JUDGMENT N. D. Ojha, J. - One R. N. Zutshi was tenant of house No. 57, Lukerganj Allahabad. He was a bachelor and died intestate on 25th March, 1980. Thereafter an application was made by Shyamal Kishore Bhagat, respondent No. 2, for allotment of the aforesaid house in his favour. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer to whom the aforesaid application was made deputed the Inspector of his department to make an inquiry who inspected the house and submitted a report. He found the petitioner Miss Nirmala Handoo in occupation of the house in question. 2. Subsequently the Rent Control and Eviction Officer issued a notice to the petitioner who filed an affidavit asserting that she was the daughter of the sister of late R. N. Zutshi, that her mother died in 1936 when she was about 10 years of age, that late R. N. Zutshi brought her with him, that ever since she had been living with him and received her education at Allahabad and that the tenancy rights of 1ate R. N. Zutshi on his (lying as a bachelor and intestate on 25th March, 1980, devolved on her. According to her she was in occupation of the accommodation in question since the year 1936 along with Tate R. N. Zutshi being his sister's daughter and after the death of R. N. Zutshi she was occupying the same as a tenant having inherited the tenancy rights Reliance in support of her case was placed by the petitioner on Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act read with its Schedule XXXX. According to her she being the sister's daughter of late R. N. Zutshi in his heir under the category of class (ii) heirs mentioned in the said schedule. 3. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer by order dated 10th February, 1981, held that deemed vacancy had occurred in respect of the house in question in view of section 12(1)(b) of U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) which contemplates that a landlord or tenant of a building shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building or a part thereof if he has allowed it to be occupied by any person who is not a member of his family. The term "family" stands defined in Section 2(g) of the Act and does not include a sister's daughter. The term "family" stands defined in Section 2(g) of the Act and does not include a sister's daughter. The petitioner filed an application for review before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer inter alia asserting that even on the facts found by him he had no jurisdiction to declare vacancy in respect of the house in question and that consequently the order dated 10th February, 1981, may be reviewed. This application was, however, dismissed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer by his order dated 26th June, 1981. 4. Aggrieved the petitioner has instituted this writ petition with a prayer for the issue of a writ of prohibition directing respondent No. 1 not to proceed further in the case relating to the house in question. She has also made a prayer for the issue of a writ of certiorari quashing the order dated 10th February, 1981 and 26th June, 1981, referred to above. 5. It has been urged by counsel for the petitioner that even on the facts found by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer he had no jurisdiction to declare that deemed vacancy had occurred in respect of the house in question under Section 12(l)(b) of the Act and his insistence to proceed further is contrary to the statutory provisions contained in this behalf in Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act read with the schedule thereto According to counsel for the petitioner, in this view of the matter, it was a lit case for the issue of a writ of prohibition as prayed for. It was also urged by counsel for the petitioner that since the impugned orders were without jurisdiction they also deserved to he quashed by a writ of certiorari. 6. During the pendency of the writ petition an application was made by S. K. Mushran for impleadment as a respondent in the writ petition on the ground that he was one of the owners of house No. 57 Loker Ganj, Allahahad. This application was allowed and he has been directed to be impleaded as respondent No. 3. A counter affidavit had already been filed by Shyamal Kishore Bhagat respondent No. 2 at whose instance the proceedings for declaration of vacancy of the house in question were entitled and another counter-affidavit has been filed today by S. K. Mushran, the newly added respondent No. 3. 7. A counter affidavit had already been filed by Shyamal Kishore Bhagat respondent No. 2 at whose instance the proceedings for declaration of vacancy of the house in question were entitled and another counter-affidavit has been filed today by S. K. Mushran, the newly added respondent No. 3. 7. Counsel for respondents 2 and 3 have on the other hand urged that the writ petition was premature both in regard to the issue of a writ of prohibition as well as certiorari. According to them the proper course for the petitioner is to wait till an order either for allotment or for release of the house in question is passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and to file a revision against that order thereafter under Section 18 of the Act and to raise the plea which has been raised in the present writ petition in the said revision. Reliance in support of this submission has been placed by counsel for respondents 2 and 3 on the decision of the Supreme Court in M/s. Trilok Singh and Co. v. District Magistrate Lucknow, AIR 1976 Supreme Court 1988. 