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1983 DIGILAW 323 (ALL)

Ratan Lal Agarwal v. District Judge

1983-04-26

N.D.OJHA

body1983
JUDGMENT N.D. Ojha, J. - The Petitioner is the landlord of a building which is situate within the Cantonment area of Jhansi. This building was let out to Respondent No. 3. Subsequently, an application was made by the Petitioner for release of the aforesaid building in his favour u/s 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Act, on the ground that he needed it bonafide for his own use. This application was contested by Respondent No. 3 but was allowed by the Prescribed Authority. 2. An appeal was preferred by Respondent No. 3 before the District Judge. He has taken the view that since the Act "as in force on the date of this notification" was made applicable to the buildings situated within the Cantonment areas by the Notification dated 1st September, 1973, issued by the Central Government u/s 3 of the Cantonments (Extension of Rent Control Laws) Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as Act 46 of 1957) the Act as it existed on 1st September 1973 alone was applicable to buildings which were situated within a cantonment area. He has further held that since the Officer who passed the order under appeal had been authorized by the District Judge to exercise the powers of Prescribed Authority in pursuance of definition of the term 'Prescribed Authority' contained in Section 3(e) of the Act as amended by U.P. Act No. 28 of 1976 and the said officer had not been authorized to exercise the powers of Prescribed Authority in accordance with the provisions of the Act as they stood on 1st September, 1973, he had no jurisdiction to entertain the application made by the Petitioner u/s 21 of the Act. On this view the District Judge without going into the merits of the appeal allowed it and set aside the order of the Prescribed Authority on 2-2-1981. It is this order of the District Judge which is sought to be quashed in the present writ petition. 3. Having heard learned Counsel for the parties I am of the opinion that the view taken by the District Judge cannot be sustained. It is this order of the District Judge which is sought to be quashed in the present writ petition. 3. Having heard learned Counsel for the parties I am of the opinion that the view taken by the District Judge cannot be sustained. That the provisions of the Act are applicable to the Cantonment areas of Uttar Pradesh subject to the restrictions and exceptions contained in Act 46 of 1967 and the modifications contained in the notification dated September 1, 1973 issued by the Central Government published in the Gazette of India dated September 29, 1973 admits of no doubt in view of the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Lekh Raj Vs. 4th Additional District Judge, Meerut and Others, AIR 1982 All 265 . 4. The question which really falls for consideration in the present writ petition is as to what is the effect of the words "as in force on the date of this notification" used in the aforesaid notification dated 1st September, 1973. As seen above this notification was issued by the Central Government in exercise of the power conferred on it by Section 3 of Act 46 of 1957. The said section which in so far as is relevant for the decision of the aforesaid question as it stood before its amendment by the Cantonment (Extension of Rent Control Laws) Amendment Act, 1972, hereinafter referred to as Act 22 of 1972, read as follows: 3. Power to extend to cantonments laws relating to control of rents and regulation of house accommodations. The Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, extend to any cantonment with such restrictions and modifications as it thinks fit, any enactment relating to the control of rent and regulation of house accommodation which is in force on the date of the notification in the State in which the cantonment is situated: Provided.... Section 3 of Act 22 of 1972 inter alia provides that Section 3 of the Principal Act namely Act 46 of 1957 shall be renumbered as Sub-section (1) thereof, and in Sub-section (1) as so renumbered the words "on the date of the notification" shall be, and shall be deemed always to have been omitted. 6. Section 3 of Act 22 of 1972 inter alia provides that Section 3 of the Principal Act namely Act 46 of 1957 shall be renumbered as Sub-section (1) thereof, and in Sub-section (1) as so renumbered the words "on the date of the notification" shall be, and shall be deemed always to have been omitted. 6. The effect of the words "on the date of the notification" being omitted from Section 3 of Act 46 of 1957 in the manner contemplated by Section 3 of Act 22 of 1972 was that the aforesaid words would be deemed not to have been in existence in Section 3 of the Act 46 of 1957 from the very inception. As such Section 3 of Act 46 of 1957 did not confer on the Central Government the power to issue a notification under that Section to extend to any Cantonment an enactment relating to the Control of Rent and Regulation of house accommodation which was in force "on the date of the notification" in the State in which the Cantonment is situated. The use of the words "on the date of this notification" after the word "as in force" and before the words "in the State of Uttar Pradesh" in the notification dated 1st September, 1973, were, therefore, beyond the power conferred on the Central Government by Section 3 of Act 46 of 1957 and will accordingly be deemed to be not in existence in the aforesaid notification and have to be ignored. 7. In Bajaya Vs. Gopikabai and Another, AIR 1978 SC 793 it was held in paragraph 27 of the report as follows: Broadly speaking, legislation by referential incorporation falls in two categories: First, where a statute by specific reference incorporates the provisions of another statute as of the time of adoption. Second, where a statute incorporates by general reference the law concerning a particular subject, as a genus, in the case of the former, the subsequent amendments made in the referred statute cannot automatically be read into the adopting statute. In the case of latter category, it may be presumed that the legislative intent was to include all the subsequent amendments also, made from time to time in the generic law on the subject adopted by general reference. 8. In the case of latter category, it may be presumed that the legislative intent was to include all the subsequent amendments also, made from time to time in the generic law on the subject adopted by general reference. 8. Section 3 of Act 46 of 1957 after its amendment by Act 22 of 1972 as aforesaid on the face of it comes in the latter category referred to in the decision of Bajya (Supra). Consequently the definition of the term "Prescribed Authority" as it was subsequently amended by U.P. Act No. 28 of 76 is applicable for finding out as to who is the Prescribed Authority to entertain an application u/s 21 of the Act even in regard to those buildings which are situated within a Cantonment area. The view taken to the contrary by the District Judge in the impugned order suffers from a manifest error of law and deserves to be quashed. 9. In the result the writ petition succeeds and is allowed and the impugned order dated 2-2-1981 passed by the District Judge, Jhansi Respondent No. 1, is quashed and he is directed to decide the appeal filed by Respondent No. 3 on merits in accordance with law keeping in mind the observations made above. Since the application for release was made in the year 1977, the District Judge shall decide the appeal as expeditiously as possible. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.