is whether in the light of these principles, S.14 of the Cochin Act can be held to have been impliedly repealed by the Kerala Act. S.14 reads: "14. Rate of interest payable by agriculturists on new loans: In any proceeding for recovery of a debt, the court shall scale down all interest due on any debt incurred by an agriculturist after the commencement of this Act so as not to exceed a sum calculated at 9 per cent per annum simple interest, when the creditor is a public company and at six per cent per annum simple interest in the case of other creditors: Provided that Government may, by notification in the Cochin Government Gazette, alter and fix any other rate of interest, from time to time. Explanation: For the purpose of this section, the definition of 'agriculturist, in S.3(ii) shall be read as if (i) in proviso (a) to that section, for the expression "the two financial years ending on the last day of Karkadagam 1114", the expression "the two financial yeas ending on the last day of Karkadagam immediately preceding the date on which, the debt is incurred" were substituted; and (ii) in provisos (b) and (c) to that section for the expression "the two years immediately preceding the 1st Chingam 1115" the expression "the two years immediately preceding the date on which, the debt is incurred" were substituted." On its terms the Section prescribes that the court shall scale clown the interest on the debts incurred by an agriculturist after 1-1-1115 so as not to exceed 9 per cent per annum where the creditor is a public company and six per cent per annum in the case of other creditors. The proviso empowers the Government to alter and fix any other rate of interest from time to time. The Explanation introduces two modifications in the definition of agriculturist in S.3(ii). S.5 of the Kerala Act deals with interest payable on debts. So far as material, S.5(1) (a) enacts that for determining the amount of any debt other than a debt due to a banking company, interest shall be calculated at the rate applicable to the debt under the law, custom or contract or the decree or order of court under which it arises or at six percent per annum simple interest, whichever is less. Sub-section (2) provides that for determining the amount due to a banking company for the purpose of payment under the Act, interest shall be calculated at the rate applicable to the debt under the law or contract or the decree or order of court under which it arises or at seven percent per annum whichever is less, with effect on and from the commencement of the Act. In the Cochin Act the definition of 'debt' does not include rent as defined in that Act or 'kanam amount' as defined in the Cochin Tenancy Act of 1113. In the Kerala Act there is no such exemption. Both the Acts exclude certain liabilities from the scope of their provisions. Revenue, tax or cess or any other sum payable to the Government or to any municipality, liabilities due to a Co-operative Society or a land mortgage bank, liability arising out of breach of trust, liability in respect of maintenance, debt which represents the price of goods purchased for purposes of trade and liability for which a charge is provided on the property sold are excluded under both the Acts. However liabilities due to Government of India or of any other State or Union Territory, liabilities due to the Reserve Bank of India or the State Bank of India or any subsidiary Bank or the Travancore Credit Bank (in liquidation) (provided the right of the Bank to recover the sum did not arise by reason of any assignment or statutory transfer subsequent to 1-7-1957), Corporations owned or controlled by the Government of Kerala or the Government of any other State or the Government of India or a Government Company, the Tea Board, the Coffee Board, the Rubber Board or the Cardamom Board, any sum payable to a bank specified in column (2) of the First Schedule to the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1969 on account of any transaction entered into after 18-7-1969 other than by way of renewal, debt or debts due to a widow at the commencement of the Act, (provided the value of her properties including the amount of the debt does not exceed Rs. 10,000), liabilities under the Travancore Chitties Act and Cochin Kuries Act or conducted under any chit fund scheme which has not terminated one year before the commencement of the Act (subject to certain specified exceptions), amount exceeding Rs. 3,000 borrowed under a single transaction and due before the commencement of the Act to any banking company (subject to certain exceptions), any amount due on account of any goods to a financier who financed the purchase of goods and whose principal business is to finance the purchase of goods and any sum advanced for the purposes of agriculture by an institution receiving financial assistance from the Agricultural Refinance Corporation are outside the Kerala Act. 7. It is obvious from a study of these definitions of debt in juxtaposition that the two provisions cannot stand together. The term "debt" in the Cochin Act takes in various kinds of liabilities which are excluded from the definition of "debt" in the Kerala Act. If the two provisions operate the result would be an unworkable situation. The debts due to the Union of India, State Governments, Government Corporations, such institutions as the Tea Board etc., will be subject to the Cochin Act and liable to be scaled down while they will be outside the scope of the Kerala Act. If the two provisions operate the result would be an unworkable situation. The debts due to the Union of India, State Governments, Government Corporations, such institutions as the Tea Board etc., will be subject to the Cochin Act and liable to be scaled down while they will be outside the scope of the Kerala Act. Not only such institutions but even a debt due to a widow at the commencement of the Act will be hit by the Cochin Act. 8. For the application of S.14 the debtor must be an agriculturist as defined in the Cochin Act. Those who are excluded from its definition include persons whom it would be difficult or impossible to identify now, e.g., those who in either of the two financial years ending on the last day of Karkatagam 1114 had been assessed to income-tax or those who had within the two years immediately preceding Ist Chingam 1115, been in receipt of an annual income of Rs. 900 or more derived from a profession other than agriculture, those who had within the same two preceding years been assessed to property or house tax in respect of buildings or lands, other than agricultural lands under any municipal law provided that the aggregate annual rental value of such buildings and lands exclusive of the house in which they permanently reside is not less than Rs. 400. Those who are excluded from the corresponding definition of the Kerala Act are sales tax assessees whose turnover in the aggregate is not less than Rs. 40,000 in any two years within the three years prior to 1970, income-tax assessees under the Act of 1961 in any two years within the three years prior to 1970 and whose total income exceeded Rs. 8,000/-, agricultural income-tax assessees in any two years within three years immediately prior to 1970 on an income exceeding Rs. 8,000 and registered firms, Companies and Corporations formed in pursuance of an Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom or any special Indian law. Those categories of persons and entities are not excluded from the Cochin Act, in other words they are entitled to claim its benefits including the benefit of S.14 while they are outside the scope of the Kerala Act. The conflict and the resultant anomaly is obvious. 9. Those categories of persons and entities are not excluded from the Cochin Act, in other words they are entitled to claim its benefits including the benefit of S.14 while they are outside the scope of the Kerala Act. The conflict and the resultant anomaly is obvious. 9. On the above analysis and comparison we have no doubt that the provisions are repugnant to one another and that they cannot stand together. Now an implied repeal can happen not only when an irreconcilable inconsistency exists between the old and new laws but also as pointed out by Crawford when the new law is intended as a substitute for the old. In our view, this test is also satisfied in the present case as the Kerala enactment is a Statewide and comprehensive substitute for the old Cochin Act. The intention is obvious, that the old Act was being superceded. We hold that S.14 of Act XVIII of 1114 stood repealed when the Kerala Act was enacted. (We have not considered whether such a repeal had taken place when the earlier enactment, Act 31 of 1958 came into force as it is unnecessary for the appeal) 10. The appellant is therefore entitled to a decree unfettered by the provisions of S.14 of the Cochin Act. On the findings of the courts below the Kerala Act has no application. The judgment of the appellate court will have therefore to be reversed. We set aside the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court and restore the judgment and decree of the Subordinate Judge. The appeal is thus allowed. The appellant will get its costs from the respondent. Allowed.