8. In regard to this submission made by counsel for respondents 2 and 3 it has been urged by counsel for the petitioner that the decision in the case of M/s. Trilok Singh and Co. was rendered by the Supreme Court at a point of time when there was no provision for grant of a hearing to the landlord or the tenant before declaring vacancy but when subsequently a proviso was added to Section 16(1) of the Act whereby such an opportunity is to be given the decision in the case of M/s. Trilok Singh anil Co. (supra) was no longer an authority for the proposition that a writ petition against an order declaring vacancy would be premature. So far as this submission is concerned I find it difficult to accept the same in view of the decision of a Division Bench of this court in Hari Strarup v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, A1lahabad, 1982 All. R.C. 809 where it has been held that the case of M/s. Trilok Jingh and Co. is clearly applicable even after the aforesaid amendment made in 1976 whereby the proviso was added to Section 16(l) of the Act and a writ directed against declaration of vacancy simpliciter is premature. 9. R.C. 809 where it has been held that the case of M/s. Trilok Jingh and Co. is clearly applicable even after the aforesaid amendment made in 1976 whereby the proviso was added to Section 16(l) of the Act and a writ directed against declaration of vacancy simpliciter is premature. 9. Counsel for the petitioner has, however, urged that in regard to the issue of a writ of prohibition the law laid down either by the Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Trilok Singh and Co. (supra) or by this Court in the case of Hari Swarup (supra) is not applicable. 10. Having heard counsel for the parties I am of opinion that on the facts of the instant case the submission made by counsel for the petitioner is well founded. It is true, as has been held by a Full Bench of this Court in Asiatic Engineering Co. v. Achhru Ram, AIR 1951 Allahabad 746 that even a writ of prohibition cannot be claimed as a matter of right and it is still within the discretion of the court to grant or not to grant a writ of prohibition. It is also true that the discretion in this behalf has to be exercised in a judicial manner and as to whether a case has been made out for the grant of a writ of prohibition or not will depend on the facts of each case. In the case of Asiatic Engineering Co. (supra) it has been held that if the petitioner had an alternative remedy of filing a revision before the High Court it would not be a proper exercise of discretion to issue a writ of prohibition. 11. The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Trilok Singly and Co. (supra) has been followed by this Court in several cases. Counsel for respondents 2 and 3 placed reliance on some of those cases, but in my opinion in view of the latest decision of this Court in Hari Swarup's case (supra) that the case of M/s. Trilok Singh and Co. is equally applicable even after the 1976 amendment of the Act and a writ petition directed against an order declaring vacancy simpliciter is premature, it is not necessary to refer to the other decisions of this Court where the case of M/s. Trilok Singh and Co. has been followed. 12. is equally applicable even after the 1976 amendment of the Act and a writ petition directed against an order declaring vacancy simpliciter is premature, it is not necessary to refer to the other decisions of this Court where the case of M/s. Trilok Singh and Co. has been followed. 12. Coming to the scope of a writ of prohibition reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in East India Commercial Co. v. Collector of Customs, AIR 1962 Supreme Court 1893. It was held in paragraph 26 of the report that a writ of prohibition is an order directed to an inferior Tribunal forbidding it from continuing with a proceeding therein on the ground that the proceeding is without or in excess of jurisdiction or contrary to the laws of the land, statutory or otherwise. The two stages at which writs of prohibition and certiorari are issued are well known. A writ of certiorari is issued after an order has been passed by an authority on the ground inter alia that the said order is without jurisdiction. A writ of prohibition out the other hand is issued even before such an order is passed it' it is shown that the authority proceeding in the matter has no jurisdiction to do so. 13. Considerable emphasis was placed by counsel for respondents 2 and 3 on the observation made by the Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Trilok Singh & Co. (supra) that no injury can be said to have been caused to any person at the stage when only a vacancy has been notified. It was urged by counsel for respondents 2 and 3 that since the petitioner cannot be said to be it person aggrieved against the impugned orders at this stage even a writ of prohibition does not deserve to be issued. This submission in my opinion, ignores a very salutary aspect dealing with the problem as to when a person can be said to be aggrieved. Prohibition, as is well known, is a preventive rather than corrective remedy. This submission in my opinion, ignores a very salutary aspect dealing with the problem as to when a person can be said to be aggrieved. Prohibition, as is well known, is a preventive rather than corrective remedy. On establishing that even on the facts admitted or found by an authority entitled to adjudicate upon the rights of a subject the said authority has no