Judgment :- 1. This appeal arises out of the proceedings of the Appellate Authority under the Kerala Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, 1960, the Act for short, which directed the reinstatement of the appellant herein, with back wages and attendant benefits, as a messenger in the service of the State Bank of India, Alleppey branch. He had been dismissed from service earlier for alleged misconduct, after a domestic enquiry. He filed an appeal to the Bank authorities under the terms of the Sastri Award which was of no avail. Afterwards he moved the Appellate Authority under the Act by way of appeal under S.18 of the Act. Both parties adduced evidence in the appeal. But without going into that evidence, the Appellate Authority came to the conclusion that the domestic enquiry was vitiated by the violation of the principles of natural justice. The Authority found that there was no proper enquiry and 'no reasonable evidence was adduced by the respondents' (Bank authorities) to prove the charges which have to be declared as null and void'. Then the authority considered the evidence adduced at the domestic enquiry and found that the charges have not been proved. Consequently reinstatement of the worker was directed or in lieu of such reinstatement to pay his half a monthly salary plus DA. for each year of service. 2., When that order was questioned in this court in OP. No. 3313 of 1979, a learned single judge of this court pointing out that the Appellate Authority should have rested his decision on the evidence that had been adduced before him remitted the case for fresh disposal on that basis. Since the question of limitation in the matter of filing the appeal before the Appellate Authority had been raised, the Appellate Authority was also directed to consider that point also. 3. This decision of the learned judge was challenged by the Management in Writ Appeal, W.A. No. 147 of 1981. That appeal was eventually dismissed. Consequently the matter went back before the Appellate Authority. 4. After hearing the parties, the Authority again allowed the appeal directing reinstatement of the second respondent herein. Ext. P5 is the copy of that order. There as noted earlier, reinstatement with full back wages and other attendant benefits had been ordered. The subsistence allowance paid to him had to be deducted from the amount so due. 4. After hearing the parties, the Authority again allowed the appeal directing reinstatement of the second respondent herein. Ext. P5 is the copy of that order. There as noted earlier, reinstatement with full back wages and other attendant benefits had been ordered. The subsistence allowance paid to him had to be deducted from the amount so due. The reinstatement was directed to be within 30days from the date of the order. In case the second respondent was not reposted in service, the Bank was to pay compensation for him. namely full back wages with all attendant benefits for the period from 23-3-1970 to 14-9-1982, and two months' pay and allowances for every year of service from 2-11-1966 to 14-9-1982 less the subsistence allowance already paid to him. 5. This order was attacked in the OP. which was disposed of by the learned single judge in favour of the petitioner, on the ground that the appeal before the Appellate Authority has been filed beyond the prescribed period. Two questions had been urged in the OP: (1) the conclusion of the first respondent (the Appellate Authority) that the appeal filed by the second respondent in the OP. (the present appellant) was within the time prescribed was wrong and (2) the finding in Ext. P5, the impugned order that the misconduct alleged against the second respondent was not true had no basis factually or legally. However, before the learned single judge, the counsel for the Bank confined his arguments to the contention that the appeal before the Appellate Authority was not filed in time, without touching upon the finding on the proof of misconduct. Regarding thai question, on the basis of the Supreme Court decision in Syndicate Bank v. K. Ramanath (AIR. 1968 SC. 231) where the Supreme Court was construing the provisions of S.33A and 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, the learned Single Judge took the view that the appeal before the first respondent had been filed out of time. Regarding thai question, on the basis of the Supreme Court decision in Syndicate Bank v. K. Ramanath (AIR. 1968 SC. 231) where the Supreme Court was construing the provisions of S.33A and 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, the learned Single Judge took the view that the appeal before the first respondent had been filed out of time. Learned counsel for the appellant second respondent had based his arguments before the learned judge on the basis of the decision of the Madras High Court in Syndicate Bank v. Muniraj (1975 II LLJ.106) where the question of the construction that should be placed on the question of limitation with reference to S.41(2) of the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act, 1947 and R.9 (1) of the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Rules, 1949 corresponding to S.18(2) of the Act and R.3(1) of the Rules framed thereunder had come up for consideration. Justice Ismail, as he then was, had said therein that if there is an appeal provided for by the service Rules against the order of one officer of the employer to another officer, then till the matter is disposed of by the appellate officer, it cannot be said that there is an order of the employer terminating the services of the employee. This is because according to the learned judge, if the appellate officer allows the appeal of the employee there will not be any termination of the services and the question of the employee appealing against the dispensing with of his services under S.41 (2) of the Tamil Nadu Act will not arise. 