Judgment 1. The petitioner was elected as the Mukhiya of the Keotsha Gram Panchayat in 1978. Respondent 4 filed a petition under Rule 72, Bihar Panchayat Election Rules, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules) challenging the election. The petitioner challenged the maintainability of the application on the ground that it was not accompanied by a verification and affidavit as required by the Rules. The Election Tribunal agreed with the petitioner and dismissed the application by order dated 18-9-1978 as contained in Annexure 3. Respondent 4 appealed which was allowed by the Additional District Judge, Muzaffarpur, by his order dated 16-2-1981 as contained in Annexure 4. The Election Tribunal was directed to hear the election petition on merits. The petitioner has by this application challenged the said order. 2. Mr. D.N. Yadav, appearing in support of the application, has pressed the following points that the election petition, suffers from such serious defects that it has to be dismissed without a trial on merits : (a) The affidavit accompanying the election petition was not sworn before a Magistrate empowered in this regard under S.139 Civil P. C.; (b) The verification made at the foot of the election petition was not parawise and, therefore, defective; and (c) The petition was not accompanied by a list setting forth particulars of corrupt practices. The learned counsel also challenged the judgment of the learned Additional District Judge (Annexure 4) as illegal and without jurisdiction on the ground. (d) that the judgment was not delivered within six months as directed by the proviso to Rule 70 of the Rules. 3. Rule 75 requires an election petition to be signed by the petitioner and verified in the manner laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure for the verification of the pleadings. The sub-rule (1) of Order 6, Rule 15, Civil P. C. as modified by Patna amendment enjoins that the facts stated in every pleading shall be verified by solemn affirmation or on oath of the party before any officer empowered to administer oath under Sec.139 of the Code. It has been contended by Mr. Yadav that the affidavit in support of the petition was sworn before the Election Tribunal itself and not before any Magistrate. Sec.139 of the Code does not require the affidavit to be sworn necessarily before a Magistrate. It has been contended by Mr. Yadav that the affidavit in support of the petition was sworn before the Election Tribunal itself and not before any Magistrate. Sec.139 of the Code does not require the affidavit to be sworn necessarily before a Magistrate. The oath can be administered apart from a Magistrate by any Court or any officer or other person appointed by the High Court in this behalf or any officer appointed by any other Court empowered in this behalf by the State Government. It has not been stated in the writ application or claimed on behalf of the petitioner before me that the member of the Election Tribunal was not empowered to administer the oath. The first point urged has, therefore, no merit. 4. With respect to the verification said to be defective as not having been made parawise, the learned counsel contended that in view of the decisions of this Court in Saratchandra Mandal V/s. Phani Bhushan Singh, AIR 1974 Pat 40 and Abdul Qasim Khan V/s. Naurang Singh, 1974 PLJR 319 the election petition must be held to be so defective as liable to be summarily dismissed. It was also urged that it was essential for respondent 4 to have annexed a list giving full particulars of the corrupt practices. 5. The Full Bench in Saratchandra Mandal V/s. Phani Bhushan Singh, AIR 1974 Pat 40 (supra) held that a complete absence of a verification in accordance with Order 6, Rule 15 of the Code may be fatal to the election petition. The position remains the same if the verification is so very defective that in the eye of law there is a failure to comply with the requirement of O.6, R.15 of the Code, but where there is sufficient. compliance with the requirements, though not a literal compliance, the defect may be treated as one of a minor character and in that situation it will be too technical and unreasonable to hold that the case is covered by Rule 77 requiring the Tribunal to summarily dismiss the election petition. compliance with the requirements, though not a literal compliance, the defect may be treated as one of a minor character and in that situation it will be too technical and unreasonable to hold that the case is covered by Rule 77 requiring the Tribunal to summarily dismiss the election petition. So far as the effect of omission to file a list giving particulars of the corrupt practices is concerned, I am of the view that in such a case the election petitioner will not be allowed to press his case on the basis of the alleged corrupt practices, but the case can be summarily dismissed where the election is challenged on other grounds. I have gone through the election petition (Annexure 1) and I find that the grounds taken in paragraphs 5 to 7 and 10 to 14 do not relate to any allegation of corrupt practice. The date of the poll was originally fixed as 26-5-1978 which, according to the case of respondent 4, was changed to 3-6-1978 by the officer who had no jurisdiction to do so; and the changed programme was not published as required by the rules. The validity of the location of the booths was also challenged. It was further said that the counting of the votes was made in inadequate light and was, therefore, not correctly done. With respect to these grounds the election petitioner stated in his verification that the contents of the petition were true to his knowledge. It is true that the statements were not referred to by paragraph numbers, but that, I am of the view, does not render the verification so materially defective as to require the petition to be summarily dismissed. I would, however, direct the Election Tribunal not to permit the election petitioner to rely on any alleged corrupt practice. 6. Lastly, the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that as the judgment of the Additional District Judge was delivered after the expiry of six months, the same must be treated as null and void. The proviso to Rule 70 enjoins the District Judge to deliver his judgment within six months so as to avoid undue delay in the disposal of the case. So long the election of a successful candidate is not set aside, he continues in office even if elected illegally. It is, therefore, in public interest to expedite the disposal of the election petition. So long the election of a successful candidate is not set aside, he continues in office even if elected illegally. It is, therefore, in public interest to expedite the disposal of the election petition. In many cases, an elected respondent is successful in getting the case indefinitely postponed and by that tactics to remain in office even on the basis of an illegal election liable to be set aside. The proviso to Rule 70 has been inserted with the object of reminding to the District Judge to dispose of the appeal without delay. If the judgment is not expedited, the general public including the election petitioner suffers from delay, but not the elected candidate. The provision, therefore, cannot be allowed to be used by him as an instrument to thwart the remedy provided against an illegal election. The election petitioner cannot be blamed for any delay on the part of the District Judge and he should not, therefore, be made to suffer on that account. Examined in this light, the provision must be held to be directory in nature and not mandatory, although the word shall has been used in the Rule. It has been firmly established that the use of the word may or shall does not conclusively determine the directory or mandatory nature of a statutory provision. Accordingly, the last point also fails. 7. In the result, the writ application is dismissed subject to the observation made above with costs payable to respondent 4. The bearing fee is assessed at Rs. 250/although the election in question took place about 5« years ago, the petitioner continues in office without a trial of the election petition as no fresh election has taken place. It is, therefore, desirable that the Election Tribunal takes up the case as expeditiously as may be possible.