ORDER.- The Executive Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Trichur, had passed a conditional order dated 28th March, 1979, under section 133 (1)(d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, directing respondents 1 to 3 to cut and remove three poola trees and one jack tree standing on the northern boundary of the petitioners’ compound dangerously situated and liable to fall on the house of the petitioners. That order was passed on the basis of the reports submitted by the Tahsildar, Trichur and Sub-Inspector of Police, Trichur, Town West and directed the respondents to cut and remove the said trees on receipt of the order and also called upon them to show cause why that order should not be enforced and made absolute. 2. The respondents filed their objections in answer to the preliminary order, inter alia contending that this is civil dispute and not a public nuisance, in relation to which alone, the power under section 133 of the Criminal Procedure Code should be exercised. During the course of the proceedings, the respondents herein filed a revision petition before the Court of Sessions, Trichur under section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and also obtained an order of stay against the conditional order. The petitioners, who raised a preliminary objection before the Court of Session submitted that in view of section 397 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the petition would not lie against the interlocutory and conditional order under section 133 of the Code. Sessions Court dismissed this objection for the reason that if on acceptance of the objection, the proceedings would have ended the order rejecting that objection would be revisable under section 133 of the Code since that would be a final order and not an interlocutory order. The Court of Session therefore directed that the revision petition might be taken on file and numbered. The petitioners have come up in revision against that order of the Sessions Court. 3. The Counsel for the petitioners reiterated that no revision could have been entertained against an interlocutory order passed under section 133 of the Code, directing the respondents to show cause on a specified date. It is submitted that the respondents could raise their objections in answer to the order directing cause to be shown, if they would not comply with the direction contained in the order. It is submitted that the respondents could raise their objections in answer to the order directing cause to be shown, if they would not comply with the direction contained in the order. It is submitted that the order enabling the party to show cause cannot be treated as a final order for the only reason that if the objection which they propose to take were to be upheld, there would have a finality in the proceedings. 4. Counsel for the petitioners placed reliance on the decisions reported in Amar Nath v. State of Haryana1; Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra2 and V.C. Shukla v. State3. It is decided in all these cases that revision petition would lie against certain types of interlocutory orders. In Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra2 it is observed: “It appears to us that the real intention of the legislature was rot to equate the expression “interlocutory order” as invariably being coverse of the words “final Order”. There may be an order passed during the course of a proceeding which may not be final in the sense noticed in Kuppuswami's case4, but yet it may not be an interlocatory order — pure or simple. Some kinds of orders may fall in between the two. By a rule of harmonious construction, we think that the bar in sub- section (2) of section 397 is not meant to be attracted to such kinds of intermediate orders. They may not be final orders and for the purposes of Article 134 of the Constitution, yet it would not be correct to characterise them as merely interlocutory orders within the meaning of section 397 (2). it is neither advisable, nor possible, to make a catalogue of orders to demonstrate which kinds of orders would be merely, purely or simply interlocutory and which kinds of orders would be final, and then to prepare an exhaustive list of those types of orders which will fall in between the two. The first two kinds are well known and can be called out from many decided cases We may, however, indicate that the type of order with which we are concerned in this case, even though it may not be final in one sense, is surely not interlocutory so as to attract the bar of sub- section (2) of section 397. The first two kinds are well known and can be called out from many decided cases We may, however, indicate that the type of order with which we are concerned in this case, even though it may not be final in one sense, is surely not interlocutory so as to attract the bar of sub- section (2) of section 397. In our opinion it must be taken to be an order of the type falling in the middle course.” It was further held: “Yet for the reasons already alluded to, we feel no difficulty in coming to the conclusion, after due consideration, that an order rejecting the plea of the accused on a point which, when accepted, will conclude the particular proceeding, will surely be not an interlocutory order within the meaning of section 397 (2).” In V.C. Shukla v. State1, also it was held that: “We might reiterate here even at the risk of repetition that the term ‘interlocutory order’ used in the Code of Criminal Procedure, has to be given a very liberal construction in favour of the accused in order to ensure complete fairness of the trial because the bar contained in section 397 (3) of the Code, would apply to a variety of cases coming up before the Courts not only being offences under the Penal Code, but under numerous Acts. If, therefore, the right of revision was to be barred, the provision containing the bar must be confined within the Court corners of the spirit and the letter of the law. In other words, the revisional power of the High Court or the Sessions Judge could be attracted if the order was not purely interlocutory but intermediate or quasi-final.” In his separate, but concurrent opinion, Desai, J., held that “Till this situation is reached, a number of orders may have to be made, during the progress of adjudication of main dispute, such order can appropriately and legally be styled as “interlocutory orders”. In the decision reported in Raj Kapoor