JUDGMENT Maheshwar Prasad for himself and for S.K. Sahgal, Chairman. The point referred to this full bench by the learned Member, Sri I.B. Singh, is as follows:- "When the two members of a review bench differ, whether the review application should be deemed to stand dismissed in view of provisions of order XLVII, Rule 6(1) of the C.P.C., or the matter should be referred to a third member for decision according to the practice of the Board..... and as provided by Section 8(2) of the U.P. Land Revenue Act and paras 170 and 190 of the Revenue Court Manual." 2. The point has arisen consequent on review applications presented against the judgment and decree dated July 28, 1970 passed by the then judicial Member, B.K. Misra, dismissing second appeal Nos. 130 and 131 of 1968-69/Aligarh, in proceedings under the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, I of 1951, hereinafter referred to as the Act. The review applications were heard by a division bench consisting of I.B. Singh and R.S. Verma, Members. The learned Members disagreed on whether the review applications should be allowed. It is generally admitted that in proceedings, including review, under the U.P. Land Revenue Act III of 1901, under which the Board of Revenue is constituted, a difference of opinion between two Members is referred normally to a third Member, and the point decided in accordance with the majority opinion of the three Members, including the two original Members. Under Order XLVII, rule 6(i) of the civil Procedure Code, however, if there is a difference of opinion between the two Members hearing a review application, the review application stands dismissed. The basic point for decision, therefore, is whether in reviews arising from proceedings under the Act, the provisions of Order XLVII of the C.P.C. will apply or not. 3. The learnd counsel for the applicants ably argued his case by tracing the historical position regarding the constitution of the Board of Revenue and its powers right from its very inception. In all the legislative enactments, or enactments with legislative force, in the 19th century and earlier 20th century, the Board of Revenue was given full powers to amend, modify, or review its decisions. In all the legislative enactments, or enactments with legislative force, in the 19th century and earlier 20th century, the Board of Revenue was given full powers to amend, modify, or review its decisions. He stressed the point that in the North-West Provinces Tenancy Act of 1901, the Agra Tenancy Act of 1926 and the U.P. Tenancy Act of 1939, the powers to review were given in all those enactments in two different sections. In the first of these sections, of which Section 273 of the U.P. Tenancy Act is the latest representative, full powers are given to the Board of Revenue. In the second section, the representative Section 274 of the same Act gives powers of review to other courts set up under the Act subject to the provisions of Order XLVII of the C.P.C. Learned counsel emphasised the distinction that the legislature had consistently made in the powers of review given to the Board of Revenue and the powers of review given to other courts only in accordance with Order XLVII. The plain implication was that the powers of review granted to the Board of Revenue not subject to the provisions of Order XLVII. 4. The Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, however, made no direct provision for review in the body of the Act itself. Section 341 of the Act made the C.P.C. applicable to all proceedings, 'unless otherwise expressly provided by or under the Act.' In the rules framed under the Act, rule 339(1) reads 'unless otherwise expressly provided by or under the Act, the provisions of Sections 256, 261, 273, 274, 277 to 282 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939, shall apply to the suits and proceedings specified in schedule II of the Act and appeals, revisions and reviews arising therefrom.' Learned counsel argued that since both the Sections 273 and 274 of the U.P. Tenancy Act had been made applicable, the distinction made by the legislature in these two sections should continue to be respected. 5. Learned counsel also drew our attention at length to the full bench decision of five Members of the Board of Revenue in Baharuddin v. Gaon Sabha 1976 R.D. 53 onwards. He drew our attention to the historical presentation, and the constitution and powers of the Board of Revenue given in that ruling, and drew particular attention to paras 39 and 40 of the ruling. He drew our attention to the historical presentation, and the constitution and powers of the Board of Revenue given in that ruling, and drew particular attention to paras 39 and 40 of the ruling. Learned counsel, who was also the learned counsel before that Bench and who has been quoted by that Bench in these paragraphs, clarified that these where not the views he had expounded, though the fact is that the Bench recorded with approval the arguments that the powers of the Board of Revenue to review its order are neither governed by rule 339 of the Act or Section 11 of the C.P. Code or Order XLVII of the C.P.C. but are inherent jurisdiction powers of the Board. The Bench had, however, clearly held that neither Section 114 nor Order XLVII of the C.P.C. are applicable. 6. Learned counsel also took us through a large number of rulings in which the Board had repeatedly held that it has full powers of review and that Order XLVII generally, and rule 9 of the Order XLVII in particular, has been held as inapplicable. Learned counsel admitted that in some of the rulings the Board had held, according to him wrongly, that although the Board was not restricted by the provisions of Order XLVII, the Board would normally be guided by those provisions. Learned counsel conceded that a division bench of the High Court had given a contrary view, as reported in 1978 A.W.C. at page 177, regarding the applicability or Order XLVII. He argued that it had been wrongly represented to the High Court that the Board of Revenue has consistently held that it would be guided by the provisions of Order XLVII, and it was under this erroneous presentation that the High Court has pronounced accordingly. He cited many rulings to show that in the past the Board of Revenue has clearly held that Order XLVII was not applicable, and it was unfortunate that based only on a few stray rulings, a wrong presentation had been made to the High Court. It does not seem necessary to refer to these rulings at length in view of the clear finding of the High Court. It does not seem necessary to refer to these rulings at length in view of the clear finding of the High Court. The crux of the arguments put forward by the learned counsel for the applicant was that both Sections 273 and 274 of the U.P. Tenancy Act 1939 were made applicable to review proceedings under the present Act through rule 339, and, although Section 341 of the Act makes the C.P.C. applicable in its entirely, the harmonious reading of this with Sections 273 and 274 would point to the conclusion that Order XLVII was not also stressed the fact that in all proceedings under the Land Revenue Act the provisions of Sections 7 and 8 read with rules 170 and 190 of the Revenue Court Manual gave a clear and consistent justification for the practice of referring to a third member points of disagreement between two Members. 7. At one stage learned counsel for the applicants also referred to rule 182(2) of the Z.A. and L.R. Rules whereby the provisions regarding appeal, revision and review contained in Chapter X of the U.P. Land Revenue Act were made applicable to revenue courts under the Act, Learned counsel for the opposite party promptly pointed out that rule 182(2) referred only to orders passed by revenue courts under the particular chapter of the rules and not to all orders of revenue courts under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. The point was not further pursued by learned counsel for the applicant. 8. Learned counsel for the opposite parties placed his reliance entirely on the High Court decision in Niyaz Ahmad v. Board of Revenue 1978 A.W.C. 177 onwards. The High Court clearly held that in review proceedings under the Act Order XLVII of the C.P.C. was applicable. The High Court held that there was no inconsistency between the provisions of Section 341 of the Act and Rule 339 of the Act which makes Sections 273 and 274 of the Agra Tenancy Act 1939 applicable. The decision of the High Court is subsequent to the ruling in Baharuddin v. Gaon Sabha, referred to at length by the learned counsel for the applicants. He emphasized the point that the interpretation of law given by the High Court is binding on the Board. 9. The decision of the High Court is subsequent to the ruling in Baharuddin v. Gaon Sabha, referred to at length by the learned counsel for the applicants. He emphasized the point that the interpretation of law given by the High Court is binding on the Board. 