The substantial question of law involved in this appeal is relatable to the question as to when presumption available in the case of a registered letter properly addressed is sufficient to hold about the service of the same even if the addressee denies its receipt on oath. This question arises in the context of a suit filed for eviction of the defendant from 1B-4K-13 chh. of land. According to the plaintiff-respondent, notice as required under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was sent to the defendant by registered post which the defendant had refused to receive. The tendering of notice was denied by the defendant in his written statement, so also in his evidence. The plaintiff had not examined the postal peon in question. The learned trial Court held that notice was duly served. This finding was arri­ved at on the basis of the exhibits showing posting of a regis­tered letter and the acknowledgement endorsing "refused". Reliance was placed on a decision of this Court in Kashilal vs. Jawaharmal, AIR 1966 A &N 104. On appeal being preferred, it was held by the learned Assistant District Judge that when noitce of ejectment is posted by giving proper address, the requirement of section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is complied with and there will be a presumption that a notice has been tendered as required under the law. This presumption is fortified when the notice is returned with the endorsement "refused". It was, however, acknowledged that this presumption is rebuttable. Despite this, the evidence of the defendant rega­rding non-refusal of notice by him was not considered. 2. Though two other contentions of the defendant that this was a case of splitting up of tenancy and he was mot a defaulter were also not accepted by the courts below. Shri Dey has not addressed me, and rightly, on these issues, as they are concluded by finding of facts. The learned counsel, therefore, confined his address on issue No. 3 which reads: "Had any legally valid ejectment notice been served upon the defendant?" 3. Shri Dey has not addressed me, and rightly, on these issues, as they are concluded by finding of facts. The learned counsel, therefore, confined his address on issue No. 3 which reads: "Had any legally valid ejectment notice been served upon the defendant?" 3. It is not denied by Shri Dey and again, lightly, that if a letter properly addressed and sent by registered post, pre­sumption of its service would be available to the sender in view of what has been stated in section 27 of the General clauses Act and sections 16 and 114 of the Evidence Act read with illustra­tions (a) and (b) of section 16 and (e) and (f) of 114. But then this presumptions is rebuttable. His contention is that as the defendant denied on oath the tender of notice to him, the presumption had sufficiently been rebutted. In such a situation, according to the learned counsel, it was incumbent on the part of the plaintiff to examine the postal peon in question, which was not done. Shri Dey contends that the entire matter could not have been decided only on the basis of presumption on the face of the testimony of the defendant, as has been done. As the courts below have relied the decision in kashilal, it would be in the fitness of things to note the ratio of that deci­sion first. In that case, the defence was that the notice was never sent. In dealing with such a defence, it was pointed out that as soon as the notice is posted by giving proper address, the requirement of section 106 of the Transfer of property Act is complied with and there will be a presumption that notice has been tendered as required by that section. Further observa­tion in paragraph 3 is pertinent in this regard as it is stated that "(I) if the defendants wants to rebut that presumption it is for him to prove that the notice has not been tendered at all". This aspect had completely missed the learned courts below inasmuch as the defendant did enter the witness-box and stated that he had not refused the notice. Whether that is sufficient to rebut the presumption is a different matter; but his evidence could not have been totally ignored in coming to the finding whether the presumption can be said to have been rebutted in the present case. 4. Whether that is sufficient to rebut the presumption is a different matter; but his evidence could not have been totally ignored in coming to the finding whether the presumption can be said to have been rebutted in the present case. 4. Reference has been made in Kashilal to Shaligram Rai Chunnilal Bahadur vs. Abdul Ghani, AIR 1953 Assam 206, which is a decision by Division Bench of this Court, whereas Kasbilal is a rendering of a learned Single Judge. In Saligram (supra) acknowledgement receipt had been filed and the addressee had not examiaed himself to deny receipt. It is because of this that it was held that there was no obligation upon the sender to lead any further proof of service of the notice. As the relevant section raises a rebuttable presumption, it is apparent that every case