jurisdiction to proceed in the matter, a citizen is entitled to the issue of a writ of prohibition in order to save himself from unnecessary harassment at the hands of such an authority. If the submission made by counsel for respondents 2 and 3 that even in such an extreme case of a writ of prohibition cannot be issued and the petitioner should be required to submit to the jurisdiction of such authority is accepted it will amount not only to virtually erasing the writ of prohibition from the Constitution but also to compel a citizen to undergo harassment at the hands of an authority which has no jurisdiction to do so. 14. I must hasten to add that it writ of prohibition cannot be a substitute for a writ of certiorari in every case. In all these cases where a writ of certiorari cannot be issued being premature the purpose of issuing such a writ obviously cannot be permitted to be indirectly achieved by issuing a writ of prohibition. In those cases where the basic facts, on the determination of which will depend the determination of the question as to whether a particular authority has or has not the jurisdiction to proceed in the matter, are not admitted and the finding recorded by the said authority is such which unless reversed a writ of prohibition cannot be issued, it will he a fit case where not only a writ of certiorari but also a writ of prohibition may be refused on the ground that it is premature. 15. Before coming to the facts of the instant case I may point out that counsel for respondents 2 and 3 have placed reliance on certain decisions laying down the scope of Article 141 of the Constitution which are obviously to the effect that the law declared by the Supreme Court is binding on all courts in India. Admittedly no possible exception can be taken to the view expressed in those authorities. Admittedly no possible exception can be taken to the view expressed in those authorities. Indeed it is apparent from the plain language of Article 141 of the Constitution. The question which, however, arises is whether the consequential submission made by counsel for respondents 2 and 3, that, since in the case of M/s. Trilok Singh & Co. (supra) it has been held that a writ petition against an order notifying vacancy simpliciter is premature, no writ even of prohibition could be issued even if the authority proceeding in the matter is demonstrated on either facts admitted or found to have no jurisdiction is well-founded or not. Firstly, the question as to whether on such facts a writ of prohibition does or does not deserve to be issued was not the question which came tip for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Trilok Singh & Co. (supra). What has been held in that case can, therefore, not he used by counsel for respondents 2 and 3 as an authority for the proposition for which it is sought to be used. The scope of a writ of prohibition, as pointed out in the case of East India Commercial Co. (supra), has already been noticed. In a subsequent decision in Isha Beevi v. Tax Recovery Officer, AIR 1973 Supreme Court 2135 it has, while dealing with the scope of a writ of prohibition, been held by the Supreme Court in paragraph 5 of the report :- "The existence of an alternate remedy is not generally a bar to the issuance of a writ of prohibition. But in order to substantiate a right to obtain a writ of prohibition from a High Court or the Supreme Court, an applicant has to demonstrate total absence of jurisdiction to proceed on the part of the officer or authority complained against. It is not enough if a wrong section or provision of law is cited in a notice or order if the power to proceed is actually there under another provision (emphasis supplied)." 16. Counsel for respondents 2 and 3 have, however, placed reliance on the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in C.C. Industries v. State of U.P., AIR 1964 Allahabad 328. In that case a writ of prohibition was sought to be issued on the ground that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to proceed in the matter. Counsel for respondents 2 and 3 have, however, placed reliance on the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in C.C. Industries v. State of U.P., AIR 1964 Allahabad 328. In that case a writ of prohibition was sought to be issued on the ground that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to proceed in the matter. The view taken fry this Court was that if the State Government had no power to refer the dispute and still referred it, the Labour Court should have refused to assume jurisdiction over it. So it was for the Labour Court to decide whether the State Government had the power to refer it, i.e. the State Government's power was a matter to he raised before it. It was further held that since the petitioner could question the power of the State Government to refer the question to the Labour Court before the Labour Court itself, he should first be required to do so before issuing a writ of prohibition. Such are not the facts in the instant case. Here the plea that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer had no jurisdiction to proceed in the matter was raised by the petitioner not only before order declaring vacancy was passed on 10th February, 19k1, but also by a review application and the plea raised by the petitioner was repelled. Now the petitioner cannot on the analogy of the decision of this Court in C C. Industries (supra) be required again to raise the same plea before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer before issuing a writ of prohibition. 