9. After careful consideration of the arguments put forward by the learned counsel on both sides, it is clear that Section 341 of the Act has extended all the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code unless otherwise expressly provided. It is true that Rule 339 has made Sections 273 and 274 of the Agra Tenancy Act applicable. The High Court had held that there is no inconsistency between the application of the C.P.C. through Section 341 of the Act and of Section 273 of the U.P. Tenancy Act through Rule 339. After a careful reading of Niyaz Ahmad v. Board of Revenue 1955 A.L.J. 370, we cannot accepted the contention of the learned counsel for the applicants that the High Court has been mislead by an erroneous argument presented before it. It is true that the High Court has referred to the so called consistent view of the Board of Revenue and we sympathise with the learned counsel's argument that there was no such consistent view. But the learned Judges of the High Court have clearly decided the applicability of Order XLVII in the portions of the Judgment preceding the reference to this so called consistent view. It is true that the High Court has not commented on the distinction between Sections 237 and 274 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, both of which have been made applicable. It would have been of advantage of this had been discussed, particularly as the High Court Judgment itself refers to a Bench decision of the court in Smt. Indra Devi v. The Board of Revenue 1955 A.L.J. 370, onwards. That decision had upheld the power of the Board to exercise powers of review more than once, contrary to Rule 9 of Order XLVII. In other words, the powers of review of the Board under Section 273 of the U.P. Tenancy Act were not bound by Order XLVII. The High Court has distinguished 1955 A.L.J. page 370 as arising from proceedings under the U.P. Tenancy Act and not under this Act. In other words, the powers of review of the Board under Section 273 of the U.P. Tenancy Act were not bound by Order XLVII. The High Court has distinguished 1955 A.L.J. page 370 as arising from proceedings under the U.P. Tenancy Act and not under this Act. This would appear inconsistent with the authoritative finding that there is no inconsistency between Section 273 of the U.P. Tenancy Act as applied to proceedings under this Act, and Order XLVII. But it is correct that the law, as interpreted by the High Court, is binding on the Board, and we cannot question, only on the Strength of Rule 339, the High Courts view that Order XLVII is applicable to proceedings generally under this Act. 10. The High Court has not, however, made any reference to Rule 182 or assessed its impact, Rule 182(2) reads "The provisions regarding appeals, revisions and review contained in Chapter X of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901, as amended by the Act, shall apply to the orders passed by revenue courts under this chapter. "After carefully considering this point we are unable to agree with the summary dismissal of this rule suggested by learned counsel for the opposite parties. The Z.A and L.R. Rules are divided into Chapters just like the parent Act, and it is significant that the Chapter headings are the same as those in the Act. The rule in any given Chapter are, therefore, rules which amplify the provisions of the corresponding Chapter of the Act. It is clear, therefore, that rule 182 would apply to all orders of revenue courts passed under the Sections included in Chapter VII of the Act, headed 'Tenure'. These proceedings originated as proceedings under Section 209, which figures in that Chapter. 11. There is no doubt that the Civil Procedure Code does not apply, with limited exceptions, to proceedings under the Land Revenue Act. Order XLVII in particular does not apply. The application of the Land Revenue Act to proceedings under Chapter VIII, by virtue of Rule 182, is certainly an express provision which would, therefore, negate the provisions both of Section 341 regarding application of the C.P.C. and of Rule 339 extending Section 273 of the U.P. Tenancy Act. Order XLVII in particular does not apply. The application of the Land Revenue Act to proceedings under Chapter VIII, by virtue of Rule 182, is certainly an express provision which would, therefore, negate the provisions both of Section 341 regarding application of the C.P.C. and of Rule 339 extending Section 273 of the U.P. Tenancy Act. It seems clear to us, therefore, that while as propounded by the High Court, Order XLVII would have to be followed in reviews arising from proceedings under all the other Chapters of the Act, it would not be applicable to review arising from proceedings, under Chapter VIII i.e. under any section from Section 129 to 230. Similarly the Civil Procedure Code will not be applicable to appeals, revisions and reviews arising from proceedings under this Chapter. It is unfortunate that the attention of the Division Bench which decided Niyaz Ahmad v. The Board of Revenue 1978 A.W.C. 177 was not drawn to rule 182. If it had, we feel certain that it would have agreed that Section 341 does not come into play in view of the express provisions of rule 182. 12. The Board of Revenue has, no doubt, developed the consistent practice of making a reference to a third Member whenever there was disagreement between two Members. This is authorised by Section 7 and 9 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act read with rules 170 and 190 of the Revenue Court Manual. There can be no doubt that this consistent practice is and will continue to be justified in all proceedings of the Board of Revenue where the C.P.C. is not applicable. 13. Since, in our view, the original proceedings were under the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Act and therefore, the provisions of the Land Revenue Act are applicable to all appeals, revisions and reviews it follows that in these cases the Board of Revenue will not have to follow the provisions of Order XLVII or, in fact, any other provision of the C.P.C. The powers of the Board in reviews under the Land Reforms Act are complete and the procedure to be followed will also be that spelt out in the Revenue Court Manual. Although the Board may choose generally to be guided by the provisions of Order XLVII, it cannot be restricted by those provisions in cases where the Board is satisfied that there is good cause to make a departure, or the provisions of Order XLVII are contrary to those under the Land Revenue Act. 14. Our answer to the point referred will, therefore, be:- "That in proceedings originating in any of the sections of Chapter VIII of the Act, the C.P.C. or Order XLVII will not be applicable, by virtue of rule 182(2), to all appeals, revisions or reviews which will be governed by the provisions of the Land Revenue Act. Therefore, differences between two Members of a review bench will be referred to on, or more than one if necessary, Member and the question decided by he majority opinion, as has ben the consistent practice followed by the Board in accordance with the Land Revenue Act and the revenue court Manual. Further the Board of revenue court generally will follow the provisions of the Land Revenue Act in appeals, revisions, and reviews in all proceedings under Chapter VIII of the Act pertaining to Tenure. Furthermore, in proceedings under all other Chapters of the Act revenue court will follow the interpretation given by the High Court in Niyaz Ahmad v. Board of Revenue regarding applicability of Order XLVII of the Code of Civil Procedure." R.S. Verma, M. - We have carefully read the judgment prepared by Shri Maheshwar Prasad, learned Member. We regret out inability to agree with the view expressed by him therein. 16. The referring order and the context, in which the matter was referred to this Full Bench have been mentioned in the judgment of my learned colleague. Before I state the reasons for differing with the aforesaid views, I will like to deal with Section 8(2) of the U.P. Land Revenue Act because this section is mentioned in the referring order and also because Shri B.B. Paul, is learned counsel for the applicant, reportedly cited his section in support of his views. Before I state the reasons for differing with the aforesaid views, I will like to deal with Section 8(2) of the U.P. Land Revenue Act because this section is mentioned in the referring order and also because Shri B.B. Paul, is learned counsel for the applicant, reportedly cited his section in support of his views. In his referring order, Shri I.B. Singh learned Member, posed the question whether the matter should be referred to a third member for decision.....as provided by Section 8(2) of the U.P. Land Revenue Act.' 16-A. Section 8, U.P Land Revenue Act, is as follows: "Decision when case heard by Division Bench - (1) Where a judicial proceeding coming under consideration of the Board on appeal or reference or in revision is heard by a Division Bench composed of two or more members, the case shall be decided in accordance with the opinion of such members or of the majority if any, of such members. (2) Where the members constituting the Bench are equally divided in opinion as to the decision to be given on any point, the case shall be heard upon such point by one or more of other members and the point be decided according to the opinion of the majority of the members who have heard the case including those who first heard it." (Emphasis supplied) 16-B. It is clear from a bare reading of this section that it is deals with cases coming to the Board on appeal or reference or in revision. It does not mention cases coming to the Board as review applications. Hence, if this court respects the legislative intention, it cannot apply Section 8, U.P. Land Revenue Act, to review petition. No court of law has power to add words in any statue. 16-C. Even if Section 8(2) U.P. Land Revenue Act, is applied to review petitions, a correct interpretation of the section would show that where several members of the Board have considered a point, the decision thereon shall be according to the majority of the Members, who have heard the case, including those who first heard it. 16-C. Even if Section 8(2) U.P. Land Revenue Act, is applied to review petitions, a correct interpretation of the section would show that where several members of the Board have considered a point, the decision thereon shall be according to the majority of the Members, who have heard the case, including those who first heard it. Hence, when a case has decided on merits by a single Member and the correctness of that judgment is challenged before two other Members of the Board, and one of the two Members of the Bench agrees with the view of the single Member, who had first heard the case on merits, it is a clear case showing that the majority of opinions and that only one Member, out of the members - two out of three - have similar three Members, holds a different opinion. In that eventuality the view of the majority will prevail and the case will be decided accordingly. It means that the review petition will fail and there will be no need to refer the matter to a third Member. 