6. The learned single judge refused to follow the decision of the Madras High Court as he felt that in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court to which no reference had been made by Justice Ismail, it was difficult to agree with the opinion expressed in the judgment of the Madras High Court. In this view allowing the OP. the learned judge quashed Ext. P5. The employee, the second respondent in the OP. has therefore come up in appeal. 7. Mr. M. V. Joseph, learned counsel for the appellant, urged before us that the order of the Disciplinary Authority by which the appellant had been dismissed from service copy of which order is Ext. P1 in these proceedings had merged with the order in appeal passed by the Chief Regional Officer (Ext. has therefore come up in appeal. 7. Mr. M. V. Joseph, learned counsel for the appellant, urged before us that the order of the Disciplinary Authority by which the appellant had been dismissed from service copy of which order is Ext. P1 in these proceedings had merged with the order in appeal passed by the Chief Regional Officer (Ext. P2 is a copy of the same). Mr. Joseph would point out that this appeal which is to a higher authority within the Bank Management itself is one provided under Para.521 (12) of what is well known as the Sastri Award which is an award passed by the All India Industrial Tribunal (Bank Disputes), Bombay, presided over by Sri. S. Panchapagesa Sastri, Retired Judge of the Madras High Court on an industrial dispute, referred to the said Tribunal, between the Banking Companies and their workmen, by the Central Government. The relevant portion in the said Award reads as follows: "It also seems to us necessary that a bank should decide which officer shall be empowered to take disciplinary Action in the case of each office or establishment and that it should also make provision for appeals against orders passed in disciplinary matters to an officer or a body not lower in status than the manager, who shall if the employee concerned so desirous in a case of dismissal hear him or his representative before disposing of the appeal " 8. According to the learned counsel, Ext. P2 could therefore have to be taken as the final decision of the management dispensing with the services of the petitioner and therefore limitation in the matter of filing the appeal under the Act will have to be reckoned from this decision. Mr. Joseph would further contend that the decisions of the Supreme Court referred to by the learned judge would have no application in this case and Justice Ismail's decision in 1975(2) LLJ.106 gives the correct law on the point in issue. 9. Our learned brother Justice Bhaskaran who had heard the OP. in sustaining the Bank's contentions had proceeded on the following basis. That in terms of S.18(2) of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder, the appeal provided is against the order terminating the service of the employee; and the time for filing the appeal has to be reckoned from the date of delivery of that order on the employee. in sustaining the Bank's contentions had proceeded on the following basis. That in terms of S.18(2) of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder, the appeal provided is against the order terminating the service of the employee; and the time for filing the appeal has to be reckoned from the date of delivery of that order on the employee. Being a self-contained Code, there would be no scope for importing into the section and the rule qualifying the expression "order of termination" against which the right of appeal is conferred on the employee, to read as "The order which had become final after the disposal of the appeal, if any, filed against the original order of termination." 10. In taking this view the learned judge relied on some decisions of the Supreme Court. In the first of these, the court was construing the provisions of S.26A of the Income-tax Act. 1922, and R.6(2) of the Income-tax Rules framed thereunder, the case of Subba Rao v. I.T. Commissioner (AIR. 1956 SC. 604). The court held there that the intention of the Parliament was that a firm should be given the benefit of S.23(5)(a) of the Income-Tax Act only if it is registered under S.26A in accordance with the condition laid down in that section and the relevant rule and as the word "personally" in R.6 required the application to be signed by the partner in person, the signature by an agent on his behalf not being sufficient. 