JUDGMENT - Ginwala J. - On 25-7-1973 respondent No. 1 (hereinafter refer red to as 'the landlady') purchased a house consisting of three storeys and situated in the town of Amravati. The ground floor was being (Used for non-residential purposes and the first and second floors which consist of several rooms, had been let out to some tenants for residential purposes. One room on the first floor and three rooms on the second floor were in the occupation of the petitioners as tenants at a monthly rental of Rs. 25/-. On 13-8-1973 the landlady made an application to the Rent Controller (respondent No. 3) under Clause 13(3) of the C. P. and Berar Letting of Houses end Rent Control Order, 1949 (here-inafter referred to as 'the Rent Control Order') for permission to give •notice to determine the tenancy of the petitioners on the ground that they were habitual defaulters, that she needed the house for the pur poses of her bona fide occupation and that the petitioners were commit ting acts of waste which were likely to impair the value or utility of the house. In short, permission was sought Under clause 13(3)(ii)(vi) and (viii) of the Rent Control Order. The petitioners resisted this application by filing written statement. Besides the petitioners, the landlady had also made similar appplications against other three tenants occupying rest of the first and the second floor. Against them also she sought permisision to give notice to quit on the ground that she needed the whole of the house for the purposes of bona fide occu pation. Both the parties led evidence before the Rent Controller in support of their respective contentions. All the four applications were consolidated by the Rent Controller and common evidence was record ed. By his order passed on 7-2-1975 the Rent Controller amongst other findings held that the one room in which the landlady and mem bers of her family were residiing in a farm-house at Mhaska was incon venient and insufficient and-unsuitable for the purposes of their resi dence and that the landlady needed the house in question for her bona fide residence. The Rent Controller consequently granted permission) to the landlady to serve notice on the petitioners and other tenants on this ground amongst others with which we are not concerned in the present writ petition. 2. The Rent Controller consequently granted permission) to the landlady to serve notice on the petitioners and other tenants on this ground amongst others with which we are not concerned in the present writ petition. 2. The petitioners being dissatisfied with the said ordler passed by the Rent Controller, preferred an appeal to the Resident Deputy Collector who is designated as appellate authority under the Rent Control Order. This appeal came up for hearing on 23-10-1975. On ¦ that day Mr. Malani Advocate Appeared: before the appellate authority and at about 1 p.m. he filed an application for admitting evidence on affidavit purported to have been sworn by petitioner No. 3 to the effect that during pendency of the appeal one Nar bheram had vacated one room on the first floor and two rooms on the Second floor occupied by him as a tenant. This affidavit was sought to be filed to support the contention that during the pen dency of the appeal the landlady had come in possession of part of the first and second' flooms. It seems that the appeal could not be called out for hearing till 4 p.m. on that day and when sometime thereafter it was called out, petitioner No. 3 made an application for adjournment on the ground that his counsel, namely Mr. N. S. Agrawal waited upto 4 p.m. but left for his house at 4-05 p.m. as he was not feeling well. It seems that the counsel for the landlady had also filed all application on that very day for hearing the appeal since the premises were needed by the landlady! urgently. Considering this application the appellate authority rejeot-ea the application made by petitioner No. 3 for adjournment and proceeded to hear the appeal. He passed his order on 27-10-1975 con-firming the finding of the Rent Controller granting permission to the landlady to give notice the the tenants to determine their tenancies on the ground that she needed the house for her personal occupation By this writ petition the petitioners are challenging these orders passed by the Rent Controller and the appellate authority. 3. This writ petition came up for hearing before a learned Single Judge of this Court on 21-7-1981. 3. This writ petition came up for hearing before a learned Single Judge of this Court on 21-7-1981. One of the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners before the learned Single Judge was that the Rent Controller should have outright rejected the application of the landlady for permission to determine the tenancy on the ground of her bona fide personal ocoupation for the simple reason that she had not entered the withness-box and had not deposed to her needs and that the evidence given by her son in. this, respect could not be taken into cons federation. For this proposition the learned counsel for the petitioners relied on the decision of a Single Judge of this Court in (Nanalal v. Smt. Samratbai)1, which was a case under Section 13(1)(g) of the Bombay Rente, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 wherein the learned Judge held that bona fide requirement of a tenement by the landlord for his personal occupation is a state of his mind and, therefore, must be deposed to by him and that if he does not step into witness-box for proving this require ment, it cannot be said that he reasonably and bona fide requires the premises as stated in that Section. The learned Single Judge went further to say-that on this ground alone the suit can be dismissed. The learned Single Judge who was hearing the present writ petition, did not find himself in agreement with the proposition which has been laid down in Nanalal's case and therefore, he by has order dated 21-7-1981 directed the papers to. be placed before the learned Chief Justice for . referring the case to a larger Bench and this is how this writ petition, has Come before us for final disposal. 