17. Some of the our learned colleagues have answered the referred question as follows:- 'that in proceedings originating in any of the sections of Chapter VIII of the Act, the C.P.C. or Order XLVII will not be applicable, by virtue of rule 82(2) to all appeals, revisions or reviews, which will be governed by the provisions of the Land Revenue Act.' Our view is contrary to this, and we will presently give reasons in support of our view. Section 341, U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms act, lays down that 'unless otherwise expressly provided by or under this act, the provisions of........the code of civil procedure.......shall apply to the proceedings under this act. in the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms act there is no provision for review. however, under this act, U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms rules were framed under rule 339 of the said rules, it is laid down that section 273 of the U.P. tenancy act shall apply to reviews arising from suits and proceedings specified in schedule II of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms act. however, under this act, U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms rules were framed under rule 339 of the said rules, it is laid down that section 273 of the U.P. tenancy act shall apply to reviews arising from suits and proceedings specified in schedule II of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms act. section 273 of the U.P. tenancy act lays down that 'the board, on its own motion or on an application of a party to the case, may review and may rescind, alter or confirm any decree or order made by itself, or by a single member.' this provision is not contrary to the provisions contained in order XLVII of the C.P.C. and therefore Order XLVII of the C.P.C. will apply to review petition in the Board of Revenue. 18. Section 341, U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, simply makes the three enactments including the Code of Civil Procedure, applicable to the proceedings under the Act unless there is any express provision to the contrary. Where there is no provision to the contrary, the C.P.C. will have an unfettered application. The enactments mentioned in Section 341, U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, that is Indian Court Fees Act, C.P.C. and the Limitation Act will apply unless they were expressly excluded. If there are no express provisions to the contrary in the Act or under the Act regarding reviews, C.P.C. and Order XLVII will apply to re-review petition pending in the Boar of Revenue. If there are no express provisions to the contrary in the Act or under the Act regarding reviews, C.P.C. and Order XLVII will apply to re-review petition pending in the Boar of Revenue. So if it si to be held that C.P.C. or Order XLVII of the C.P.C. does not apply to reviews in the Board of Revenue, it must be shown and established that in the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, Land Revenue Act, U.P. Tenancy or Revenue Court Manual there are express contrary provisions to those mentioned in the C.P.C. and Order XLVII of the C.P.C. We need not much be detained for explaining this aspect of the matter in view of a Division Bench ruling of the Allahabad High Court given by Nyaya Murti Shri M.N. Shukla and Nyana Murti Shri K.P. Singh, reported in 1978 A.W.C. 177, wherein it was laid down that, 'That provisions of Section 341 of the U.P. Act I of 1951 read with Rule 339 of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules and Section 273 of the U.P. Tenancy Act lead to only one inference, namely, that the requirement of law is that the Board should exercise its power of review in conformity with the guidelines by Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure'. This ruling in binding on the High Court, this court and all the other courts of Uttar Pradesh, until it is reversed by the High Court or the Supreme Court. In A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1893, it has been held that High Court's ruling is blinding on all courts of that territory. 19. In the judgment prepared by our learned brothers, it has been held that this ruling of the High Court (1978 A.W.C. 177) is applicable to review petitions in the Board, arising from suits or proceedings under all the chapters of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act except Chapter VIII of that Act, which deals with Tenure and which contains Sections 129 to 230 of that Act. The reason given by the learned Members is that Rule 182 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules contains express contrary provisions regarding review as far as Chapter VIII of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act is concerned and that the High Court, in 1978 A.W.C. 177, Rules 182, U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules, nor its impact on the review petition of the Board of Revenue. 20. In our opinion Rule 182, U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules, Chapter X of U.P. Land Revenue Act and paras 170 and 190 of the Revenue Court Manual do not contain any express contrary provisions regarding review. This is a verifiable fact and it can be gathered from the said Act, Rules and Manual. We may observe here that while our esteemed colleagues dealt with Rule 182 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules, they have not discussed the provisions of Chapter X of the U.P. Land Revenue Act and of paras 170 and 190 of the U.P. Revenue Court Manual, and thus we are left in the dark as to what these express contrary provisions are. So we must go through those provisions and find out whether those contain any express and contrary provision to what is mentioned in Order XLVII of the C.P.C. If there are express and contrary provisions therein, the Board will be guided by those contrary provisions, but if those provisions are silent and do not 'otherwise expressly provide' the C.P.C. including Order XLVII of the C.P.C. including Order XLVII of the C.P.C. will apply in view of Section 341, U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. 21. Rule 182 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules, as far as it is relevant for the decision of the question before us, is that, 'The provisions regarding appeals, revision and reviews contained in Chapter X of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901, as amended by the Act, shall apply to the orders passed by revenue courts under this chapter. The phrase 'this chapter refers to Chapter VIII of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, which contains Sections 129 to 230. The phrase 'this chapter refers to Chapter VIII of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, which contains Sections 129 to 230. This rule itself does not contain any express contrary provision, but refers to chapter X of the U.P. Land Revenues Act and states that reviews shall be decided in accordance with the provisions of that chapter of the U.P. Land Revenue Act. 22. Thus we are led to chapter x of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, and we have to find out the provisions contained in it regarding review, Section 220 of this chapter is the only section, which deals with review. That section is as follows:- "220. Power of Board to review and alter its order and decrees:- (1) The Board may review, and rescind, alter or confirm any order made by itself or by any of its members, in the course of business connected with settlement. (2) No decree or order passed judicially by it or by any of its member shall be so reviewed except on the application of a party to the case made within a period of ninety days from passing of the decree or order, or made after Board that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period. (3) A single member vested with all or any of the powers of the Board shall not have power to alter or reverse a decree or order passed by the Board or by any member other than himself." 23. Now the question is what is expressly provided by this section, that has not been provided by Order XLVII of the C.P.C.? In Order 47 of the C.P.C. there is no provision regarding limitation of ninety days. So in the Board of Revenue application for review can be filed within a period of ninety days from passing of the decree or order. Moreover, in view of Rule 339, U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules, read with Section 273 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, the Board can exercise the power of review on its own motion. Apart from these two express provisions there is no contrary provision regarding review and hence the other provision of Order 47, C.P.C. shall apply to review power of the Board of Revenue. 24. Apart from these two express provisions there is no contrary provision regarding review and hence the other provision of Order 47, C.P.C. shall apply to review power of the Board of Revenue. 24. Our learned colleagues have argued in their judgment that the application of the Land Revenue Act to proceedings under Chapter VIII, by virtue of rule 182, is certain an express provision which would, therefore, negate the provisions both of Section 341 regarding application of the C.P.C. and or Rule 339 extending Section 273 of the U.P. Tenancy Act. What has been lost sight of here is that, for the purpose of excluding the C.P.C., it is not enough if there is express provision in the Act or under the Act, but in addition to it the provision must be otherwise than is provided in the C.P.C. The phrase 'otherwise' means contrary: and therefore unless the provisions in the Act or under the Act in contrary to the provisions of the C.P.C. the application of C.P.C. cannot be excluded. We have already shown that in Section 273, U.P. Tenancy Act and under Section 220, U.P. Land Revenue Act, there is no express contrary provision except about the period of limitation and about the Board exercising review powers an its own motion. 