17. Counsel for the petitioner then placed reliance on the decision of a Division Bench of the Punjab High Court in Afgan Commercial Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1983 Allahabad 225 wherein it was held that the principles tender which a writ of prohibition lies are practically the same as those under which a writ of mandamus lies. Where there is authority to do the act, but the manner of doing it is improper, the writ will not lie. In the instant case the petitioner is not challenging the manner of doing the act which the Rent Control and Eviction Officer contemplates to do in pursuance of the impugned orders but his very authority to do so. Even in the case of Afgan Commercial Co. In the instant case the petitioner is not challenging the manner of doing the act which the Rent Control and Eviction Officer contemplates to do in pursuance of the impugned orders but his very authority to do so. Even in the case of Afgan Commercial Co. (supra) it was held that the writ of prohibition is a preventive rather than a remedial or corrective remedy and that it is to be issued to prevent an unlawful assumption of jurisdiction. 18. Reliance was then placed by counsel for respondents on the decision of the Supreme Court in Narayana Chetty v. I.T. Officer, AIR 1959 Supreme Court 213. In that case the argument was that a revised assessment was completely illogical and, therefore, illegal. It was pointed out by the Supreme Court that that was a matter concerning the merits of the order of assessment and by no stretch of imagination can it be said to raise any question of jurisdiction under Article 226. 19. Lastly it was urged by counsel for respondents 2 and 3 that by filing a review application the petitioner submitted to the jurisdiction of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and as such it was not open to her now to assert that a writ of prohibition may be issued against the genic Rent Control and Eviction Officer restraining him from proceeding further in the matter. Reliance in support of this proposition of law has been placed on the decision on of the Supreme Court in Tikaram and Sons v. Commissioner, Sales Tax U.P.. AIR 1968 Supreme Court 1286, where it was held that where the appellants had voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction and had taken the chance of judgment in its favour it is not right that the appellants should take exception to the jurisdiction of the High Court when the judgment has gone against it. I find it difficult to take the view that when the petitioner filed an application before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer with a prayer that the order dated 10th February, 1981, declaring vacancy in respect of the house in question may be reviewed on the ground that he had no jurisdiction to do so, the petitioner will be deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. Challenging the jurisdiction of a particular officer is not tantamount to submitting to his jurisdiction. Challenging the jurisdiction of a particular officer is not tantamount to submitting to his jurisdiction. Indeed challenging the jurisdiction of an officer runs counter to submitting to his jurisdiction. 20. Coming to the facts of the instant case it would be seen that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer in his order dated 10th February, 1981 has held that late R.N. Zutshi was inducted in the house in question as a tenant in 1926 and that he occupied the same till 25th March, 1980, when he died. He has further held that the petitioner was the sister's daughter of late R.N. Zutshi and that she had been living along with him "at least since 1952" She was found to he living with late N.N. Zutshi even on the date when R.N. Zutshi died and to be in a continued possession of the accommodation in question thereafter. Further it is not the view of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer that the petitioner was not an heir of late R.N. Zutshi under Section 8 read with the Schedule thereto of the Hindu Succession Act. Since sister's daughter is clearly shown to be an heir of class (ii) in the schedule referred to above no exception can obviously be taken to the claim of the petitioner that she had inherited the tenancy rights of R.N. Zutshi on his death on 25th March, 1980, and had become a tenant herself in her capacity of being the heir of late R.N. Zutshi. However, the view taken by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer is that since the petitioner was not a member of the family of late R.N. Zutshi within the definition of the said term contained in Section 2(g) & 3(g) of the Act and since R.N. Zutshi was a statutory tenant she could not inherit the tenancy rights of R.N. Zutshi and a deemed vacancy had occurred in respect of the house in question in view of section 12(1)(b) of the Act. Nothing has been brought to my notice on the record of the instant case to indicate that it was ever the case of respondents 2 and 3 before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer that K.N. Zutshi was a tenant for a fixed term and that his tenancy stood terminated on the expiry of the said fixed term before he died or that during his lifetime his tenancy was terminated by serving upon him a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Statutory tenant so as to make his heirs under the personal law incapable of inheriting his tenancy rights on his death apparently means such a tenant who is continuing