v. State2 Krishna Iyer, J., while considering the same question with reference to the decision reported in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra3 observed: “The policy of the law is clear that interlocutory orders, pure and simple, should not be taken up to the High Court resulting in unnecessary litigation and delay. In the decision reported in Raj Kapoor v. State2 Krishna Iyer, J., while considering the same question with reference to the decision reported in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra3 observed: “The policy of the law is clear that interlocutory orders, pure and simple, should not be taken up to the High Court resulting in unnecessary litigation and delay. At the other extreme, final orders are clearly capable of being considered in exercise of inherent power, if glaring injustice stares the Court in the face. In between is a teritum quid, as Untwalia, J., has pointed out as for example, where it is more than a purely interlocutory order and less than a final disposal.” It was assumed that revision may lie against such an order and the inherent power of the Court under section 482 would be available to safeguard the interests of justice at the instance of the person complaining of harassment by abuse of the process of Court. 5. The decisions referred to above indicate that from interlocutory orders, pure and simple, no revision could be entertained. They also seem to suggest that from intermediate orders which is a category of orders in between interlocutory orders on the one hand and final orders on the other, revisions could be entertained. An order “rejecting the plea of the accused on a point which, if accepted will conclude the proceeding”, has been held to be an intermediate order which “will surely not be an interlocutory order within the meaning of section 397 (2) of the Code. The Counsel for the respondent submits that an order under section 133 in the instant case was such an intermediate order and hence the Sessions Court was correct in entertaining the revision. To accept this submission I should hold that all orders against which any preliminary objection could be taken are intermediate orders. This will render nugatory the provisions of section 133 of the Code, where under a party is enabled to show cause against a preliminary order. In showing cause, an opposite party can as well say that the proceedings are devoid of jurisdiction in the sense that the matter relates to a private dispute and not a public right. If such an objection is taken as part of the cause shown by an opposite party the Magistrate before whom that objection is taken cannot but decide that question. If such an objection is taken as part of the cause shown by an opposite party the Magistrate before whom that objection is taken cannot but decide that question. If the decision goes against the opposite party, he may seek to revise it by I invoking the revisional jurisdiction under section 397 (i) of the Criminal Procedure Code. None of the decisions have laid down the proposition that mere possibility of a preliminary objection to an order would transform that order from an interlocutory to an intermediate order amenable to correction under section 397 of the Code, notwithstanding the bar under sub- section (2) thereof. I still understand the observations in the above decisions only to mean that an order on a preliminary objection which if considered favourably would terminate the proceedings, would be amenable to revision notwithstanding the fact that order does not in fact qualify as a final order. Any other understanding of the decisions of the Supreme Court would have the effect of practically nullifying section 397 (2) of the Code. The purport of the Supreme Court decisions, according to me, is that even orders on preliminary objections during interim stages of the proceedings would be revisable, if the objections are such as would terminate the proceedings, if accepted. This according to me, obliges and does not obviate, the preliminary objection being taken before the Magistrate himself, acceptance of which would terminate the proceedings by an order, which being a final order, will be revisable at the instance of one party and rejection of which by an order which is neither interlocutory nor final, will also be revisable at the instance of the other party, notwithstanding the bar contained in section 397 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This seems to me to be the reasonable approach which should commend itself for acceptance, rather than the approach made by the Sessions Court that whether objections were taken or not, the mere possibility of such objection should render the preliminary order itself amenable to revision under section 397 of the Code. The only order liable to be revised in this case would therefore be either an order upholding the objection raised by the opposite party or an order rejecting the objections. The only order liable to be revised in this case would therefore be either an order upholding the objection raised by the opposite party or an order rejecting the objections. The preliminary conditional order does not cease to be one such, and therefore revisable only because the respondents had filed objections including those to the jurisdiction or competence of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate to act under section 133 of the Code. The revision, if at all, would be not against the preliminary order, but only against a subsequent order either accepting or rejecting the objections. That order may be an intermediate and not interlocutory order. But the order under section 133 is only an interlocutory order, pure and simple. In this view of the matter, the order of the Sessions Court has to be set aside. 6. This course has the merit of expediting the proceedings, without in the least causing any prejudice to the parties or affecting the interests of justice. The preliminary order against which cause has already been shown cannot be effective until after the inquiry is over. 7. The revision petition is therefore allowed and the order of the Court of Session, Trichur in Crl.R.P. No. 19 of1980 is set aside. The proceedings before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate will continue. The respondents can, if so advised, move for orders on their preliminary objections, so that the proceedings may be terminated expeditiously. M.C.M. ----- Revision petition allowed.