JUDGMENT N. D. Ojha. J. - These three writ petitions raise an identical question. The petitioners of these writ petitions are co-owners of three shops. These shops were let out to Umardin respondent No. 2 in these petitions. Three suits were instituted by the petitioners against respondent No. 2 in the year 1979 for his ejectment from the three shops, on the ground that these shops had been constituted after the year 1972 and consequently the provisions of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 thereinafter referred to as the Act) were not applicable to them in as much as 10 years from the date on which the construction of these shops was completed, had not expired when the suits were instituted. In other words, the petitioners claimed that the shops in question were exempted from the application of the Act in view of Section 2(2) thereof. 2. The suits were contested by respondent No. 2 inter alia on the ground that he had been occupying the shops as a tenant since the year 1972 and these shops had been constructed prior to that year and the provisions of the Act were applicable. The petitioners produced both oral and documentary evidence in support of their case that the provisions of the Act were not applicable to the shops in question. The documentary evidence which was produced by the petitioners was copy of the first assessment of the shops in question indicating that the first assessment in respect of all these shops came into effect on 24th December, 1973. Deoki Nandan one of the petitioners appeared as a witness and stated, as is evident from the copy of his statement filed in these writ petitions, that the construction of these shops had been completed in June 1973. He also stated that the first assessment in respect of these shops came into effect on 24th December, 1973. In reply to a question in cross-examination, he further stated that either in the month of May or June 1973 he had made a report to the Municipal Board about the completion of these shops and it was on the basis of that report that the assessment referred to above was made. 3. Respondent No. 2 does not appear to have produced any documentary evidence in regard to the date of the construction of the shops in question. 3. Respondent No. 2 does not appear to have produced any documentary evidence in regard to the date of the construction of the shops in question. He, however, appeared as a witness in support of his case. A copy of his deposition has been filed as annexure 4 in each of these three petitions, Copy of his statement filed in writ petition No. 8748 of 1981 and No. 8749 of 1981 indicates that his case was that the shops in question giving rise to these two writ petitions had been constructed in the year 1971 and were in his tenancy since January, 1971, Copy of his statement filed in writ petition No. 8611 of 1981 also indicates that the shop in question in the suit giving rise to this writ petition was also let out to him in January 1972 and had been constructed prior to that. It is true that in this statement he has not specifically stated that the shop was constructed in 1971 but in view of the fact that it was not the case of respondent No. 2 that the construction of these shops was completed on different dates, this omission does not appear to he of much consequence. 4. The Judge Small Causes accepted the case of the petitioners and held that the provisions of the Act were not applicable to the shops in question inasmuch as the construction of these shops was to he deemed to have been completed sometimes in May 1973, when the report of their completion was made on behalf of the petitioners. On this finding and the finding that the tenancy of respondent No. 2 had been validly terminated, the suit for ejectment of respondent No. 2 and for arrears of rent etc. was decreed by the Judge Small Causes in respect of all the three shops on 14-3-80. Three revisions were filed by the respondent No. 2 before the District Judge which were transferred to the V Additional District Judge, Bareilly respondent No. 1. These revisions were allowed by respondent No. 1 on 16.2.81. The Additional District Judge has taken the view that the oral evidence on behalf of the Petitioners that the report about the completion of the shops in question was made in the Municipal Board in May, 1973, was inadmissible in evidence. These revisions were allowed by respondent No. 1 on 16.2.81. The Additional District Judge has taken the view that the oral evidence on behalf of the Petitioners that the report about the completion of the shops in question was made in the Municipal Board in May, 1973, was inadmissible in evidence. According to him, it was only documentary evidence which could be relied on by the petitioners to prove that the report of the completion of the shops, in question had been made in May, 1973. He has altogether ignored the extract indicating that the first assessment of the shops in question came into effect from 24.12.73 on the ground that the petitioner had failed to establish as to on which date the completion of the shops in question was reported by them to the Municipal Board. It is these orders dated 16.2.81 passed by respondent No. 1 in the three revisions which are sought to be quashed in these three writ petitions. 5. All these writ petitions were filed and admitted on the same date, namely, 16.7.81. The parties in these three petitions are also represented by the same counsel. However, writ petition No. 8611 of 1981 only was listed today. When it was taken up for hearing counsel for the parties made a joint request that since the parties in all the three writ petitions were the sane and the question raised therein was also identical the other two writ petitions namely, writ petitions No. 8748 of 1981 and No. 8749 of 1981 may also he heard and decided, along with writ petition No. 8611 of 1981. In view of this joint request made by counsel for the parties writ petitions Nos. 8748 of 1981 and 8749 of 1981 were also heard along with writ petition No. 8611 of 1981 and all of them are being decided together. 6. It was urged by counsel for the petitioners that since the shops in question are subject to assessment it is the date on which the first assessment in respect of these shops came into effect which was material for the determination of the question as to when the construction of these shops shall be deemed to have been completed and the extract of the first assessment was the best evidence to prove this fact. He submitted that simply because no documentary evidence was produced by the petitioners, to indicate the actual date on which the report about the completion of these shops was made by the petitioners to the Municipal Board, the extract indicating that the first assessment of these shops came into effect on 24.12.73 could not be ignored by the Additional District Judge. According to him, it was a case in which what could be said at best was that no material had been furnished by the parties about the date on which the completion of the shop, in question had been reported to the Municipal Board. It is only when there was material indicating the date on which the completion of a building is reported and that date happens to be a date earlier than the date on which first assessment comes into effect that the date of reporting becomes relevant. 