11. The second decision relied on is that reported in AIR. 1958 SC. 1036, S. R. Goel v. Municipal Board, Kanpur. In that case the question revolved round the dismissal of a municipal overseer by a resolution of the Municipal Board. The employee had appealed to the Government as provided in the relevant statute against this resolution. That appeal was dismissed. Thereafter, the employee filed a suit for compensation for the wrongful dismissal. The question arose whether the suit was barred by the law of limitation. The Supreme Court said there: "On a plain reading of the provisions of S.58(1) and (2), we are of opinion that the contention of the appellant is not tenable. One condition of the validity of the order of dismissal made by the Board is that the Special resolution in that behalf should be supported by not less that 2/3rd members constituting the Board. One condition of the validity of the order of dismissal made by the Board is that the Special resolution in that behalf should be supported by not less that 2/3rd members constituting the Board. Once that condition is fulfilled there is nothing more to be done by the Board and the only right which then accrues to the officer thus dealt with by the Board is to appeal to the State Government within 30 days of the communication of that order to him. He may choose to exercise this right of appeal or without adopting that procedure he may straight-away challenge the validity of the resolution on any of the grounds available to him in law., Eg. the non-observance of the principles of natural justice and the like. There is nothing in the provisions of S.58(1) to prevent him from doing so and if without exercising his right of appeal which is given to him by the statute he filed a suit in the Civil Court to establish the ultra vires or the illegal character of such resolution it could not be urged that such a suit was premature, he not having exhausted the remedies given to him under the statute. The principle that the Superior courts may not in their discretion issue the prerogative writs unless that applicant had exhausted all his remedies under the Special Act does not apply to a suit. There is nothing in S.58(1) which expressly or impliedly bars his right of suit." Justice Bhaskaran observed that on a parity of reasoning it could be seen in this case that when Ext. P1 was delivered to the employee, he had the option with him either to file an appeal to the Chief Regional Manager, the officer to whom in terms of the contract of service an appeal would lie, or to the Appellate Authority under the Act invoking sub-section (2) of S.18 of the Act and he had taken a calculated risk in waiting indefinitely for the disposal of the appeal by the Chief Regional Manager, unmindful of his right of appeal to the Appellate Authority under S.18(2) of the Act getting time barred. 12. The third decision of the Supreme Court relied on by the learned judge is that in Syndicate Bank v. K. Ramanath (AIR. 3968 SC. 231). 12. The third decision of the Supreme Court relied on by the learned judge is that in Syndicate Bank v. K. Ramanath (AIR. 3968 SC. 231). There the Supreme Court was concerned with S.33A and 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act and the observation there on which emphasis was made by the judge is as follows: "The natural and reasonable interpretation, to be placed on S.33, is, in our opinion, that the order of discharge or dismissal, is the original of the very first order passed by the management" 13. We may also note that Justice Bhaskaran laid great stress on the following passage of the Supreme Court in its judgment in U. P. State v. Mohammed Nooh (AIR. 1958 SC. 86), in Para.13 at page 95: "There is nothing in the Indian Law to warrant the suggestion that the decree or order of the court or tribunal of the first instance becomes final only on the termination of all proceedings by way of appeal or revision. The filing of the appeal or revision may put the decree or order in, jeopardy but until it is reversed or modified it remains effective. In that view of the matter the original order of dismissal passed on April 20;1948 was not suspended by the presentation of the appeal by the respondent nor was its operation interrupted when the Deputy Inspection General of Police simply dismissed the application for revision. The original order of dismissal, if there were no inherent infirmities in it, was operative on its own strength and it did not gain any greater efficiency front the subsequent orders of dismissal of the appeal or the revision except for the specific purposes hereinbefore mentioned." 14. The view taken by the learned judge was sought to be sustained by Mr. K. P. Radhakrishna Menon, again with reference to the Supreme. Court cases relied on in the judgment under attack. 15. As far as the decision in Subba Rao v. I.T. Commissioner (AIR 1956 SC. 604) we do not think that the dictum laid down there would be of much help in resolving the controversy in this case. K. P. Radhakrishna Menon, again with reference to the Supreme. Court cases relied on in the judgment under attack. 15. As far as the decision in Subba Rao v. I.T. Commissioner (AIR 1956 SC. 604) we do not think that the dictum laid down there would be of much help in resolving the controversy in this case. That only lays down that if a right is conferred by a statutory provision and such right could not be availed of but for that provision, such a right can be claimed only in accordance with that statutory provision, it being the creature of the statute. A person who seeks such a benefit must bring himself strictly within the terms of the statutory provisions. The right is regulated by the statute, solely by its own terms and it would be repugnant to the. character of such right to add to those terms by reference to other laws. The statute must be construed as exhaustive in regard to the conditions under which it can be claimed. 