4. Mt. N.S. Agrawal, the learned counsel for the petitioners, has advanced manifold arguments in support of the challenge to the impugn ed orders. He firstly contended that the Resident Deputy Collector ought to have adjourned the, appeal as the counsel for the petitioners had to leave the premises of the Court after waiting upto 4 p.m. since he was not feeling well. Mr. Agnawal submitted that this was a genuine ground and the appellate authority in the circumstances stated in the appli cation for adjournment by petitionter No. 3 ought not to have proceeded with the hearing of the appeal. Mr. Agnawal submitted that this was a genuine ground and the appellate authority in the circumstances stated in the appli cation for adjournment by petitionter No. 3 ought not to have proceeded with the hearing of the appeal. He further submitted that the appellate authority should also not have considered the application, which was filed on behalf of the landlady for proceeding with the hearing of the appeal in the absence of the counsel for the petitioners. We do not find much substance in this submission of Mr. Agrawal. Copy of the order-sheet which has been recorded by the appellate authority on 24-10-1975 has been included in the record of this writ petition at Annexure J. It would appear that Mr. N. S. Agrawal was hot the only counsel who was appearing in the petitioners' appeal before the appellate authority. Mr. Malani was also appearing as Advocate for the petitioners. Not only that but the order sheet would show that Mr. Malani had attended the Court of the appellate authority and had in fact filed the abovesaid application with affidavit at about 1 P-m. It is, therefore, clear that .Mr. Malani was very much present in the premises of the Court and had taken steps for hearing of the appeal. Assuming that Mr. Agrawal waited till 4 p.m. and left the premises because of his benig unwell there is absolutely no reason why the other counsel, viz. Mr. Malani should not have appeared at the time when the appeal was called out, and made his submissions. No reasons have been) advanced whatsoever as to why Mr. Malani did not make it convenient to appear before the appellate authority when the matter was called out. If in these circumstances the appellate authority rejected the application for adjournment filed by petitioner No. 3 it is not possible to 1ky blame at 1ts door. 5. Mr. Agrawal next contended that the appellate authority nad not at all taken into consideration the fact which was brought to its notice through the affidvait of petitioner No. 3 filed on 24-10-1975 which event had taken place during the pendency of the appeal. Mr. 5. Mr. Agrawal next contended that the appellate authority nad not at all taken into consideration the fact which was brought to its notice through the affidvait of petitioner No. 3 filed on 24-10-1975 which event had taken place during the pendency of the appeal. Mr. Agrawal Submitted that the fact that during the pendency of the apppeal the landlady had come into possession of some portion of the house required consideration by the appellate authority with a view to see if the need of the landlady would be met by the portion which had come in her possession subsequent to the order passed by the Rent Controller. According to Mr. Agrawal, if the appellate authority had applied its mind to this fact it could have come to the conclusion that the portion which had been vacated by one of the tenants would suffice the needs of the landlady. It is true that on behalf of the petitioners an application was filed by their counsel on 24-10-1975 for taking this affidavit on record in which it is stated that one of the tenants had vacated a portion of the house in his occupation. It is also true that the appellate authority has not considered the averments made in this affidavit. However, in our opinion, even if the averments made in, this affidavit are true, they would not have turned the scales against the landlady. In this connection it is to be borne in mind that the landlady had moved the Rent Controller against alt the tenants occupying the first and the second floor and as seen above the Rent Controller had come to the conclusion that having regard to the extent of the family of the landlady she needed the whole of the house, viz. the first and the second floors. It is further to be borne in mind that the tenant who is alleged to have vacated the portion of the first and the second floors, as stated in the affidavit, was also one of the tenants against whom the landlady had moved the Rent Con-troller and had obtained permission for terminating his tenancy. the first and the second floors. It is further to be borne in mind that the tenant who is alleged to have vacated the portion of the first and the second floors, as stated in the affidavit, was also one of the tenants against whom the landlady had moved the Rent Con-troller and had obtained permission for terminating his tenancy. It is implicit in the order of the Rent Controller that the premises vacated by that tenant would not have been enough for the need of the landlady because if in the opinion of the Rent Controller that was so, he would not have permitted the landlady to terminate the tenancy,: of the other tenants including the petitioners. In other wosrdls, the fact that one of the tenants against whom the order of the Rent Con-troller operated, vacated the rented premises without the landlady having taken recourse to law, would not affect the finding of the Rent Controller with regard to the need of the landlady and for this reason it would not be necessary for the appellate authority to consider the averments made in the said affidavit. 6. Mr. Agrawal next contended that during the pendency of the writ petition in this Court the landlady has obtained possession of some other tenements in the said house and that also requires to be considered while determining the need of the landlady. For the rea-*sons which we have stated in the paragraphs above we db not think this submission merits any consideration. 