25. We are also in respectful disagreement with the view expressed by our learned colleagues that 'The powers of the Board in review under the Land Revenue Act are complete.......' We have already cited Section 220 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act. 25. We are also in respectful disagreement with the view expressed by our learned colleagues that 'The powers of the Board in review under the Land Revenue Act are complete.......' We have already cited Section 220 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act. Does it make any provision regarding the grounds on which review jurisdiction can be invoked, as is provided in Order XLVII Rule 1, C.P.C. does it provide for the form of application for reviews as is provided in Rule 3 of Order 47, does it provide for previous notice to the opposite party as is provided in Rule 4(2)(a) of Order 47, does it provide for the rejection of the review petition in cases where the members are equally divided, as is provided in Rule 6 of Order 47, does it provide that in case of difference of opinion between two members of the Bench the point shall be referred to a third member, does it provide that rejection of the review is not appealable, as has been provided in Order 47, Rule 7, and does it provided in Order 47, Rule 7, and does it provide that a second review application is not maintainable, as has been provided in Order 47, Rule Rule 9 C.P.C.? There are no such provision in Section 220 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act and hence it cannot be said that Section 220 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act is complete and deals with all these necessary provisions. As there are no contrary provisions in Section 220 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, the application of C.P.C. to review petitions in the Board cannot be excluded. 26. It has then been said that paras 170 and 190 of the Revenue Court Manual prescribed the procedure to be followed by the Board, while dealing with review petitions. Para 170 of the Manual lays down that 'When the Board has distributed its appellate business among the Members, the order of single Member is the order of the Board. It is perspicuous that this para does not deal with review petitions, and hence it would be doing violence to the language, used by the framers of the Manual, to interpret para 170 as dealing with review petitions. It is perspicuous that this para does not deal with review petitions, and hence it would be doing violence to the language, used by the framers of the Manual, to interpret para 170 as dealing with review petitions. In 1955 R.D. 356, it was held that the procedure prescribed in paras 170 and 190 of the Revenue Court Manual, as the necessity of obtaining concurrence, do not apply at all to cases under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. 27. Para 170, Revenue Court Manual, was amended by Uttar Pradesh Gazette, Part I-Ka, dated July 18, 1970, by Notification No. 8697/12-910-B, whereby the provision regarding concurrence was deleted. Para 170-A was added by this notification and it is as follows:- "A Bench of two or more Members of the Board, doing judicial work, may be constituted to decide intricate and controversial questions of law. The procedure for the formation the Bench will be as follows:- (a) Any member doing judicial work may move the Senior Most Member proposing the formation of a Bench, giving reasons therefor. (b) The Senior Most Member may accept the proposal, reject or modify the same. (c) The Senior Most Member may also from a Bench on his own motion. (d) The Senior Most Member will name the Members, who shall constitute the Bench, if there are more than three Members doing judicial work and will also formulate specific point of reference to the Bench, as framed." Thus, we see that in rule 170 of the Manual, there is no specific provision that in case of difference of opinion between two Members of a Bench the matter shall be referred to a third Member. Likewise, Rule 190 of the Revenue Court Manual was also amended by the same Notification, referred to above, and now it reads as follows: "Where the Board has distributed its revisional business among the Members, the order of a single Member shall be the order of the Board." Rule 170 deals with appellate distribution of business and Rule 190, Revenue Court Manuel, deals with revisional distribution of business. Both these Rules do not contain any provision regarding review and, therefore, these rules will not apply to review petition. 28. Both these Rules do not contain any provision regarding review and, therefore, these rules will not apply to review petition. 28. We have discussed in detail that Rule 339, U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules, Section 273, U.P. Tenancy Act, Section 8, U.P Land Revenue Act, Chapter X of the Land Revenue Act and Paras 170 and 190 of the U.P. Revenue Court Manual have not made any otherwise or contrary provisions to those contained in Order 47, C.P.C., except regarding period of limitation and taking of suo moto action by the Board. We have further showed that nowhere it is mentioned that when two Members of the Board, while hearing review petition, disagree, the point shall be referred to third Member. So, on these grounds, we do not think that there is any justification for not following the Division Bench ruling of the High Court, reported in 1978 A.W.C. 177. That ruling is binding on this court as well as on the High Court itself. 29. There has been repeated reference to the consistent practice of this Board to refer to a third Member a point on which two Members, constituting a Review Bench, are in disagreement. We are aware of such consistent practice. That is not to say that such pratice does not exist in the Board. The learned counsel has not cited any reported or unreported case of this court in support of this assertion. However, any consistent practice of this court will not make it legal or justified unless the law authorises such pratice. If no legal justification can be found for that it would be better if such practice is stopped. 30. We have tried to show that in cases of review under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act the provisions of Order 47, Civil Procedure Code, would be applicable by virtue of Section 341 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. Even in cases where Civil Procedure Code is not applicable, as in cases of inherent and plenary powers of the High Court, Order 47, Civil Procedure Code, applies. In A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1047, it was laid down by the Supreme Court of India that..... Even in cases where Civil Procedure Code is not applicable, as in cases of inherent and plenary powers of the High Court, Order 47, Civil Procedure Code, applies. In A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1047, it was laid down by the Supreme Court of India that..... there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude a High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave or palpable errors committed by it. But there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter of evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found, it may also be exercised in any analogous ground'. These are the very three grounds mentioned in Order 47, Rule 1, Civil Procedure Code. Article 111, Constitution of India, says that 'The law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts within the territory of India.' In A.I.R. 1982 Alld. 355, a Division Bench held, while referring to the aforesaid decision of the Court, that, 'These are the very three grounds referred to in Order 47, Rule 1, Civil Procedure Code and by declaration of law at the hands of the Supreme Court in the above case they are the hedges or limitation of the High Court's power. If it is so for the High Court, it will certainly, by necessary implication, be applicable to the Board or Revenue while dealing with review petitions under the Land Revenue Act. 31. My learned colleagues have observed in para 18 of the judgment that, "Although the Board may choose generally to be guided by the provisions of Order XLVII, it cannot be restricted by these provisions in cases where the Board is satisfied that there is good cause to make a departure....... The question then will be why the Board should make a departure from Rule 6 of Order 47 C.P.C. Code when two Members of a review bench differ in their view? The question then will be why the Board should make a departure from Rule 6 of Order 47 C.P.C. Code when two Members of a review bench differ in their view? In the present case, out of which the review arose, an appeal was decided on merits by a learned Member of this Board. A review petition filed alleging that there was apparent mistake or error in that judgment. It is an established law that (A.I.R., 1980, Supreme Court, 674) that the finality of the judgment delivered by the court will not be reconsidered except "share a glaring omission or a patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility". In A.I.R., 1975, Supreme Court, 1500, it was held that, "A review of a judgment is a serious step and reluctant resort to it is proper only where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility.......... The present order is not a virgin ground but review of an earlier order which has the normal feature of finality". As long as the original Member, who decided the case on merits, is available, review of his order can be made only by him and by no other member or members. It is only when the original member is not available, the review petition is heard by two members. The clear purpose behind this practice is that the original final judgment of a member cannot be modified or reversed unless two other members concur in the opinion that the judgment suffers from a patent and grave mistake. Here it must be emphasised that the scope before Review Bench is very limited, as has been held by the Supreme Court in rulings quoted above. If the two members of the Review Bench differ in their opinion, it is definitely a case in which it becomes disputable that the original judgment suffers from a patent and grave error. In A.I.R. 1964, Supreme Court, 1372, it was held that, "........ it would be suffice for us to say that where without any elaborate argument one could point to the error and any here is a substantial point of law which stares one in the face, and there could reasonably be no two opinions entertained about it, a clear case of error apparent on the face of the record would be made out". The very fact of divergence of opinion between the members of a Review Bench would be sufficient to prove that there could reasonably two opinions entertained about it; and in that event the revision petition is bound to fail. In this background, Order 47 Rule 6, C.P. Code, was enacted and there would be no 'good cause to make a departure' from the rule. Apart from this if the matter, upon such difference of opinion between two members of a Review Bench is referred to another member it would be, in fact, referring the matter not to a third member but to a fourth member, because the original members cannot be eliminated from the scene as his opinion about the case is the most important and, to a large extent, the final judgment in the case. If the fourth member concurs with the minority view, there will again be tie and the matter will have to be referred to a fifth member. That could be most unreasonable approach in dealing with the situation. Justice and reason both are in favour of the provisions or Order 47, Rule 6, C.P.C., and it is also the law enacted by the Parliament to meet such contingency. Law, justice and reason - all demand that in case of disagreement between two members of a review bench, the review petition shall stand dismissed. 32. Our learned colleagues have been much influenced by the fact that 'the application of Land Revenue Act to proceedings under Chapter VIII, by virtue of Rule 182, is certainly an express provision which would, therefore, negate the provisions both of Section 341 regarding application of the C.P.C., and Rule 339 extending Section 273 of the U.P. Tenancy Act'. We have given our anxious thoughts to this line of argument. The argument is that in view of this specific provision review in cases arising out of suits and proceedings under chapter VIII of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, the U.P. Land Revenue Act (Chapter X) will apply; and because in the Land Revenue Act Order 47 of the C.P.C. is not applicable, it could also be not applicable to review under Chapter VIII of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. This arguments is very much attractive and, ex-facie, appears to have grate force in it. However, we are of the view that this approach requires reconsideration. This arguments is very much attractive and, ex-facie, appears to have grate force in it. However, we are of the view that this approach requires reconsideration. Firstly, for execution of the C.P.C. in cases under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act it is not enough that there should be an express provision in the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act or in the said Act; it is also necessary that express provision should be otherwise than what is mentioned in the C.P.C. we have seen, after a detailed discussion, that the provisions of Chapter X of the Land Revenue Act, which have been made applicable by Rule 182, are not otherwise than the provisions of the C.P.Code. The fact is that Chapter X of the Land Revenue Act is silent on the point incorporated in Chapter 47, C.P.C. It simply does not contain any provision similar to, or otherwise than or contrary to the provisions of Chapter 47, C.P.C. In absence of such provisions, the C.P.C. will have unfettered application to cases under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. Secondly, the fact that Order 47, C.P.C. is not applicable to Land Revenue Act will not be treated as a provision otherwise than that of C.P.C. It is only a negative aspect. Chapter X of the Land Revenue Act neither included the provisions of Order 47, C.P.C., nor excludes it. On the other hand, there is a positive expression of the intention of the Legislature that, by virtue of Section 341, U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code will be applicable in case there is no express 'otherwise' provision in the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act or under the L.R. Act. Thirdly, Rule 182 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules can only be treated as a guidance to the revenue courts and officers; and can try to compete with the substantive law enacted, in Section 341, U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, by the Legislature. Rule 182 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules was made by virtue of Section 230 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act which lays down that 'the State Government may make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of this Chapter (VIII of the Z.A. Act)'. Rule 182 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules was made by virtue of Section 230 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act which lays down that 'the State Government may make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of this Chapter (VIII of the Z.A. Act)'. In Section 230(2) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, it is laid down that "without prejudice to the generality of foregoing power, such rules, may provide for - (1) the guidance of courts and officers in suits, applications and other proceedings under, and generally in all matters connected with the enforcement of this Chapter;? The purpose of framing rules under Section 280 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act is for the purpose of guidance only. It must not take the place of other substantive law enacted in that Act itself. Fourthly, it must be kept it mind that Section 341, U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act finds place in Chapter XII of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, and that rule making power in that chapter is derived from Section 344 under which Rule 339. U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules, which expressly deals with review matters, was framed. Thus Chapter VIII of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and Rule 182 framed under that chapter on the one hand, and Chapter XII of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and Rule 339 framed thereunder must operate on different planes; and in case of conflict regarding the interpretation of the import of Section 341, U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act more weight ought necessarily to be given to Rule 339, instead of Rule 182. Sixthly in cases of inevitable conflict between Rule 182 and Rule 339 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules the balance must tilt in favour of Rule 339 because while rules framed under Section of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, in which Rule 182 finds place, require to be laid before the State Legislature and are subject to such modifications that the State Legislature may make. Seventhly, if it is ultimately found out that the provisions of Rule 182 and those of Section 341 U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, are irreconcilable. Seventhly, if it is ultimately found out that the provisions of Rule 182 and those of Section 341 U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, are irreconcilable. Section 341, U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act will preference over Rule 182. In that event, Rule 182, U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules, will be deemed to be ultra-vires the Act. Whenever there be a conflict between the provisions of a rule and the provisions of the Act, the Act, framed by the Legislature, will prevail over the Rules, framed by the Executive. The main Legislation must have preference over the subordinate or delegated legislation. It is well-known that Act is the creation of the Legislature and that Rules, framed under the Act, are creation of the Executive. Lastly, if the view of our learned brothers prevail it would lead to illogical and starting results, that is, in suits involving declaration of title to land, the elaborate procedure given in the C.P.C. regarding trial of suits will not be available, while those provisions will govern other applications and proceedings which are of a summary nature and which do not involve declaration of title. The Legislature could never had envisaged such a result. We will devote another paragraph for a discussion of this aspect of the matter. 33. All the important suits and proceedings under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act are started under Chapter VIII of the Act. The chapter deals with tenure. The view of our learned brothers is that C.P.C. is not applicable to appeals, revisions or reviews arising out of any suit or proceeding originating in any of the sections of Chapter VIII of the Act; and that the provision of Land Revenue Act and Revenue Court Manual will alone apply to these. It is well known that, though cases under the Land Revenue Act are important for the administration of revenue law, they are of summary nature and do not deal with declaration of rights in land. So the Legislature applied only some of the sections and orders of the C.P.C. in dealing with cases under that Act, vide Appendix I of Revenue that Act, vide Appendix I of Revenue Court Manual. So the Legislature applied only some of the sections and orders of the C.P.C. in dealing with cases under that Act, vide Appendix I of Revenue that Act, vide Appendix I of Revenue Court Manual. Even in the U.P. Tenancy Act and in proceeding Tenancy Acts, important cases involving proprietary rights in land were exclusively dealt with by the Civil Courts, and only cases about tenancy rights were tried by the Revenue Courts. While the Civil Courts dealt with proprietary rights under the U.P. Tenancy Act and the preceding Tenancy Acts, they were fully governed by the C.P.C. It is in that context that the U.P. Tenancy Act and the preceding Tenancy Acts excluded some of the provisions of the C.P.C. from being applied to revenue courts, because the Legislature was aware that important suits regarding proprietary rights in land were to be tried by the civil courts, in which C.P.Code was applicable. When the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act came into force suits about Bhumidhari and Sirdari rights were tried by the Civil Courts and C.P.C. was applicable to them. Only Adhivasi and Asami rights were left within the jurisdiction of the revenue courts, but even there when a question about Bhumidhari or Sirdari rights was raised, the question had to be referred to the Civil Court for a finding and that finding was binding on the revenue court. It is only after six or seven years of the advent of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act that revenue courts were given jurisdiction to try suits regarding Bhumidhari and Sirdari rights. This was done not because Bhumidhari or Sirdari rights came to be considered inferior rights like