7. On the other hand it has been urged by the counsel for respondent No. 2 that since it was admitted by Deoki Nandan, petitioner No. 1, who had appeared as a witness before the Judge, Small Causes, that he had made a report about the completion of the shops to the Municipal Board either in May or June, 1973, it was incumbent upon him to have filed a certified copy of the report so made and since that was not done, it was not possible to find out as to which of the two dates, namely, the date on which the completion of the shops in question was reported and the date on which the first assessment in respect of these shops came into effect, was the earlier date. It has been urged by the counsel for respondent No. 2 that in this view of the matter it cannot he said that the Additional District Judge has committed any error in not placing reliance on the copy of the first assessment in respect of the shops in question. 8. Having heard the counsel for the parties, I am of the opinion that the impugned orders dated 16-2-81 passed by the Addl. District Judge in these three writ petitions cannot be sustained. In Om Prakash Gupta v. Digvijendra Pal Gupta, 1978 All. 8. Having heard the counsel for the parties, I am of the opinion that the impugned orders dated 16-2-81 passed by the Addl. District Judge in these three writ petitions cannot be sustained. In Om Prakash Gupta v. Digvijendra Pal Gupta, 1978 All. R.C. 469 (D.B.) it was held by a Division Bench of this Court that tau clear object and purpose of placing the words "and in case of a building subject to an assessment in clause (a) of Explanation (1) of Section 2(2) of the Act appears to be to classify buildings into those of two kinds, namely, (1) those subject to assessment and (2) not subject to assessment. It was further held that clause (a) of Explanation (1) referred to above together with its proviso was capable of only one meaning and not other and it was that in case of a building subject to assessment, the construction of a building shall be deemed to have been completed on the date on which the first assessment of the building comes into effect. It was also observed that if completion thereof is reported or otherwise recorded by the local authorities having jurisidiction on a date earlier than the date of the first assessment coming into force, the building, shall be deemed to have been completed on the earliest of the said dates and that it was only in the absence of such a reports record of completion or assessment by the local authority that the date of occupation becomes relevant for determining as to on which date the construction of a building shall be deemed to have been completed. 9. As seen above, to start with the petitioners do not appear to have placed reliance on any report of completion made to the Municipal Board in regard to the date of completion of the construction of the shops in question. They placed reliance on the extract of the first assessment of the Municipal Board which indicated that it came into force on 24-12-73. It seems to have been elicited from Deoki Nandan in his cross-examination by counsel for respondent No. 2 that a report was made to the Municipal Board about the completion of the shops in question sometimes in May or June 1973 and that it was on the basis of that report that first assessment referred to above was made. It seems to have been elicited from Deoki Nandan in his cross-examination by counsel for respondent No. 2 that a report was made to the Municipal Board about the completion of the shops in question sometimes in May or June 1973 and that it was on the basis of that report that first assessment referred to above was made. In other words, the fact that the report had been made about the completion of the shops in question, is sought to be established by respondent No. 2 on the basis of an admission by Deoki Nandan it is settled law that an admission has to be read as a whole. In case it was read as a whole the said admission also indicated that the report about the completion of the shops in question has been made either in the month of May or June 1973. It was this date which was taken to be the relevant date by the Judge, Small Causes and even on the basis of this date it was held that the provisions of the Act were not applicable to the shops in question. If the admission was to be ignored and the case was to be decided on the basis of other evidence produced by the parties then apparently it was a case where there was nothing on the record to indicate that any report about the completion of the shops in dispute had been made or otherwise recorded by the local authority having jurisdiction, and in this view of the matter it is the date on which the first assessment in respect of the shops in question came into effect which would be the date on which the construction of these shops shall be deemed to have been completed in view of clause (a) to Explanation (1) of Section 2(2) of the Act. Whether May or June 1973 the report of the completion of the construction is said to have been made is taken as the crucial date or 24-12-73 when the first assessment in respect of these shops in question came into effect, is taken to be the crucial date, the result is the same, namely, that in the year, 1979 when the suits were instituted 10 years had not expired from the date on which the construction of these shops shall be deemed to have been completed and the provisions of the Act were not applicable thereto. The decision of this Court in the case of O.P. Gupta (supra) has been affirmed by the Supreme Court in O.P. Gupta v. Dig Vijendrapal Gupta, 1981 All. R.C. 466 (S.C.) Nothing in that case, however, was brought to my notice which may indicate that an extract indicating the date on which the first assessment of a building comes into effect has to be ignored or would become inadmissible in evidence simply because even after admitting that a report about the completion of a building was made to the Municipal Board, copy of the said report was not produced by the landlord notwithstanding the fact that even if the admission is read as a whole it would made no difference in regard to the determination of the question as to whether the provisions of the Act applied to the said building or not. 10. It is in this view of the matter, that I am of the opinion that the impugned orders passed by the Addl. District Judge cannot he sustained. The matter can be looked from another angle also. As seen above, in his deposition, respondent No. 2 has admitted that the shops in question were constructed in the year 1971 and were let out to him in January 1972. When the shops in question were, on the own admission of respondent No. 2, constructed in 1971 it is not at all conceivable as to how 10 years had expired from the date of the construction of the shops when suits for ejectment of respondent No. 2 were filed in the year 1979. Looking from this angle also, therefore, the provisions of the Act were not applicable to the shops in question and the view taken by the Judge, Small Cause in this behalf was set aside by the Addl. Looking from this angle also, therefore, the provisions of the Act were not applicable to the shops in question and the view taken by the Judge, Small Cause in this behalf was set aside by the Addl. District Judge by committing a manifest error of law. 11. In the result, all the three writ petitions succeed and are allowed and the impugned order dated 16-2-81 passed by the V Addl. District Judge, Bareilly, respondent No. 1, in each of these three writ petitions is quashed. In the circumstances of the case, however, there shall be no order as to costs. Respondent No. 2 is granted one month's time to vacate the three shops in question.