7. Mr. Agrawal sought to rely before us on certain; statements made by one Harikisan, who is said to be son of the landlady, in a criminal case on 14-9-1975 to the effect that he had been asking the tenants to enhance the rent 2nd since they had not heeded to this request he had filed proceedings against them under the Rent Control Order. Mr. Agrawal presses this statement of Harikisan in service to support the case of the petitioners before the authorities below to the effect that the landlady wanted firstly to enhance the rent and secondly to get the house vacated in order to sell it out which, accord ing to the petitioners, is the business carried out by the landlady and her husband. Now “abviously this statement which is purported to have been made by Harikisan on 14-9-1975 was not produced before the appellate authority though it heard the appeal on 24-10-1975 and decided it on 27-10-1975. It cannot be said that this statement was not available to the petitioners then as obvitously on its own showing it purports to have been recorded on) 14-9-1975 i.e. before the appeal was heard. We are not, therefore, inclined to take this statement into Consideration while deciding this writ petition. As a matter of fact, even if it were to be taken into consideration it is difficult to see how it can be used against the landlady as it cannot be donstnued to be an admission on her part but is a statement made by her son in a criminal case and one does not know in what circumstances that statement has been made. 8. Mr. Agrawal further contended that neither the Rent Controller nor the appellate authority has bestowed its anxious considera tion, to the evidence and the circumstances to hold whether the land-lady needs the house for the purpose of her bona fide occupation. He submitted that both these authorities have not considered the evidence on record and have recorded their findings without doing so. It is true that both the authorities have not discussed the evidence in considerable details separately considering the evidence of each witness. However, the order of the Rent Controller as well as that of the appellate authority indicates sufficiently that they have not been oblivious of the material evidence on record. The appellate authority has in fact considered in para 5 of its order the relevant factors, namely the present accommodation occupied by the landlady, the extent of her family and the extent of accommodation which she would need to house her family and the difficulties in her continuing to stay in the present accommodation. If all these relevant factors have been taken into consideration by the appellate authority in; confirming the finding of the Rent Controller, it is difficult to fid fault with its order. 9. Lastly Mr. Agrawal submitted that the failure on the part of . If all these relevant factors have been taken into consideration by the appellate authority in; confirming the finding of the Rent Controller, it is difficult to fid fault with its order. 9. Lastly Mr. Agrawal submitted that the failure on the part of . the landlady to enter the witness-box to establish her need and bona fides is fatal to the proceedings before the Rent Controller and for this simple reason the Rent Con troller ought to have refused to grant permission to the landlady for determining the tenancy on the ground of need on the part of the landlady to occupy the house. As said above, for this proposition Mr. Agrawal places reliance on the deci sion of the learned Single Judge in Nanalal's ease. 10. Under Section 13(1)(g) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 a landlord is entitled1 to reco ver possession of any premises if the Court is satisfied that they are reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for occupation by himself or by any person for whose benefits the premises are held. Glause 13(3) (vi) of the Rent Control Order lays down that the Rent Controller shall grant permission to the landlord to give notice to determine the lease if after hearing the parties he is satisfied that the landlord needs the house or portion thereof for” the purpose of his bona fide occupation. It would, therefore, appear that the provisions contained in Section 13(1)(g) of the Bombay Act and Clause 13(3)(Vi) in the Rent Control Order are in pan materia in the sense that both speak of the entitlement of the landlord to obtain possession of tenement on the ground of personal occupation. Hence any principle which is enunciated with regard to the way in which the landlord should establish his requirement Under Section 13(1)(g) Of the Bombay Act would also apply to his need under Clause 13(3)(vi) of the Rent Control Order. In other words, the proposition which has been laid down by the learned Single Judge in) Nanalal's' case would also govern the provisions contained in Clause 13(3)(vi) of the Rent Control Order. In other words, the proposition which has been laid down by the learned Single Judge in) Nanalal's' case would also govern the provisions contained in Clause 13(3)(vi) of the Rent Control Order. Hence if what is held by the learned Single Judge in the said case is correct, the landlady in the present case would be out of Court since admittedly she has not entered the witness-box in sub-port of her contention that she bona fide needs the house in question for her own Occupation. It is for this reason that we have to test the; correctness of the proposition which has been laid down by the learned Single Judge in Nanalal's case. 11. That was a case where the landlady wanted possession of the tenements for her personal occupation. She did not enter the witness-box in support of her contentions but examined her son for that purpose. It is in this context that the learned Single Judge held as follows in paragraph 22 of the report : “Section 13(1)(g) says that the premises must be reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord. The bona fide requirement is in the first place a state