tenancy rights, but because revenue courts were considered competent to deal with cases involving superior rights of Bhumidhars and Sirdars. When revenue courts began to deal with Bhumidhari and Sirdari rights they applied the provisions of the the C.P.C. in view of Section 341, U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. If C.P.C. is excluded in appeals, revisions and reviews out of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, the courts and litigants will be deprived from the benefit of elaborate procedure of the C.P.C. enacted by the Parliament, and will begin to deal with according to the sweet discretion of individual members of the Board. If C.P.C. is excluded in appeals, revisions and reviews out of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, the courts and litigants will be deprived from the benefit of elaborate procedure of the C.P.C. enacted by the Parliament, and will begin to deal with according to the sweet discretion of individual members of the Board. We have already shown that Land Revenue Act and Revenue Court Manual do not contain complete provisions according to which appeals, revisions or reviews are to be governed. In absence of such provisions individual members will interpret the law as they like. It is well-known that every person is a prisoner of his own ideas, framed according to his own experience of life. In important matters individual partiality and prejudice necessarily asserts itself even in trained and disciplined persons. That is the more reason why rules, procedure and guidelines be prescribed for the observance of courts and authorities. This is all of the more important for courts of law because their functioning profoundly affects public confidence which is so necessary for democratic administration. In this view of the matter, we are firmly of the belief that the elaborate procedure contained in the parliamentary statute, the C.P.C., must be available to the revenue courts, while dealing with cases under Chapter VIII of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. That will ensure confidence in the public Departure from it, unless provided for by some statue or Rules, will leave the matter to member's own interpretation of the law and will be a sure way for shaking the confidence of the public in the administration of law. 34. Our learned brothers have expressed the view that Rule 182, U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules, will negate the provisions of Rule 339, extending Section 273 of the U.P. Tenancy Act. This would be a correct approach. It is only be virtue of Rule 339, U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules that the Board of Revenue gets power of review. If Rule 339 is taken away, the Board will not have any power of review. In Patel Narani Tarkeshi v. Pradumn Singhji A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1273 it was held by the highest court of this land that, "That power of review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication." 35. If Rule 339 is taken away, the Board will not have any power of review. In Patel Narani Tarkeshi v. Pradumn Singhji A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1273 it was held by the highest court of this land that, "That power of review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication." 35. Section 8, U.P. Land Revenue Act, Rule 182, U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules and Para 170, Revenue Court Manual, came up for consideration before Nyayamurti Shri Satish Chandra (as he then was) in Civil Miscellaneous writ No. 518 of 1968. It was decided on April 11, 1969, and it was reported in Unreported Revenue Cases, Volume I. It was held in that decision that, 'Section 8 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act provided that no decree or order in judicial proceedings coming before the Board, inter alia, in appeal, shall be altered or reversed without the concurrent judgment of the member of the Board. Para 170 is to the same effect. The U.P. Land Revenue (Regulation of Procedure) Act No. XXXII of 1966 repeated the re-enacted Section 8. The re-enacted provision did not require the concurrence of two members before the Board could alter or reverse a decree. Rule 170, which was a rule fraud under Section 8, would, therefore, not govern the procedure before the Board of Revenue after the coming into force of the 1966 Amending Act. "It was urged that, under Section 7, as re-enacted the power of the Board to distribute its business among its members was subject to provisions of any rules. It was urged that Rule 170 would, therefore, control the power of the Board to distribute its business. In my opinion, the phrase 'to distribute its business would refer to allocation of cases instituted before the Board of Revenue. It will not apply to procedure that may be adopted by the Board in hearing and deciding those cases. The question of concurrence of two members of the Board does not relate to the distribution of its business, and would, therefore, not be subject to Section 7. It will not apply to procedure that may be adopted by the Board in hearing and deciding those cases. The question of concurrence of two members of the Board does not relate to the distribution of its business, and would, therefore, not be subject to Section 7. Consequently, Rule 170 would not be applicable to the decision of appeals by the Board." "In the alternative, reliance was placed upon Rule 182 of the Rules framed under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, Under it , the procedure laid down in Parts I and IV of the Revenue Court Manual was to be, mutatis mutandis applied in hearing and deciding suits, application and other proceedings under Chapter VIII of the Z.A. Act. Section 229-B which provides for a suit is in Chapter VIII of the Act. Rule 170 falls in Part I of the Revenue Court Manual. In view of the Rule 182, Z.A. Rules, it may be that the rules contained in Part I of the Revenue Court Manual will apply to the hearing and decisions of suits, applications and other proceedings under Chapter VIII of the Zamindari Abolition Act. But from that, it will not follow that these provisions of the Revenue Court Manual would also apply to appeals which are not under Chapter VIII, because Rule 182 expressly limits the applicability of Parts I and IV of the Revenue Court Manual to the hearing and decisions of suits, etc., under Chapter VIII. Second appeals arising out of suit under Section 229-B are provided by Section 331 in Chapter XII of the Zamindari Abolition Act. The hearing and decision of such appeals would be not governed by Rule 182 at all. Therefore, by virtue of Rule 182, Rule 170 of the Revenue Court Manual could not be attested to the hearing of decision of appeals by the Board of Revenue. "The case will apply to revise jurisdiction also because Section 344 read with Rule 339, giving review jurisdiction to the Board, fall under Chapter XII of the Act and not under Chapter VIII. 36. This aforesaid ruling of the High Court is on the point and is binding on this court. 37. "The case will apply to revise jurisdiction also because Section 344 read with Rule 339, giving review jurisdiction to the Board, fall under Chapter XII of the Act and not under Chapter VIII. 36. This aforesaid ruling of the High Court is on the point and is binding on this court. 37. So, from whatever angle we may look at this important point of law, the only conclusion will be that the Civil Procedure Code will apply to cases under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, in view of Section 341, unless it is otherwise expressly provided by the Act or under the Act. 38. Our answer to the learned question is that when two members of a review bench differ in their review petition shall be dismissed in view of the provisions of Order XLVII, Rule 6(1), Civil Procedure Code. C.B.D. Dwivedi, M. - I agree. I.B. Singh, M. - I had the advantage of perusing the judgment jointly prepared by Shri Sehgal, Senior most Member/Chairman Board of Revenue and Shri Maheshwar Prasad, Member Board of Revenue answering the question referred to the full bench by ultimately holding that difference between two members of a review bench will be referred to one or more than one Member if necessary and the question shall be decided by the majority opinion, I had therefore signed it. 40. I have also advantage of perusing the judgment of brother Varma Member Board of Revenue who has disagreed with the view referred to above and has answered the question referred to the full bench by observing that entire procedure contained in order 47 C.P.C. is applicable to the Board exercising its power in review and that in event of disagreement between two members hearing review petition that same shall stand dismissed in view of provisions of Order 47 Rule 6, C.P.C. 41. I fully agree with the view taken by Shri Sehgal and Shri Maheshwar Prasad and with due respect I entirely disagree with the view taken by brother Varma Member Board of Revenue and in this connection I wish to give my point of view besides showing that the view taken by brother Varma is incorrect. 42. I fully agree with the view taken by Shri Sehgal and Shri Maheshwar Prasad and with due respect I entirely disagree with the view taken by brother Varma Member Board of Revenue and in this connection I wish to give my point of view besides showing that the view taken by brother Varma is incorrect. 42. The question posed to the full bench does not call for any adjudication by us with regard to the norms and scope on the basis of which the power of Board in review is to be exercised in which view of the matter with due respect I would state that brother Varma Member Board of Revenue has unnecessarily addressed himself on the question aforesaid I shall in a suitable case express my view but presently I shall deal with only the question referred to the full bench and questions arising in this context only. 43. The power of the Board in review in the proceedings under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act is the same as is and has been the power of Board in review under the U.P. Land Revenue Act and under the U.P. Tenancy Act which provisions have been made applicable in view of rule 182 and Rule 339 of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules. At this stage it is useful to reproduce the power of Board and that of the subordinate revenue courts under the two enactments referred to above. 