JUDGMENT 1. - These two revision petitions arise out of an order dated 20th July, 1981, passed by Additional District Judge No.7, Jaipur City, as such the same are disposed of by one single order. 2. An important question of law called for determination in this case is whether right to continue a suit for pre-emption survives to the legal representatives of the pre-emptor? 3. One Damodar Lal filed a suit for possession on the basis of pre-emption against the petitioner Kewal Chand, Chhota Devi, Nirmala Devi and Patasi Devi. During the pendency of the suit, plaintiff Damodar Lal died on, 5th March, 1980 and non-petitioner Kunj Behari Lal filed an application for substituting his name as plaintiff and non-petitioner Nos. 2 to 8 proforma defendants alleging that right to sue survives to the said legal representatives. Learned trial Court allowed the application by order dated 20th July, 1981 holding that under order 22 rule 3 C. P. C. and Section 18 of the Rajasthan Pre-emption Act, 1966 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') right to continue the suit survives to legal representatives. Aggrieved against the aforesaid order these two revisions have been filed. 4. It was argued by Mr. Rastogi, learned counsel for the petitioner that in the area of Jaipur City where the disputed property is situated. Mahomadan Law was applied by way of custom in the matter of pre-emption According to such law a right of pre-emption ought to subsist on the date of sale, date of suit and date of decree by the trial Court. It was a personal right which was lost if the pre-emptor died before the date of decree and such right did not survive to be asserted or continued by the legal representatives of deceased pre-emptor. It was argued that there is a primary right of pre-emption and also a secondary right. The primary right is that before an offer of sale is made and the secondary right is to pursue such right by filing a suit in a court and this secondary right was remedial in nature. This remedial right is a personal right which is right of substitution in place of original vendee and not a right of re-purchase inasmuch as the right of repurchase exhausted before the property was sold to the vendee. According to Mr. This remedial right is a personal right which is right of substitution in place of original vendee and not a right of re-purchase inasmuch as the right of repurchase exhausted before the property was sold to the vendee. According to Mr. Rastogi this position of law is well established under the Mahomedan Law and was not changed even after the coming into force of the Act. Right of pre-emption is a very weak right and can be defeated by any legitmate means. It was argued that the trial Court committed a material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction in applying section 18 of the Act and allowing the legal representatives of deceased Damodar Lal to continue the suit. According to Mr. Rastogi, the words before the decree has become final used in the language of section 18 of the Act clearly contemplated that there should be a decree passed by the trial Court and only thereafter the right to sue was kept survived till such decree become final by the higher Court. It was further submitted that the language of Section 18 of the Act has been framed in a negative form and according in which ordinarily the suit should abate but this section only serves out the exceptions and if that be so then the suit shall not abate only in a case where the decree has been passed by the trial Court and till it had not become final. Shri Rastogi placed reliance on (1) Naravana Manoki v. Karthion Yunis, AIR 1982 Kerala 122 , Pench Gujar Gour Brahmana v. Amar Singh : 1954 RLW 204 , Perusal etc. v. Motilal and others : AIR 1981 Rajasthan 119 , and Pyare Mohan v. Rameshlwar and others, AIR 1980 Rajasthan 116 . 5. On the other hand, it was argued by Mr. Keshote that the proceedings in the trial Court are at the stage of final arguments in the main suit and no terference should be made in exercise of revisional jurisdiction of this Court at this stage. It was submitted that Section 18 of the Act is quite clear and the intention of the legislature in enacting section 18 in the Act was to over-ride and supersede Mahomadan Law in this regard which was prevelant as a customary law. It was submitted that Section 18 of the Act is quite clear and the intention of the legislature in enacting section 18 in the Act was to over-ride and supersede Mahomadan Law in this regard which was prevelant as a customary law. It was further submitted that the trial Court has rightly interprated the provisions of Section 18 of the Act and in the alternative it was submitted that no revision is maintainable even on a question of error of law or wrong interpretation of provision of a section in the Act. Shri Keshote, also argued that even under the Mohemadan Law the right of pre-emption is a right of substitution and not of re-purchase. This sight continues to the legal representatives of a deceased pre-emptor. Reliance is placed on Hazari & Others v. Neki (dead) by his Legal Representatives, AIR 1968 SC 1205 , Gurdev Kaur and Others v. Smt. Chanan Kaur and others, AIR 1971 Punjab & Haryana 416 . 