of mind though it may be something more. It must therefore, be deposed to by the person who is requiring the premises under Section 13(1)(g) namely, the landlord. If the landlord does not step into the witness-box to bring before the Court legal evidence for proving his requirement, then it cannot be said that he reasonably and bona fide requires the premises as mentioned in Sec. 13(1)(g). The landlord can delegate the authority to conduct a case but he cannot delegate the duty to depose.” Further in para 23 of the report the learned Single Judge observed as follows: “The respondent, who is the landlady, has not been examined in support of her case nor has she been examined as a witness on, com-mission. On this ground alone the suit of the respondent ought to have been dismissed because the bona fide requirement which, as I have mentioned above is a state of mind and something more must be proved in this case. Ramanlal, the respondent's son, is said to be her constituted attorney but that could only be for the purpose of conducting the case but his evidence cannot be substituted for the legal evidence of the landlady herself.” 12. Ramanlal, the respondent's son, is said to be her constituted attorney but that could only be for the purpose of conducting the case but his evidence cannot be substituted for the legal evidence of the landlady herself.” 12. With respect we do not find ourselves in agreement with the proposition which has been adumbrated by the learned Single Judge in the extracts quoted above. What is required to be dome by a land lord for obtaining.possession under section 13(1)(g) of the Bombay Act or under clause 13(3)(vi), of the Rent Control Order for permission to determine the tenancy is to establish that he needs or requires the pfremises bona fide for his own use and occupation The question whether the landlord so requires or needs the premises or the house and whether such need or requirement is bona fide or not would be a question of fact which of course the landlord would have to establish for success in the case. Neither the provisions of the Bombay Act nor the Rent Control Order make any provision as to how and in what way the landlord has to establish these two facts. Under Section 13(1)(g) of the Bombay Act he has to satisfy the Court in this regard and under clause 13(3)(vi) he has to Satisfy the Rent Controller. It would appear that the evidence which the landlord would adduce to establish these factors should be sufficient to satisfy the Court or the Rent Controller as the case may be. In the absence of any specific, provision as to how the need or the requirement has to be established, these facts could be proved by the landlord by adducing any evidence which satisfies the Court or the Rent Controller. It may be that certain facts which are needed to establish these requirements are in the personal knowledge of the landlord alone and could not be proved unless he is examined. In such a case it may be necessary for the landlord to step in, the witness-box and the authority concerned may not accept anyt other evidence. It may be that certain facts which are needed to establish these requirements are in the personal knowledge of the landlord alone and could not be proved unless he is examined. In such a case it may be necessary for the landlord to step in, the witness-box and the authority concerned may not accept anyt other evidence. But if these two factors can be established by any other evidence, than that of the llandlord, by putting on record circumstances which sufficiently indicate that the landlord requires the premises bona fide for his use and occupation, we fail to see why it should be necessary as a matter of law that the landlord must examine himself with fatal consequence if he omits to do so. It may be. as has been said by the learned Single Judge in Nanalal's case, that bona fide requirement is state of mind though at may be something more. But if what is required to be established is bona fide requirement one fails to see why it should be necessary to be done only by the evidence of the landlord and none else if such requirement can] be established to the entire satisfaction of the authorities concerned by any other evidence. In our view, the learned Single Judge has laid down the proposition in a very wide,, absolute and abstract terma In our view the question whether the evidence with regard to the bona fide requirement of the landlord should Or should not be accepted in a given case in the absence of the evidence of the landlord himself, would depend upon the facts and evidence in that particular case and any absolute proposition as has been done by the learned Single Judge cannot be laid down in this behalf. It its for these reasons that we, with great (respect to the learned Single Judge, do not agree with what he has said and in) our view Nanalal's case does not lay down the correct law in this respect. 13. What we have stated above is supported by the view taken (by a Division Bench of this Court to which one of as (Ginwala J.) was a party, in (Dattatraya v. Kama] (L.P.A. No. 24 of 1979 decided on 21-9-1981). Submission similar to the one which (has been advanced by Mr. 13. What we have stated above is supported by the view taken (by a Division Bench of this Court to which one of as (Ginwala J.) was a party, in (Dattatraya v. Kama] (L.P.A. No. 24 of 1979 decided on 21-9-1981). Submission similar to the one which (has been advanced by Mr. Agrawal in this case was urged in that case and while repelling this submission the Division Bench observed as follows: “There is also no warrant for the proposition that bona fide need of the Landlord cannot be said to be established unless the landlord,-or the landlady himself or herself steps in the witness'-box to depose the need. The need can be established from the circumstances brought on record. “ 14. All said and done, therefore, we do not find any subistance in this writ petition and it stands dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to Costs. Petition dismissed -----