44. Under the U.P. Land Revenue Act there is no power of review conferred to the subordinate revenue court and the power of review of has only been conferred to the Board under Section 220 which reads as follows : "220. Power of Board to review and alter its order and decrees:- (1) The Board may review and may rescind alter or confirm any order made by itself or by any of its members in the course of business connected with settlement. (2) No decree or order passed judiciably by it o by any of the members shall be so reviewed except on the application of a party to the case made within a period of ninety days from the passing of the decree or order or made after such period if the applicant satisfies the Board that he had sufficient causes for not making the application within such period. (3) Members not empowered to alter each other's orders. A single member vested with all or any of the powers of the Board shall not have power to alter or reverse a decree or order passed by the Board or by any member other than himself. (4) Under the U.P. Tenancy Act power of Board and that of subordinate courts in review has been conferred under Sections 273 and 274 which reads as follows:- "273. The Bord on its own motion or on the application of party to the case may review and may rescind alter or confirm any decree or order made by itself or by a singly member. 274. Every other court shall be competent to review its judgment in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 and the provisions of Order XLVII of the said Code shall apply to any such review." 45. Shri B.B. Paul counsel for the applicant during course of his argument has very ably and effectively traced the history of power of the Board and that of subordinate courts in review ever since creation of the Board of Revenue by referring to Bengal Regulations and said power occurring in various enactments prior to passing of U.P. Land Revenue Act and the U.P. Tenancy Act and in this connection he has cited large number of cases on the question aforesaid but since we fully agree that Section 114 or Order 47, C.P.C. do not apply to the Board in exercise of its power in review we do not consider it necessary to refer to the cases cited by him for the purpose of brevity. A bare perusal of Sections 273 and 274 of U.P. Tenancy Act clearly establish beyond doubt that Section 114 of U.P. Tenancy Act clearly establish beyond doubt that Section 114 and order 47 of the C.P.C. do not at all apply to the Board in exercise of its power in view. 46. The same is the position with regard to the power of Board in regard to the U.P. Land Revenue Act as would appear from Section 220 of U.P. Land Revenue Act read with Rule 176 of U.P. Revenue Court Manual. 47. 46. The same is the position with regard to the power of Board in regard to the U.P. Land Revenue Act as would appear from Section 220 of U.P. Land Revenue Act read with Rule 176 of U.P. Revenue Court Manual. 47. Before proceeding further it would be useful to quote Rule 182 and Rule 339 of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules and Section 341 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act which read as follows:- "182. General - (1) In hearing and deciding suits, applications and other proceedings under this Chapter revenue court shall follow mutatis mutandis and subject to the following amendment, the procedure laid down in parts I and IV of the Revenue Court Manual. In between the words "Government" and "as a party" occurring in sub-rule (1) of Rule 204 of the Revenue Court Manual, the words "or a (Goan Sabha" shal be inserted). (1-A) The provisions of Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 shall apply to all suits covered by sub-rule (1). (2) The provisions regarding appeals, revisions and review contained in Chapter X of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901 as amended by the Act, shall apply to the orders passed by revenue courts under this Chapter. 339. (1) Unless otherwise expressly provided by or under the Act the provisions of Sections 256, 261, 273, 274, 277 to 282 of the U.P. Tenancy Act 1939 shall apply to the suits and proceedings specified in Schedule II of the Act and appeals revisions and reviews arising therefrom. (2) In respect of the suits or proceedings mentioned in sub-rule (1) the first appeal shall lie within thirty days of the date of the decree or order appealed against and the second appeal if any shall lie within ninety days of the date of decree or dated passed by the court of first appeal. 341. Application of certain Acts to the proceedings of this Act - Unless otherwise expressly provided by or under this Act, the provisions of the Indian Court Fees Act, 1870 the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and the Limitation Act 1963 including Section 5 thereof shall apply to the proceedings under this Act." 48. 341. Application of certain Acts to the proceedings of this Act - Unless otherwise expressly provided by or under this Act, the provisions of the Indian Court Fees Act, 1870 the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and the Limitation Act 1963 including Section 5 thereof shall apply to the proceedings under this Act." 48. The use of words "unless otherwise expressly provided by or under this Act "occurring in Rule 339 and the use of almost similar words" unless otherwise expressed provided by or under this Act" in Section 341 of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, in our opinion deserve to be explained. In our considered opinion provisions of Indian Court Fees Act 1870, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 and the Limitation Act, 1963 shall apply to proceedings under U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act only in event of something occurring in 3 enactments referred to above has not been stated expressly or impliedly under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and the rules framed thereunder and not otherwise with thereunder and not otherwise with reference to controversy involved in the case in question. This clearly leads us to hold that Section 114 and Order 47, C.P.C. do not apply to the proceedings in review before the Board in as much as the power of Board in review and the procedure to be followed in this regard has been expressly and elaborately stated in Section 220 of U.P. Land Revenue Act Section 273 of U.P. Tenancy Act and its provisions have been made applicable in the proceedings under U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act by virtue of Rule 182 and 339 of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules. 49. 49. Without noticing Rule 182 of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act Hon'ble High Court in a case law reported in 1978 A.W.C. page 177 in Niwaz Ahmad v. Board of Revenue and others has laid down that in exercise of the power of Board in review the Board shall be guided with the guidelines mentioned in Order 47 Rule 1 C.P.C. In our considered opinion the guidelines given in Order 47, Rule 1 C.P.C. are illustrative and not exhaustive and that Board can in case of absolute necessity can go beyond guidelines given in Order 47 Rule 1 C.P.C. and in this connection Board can entertain second review petition which view of out is substantiated by Division Bench decision of Hon'ble High Court in Smt. Inda Devi v. Board of Revenue 1955 A.L.J. 370 and again reaffirmed by the Hon'ble High Court in Niyaz Ahmad's case (supra). 50. Bereft with unnecessary further scrutiny of the power of Board in review now we wish to straight away address ourselves with regard to the procedure to be followed by the Board in exercise of its power in review for our learned brother Varma, Member of Revenue has failed to find out the procedure to be followed by the Board while exercising its power in review. In this connection it would suffice to refer to the note appended to Rule 163 of U.P. Revenue Court Manual which reads as follows:- "Note - (1) The above mentioned procedure should be observed mutatis mutandis in dealing with applications for review under both the Uttar Pradesh Tenancy Act, 1939 and the Uttar Pradesh Land Revenue Act, 1901. (2) Nothing contained in these rules the period of limitation otherwise applicable in each case." 51. I bare perusal of the note referred to above clearly demonstrates that in dealing with application in review both under the U.P. Land Revenue Act 1901 and the U.P. Tenancy Act 1939 the procedure applicable in Chapter 7 of Part I of the U.P. Revenue Court Manual would mutatis mutandis apply. 52. The meaning of word 'Mutatis mutandis' as per various judicial pronouncement is 'with necessary changes in point of details.' 53. 52. The meaning of word 'Mutatis mutandis' as per various judicial pronouncement is 'with necessary changes in point of details.' 53. In the note appended to rule 163 of U.P. Revenue Court Manual it has been stated with emphasis that procedure applicable in Chapter 7 of Part I of the U.P. Revenue Court Manual should be observed mutatis mutandis in dealing with application for review under the U.P. Tenancy Act and U.P. Land Revenue Act, in that view of the matter it has become necessary for us to appreciate the use of word 'should' occurring in the note referred to above. 54. As per rule of interpretation the word 'shall' and the word 'may' are capable of being interpreted vice versa but in our considered opinion the word "should" connotes only the imperativeness particularly when it is being talked of with reference to procedural law. We are supported in our view by a decision of Supreme Court in Smt. Juthika Bhattacharya v. State of Madhya Pradesh 1976(4) SCC 96 wherein full bench of their lordship of the Supreme Court have construed the word 'should' to be understood in a mandatory sense to which view we humble subscribe in the context in which the word 'should' has been used, in the note appended to rule 163 of U.P. Revenue Court Manual. 55. There is yet another aspect of the matter which deserves to be considered by us namely, what is the sanctity of the note appended to rule 163 of U.P. Revenue Court Manual. 