16. We do not think that the contentions raised by the employee require addition to the statutory terms by reference to other laws. What he contends is that the order in appeal passed by the top authority in the management itself should be considered to be the final order by which his services had been dispensed with. When a dismissed employee takes recourse to the appeal provision, the appeal being to the employer himself, that order in appeal is the final and ultimate order of the employer in the matter of dispensing with the services of the employee and termination would begin to run from the date of that order only. 17. Now we will take the decision in S.R. Goel v. Municipal Board, Kanpur (AIR. 1958 S. C. 1036). Under the U. P. Municipalities Act, the Municipal Board can punish or dismiss any of its officers by a special resolution subject to certain conditions in respect of punishment or dismissal of an Executive Officer. The Executive Officer so punished or dismissed is given a right by the Statute itself to file an appeal to the State Government within a prescribed period. S.326 of the U.P. Municipalities Act prescribed that no suit shall be instituted against a Board or against a member. The Executive Officer so punished or dismissed is given a right by the Statute itself to file an appeal to the State Government within a prescribed period. S.326 of the U.P. Municipalities Act prescribed that no suit shall be instituted against a Board or against a member. Officer or a servant of the Board, unless it is an action for recovery of immovable property or for a declaration of title thereto beyond six months next after the accrual of the cause of action. Apparently the period of six months would commence to run from the date of the resolution of the Board dismissing the employee. But it was contended in that case by the employee that the special resolution passed by the Board was subject to his right of appeal to State Government within the prescribed period, the resolution was kept in abeyance and did not come into operation until the decision of the appeal by the State Government. Therefore, according to him his wrongful dismissal by the Board became operative as from the date when the decision of the State Government was communicated to him and that was the date on which the cause of action in regard to his wrongful dismissal accrued to him. The contention did not find favour with the Supreme Court. The court said that the mere filing of an appeal has not the effect of holding the order of the Board in abeyance or postponing the effect thereof until the decision of the appeal. The court said:- "Such a construction would on the other hand involve that even though a special resolution was passed by the Board dismissing or removing the employee he would continue to function as such and draw his salary pending the decision of the appeal, once he filed an appeal to the State Government as prescribed. We do not find any words in S.58(1) and (2) which would suspend the operation of the order passed by the Board or render it ineffective by reason of the filing or the pendency of the appeal". 18. We do not find any words in S.58(1) and (2) which would suspend the operation of the order passed by the Board or render it ineffective by reason of the filing or the pendency of the appeal". 18. The Supreme Court's decision is of no difficulty to comprehend as S.326 of the U.P. Municipalities Act is with reference to suits against the Board or against a member, Officer or Servant of the Board in respect of an act done or purporting to have been done in its or his official capacity It is therefore the action of the Board which gives rise to the cause of action and therefore such cause of action arises immediately with the impugned action of the Board. The fact that such action could be challenged before the Government in an appeal would not postpone the commencement of such cause. The position here is different. Here the employer himself is considering a fresh correctness of an order of dismissal of its employee in proceedings by way of appeal, the original order and the appellate order being by the employer himself no doubt acting through different officers the appellate order being naturally by an officer in a superior position. The provision in the Act refers to dispensing with the services of the employee and it could therefore be very well said that if an appeal is filed to the employer itself (acting through its superior Officer), the order in appeal could be said to be the order dispensing with the services of the employee. If the appeal is not filed within the prescribed period, the original order has to be taken to be the order dispensing with the services. 19. It is true that Sita Ram Goel's Case refers to Mohammed Nooh's Case (1958 SCR.595) where the Supreme Court had said that proceedings in departmental enquiries, even though they may culminate in decisions on appeals or revisions cannot be equated with proceedings before regular courts of law and the theory of merger of the original order in the appellate or revisional order may not be applicable as such to such proceedings. We might note here that in three subsequent Supreme Court cases, two of them by the same Constitution Bench it had been said that Mohammed Nooh's case was a special case which stands on its own facts. We might note here that in three subsequent Supreme Court cases, two of them by the same Constitution Bench it had been said that Mohammed Nooh's case was a special case which stands on its own facts. The decisions are Madan Gopal Rungta v. Secretary to Govt. of Orissa (AIR. 1962 SC. 1513), Collector of Customs, Calcutta v. East India Commercial Co Ltd. (AIR. 1963 SC 1124) and Gojer Brothers v. Ratanlal (AIR. 1974 SC. 1380). In the second of these cases it was said that even it the principle of merger was applicable the facts would still have remained that the dismissal of Mohammed Nooh was prior to the Constitution and therefore he was not entitled to take advantage of the provisions of the Constitution. That was why in Madan Gopal Rungta's case it was observed that the facts of Mohammed Nook's case were of a special kind and in the last of the three cases, Gojer Brothers' case, justice Chandrachud as he then was, stated for the court that the observations in Nooh's case are evidently made in the context of the peculiar facts of the case and their application ought not to be extended beyond those facts. 