6. I would consider the position of law on the controversy in question as it existed before coming into force of the Rajasthan Pre-emption Act, 1966. It is well established now by a plathora of case law on the subject that principles of Mohemaden Law with regard to law of pre-emptions ware applicable in the area of Jaipur City where the immovable property in question is situated, Mulla in his Treatise -Principles of Mohemadon Law 18th Edition" has dealt with the point under Section 239. He has observed if the pre-emptor dies pending the suit for pre-emption the suit may be continued by his legal representatives." In the Commentary under the above section Mulla has noted as under : "A sues B for pre-emption. A dies before obtaining a decree in the suit. According to Mahomd. Law, the right to sue is extinguished end the suit cannot he prosecuted by As heirs/(q). According to the Shia and the Shefei law, the right to sue is not extinguished and the suit may be continued by A's heirs: Gaillie, 11, 190; Madaya, 561. According to the Probate and Administration Act, 1881, section 89 (now Indian Succession Act, 39 of 1925, section 306), the right is not extinguished, and the suit may be continued by A's legal representatives that is his executor or a administrator. According to the Probate and Administration Act, 1881, section 89 (now Indian Succession Act, 39 of 1925, section 306), the right is not extinguished, and the suit may be continued by A's legal representatives that is his executor or a administrator. That Act applies to Mohamedens and the effect of Bombay decision is that whatever be the act to which the parties belong the rule applicable to cases or this kind is that laid down in the Act, that is to say if A dies leaving a will, the suit may be continued by his executor, and if he dies intestate it may be continued by his heirs on obtain letters of administration. (r). 7. In Hazari and others's case (supra) their Lordships of the Supreme Court while dealing with a case of premption under the Punjab Pre-emption Act, observed as under : "It is necessary to emphasise that we are dealing in this case with the statutory right of pre-emption under Punjab Act 1 of 1913 and its subsequent amendment and not with the right of pre-emption under the Mohemmadan Law. In regard to the latter right it has been held that according to the Mohemmadan law applicable to the Sunni sect if a plaintiff in a suit for pre-emption has not obtained the decree for pre-emption in his life time the right to sue does not survive to the heirs See Mohemmad Hussain v. Niamat-un-Nisar, (1897) ILH 20 All 86 . It is not necessary for us to express any opinion on this point in the present case 8. In Gurdev Kaur's case (supra), a Division Bench of Punjab & Haryana High Court while placing reliance on Hazari's case (supra) held that the right of pre-emption is right which runs with the land which is subject matter to suit preemption. As this right runs with the land it passes on the death of the pre-emptor to his legal heirs and they can continue the suit filed by him. However, this case also arose under the provisions of Punjab Pre-emption Act. 9. Shri Rastogi, learned counsel for the petitioner, also cited a recent Full Bench case of Punjab & Haryana High Court in Chandrup Singh and another v. Data Ram and Others, AIR 1983 Punjab & Haryana 1 . However, this case also arose under the provisions of Punjab Pre-emption Act. 9. Shri Rastogi, learned counsel for the petitioner, also cited a recent Full Bench case of Punjab & Haryana High Court in Chandrup Singh and another v. Data Ram and Others, AIR 1983 Punjab & Haryana 1 . In the above full bench case it was observed that on the particular language of the Statute on principle and on the weight of precedent it is held that purely statutory right of preemption resting wholly on blood relationship alone under section 15 (1) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act is not a heritable right and does not devolve on the heirs on the death of the plaintiff pre-emptor before the grant of the decree in the suit. The Full Ben:h for the reasons given in the case over-ruled the judgment of Gurdev Kaur's case (supra). The decision of Hazari's case (supra) was distinguished on the ground that Supreme Court was not considering a case of right of pre-emption flowing from blood relationship only. 10. In my view the above full bench authority