in occupation of a building only because of the protection granted by the Act and is not a tenant otherwise. That tenancy is a matter of contract is a proposition of law which admits of no doubt. A person occupying an accommodation under a contract between him and the landlord continues to be a tenant in pursuance of the said contract till it is terminated in accordance with law. Even such a tenant is entitled to the protection of the Act but simply on that ground he will not become a statutory tenant and on his death his heirs cannot be deprived of the right of inheritance. It is only in those cases, as already pointed out above, where the contract of tenancy stood terminated in accordance with law prior to the death of the tenant and he was continuing in occupation of the accommodation only by virtue of the protection granted to him by the Act that it can he said that the rights of such a statutory tenant are not heritable. So are nit the facts of the instant case. The use of the words "statutory tenant" by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer in his order dated 10th February, 1981, is on the face of it misconceived. He seems to have been of the view that since the provisions of the Act were appliecael to the house in question and R.N. Zutshi was entitled to the protect ion granted by the said Act to the tenants he was a "statutory tenant". This view is manifestly erroneous in law. 21. The term "tenant" stands defined in Section 3(a) of the Act. This view is manifestly erroneous in law. 21. The term "tenant" stands defined in Section 3(a) of the Act. It reads : "(a) "tenant" in relation to a building, means a person by whom its rent is payable, and on the tenant's death. (1) In the case of residential building, such only of his heirs as normally resided with him in the building at the time of his death ; (2) in the case of a non-residential building, his heirs:- Explanation-An occupant of a room in a hotel or a lodging house shall not he deemed to be a tenant ?" Admittedly the house in question is a residential building. As such only such of the heirs of R. N. Zutshi would be tenants in pursuance of this definition who normally resided with him in the house in question at the time of his death. On the facts found, R.N. Zutshi left no other heir except the petitioner and she has been found to be living with R.N. Zutshi at the time of his death. She consequently became tenant of the house in question simultaneously on the death of R. N. Zutshi on 25th March, 1980. It is well known proposition of law that inheritance or succession never remains in abeyance. In view of the facts found by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer himself and the law applicable to those facts there seems to be no doubt, whatsoever, that on the 10th of February, 1981, when the impugned order was passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer declaring vacancy in respect of the house in question the said order could not have been passed and the Rent Control and Eviction Officer had no jurisdiction to pass the said order. In this view of the matter there seems to be in doubt that the instant one is a case of "total absence of jurisdiction to proceed on the part of the officer or authority complained against" as stated by the Supreme Court in the case of Isha Beevi (supra) and it is in this view of the matter that I am of opinion that on the facts of the instant case a writ of prohibition deserves to be issued as prayed by the petitioner. 22. 22. Counsel for respondents 2 and 3 then urged that there were three co-landlords of the house in question but none of them were impleaded by the petitioner in the present writ petition. According to him the landlords were necessary parties in the present writ petition and it was liable to be dismissed for their non impleadment. I find it difficult to agree with this submission either. The proceedings giving rise to the impugned orders were initiated, as already seen above, on an application made by Shyamal Kishore Bhagat respondent No 2 who is a respondent in the writ petition from its very inception. For the issue of a writ of prohibition what has to be seen is as to whether the Rent Control and Eviction Officer has on the facts found by him jurisdiction to proceed or not. He too has been arrayed as respondent No. 1 in the writ petition. In this view of the matter for issuing a writ of prohibition it cannot he said that the landlords were necessary parties. At best it could be said that they were proper parties. For that purpose as already seen above on an application being made by one of them, namely S. K. Mushran, he has already been impleaded as respondent No. 3. He has also filed a counter-affidavit putting forward the case on behalf of the landlords of the house in question, his counsel has been heard at considerable length and it is as such not a case, at any rate at this stage, where it could be said that the interests of the landlords remain unrepresented or that this Court is not in a position to know the stand taken by the landlords. Looked at from this point of view the writ petition does not deserve to be dismissed on the ground that the remaining two co-landlords have not been impleaded therein, 23. Counsel for respondents 2 and 3 then urged that the writ petition was barred by lachas. According to them even though it had been filed within 90 days of the dismissal of the review application filed by the petitioner it had been filed after about 7 months of the passing of the order