20. Justice Gajendragadkar, has explained the position in regard to the doctrine of merger in the following words in Commissioner of Income-tax v Amrithlal Bhagilal and Co. (AIR. 1958 SC. 868): "There can be no doubt that, if an appeal is provided against an order passed by a tribunal, the decision of the appellate authority is the operative decision in law. If the appellate authority modifies or reverses the decision of the tribunal, it is obvious that it is the appellate decision that is effective and can be enforced. In law the position would be the same if the appellate decision merely confirms the decision of the tribunal, As a result of the confirmation or affirmation of the decision of the tribunal by the appellate authority the Original decision merges in the appellate decision and it is the appellate decision alone which subsists and is operative and capable of enforcement". (emphasis ours) 21. The decision in Syndicate Bank v. Ramanath (AIR. 1968 SC. 231) turns on the ambit and scope of the provisions in S.33A and 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act. 33. Conditions of service, etc. (emphasis ours) 21. The decision in Syndicate Bank v. Ramanath (AIR. 1968 SC. 231) turns on the ambit and scope of the provisions in S.33A and 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act. 33. Conditions of service, etc. to remain unchanged under certain circumstances during pendency of proceedings (I) During the pendency of any conciliation proceeding before a Conciliation Officer or a Board or of any proceeding before (an arbitrator) a Labour Court or Tribunal or National Tribunal in respect of an industrial dispute, no. employer shall (a) in regard to any matter connected with the dispute, alter, to the prejudice of the workmen concerned in such dispute, the conditions of service applicable to them immediately before the commencement of such proceeding; or (b) for any misconduct connected with the dispute, discharge or punish, whether by dismissal or otherwise any workmen concerned in such dispute, save with the express permission in writing of the authority before which the proceeding is pending (2) During the pendency of any such proceeding in respect of an industrial dispute, the employer may, in accordance with the standing orders applicable to a workman concerned in such dispute (or, where there are no such standing orders), in accordance with the terms of the contract, whether express or implied, between him and the workman (a) alter, in regard to any matter not connected with the dispute, the conditions of service applicable to that workman immediately before the commencement of such proceeding; or (b) for any misconduct connected with the dispute, discharge or punish, whether by dismissal or otherwise, that workman: Provided that no such workman shall be discharged, or dismissed unless he has been paid wages for one month and an application has been made by the employer to the authority before which the proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken by the employer. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2), no employer shall, during the pendency of any such proceeding in respect of an industrial dispute, take any action against any protected workman concerned in such dispute (a) by altering, to the prejudice of such protected workman, the conditions of service applicable to him immediately before the commencement of such proceedings; or (b) by discharging, or punishing, whether by dismissal or otherwise; such protected workman; Save with the express permission in writing of the authorities before which the proceeding is pending. Explanation: For the purposes of this sub-section, a "protected workman", in relation to an establishment, means a workman who, being (a member of the executive or other office bearer) of a registered trade union connected with the establishment, is recognised as such in accordance with rules made in this behalf. (4) In every establishment, the number of workmen to be recognised as protected workmen for the purposes of sub-section (3) shall be one per cent of the total number of workmen employed therein subject to a minimum number of five protected and a maximum number of one hundred protected workmen and for the aforesaid purpose, the appropriate Government may make rules providing for the distribution of such protected workmen among various trade unions, if any, connected with the establishment and the manner in which the workmen may be chosen and recognised as protected workmen. (5). Where an employer makes an application to Conciliation Officer, Board, (an arbitrator), a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal under the proviso to sub-section (2) for