is of no relevance to the controversy arising in the case before us. The right recognised under the Mohamedan Law or under the Raja than Pre-emption Act 1966, which now governs the parties does not flow on account of blood relationship only as was the case before the Full Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court. On the contrary, it has been laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Avadh Behari Singh's case AIR 1954 SC 417 that the right of pre-emption runs with the land and is not initially personal. It is a different question, however, that although the right of pre-emption runs with the land and is not initially personal it resumes a personal aspect for the purpose of enforeability in a court of law. I have already taken a view in Pyare Mohan's case (supra) that right of pre-emption as a right of substitution and not of repurchase There is nothing illogical in the right being not personal and attached to the property and at the same time not being heritable or transferable after the sale has been made is a stranger but before the decree has been passed in favour of the pre-emptor. There are many interest in the land which are neither heritable nor transferable and the bare right of pre-emption after the sale has been effected but before it has ripened into a decree of court seems to be such a right.In Narayana Manoki's case (supra) it was held as under : "The right of pre-emption has apparently two distinct phases : (i) the primary or substantive right and (ii) the secondary and remedial right. The primary right of pre-emption in the right to have the first offer of an intended sale, so that a sale to a stranger without making the first offer to the pre-emptor would be an infringement of this right. The reputial right of preemption is a right to be substituted in the place of the vendee who made the offending purchase. The primary right exists before the sale takes place the remedial right arises when the sale takes place the remedial right arises when the sale has taken place. The primary right avails against the owner of the pre-emptional property. the remedial right avails against the purchaser of the pre-emptional property and passes along with it to the assignes thereof. In other words it runs with the preemptive property. The remedial right inheres only in the person who is the owner of the pre-emptive property at the time of the sale which gives rise to the exercise of pre-emption, it is more or less personal to him, a transfer of the pre-emptive property after the offending sale has taken place will not transfer the right to enforce pre-emption to the transfer. 11. Shri Rastogi had also placed reliance on a decision of S. N. Deedwania J. in Peru Lal etc. v. Motilal and others : (supra). The aforesaid authority is not correct in view of the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Audh Behari Singh's case (supra). Deedwania, J. has followed the view taken in Hamediva v. Joseph Benjamin, AIR 1929 Bombay 206 and Kooderatullah v. Mohinee Mohun, (1870) A. Beng L. R. 134 (FB) . It appears that Audh Behari Singh', case (supra) escaped the notice of Deedwania, J.. where in Kooderatullah's case (supra) and Hamediya's case (supra) have been over-ruled. 12. Thus, I am clearly of the view that the right of preemption as existed under the Mohemaden Law was a right of substitution and not of repurchase. It appears that Audh Behari Singh', case (supra) escaped the notice of Deedwania, J.. where in Kooderatullah's case (supra) and Hamediya's case (supra) have been over-ruled. 12. Thus, I am clearly of the view that the right of preemption as existed under the Mohemaden Law was a right of substitution and not of repurchase. It was not a personal right on the part of the pre-emptor to get a retransfer of the property from the vendee who had already become owner of the same. At the same time, I am in agreement with the statement of law made by Madhvan Nair, J. in Narayana Menoki's case (supra). According to this view, the primary right is inherent to the pre-emptive property while the remedial right of per-emption is a right to be substituted in place of the vendee, who made the offending purchase. Thus, under the Mehamedan Law the right could be enforced only by the person who was owner of the preemptive property on the date of the sale of the property sought to be pre-empted. 