dated 10th February, 1981, declaring vacancy in respect of the accommodation in question. According to them even though it had been filed within 90 days of the dismissal of the review application filed by the petitioner it had been filed after about 7 months of the passing of the order dated 10th February, 1981, declaring vacancy in respect of the accommodation in question. It was also urged in this connection that merely filing of a review application does not constitute sufficient explanation for laches. In my opinion the writ petition does not deserve to be dismissed on this ground either. For the issue of a writ of prohibition the petitioner has a recurring cause of action. Since the Rent Control and Eviction Officer has been found to have no jurisdiction in the matter it is not possible to hold that the writ petition deserves to be dismissed on the ground of laches. 24. Counsel for respondents 2 and 3 then urged that since the Rent Control and Eviction Officer has held in his order dated 10th February, 1981, that R. N. Zutshi was a statutory tenant, his view that the petitioner was not an heir of R. N. Zutshi is unassailable. This submission has already been considered above. One more circumstance may, however, be pointed out at this stage that even in the counter-affidavit which has been filed by S. K. Mushran, the newly added respondent No 3 and who is one of the landlords it has not been stated either that R. N. Zutshi was a tenant for a fixed terns and that hie tenancy stood terminated by a efflux of time or that his tenancy had been duly terminated by serving upon him a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. What has been emphasised in the counter affidavit is that when R.N. Zutshi was allowed to occupy the house in question it was made clear to him that he will have to vacate the same as and when the landlords required the same and even though R. N. Zutshi was called upon toy handover possession of the house in dispute to the landlords as they needed the same, he did not do so. Calling upon a tenant to handover possession on the ground that there was an agreement between the parties that the tenant would vacate the accommodation if required by the landlords and that the landlords required the same can by no stretch of imagination be put at par with termination of tenancy by serving a notice as contemplated by Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The act of calling upon to deliver possession can be both oral and in writing. Even this much has not been stated in the counter affidavit whether R.N. Zutshi was called upon to handover possession of the accommodation in question to the landlords as they needed it, orally or in writing. As already pointed out the use of the words "statutory tenant" by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer in his order was under misconception. 25. Lastly it was urged by counsel for respondents 2 and 3 that since the petitioner was admittedly not a member of the family of R N. Zutshi within the definition of the said term contained in Section 3(g) of the Act and since R. N. Zutshi had allowed the petitioner to occupy, if not the whole at any rate a part of the house in question deemed vacancy on the plain language of Section 12(1)(b) of the Act had occurred and the view taken by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer is unassailable. I find it difficult to agree even with this submission. Firstly, the case of the petitioner was that R. N. Zutshi was it bachelor, that her mother who was the sister of R.N. Zutshi died in 1936 when she was about 10 years of age and that she had been living with R.N. Zutshi since thereafter. Even the Rent Control and Eviction Officer has found as a fact that at least since 1952 the petitioner had been living with R. N. Zutshi. On these facts it seems difficult to take the view that the case is covered by Section 12(l)(b) of the Act even if the provision contained therein may he retrospective. Secondly the question which is to be determined in the instant case is whether on the 10th February, 1981, when the vacancy was declared by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer Section 12(1)(b) of the Act was or was not applicable. Secondly the question which is to be determined in the instant case is whether on the 10th February, 1981, when the vacancy was declared by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer Section 12(1)(b) of the Act was or was not applicable. As already seen above, on the death of R. N. Zutshi on 25th March, 1980 the petitioner inherited his tenancy rights and with effect from that date her possession was not that of it person who was not a member of the family of the deceased tenant but as it tenant herself. If on the 10th February, 1981, the petitioner was in possession over the house in question as a tenant it is not possible to conceive as to how the provisions of Section 12(1)(b) of the Act could still be held to be applicable on that date for declaring vacancy in respect of the accommodation in question. 26. No other point has been pressed on behalf of respondents 2 and 3. 27. In the result the writ petition succeeds and is allowed and a writ of prohibition is hereby issued restraining the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Allahabad, respondent No. 1, from proceeding further in the case relating to house No. 57, Luker Ganj, Allahabad, on the footing that deemed vacancy had occurred in respect of the said house. The parties shall, however, bear their own costs.