approval of the action taken by him, the authority concerned shall, without delay, hear such application and pass, as expeditiously as possible, such order in relation thereto as it deems fit. 33A Special provision for adjudication as to whether conditions of service, etc. changed during pendency of proceedings. Where an employer contravenes the provisions of S.33 during the pendency of proceedings before a (Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal), any employee aggrieved by such contravention, may make a complaint in writing, in the prescribed manner to such (Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal) till a case for dismissal was made out in the proceedings and on receipt of such complaint that (Labour court, Tribunal or National Tribunal) shall adjudicate upon the complaint as if it were a dispute referred to or pending before it. in accordance with the provisions of this Act and shall submit its award to the appropriate Government and the provisions of this Act shall apply accordingly." 22. In the case of Syndicate Bank v. Ramanathan the Supreme Court was considering a case where the maintainability of a complaint filed by an employee under S.33A of the I.D. Act was in question. The employee had first to make put a case of contravention of S.33. In the case of Syndicate Bank v. Ramanathan the Supreme Court was considering a case where the maintainability of a complaint filed by an employee under S.33A of the I.D. Act was in question. The employee had first to make put a case of contravention of S.33. He has to show that industrial dispute was pending at the time when the order of dismissal was passed Proviso to S.33(2)(a) of the said Act, the court points out, contemplates three things, dismissal or discharge, payment of wages and making of application, as part of the same transaction. Therefore there roust be a fixed and certain point of time which will be applicable to all managements and workmen when construing the provision of S.33 of that Act. The Management must definitely know, as to when they have to take necessary action under the proviso to S.33(2)(b) and the workman also should likewise know the definite time when the management should have complied with the requirements of the proviso to S.32(b) so that he could approach the Industrial Tribunal by way of a complaint under S.33A. The Supreme Court said that a reading of the material provisions of S.33 showed that the expression used namely discharge or punishment whether by dismissal or otherwise indicated the point of time, when the order of discharge or dismissal is passed by the authority and therefore he is not concerned with the finality of the orders passed in the first instance. 23. In the nature of the statutory provision of S.33 of the I.D. Act; the order of discharge or dismissal could only be the original or the very first order passed by the Management. Therefore the Supreme Court cases relied on by the learned judge may not be decisive on the point. 24. In interpreting an equivalent and similar provision in the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act, 1947, as in the Act, Justice Ismail, as he then was, if we may say so with respect lays down the correct principle which would be applicable here. The learned judge said in Syndicate Bank v. R. Muniraj and others (1975 II ILJ.106): "In my opinion, the order terminating the services with the employer will be the final and ultimate order of the employer terminating the services. The learned judge said in Syndicate Bank v. R. Muniraj and others (1975 II ILJ.106): "In my opinion, the order terminating the services with the employer will be the final and ultimate order of the employer terminating the services. If there is an appeal provided for by the Service Rules against the order of one officer of the employer to another officer, then, till the matter is disposed of by the appellate officer, it cannot be said that there is an order of the employer terminating the services of the employee. This conclusion is reasonable for the simple reason that if the appellate officer allows the appeal of the employee there will not be any "termination of the services", and the question of the employee appealing against the "dispensing with" of his services under S.41(2) of the Act will not arise. If the conditions of service, rules or regulation or contract, provide for appeal or revision against the order passed by a particular officer terminating the services with the employed, the termination of services with the employer does not become complete original until such appeal or revision is disposed of. All such proceedings are internal with reference to the statutory appeal provided for in S.41(2) of the Act. When particular officer passes an order dismissing an employee, he does so on behalf of the employer, just as the appellate or revisional officer functions on behalf of the employer. Consequently, the order of every one of such officers is an order of the employer and hence it is the order of the appellate or the revisional authority which is the final order of the employer and therefore, an employee will approach the statutory authority under S.41(2) of the Act, only when the final order of the employer is adverse to him'. In the view we are taking we allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the learned single judge in OP. No. 8661 of 1982 and restore the decision of the Appellate Authority. In the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.