13. Whatever might have been the position under the Mohemadan Law the question now to be considered is to the effect of the provisions of order 22 rule 3 C. P. C. and section 16 of the Act. Under order 22 rule 3 (1) C. P. C. if a sole plaintiff dies and the right to site survives the Court, on an application made in that behalf shall cause the legal representatives of the deceased plaintiff to he made a party and shall proceed with the suit. In the present case Damodar Lal was the sole plaintiff, who died and the question is whether the right to sue survives on the legal representatives of Damodar Lal so as to be made a party and allowed to proceed with the suit in place of Damodar Lal. In the present case Damodar Lal was the sole plaintiff, who died and the question is whether the right to sue survives on the legal representatives of Damodar Lal so as to be made a party and allowed to proceed with the suit in place of Damodar Lal. The Rajasthan Pre-emption Act is a consolidating and amending law relating to pre-emption in the State of Rajasthan Under Section 3 of the Act right of pre-emption has been defined as under : "Section 3 - "Right of pre-emption" defined the -right of pre-emption" as the right accruing under section 4 of this Act, upon a transfer of any immovable property, to acquire such property and to be substituted on the transferee thereof in place of and in preference to the original transferee, and "pre-emption" means a person having a right of pre-emption." Section 6 deals about the persons to whom right of pre-emption accrues. There is no controversy at present in the present revision that Damodar Lal, who filed the present suit was one of the persons falling under section 6 of the Act. Section 15 enumerates the principle that no decree for pre-emption shall be passed in favour of any person unless he had a subsisting right of pre-emption at the time of the decree, but where a decree for pre-emption has been passed in favour of a plaintiff, whether by a court of the first instance or of appeal, right of such plaintiff shalt not be affected by any transfer or loss of his interest occurring on the date of such decree However, we are not concerned with the applicability of the situation contemplated in this section. Thea comes section 18, which is the direct and most relevant provision in the Act on whose interpretation the entire controversy is based in the present case. It would be important to quote the section, which reads as under: "Section 18-Survival of right of suit an death of plaintiff-If the plaintiff in a pre-emption suit dies at any time before the decree has become final the suit shall not abate if the cause of action is subsisting." A bare perusal of the title of this section makes it clear in unmistakable terms that survival of right of suit has been recognised on death of plaintiff. Then the main language used in the section also lays down clearly that the suit shall not abate, if the plaintiff in a pre-emption suit dies at any time before the decree has become final. It also lays down that the cause of action must be subsisting at such time. The words 'at any time' used prior to the words before the decree has become final' go to show clearly that it applies to the stage of suit or at any time till the decree has become final. Shri Rastogi, learned counsel for the petitioner, waited to construe the language of this Section to mean that it only contemplates a case where a decree has been passed by the trial Court but has not become final by the appellate court. What Shri Rastogi wants to mean is that the legal representatives can only be substituted at a stage when a decree for pre-emption has been passed by the trial Court but has not become final as the same has been challenged by the aggrieved party. In my view, the above interpretation sought to be made by Shri Rastogi will lead to absurdity and defeat the very object of laying down such provision under the Pre-emption Act. The Legislature shall be deemed to be aware of the principles of Mohamedan Law that a suit for pre-emption might abate where the plaintiff itself dies during the pendency of the suit. The Rajasthan Pre-emption Act is not only a consolidating but an amending law also relating to pre-emption in the State of Rajasthan The title of the Section speaks of the survival of right of suit and not of appeal. Similarly in the language used in the section also speaks of a pre-emption suit and not of appeal. It further makes a mention that the suit shall not abate if the cause of action subsists. I am unable to understand the logic in the argument of Shri Rastogi that the Legislature intended to allow the legal representatives to be substituted after the decree of the trial Court but not during the pendency of the suit. In my view, the language of this section is plain and unambigous and survives the right to continue the suit for pre-emption by the legal representatives of deceased plaintiff. 14. In my view, the language of this section is plain and unambigous and survives the right to continue the suit for pre-emption by the legal representatives of deceased plaintiff. 14. In the result I find no force in these revision petitions and the same are dismissed with no order as to costs.Revision dismissed. *******