JUDGMENT 1. - This is a wife's appeal against the judgment of the learned District Judge, Bhilwara, dated 30-4-82 by which her application under section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act (hereinafter referred to as the to as the 'Act;) has been dismissed. 2. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that the parties were married according to the Hindu rites & customs at Bhilwara in May, 1974. Thereafter they lived together at Ajmer. The petitioner gave birth to a son, who was about 31/2 years old on the date to the petition i. e. 23-3-81. The case of the petitioner is that after the birth of that son, the non-petitioner Sitaram left the petitioner at her father's house at Bhilwara and thereafter never took her back or called her back and has thus withdrawn from her society without any reasonable excuse. Her case further was that she and her relations had requested the non-petitioner to take her back but he did not care. She, therefore, prayed for a decree for restitution of Conjugal rights. The application was contested by the non-petitioner Sita Ram on the ground that the son was conceived by the petitioner Laxmi Devi from a person other than the non-petitioner Sita Ram and that Smt. Laxmi Devi was guilty of adultery and, therefore, he had sent her away to her father's house and did not want to take her back. The non-petitioner had stated further in the additional pleas that it was on 6-1-76 that the non-petitioner had gone to Bhilwara with her brother and thereafter she returned to Ajmer on 15-8-76, and during all this time, the non-petitioner did not have any sexual-intercourse with the petitioner. However, within six months of her coming back to Ajmer on 15-8-76. She delivered a son. After framing the necessary issues and taking the evidence of the parties, the learned District Judge was of the view that the non-petitioner had been able to establish that the petitioner was guilty of adultery and that she had conceived from a person other than the non-petitioner and, therefore, there was reason- able cause for the non-petitioner to withdraw from the society of the petitioner. He, therefore dismissed the petitioner's application under section 9 of the Act. The petitioner has, therefore, come up in appeal. 3. I have heard the learned Counsel for the appellant. He, therefore dismissed the petitioner's application under section 9 of the Act. The petitioner has, therefore, come up in appeal. 3. I have heard the learned Counsel for the appellant. The respondent has not cared to appear despite service of notice. 4. The learned counsel for the appellant strenuously urged that the learned District Judge was wrong in holding that the petitioner-appellant appeared to have conceived from a person other than the non-petitioner and on that count in holding that there was sufficient cause for the non-petitioner to withdraw from her society. He urged that even under section 112 of the Evidence Act, there was a presumption of legitimacy of the child in the circumstances of this case and that presumption cannot to said to have been rebutted. I have given my careful consideration to these contentions. It may at once be stated that section 9 of the Act has undergone a very significant chance inasmuch as by Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976, sub- Sec. (2) of section 9 has been omitted. This sub-section (2) which provided "Nothing shall be pleaded in answer to a petition for restitution of conjugal right s which shall not be a ground for divorce". This omission of sub- section (2) of Section 9 is not without purpose or significance. The rigour of sub-section (2) has been done away with and now it is permissible for the party resisting restitution of conjugal rights to satisfy the court that restitution should not be granted on grounds, which may otherwise be reason- able though they may not satisfy the test prescribed by the existing sub- section (2) of section 9. The burden to prove that there has been reasonable excuse for withdrawal from the society has now been placed upon the party withdrawing from the society by adding an explanation to section 9. Therefore, now as section 9 stands, it is only to be seen whether in the facts and circumstances of each particular case, the party withdrawing from the society of the other spouse has been able to show that there was reasonable cause for his doing so. He need not establish any of the grounds which may have enabled that party to obtain a decree of judicial separation, nullity of marriage or divorce. He need not establish any of the grounds which may have enabled that party to obtain a decree of judicial separation, nullity of marriage or divorce. We have, therefore, to examine this case from this point of view and to find out whether the learned District Judge was right in dismissing the appellants petition under section 9 of the Act. 5. As already stated above, the facts that the non-petitioner has not been calling back the petitioner about since 1977 and that the petitioner has been living at Bhilwara for all this time, are not in dispute. As a matter of fact the non-petitioner himself has admitted that he had sent her away and had no intention to call her back and the reason put forward for this was the infidelity of the petitioner-appellant as he suspected that she had conceived from a person other than the non-petitioner. Therefore, all that we have to examine is whether the non-petitioner has been able to establish the reasonable excuse put forward by him. At the cost of repetition, I may state that in order to establish the reasonable excuse, the non-petitioner is now not required nor expected to prove the adultery alleged by him to the hilt as otherwise, he would have been required to prove had sub-section (2) of section 9 of the Act continued to be on the statute. 6. It is admitted by the petitioner herself that she had been sent or brought back to Bhilwara to her father's place after the birth of the son. It is most unusual in the present day Hindu society to send away to her parents place with the intention not to call her back, a wife who has given birth to a son. Then there is the statement of the non-petitioner and his father stating the reason for this conduct. They have stated that as it was found that she had given birth to a child within six months of her coming back to her husband's place although her husband had no access to her at the time when that child must have been conceived. They were satisfied that she had conceived from a person other than the non-petitioner Sita Ram. They were satisfied that she had conceived from a person other than the non-petitioner Sita Ram. Then the father of the non-petitioner Shri Moolchand P. W. 2 has further stated that he had talked to the petitioner in this respect and in response to the quarries made by him, the petitioner had admitted that she had committed a mistake a person who was her 'Dharam Bhai' had deceived her and had intercourse with her and as a result of which, she had conceived. This statement of Shri Moolchand stands corroborated from the material evidence in the from of some letters. The petitioner's father's elder brother Madan Lal had written Ex. A3 and A4 to Shri Moolchand. Those letters clearly contain a reference to the misconduct of the petitioner-appellant in a very guarded manner but when read in context with the evidence of the non-petitioner Sita Ram and his father Shri Moolchand the reference to the misconduct clearly appears to be the adulterous intercourse, which gave rise to the birth of the son by the petitioner. In Ex. A3, Shri Madan Lal had mentioned."Then in Ex.A4, Shri Madan Lal had implored Moolchand's wife in the following terms."Not only this, this evidence is further corroborated by the two letters written by the petitioner herself, one to the non-petitioner and the other to his father. In Ex. Al dated 20-7-76 addressed to her husband, she had referred to some letter by his younger brother and objected to the contents of that letter. Of course, it is not clearly mentioned what the contents of the letter written by the non-petitioner's brother were but this would be clear from the letter Ex. A2 dated 20-7-76 written by the petitioner to her father-in law. In this letter also, she had referred to his letter and had objected to its contents by saying.Reading of these two letters together, leave no room for doubt that the petitioner' s husband and in-laws were accusing her for having illicit relations with her so-called "Dharm-Bhai." In these circumstances, the confession made by the petitioner to her father-in-law is of great significance and in the facts and circumstances of the case, the evidence of the father-in-law cannot be discarded merely on account of the fact that he is the father of the non-petitioner husband. Thus it clearly appears that there were reasonable grounds for the non-petitioner to suspect the infidelity of the petitioner wife and to have withdrawn from her society. In these circumstances, the presumption under section 1 12 of the Evidence Act may or may not be applicable but for the purpose of section 9 of the Act as it stands now after amendment, the husband would be justified in withdrawing from the society of his wife, he has seasonable ground to suspect the infidelity of he wife and it would amount to a reasonable excuse. In this view of this matter, I need not further discuss the evidence at any length and I would only content myself by observing that I fully agree with the appreciation of the evidence made by the learned District Judge. 7. I, therefore, find no reason to interfere with the order passed by the learned District Judge. The appeal, therefore, has no force and is hereby dismissed. As the non-petitioner has not appeared, I shall make no order as to costs.Appeal dismissed. *******