JUDGMENT V.K. Mehrotra, J. - On the basis of recommendation made by the Secretary of the Regional Transport Authority, Bareilly on Jan. 6, 1977 the State Transport Authority in its meeting of April 27, 1977 upgraded the route known as Bisauli-Bilsrkasganj route from category 'B' to category 'A' under the U., P. Motor Vehicles (Taxation), Act. This resulted in higher incidence of road tax on the petitioners who are operators of stage carriages on that route. They, consequently, approached this - Court through present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution for relief. 2. While admitting the petition to a fuller hearing, a Division Bench of this Court directed issue of notice on the application by the petitioners for an ad- interim order. This was on Oct. 31 1977. Later, the application was rejected on Feb. 24, 1982 by one of us (Hon. R. M. Sahai, J). 3. The two principal grounds taken in the petition, are firstly, that the operators were entitled to an opportunity to put forward their version against the proposed re-classification which, admittedly, they had not been afforded and, secondly, that the order of reclassification was bad as it had been passed in breach of the provisions of R. 6 of the U. P. Motor Vehicles Taxation's Rules framed under the Act, These provisions were mandatory in character. Since the respondents failed to follow them, the order was invalid. 4. Rule 6 came up for consideration by the Supreme Court in Smt. Sheela Wanti v. State Transport Authority U.P. Lucknow (1981) 3 SCC 665 . The Supreme Court has taken the view that an operator under the rule is not entitled, as a matter of law, to hearing before re-classification of a route is made. However rule 6 was mandatory in character so that while reclassifying the route, three considerations mentioned in the various sub-rules must be kept in mind by the authority. It was found as a fact in that case that the order of the Authority did not disclose that those considerations had been kept in mind by it. The reclassification order was invalidated though the Supreme Court observed that the matter being one of public interest may be re-examined expeditiously. 5. It was found as a fact in that case that the order of the Authority did not disclose that those considerations had been kept in mind by it. The reclassification order was invalidated though the Supreme Court observed that the matter being one of public interest may be re-examined expeditiously. 5. The recommendation of the Secretary of the Regional Transport Authority which has been approved in the instant case by the State Transport Authority, upgrading the route from category B to Category A, is Annexure `1' to the writ petition. A copy of that recommendation has also been filed as Annexure 1 to a supplementary counter- affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents. A perusal of the recommendation, which has been approved without any further reasons being recorded by the State Transport Authority, shows that Secretary of the Regional Transport Authority, Bareilly made his recommendation for the upgrading of the route from category B to category A for the reasons that potential income had risen- substantially within a period of nearly ten years from the date when the classification had been made earlier, that the cost of maintenance had risen considerably during the period of ten years on account of continual rise in the cost of material and thirdly that the stage carriages were being plied on the route in public interest so that the necessity for development of the route was present. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioners urged that properly read the Order did not amount to consideration of any of the factors contained in cls. (a), (b) and (c) of R. 6. He attempted to elaborate his submission with reference to the assertions contained in the affidavits exchanged between the parties. We have not felt inclined to go into this aspect in detail for the petition can be disposed of on a short ground and the ground is that even on the recital contained in the recommendation, cl. (c) of R. 6 does not appear to have been considered at all. That clause runs as under : "6. Considerations to be applied when classifying route : When classifying routes, every controlling authority shall be guided by the following consideration in the order in which they appear in this rule, that is to say,. (a) and (b) .................... (c) the necessity for the development of the proposed route in the public interest." 7. Considerations to be applied when classifying route : When classifying routes, every controlling authority shall be guided by the following consideration in the order in which they appear in this rule, that is to say,. (a) and (b) .................... (c) the necessity for the development of the proposed route in the public interest." 7. It is obvious that when it talks of the necessity for the development of the proposed route in the public interest the clause contemplates that facts necessitating the development of a particular route under consideration must be taken into account. In the instant case, there is only a recital that there was continuous need for the development of the route as stage carriages were being plied thereon in public interest. This, in our opinion, does not amount to a consideration of the factor mentioned in cl. (c). On the recital, it is clear that the attention of the authorities was not directed towards consideration of the need for development of the particular route. It is obvious, therefore, that no consideration of this clause was made either by the recommending authority or by the State Transport Authority when it approved the proposal. In this respect, the order does not conform to law as declared by the Supreme Court and it cannot, therefore, be sustained. 8. The question then is as to what relief should be granted to the petitioners. It has rightly been urged by the learned Addl. Chief Standing Counsel that the order of reclassification, upgrading the route to class 'A', was made as far back as in the year 1977 and in the absence of any stay order, by this court, the petitioners as well as other stage carriage operators have been paying road tax on the footing that the classification of the route is 'A' class. Quashing simpliciter of this order may result in a situation that there may be claims for refund of substantial amounts paid by the petitioners over these years as road tax. In addition, it might result in other operators, who did not approach this Court, seeking refund, on the basis of this judgment of the amount of road tax paid by them during these years. In addition, it might result in other operators, who did not approach this Court, seeking refund, on the basis of this judgment of the amount of road tax paid by them during these years. These are the considerations which cannot be overlooked by us while granting relief in favour of the petitioners After giving anxious thought to the question of relief we have come to the conclusion that without affecting adversely the petitioners' right to payment of tax, on the footing that the reclassification of the route was not made in accordance with law, for the period subsequent to the decision of this case, namely, from hereafter, we may ensure status quo in respect of the tax already paid by the petitioners and other stage carriage operators on the route for the period between the reclassification made by the impugned order and the date of the decision of the present petition. We, therefore, hold that the reclassification of the route into class 'A' was not in accordance with law. It shall cease to be effective hereafter until the appropriate authority reconsiders the question in accordance with law and passes suitable orders. 9. We quash the order of reclassification of the route. We make it clear that on the basis of this judgment neither the petitioners nor other stage carriage operators will be entitled to claim refund of the amount paid by them so far as road tax on the footing that the route is class 'A' route. Of course, it would be open to the respondents to reconsider the matter in accordance with law as expeditiously as they choose. 10. The petition stands allowed in the at& cs,dd terms. The petitioners shall be entitled to their costs.