shall haw to be decided on its own facts. What has been held in the aforesaid decisions of this Court cannot be taken to mean that in all cases the mere fact that notice had been sent at correct address by registered post would be enough to come to a finding of due service of notice even if the addressee steps into the witness box and denies the receipt of the same. Shri Dey has referred, in this connection, to Meghji vs. Kundanmal, AIR 1968 Bombay 387, wherein while dealing with setting aside of as exparte decree, it was held that the presumption of due service of summonses which were sent under registered post and returned with postal endorsement "refused" had been sufficiently rebutted by the denial of the defendant on oath. It was observed that in such a situation unless the postman is summoned and he makes a statement that he had tendered the cover containing the summons, the statement on oath of the defendant would remain uncontroverted. This decision of the Bombay High Court received approval in Puwada Venkateswara vs. C. V. Ramana, AIR 1976 SC 869 (see paragraph 8). The Supreme Court also approved the view expressed by the Calcutta High Court in Nirmalabala Devi vs. Provat Kumar Basu, 52 CWN659 wherein it was hald that a letter sent by registered post could be presumed to have been duly served even without examining the postman if it is returned with the endorsement "refused". What has been stated further in paragraph 10, is relevant for our purpose. What has been stated further in paragraph 10, is relevant for our purpose. That paragraph reads :- "The two decisions are reconcilable. The Calcutta High Court applied a rebuttable presumption which had not been repelled by any evidence. In the Bombay case, the presump­tion had been held to have been rebutted by the evidence of the defendant on oath so that it meant that the plain­tiff could not succeed without further evidence. The Andhra Pradesh High Court had applied the ratio decidendi of the Bombay case because the defendant-appellant before us had deposed that he had not received the notice. It may be that, on a closer examination of evidence on record, the Court could have reached the conclusion that the defendant had full knowledge of the notice and had actually refused it knowingly. It is not always necessary in such cases, to produce the postman who tried to effect service. The denial of service by a party may be found to be incorrect from its own admissions or conduct." 5. Shri Laskar who appeared for the plaintiff-respondent submits that to raise the presumption examination of postman or other evidence is not necessary. He refers to Gangaram vs. Phulwati, AIR 1970 Allahabad 445, a Full Bench decision. This proposition is unexceptionable because if evidence would have been necessary to establish service, aid of presumption would have been unnecessary, as pointed out in Jagat Ram vs. Battumal, AIR 1976 Delhi 111. In such cases presumption is intended to be a substitute for proof. But as the presumption is rebuttable, the important question to consider is whether any evidence has been lead in rebuttal and if so whether that is sufficient. It may be pointed out that the solitary statement of the defendant may be regarded as sufficient to rebut the presumption if the evidence sounds convincing. This is also the view taken in Shiv Dutt vs. Ram Dass, AIR 1980 All 280 wherein it has been pointed out that statement on oath of a party to the proceeding is a piece of oral evidence like statement of any other witness, and there is no rule of law that such a statement should not be accepted unless corroborated by any independent evidence. It was also observed that an addressee in such a case cannot examine the postman as he would not depose against his own endorsement more so if it was done to oblige the other side. 6. All told, what is needed in a case where rebuttal evidence is adduced is that mind has to be applied to the same and it has to be found out whether the evidence inspires confidence and is sufficient to rebut the presumption. This apart, the Court has to examine other evidence on record to see if the defendant had knowledge of the notice and had actually refused it knowingly. In such a case it is not always necessary to produce the postman. The denial of service may be found to be incorrect from the admission of the defendant or his conduct. 7. As this exercise has not been gone into by the court below, it is a fit case where the matter should be remanded to it not only to appreciate the materials including the evidence of the defendant already on record, but also to allow the parties to lead additional evidence on this issue. As this is an old matter the learned Assistant District Judge would act in accordance with this direction expeditiously and dispose of the matter within six months of the receipt of the records by him. The finding on this issue would decide the ultimate fate of the suit. If it is found that the notice has been duly served, the suit would stand decreed and vice versa. The appeal is allowed as aforesaid.