K.S. LODHA, J.—These two appeals can conveniently be disposed of together by a single order/judgment. Civil Misc Appeal No. 121 of 1981 is directed against the order of the learned Additional District Judge, Sriganga-nagar, dated 18 8.81 by which the appellants application for setting aside exparte decree has been rejected. First Appeal No. 65 of 81 is against the ex-parte decree itself. 2. The plaintiffs Suratgarh Cotton Cinning and Pressing Factory had filed a suit against the Rajasthan State Electricty Board for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 13389.42 alleged to have been recovered by the Rajasthan State Electricity Board in excess of the electricity charges actually due. This suit was originally filed in the court of the learned District Judge, Sriganganagar. Summonses were issued to the defendant No. 1 Raj. State Electricity Board and No. 2 the Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Electricity Board, Hanuman-garh. The date fixed for hearing was 3.2.80. The case was however transferred to the court of learned Additional District Judge, Sri Ganganagar and it was taken up by the learned Additional District Judge on 3.12.80. It was found that the summons on defendant No.l had been served but nobody appeared on behalf of the defendant No.l. Defendant No. 2 was not served. As the presiding officer of that court was on leave, the case was adjourned to 8.1.81. On 8.1.81, it was found that defendant No.2 had also been served but none of the defendants appeared before that court on that day and, therefore, exparte proceedings were ordered against them. The case was then adjourned to 18.2.81 for the plaintiffs evedence. On that day, the plaintiffs evidence was recorded and arguments wrie heard and on 20.2.81, the suit was decreed exparte against both the defendants The defendants thereupon moved an application for setting aside the exparte decree on 29 6.81. Their case was that they appeared in the premises of the District Court on 3.12.80 but the case was not called by that court on that day and, therefore, they remained under the impression that summons had wrongly been sent to them. The cause of this impression was mat the same plaintiffs had already filed another suit against these defendants before the Court of the Munsif, Sriganganagar, and it was pending. The cause of this impression was mat the same plaintiffs had already filed another suit against these defendants before the Court of the Munsif, Sriganganagar, and it was pending. Their case further was that they had no knowledge that the suit has been transferred to the court of learned Additional District Judge, Sriganganagar, nor did they receive any notice either before or after the transfer and, therefore, they could not appear before the learned Additional District Judge. Sriganganagar. It was further stated that it was only on 28th or 29th May, 1981 that the Officer-in charge of the defendant No.l came to know through Shri Satish Chandra Jain, Advocate, that the suit had already been decreed exparte against the defendants. Thereupon, further particulars about the case were gathered and the application for setting aside the exparte decree was filed on 29.6.81. An affidavit of Shri Suraj Bhan, Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Electricity Board, Hanumangarh, was also filed in support of the application. The application was opposed on behalf of the plaintiff and after hearing the parties, the learned Additional District Judge, Sriganganagar, rejected the application by his order dated 18.8.81 on the ground that the application was barred by time, since the limitation started running from the date of the decree and not from the date of the knowledge. It is against this order that the miscellaneous appeal has been tiled. The defendants have also challenged the exparte decree on merits by way of regular first appeal. 3. It will be proper to first consider the miscellaneous appeal, because, if that appeal succeeds, the regular appeal automatically succeeds because the decree would already stand set aside. If, however, the miscellaneous appeal fails, then of course, the regular appeal will have to be considered on merits. 4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record. The learned counsel for the appellants has urged that even if it is held that the limitation for filing the application under O.IX r. 13. C P.C., for setting aside the ex-parte decree started running from the date of the decree, the learned Additional District Judge ought to have examined the matter from the point of view whether there was any sufficient cause for the delay in filing the application. C P.C., for setting aside the ex-parte decree started running from the date of the decree, the learned Additional District Judge ought to have examined the matter from the point of view whether there was any sufficient cause for the delay in filing the application. He further contended that although an application under Section 5, Limitation Act, had not been moved, but all the facts explaining the delay had been stated in the application under O.IX r.13, C.P.C. itself and an affidavit in support of this application had been filed and, therefore, it was not only open to the learned Additional District Judge to consider the sufficiency of the cause for delay, rather it was his duty to have considered it. He also contended that since the appellants were bonafidely under the impression that the original summons received by them were by mistake and that those summons related to the earlier suit pending before the learned Munsif, and also because they did not receive any notice from the Additional District Judge, Sriganganagar, after the transfer of the case to that court, they did not make any further enquiries in respect of the summons and in these circumstances, there was sufficient cause for them for not having appeared before the learned Additional District Judge. In the alternative, it was also urged by him that even if the appellants are found to be guilty of some sort of negligence, that negligence should not entail the passing of an ex-parte decree against them and the opposite party can properly be compensated by awarding costs. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent supported the order of the court below and also urged that when there was no application under Section 5, Limitation Act, nor had a prayer been made for condoning the delay even orally before the court below, there was no question of condonation of the delay. He also brought it to my notice that even in the memo of appeal before this Court, no prayer for condonation of delay in filing the application under O.IX r.13 C.P.C., has been made. 5. I have given my anxious consideration to the rival contentions. 6. He also brought it to my notice that even in the memo of appeal before this Court, no prayer for condonation of delay in filing the application under O.IX r.13 C.P.C., has been made. 5. I have given my anxious consideration to the rival contentions. 6. The finding of the learned Additional District Judge that the application under O.IX r. 13, C.P.C , is barred by limitation is based on two decisions of this Court, namely, Badri Narayan Sharma vs. Panchayat Samiti, Dhariawad (1) and Deepchand vs Nandirara Sindhi (2). The ratio decidendi of these two cases is that where the first summons of the suit have been properly served on the defendants and they do not appear and an ex-parte decree is passed against them, then the limitation for filing an application for setting aside ex-parte decree would start running from the date of the decree and not from the date of know-ledge notwithstanding the fact that in the meantime the case has been transferred to some other court. The learned counsel for the appellant has not challenged this ratio decidendi and as at present advised, I also do not feel called upon to consider the correctness of this view because all that has been urged before me in the present case is that the court below should have considered the question of condoning the delay in filing the application. I shall, therefore, advert only to that aspect of the matter but before I come to it, a reference to some of the observations made in these two authorities will be necessary. In Badri Narayans case (suora), Honble Shri Jagat Naravan. C.J. while holding that the limitation shall start, for an application under O.IX r. 13, C P.C., from the date of the decree when the summons in the suit had properly been served upon the defendant, had remanded the matter to the court below because the learned counsel for the defendant wanted to move an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It is, therefore, clear that according to that decision also, the question of condonation of delay in filing the application was open to consideration. It is, therefore, clear that according to that decision also, the question of condonation of delay in filing the application was open to consideration. It may further be observed that in that case, reference was made to an earlier decision of this Court in Magraj vs. Harnarain (3), wherein it was observed, - "Where the appellant had no notice of the date of hearing the dismissal of the appeal for default is not an order passed under O 41. r. 17 and, therefore, the provisions of 0.41, r.19 or Art. 168, Limitation Act, does not come into play, and the restoration of the appeal can be done in exercise of the powers under sec. 151 of the Code." The learned Judge, however, did not agree with the view and observed that he was unable to subscribe to the view taken in this decision on account of overwhelming authorities to the contrary. It may be pointed out that the authorities referred to in Badri Narayans case (supra) only deal with the question of the starting point of limitation for an application under 0,IX r 13, C.P.C. but not with an application for setting aside an ex-parte order or decree under the inherent powers of the Court. The ex-parte order or ex-parte decree presupposes that the defendant failed to appear despite due notice and if the notice itself was not at all served, the ex-parte order or decree itself would be on account of the mistake of the Court and, therefore, it is the duty of the Court to correct its own mistake because nobody should be allowed to suffer on account is of the mistake of the Court. This aspect of the matter does not appear to have been considered in Badri Narayans case (supra). As already stated above, in the present case, I am not required to go into the correctness of this decision and, therefore, even though I do not subscribe to the view taken in Badri Narayans case and am in agreement with the view taken in Magrajs case (supra), I do not find it necessary to refer the matter to a larger Bench. 7. 7. In Deepchands case (supra), the same Honble Judge observed, - "The reasoning given by the learned Additional Munsif was that notice should have been served on the defendant before proceeding with the hearing of the case by the Additional Munsif No.3, Kota, after the case had been transferred to his court. This argument is erroneous in my opinion. Once the summons of the suit is served on the defendant it is his duty to find out to which court the case has been transferred on administrative ground and what date has been fixed in it." With great respect to the learned Judge, this view does not command itself to me and appears to be erroneous on the face of it. The learned Judge formed this view for the reason stated by him in para 7 of the same judgment which reads. - "It was held in Devichand vs. Rikhabchand (4) that "where the High Court transfers a proceeding on its own motion, it is not necessary for the High Court to give notice to the parties." The same is applicable to an order of transfer passed by the District Judge on administrative grounds." 8. It may be stated that Devichands case (supra) did not relate to a notice to the parties after the transfer. It was a case on the question whether a notice to the parties is necessary before ordering of transfer of a case from one court to another on administrative grounds. Reference in this connection may be made to para 4 of the decision on Devichands case (Supra). It was observed therein, - "...... Where the High Court transfers a proceeding on its own motion, it is not necessary for the High Court to give notice to parties. Transfer may be ordered on the application of a party. In such a case, notice is issued, parties are heard, and an order is passed. Secondly, a transfer may be ordered by the District Judge, or the High Court on its own motion. In such a case no notice to any party is required, and the transfer is generally for administrative reasons......." It would thus be clear that the notice referred to in this judgment was a notice before the order of transfer is made and not a notice of the bearing of the suit by the transferee court after the transfer has already been ordered. 9. 9. Now I may come to the question of the condonation of the delay, assuming that the application under O.IX, r.13 C.P.C., was barred by time from the date of the decree. It may at once be stated that in Firm Kaura Mal Bishan Dass vs. Firm Mathra Dass Atma Ram (5), Honble LB. Dua, J. as he then was, observed, - "The discretion under S.5 of Limitation Act has to be a judicial discretion and not an arbitrary one. Merely because there was no written application filed by the appellant is hardly a sufficient ground for refusing him the relief, if he is otherwise entitled to it. Procedure is meant for advancing and not for obstructing the cause of justice; and if the entire material is on the record, it cannot promote the ends of justice, if that material is ignoerd and the relief refused to the appellant, merely because he had not claimed it by means of a formal application in writing or that a formal affidavit was not filed. The language of S.5 also does not provide that an application in writing must be filed before relief under the said provision can be granted." I am in respectful agreement with this view and the learned counsel for the respondent has also not challenged it. 10. Now, in this case, of course, an application under S.5, Limitation Act was not filed and probably a request was also not made even orally to examine the delay but on the above view, this could not debar the appellant from the benefit of the provisions of s. 5 of the Limitation Act, if they are really entitled to it and all the facts and circumstances necessary for the exercise of the discretion under S.5, Limitation Act, are available on the record. The appellants-had stated in their application under O.IX, r. 13 C.P.C., two grounds for their non-appearance before the decree was passed in the court of the learned Additional District Judge. The first ground was their confusion on account of the other suit by the plaintiff being pending before the learned Munsif and the second was that they had not received any notice from the court of the learned Additional District Judge after the transfer of the case to that Court and, therefore, they did not come to know of the pendency of the suit before that court. Apart from this, it was their case further that it was only on 28th or 29th May, 1981, that they come to know of the ex-parte decree having been passed against them and they promptly took steps to find out the particulars of the decree and then to make an application for setting aside the same. Thus, it would be clear that they have shown reasons for not filing the application within time. The question, therefore is, whether this amounted to sufficient cause ? The general practice in the courts is that even if a case is transferred on administrative grounds, the parties are informed of this transfer and the date of hearing before the transferee court. This information is either given by the court from which the case is transferred or by the transferee court. There are authorities of various High Courts taking the view that such a notice is necessary. Reference in this connection may be made to Ram Mukul Pathak v. Besho Prasad Singh (6), and Hira Lal vs. State of Bihar (7). It has further been held by these courts that the absence of notice of such a transfer amounts to a good cause for not appearing before the transferee court. The Patna High Court has gone to the extent of holding in Hira Lal case (supra)— " I would also reiterate the principle laid down by the Special Bench that in all cases of transfer made by Court suo motu it is always desirable that notice of the transfer must be given to the parties or their lawyers. In that view of the matter I hold that the parties had good excuse for not appearing before the transferee-Court at Pasaram. This alone could be regarded as a sufficient cause within the meaning of rule 9 of Order 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure—" I am in respectful agreement with these views. As a matter of fact, it is a principle of natural justice that the parties must be given a proper opportunity . of hearing before their cause is decided. For such a hearing, it necessarily follows that they must have notice of the fact as to in which court the matter is pending and on what date it would be heard. of hearing before their cause is decided. For such a hearing, it necessarily follows that they must have notice of the fact as to in which court the matter is pending and on what date it would be heard. When a case is transferred from one court to another, a party need not be and cannot be expected to search for it and find out for itself as to where the case has travelled. It is for the court to inform the parties of the transfer and if such information is lacking, the party cannot be blamed for negligence or inaction. Of course, a prudent and very careful litigant may keep a trace of his case and may try to find out where it has been transferred but if he fails to do so. he cannot be held guilty of gross negligence or inaction. At the most, he can be held responsible for mass negligence, but this so called some negligence need not necessarily entail either the dismissal of the suit or the culmination of the proceedings in an ex-parte decree. It has been observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Bihar State Electricity Board vs. Bhowra Kankanee Collieries Ltd. (8)— "Undoubtedly, there is some negligence but when a substantive matter is dismissed on the ground of failure to comply with procedural directions, there is always some blement of negligence involved in it because a vigilant litigant would not miss complying with procedural direction on such a simple one as filing Vikalatnama." Their Lordships had also observed in the earlier part of the judgment,— "In our opinion, this is not a matter which should have been dealt with in a highly technical manner as has been done by the High Court." In the course of the judgment, their Lordships pointed out that there were some peremptory orders at some stages of the litigation and on account of some negligence the party failed to carry out those directions. 11. 11. From the facts stated above, it does appear that in this case, the present appellants did not receive any notice from the transferee court, they remained under the impression that either the original summons sent to them by the Court of the District Judge, Sri Ganganagar was wrongly sent or that if there was any case pending before that court, it was not for hearing on 3-12-80 and, therefore, if there was any further hearing in that suit either before that court or any other court, they would receive fresh notices and this impression cannot be said to be altogether unfounded. Of course, as already stated above, as a very vigilant litigant, the appellants could have made enquiries and found out as to the whereabouts of the case, but if they did not do so, they cannot be held guilty of gross negligence or inaction. In these circumstances, the ex-parte decree passed against them could not have been maintained merely on the ground that the application for setting aside the decree was barred by time without considering this aspect of the matter whether there was sufficient cause for the appellants for not filing the application in time. I am satisfied that there was sufficient cause for that and all that can be said against them is that they did not show that much of vigilance which should have been expected of a very vigilant litigant and, therefore they can, at the most, be held guilty of some negligence. The inconvenience caused to the plaintiffs for this negligence pan adequately be compensated by payment of costs. I am, therefore, further clearly of the opinion that the learned Additional District Judge was wrong in dismissing the application under O, IX, r. 13, C P.C. 12. Relying upon Radhey Shyant vs. Mst. Lalli (9), the learned counsel urged that in any case, the defendants were required to establish sufficient cause for non-appearance on the day the decree was passed against them. In my opinion, this contention is misconceived in the facts and circumstances of this case. When it has been found that the defendants had no notice of the case being pending before the learned Additional District Judge, Sri Ganganagar, and therefore they could not appear before that court, it clearly means that they could not have appeared even on the date the ex-parte decree was passed. 13. When it has been found that the defendants had no notice of the case being pending before the learned Additional District Judge, Sri Ganganagar, and therefore they could not appear before that court, it clearly means that they could not have appeared even on the date the ex-parte decree was passed. 13. For the reasons stated above, I accept this miscellaneous appeal and set aside the order of the learned Additional District Judge, Sri Ganganagar, dated 18-8-81, accept the application under O. IX, r. 13.C.P.C, and set aside the ex-parte decree dated 20-2-81, in civil suit No. 28 of 1980, subject to the payment of Rs, 500/- (rupees five hundred) only as costs to the plaintiff. 14. As a result of this appeal being allowed on the above condition, the first appeal No. 65 of 1981, automatically stands accepted because the decree under appeal stands set aside. In the circumstances of the case, there would be no order as to costs of this appeal. 15. The parties are directed to appear before the learned Additional District Judge, Sri Ganganagar, on 1-9-83.