56. In our considered opinion the note aforesaid is part and parcel of the rule 163 of U.P. Revenue Court Manual and that it has the same effect as is the effect of statutory force of rule 163 of U.P. Revenue Court Manual. 57. Now this brings us to consider the statutory force of the rules occurring in Part I and Part IV of the U.P. Revenue Court Manual which have been put in service by virtue of rule 182 of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules. In our opinion this problem would not detain us long and it would suffice to state that rules (rules 1 to 216) framed in 9 chapters constituting part I of U.P. Revenue Court Manual have been made by the Board with the provisions sanction of the State Govt. In our opinion this problem would not detain us long and it would suffice to state that rules (rules 1 to 216) framed in 9 chapters constituting part I of U.P. Revenue Court Manual have been made by the Board with the provisions sanction of the State Govt. and that the said rule making power has ben conferred to the Board under Section 234 of U.P. Land Revenue Act and Section 293 of U.P. Tenancy Act a bare perusal whereof would show that Board could frame rules with reference to items mentioned in the two rules under the two enactments referred to above and that items referred to above include procedure of rule making power to be framed as to the procedure to be followed with reference to appeal, reference, revision and review etc. 58. Sri. B.B. Paul, learned counsel for applicant in support of his submission that in event of disagreement between the members, the matter should be referred to 3rd member who in his discretion may either choose to agree with any of the two disagreeing members or may refer the case to a larger bench has drawn our attention to the provisions of Sections 7, 8 and 220 of U.P. Land Revenue Act and paragraph No. 170 and 190 of the U.P. Revenue Court Manual. Apart from this the learned counsel for the applicant has cited large number of cases which we shall deal at appreciate. 59. The old and new Sections 7 and 8 of U.P. Land Revenue Act and new rule 170 and 170-A of the U.P. Revenue Court Manual have already been quoted in extenso in the full bench decision in Baharuddin v. Gaon Sabha 1976 R.D. 53 and as such we do not consider it necessary to reproduce them. Rule 190 of the U.P. Revenue Court Manual has also been amended. The said amendment has been quoted in paragraph 13 in the judgment of our learned brother R.S. Verma, Member and as such the same is also not required to be reproduced. 60. Rule 190 of the U.P. Revenue Court Manual has also been amended. The said amendment has been quoted in paragraph 13 in the judgment of our learned brother R.S. Verma, Member and as such the same is also not required to be reproduced. 60. The existing Section 7 of U.P. Land Revenue Act clearly states that the Board may so distribute its business and make such territorial division of its jurisdiction among its members as it may think fit subject to provisions of the rules made under the U.P. Land Revenue Act including Sections 8 thereof sub-section (2) of the rule aforesaid further stipulates that the Board may regulate disposal of its judicial business by its Members sitting along or in division bench. 61. Section 8 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act states that 'Where a judicial proceeding coming under consideration of Board on appeal, reference on revision is heard by the division bench composed of two or more members the case shall be decided in accordance with the opinion of such members or of the majority but where the members constituting the bench are equally divided in opinion the case shall be heard on such point by one or more other member and the point to be decided according to the opinion of the majority of the members who have heard the case including those who first heard it.' 62. The existing rule 170 of the U.P. Revenue Court Manual states that the senior most member of the Board shall distribute business and make necessary territorial division of Board's......jurisdiction amongst members where after the order of single member shall be the order of the Board. 63. Rule 170-A of the Revenue Court Manual contemplates that a bench of two or more members of the Board doing judicial work may be constituted to decide intricate question of law and in this regard following procedure has been laid down for formation of bench: (a) Any member doing judicial work may move the seniormost Member proposing the formation of a Bench giving reasons therefor. (b) The seniormost Member accepted the proposal, reject it or modify the same. (c) The seniormost Member may also form a Bench of his own motion. (b) The seniormost Member accepted the proposal, reject it or modify the same. (c) The seniormost Member may also form a Bench of his own motion. (d) The seniormost Member will name the members who shall constitute the bench if there are more than three members doing judicial work and will also formulate specific points of reference to the Bench so formed." Rule 190 of the U.P. Revenue Court Rule 190 of the U.P. Revenue Court Manual states that where the Board has distributed its revisional business amongst its members, the order of the single member shall be the order of the Board. This rule is in line with sub-rule (ii) of rule 170 of the U.P. Revenue Court Manual. 64. The Board has in its full Board meeting dated March 4, 1967 made distribution of judicial and territorial jurisdiction amongst its members under the then existing Section 7(i) of U.P. Land Revenue Act reference thereof is really available in paragraph No. 33 of the case law in Baharuddin v. Gaon Sabha 1976 R.D. 53. Whether or not the distribution already made by the Board is completed or incomplete or the same in required to be re-considered in view of amendment Section 7 and 8 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act. Amendment of Rule 170 and 190 of the U.P. Revenue Court Manual and the insertion of Rule 170-A is not subject of our scrutiny and as such without expressing our opinion in this regard we wish to confine ourselves and accordingly we refrain ourselves from making any observation in this regard. We are, however, giving our opinion as per existing provisions referred to above. 65. On a careful consideration of the matter we are of the opinion that the cumulative effect of the provisions aforesaid is clearly to the effect that where appeal, reference or revision is heard by a division bench of two or more members, the case shall be decided in accordance with the opinion of such members of the majority and that in case appeal, reference or revision is heard by division bench and that there is disagreement between them the case shall be referred to a 3rd member who shall either choose to agree with either of the disagreeing member or shall refer the matter to a larger bench. Under the existing provisions of law ordinarily no appeal, reference or revision is heard by a division bench of the Board and that they are ordinarily heard by single member of the Board whose decision is deemed to be the decision of the Board. 66. Regarding review petition it is well settled that the same shall be heard by the matter concerned and in case he is not available on the roll of the Board, the review petition would be heard by a bench of two members. It is noteworthy to clarify that the division bench of the Board hearing a review petition directed against the judgment of the order of another member of the Board who does not as such hear appeal, reference or revision. Because unless the review petition is allowed, the appeal, reference or revision are not revived and the judgment or order in review itself is set aside if the review is granted. Therefore, the manner of determination of the majority opinion as contemplated by Section 8(2) of the U.P. Land Revenue Act in our considered opinion does not apply to review petition being heard by a division bench in its ordinary course. 67. The approach of our learned colleague Shri R.S. Varma Member relying upon provisions of Section 8(2) of the U.P. Land Revenue Act that in case of disagreement between members hearing a review petition the decision of the member who first decided it shall be taken into account for determining majority opinion is manifestly incorrect and we respectfully disagree with him. Since till review is actually granted,finality of the judgment in review is not touched and as such judgment of the Member who had decided the matter on merit cannot be taken into account to determine the majority opinion deciding the review. 68. The view taken by us is fortified by the decision in Upper Ganges Sugar Mills 1955 R.D. 42. This is being observed, so that it may not lead to wrong precedent of referring a matter to a larger bench of 3 Members which could be decided according to the practice of the Board and procedure binding on Board by a 3rd Member. This is the procedure in vogue also in the Hon'ble High Court. This is being observed, so that it may not lead to wrong precedent of referring a matter to a larger bench of 3 Members which could be decided according to the practice of the Board and procedure binding on Board by a 3rd Member. This is the procedure in vogue also in the Hon'ble High Court. We are supported in this view of ours by 1955 R.D. 12, 1957 R.D. 217 and old Rules 170 and 190 of the Revenue Court Manual and by the decision of Edhradun Kamal Nain Sharma v. Jagar Kishore (supra). 69. Our learned colleague Shri R.S. Verma, Member in his judgment has further observed that if process of referring the matter to a 3rd member is allowed to exist there would not be any finality of the matter and that the matter shall be referred to 3rd, 4th and 5th Member and onward. Although this question does not call for scrutiny by us in view of limited question referred to us but since our learned colleague Shri, R.S. Verma, Member, has made certain observation in the manner aforesaid it has become necessary for us to consider this aspect also but this problem will not detain us long inasmuch as it is well settled view that mere filing of a review petition and its admission does not re-open the liss and the appeal does not become pending unless review application is allowed and the appeal is re-heard. The view taken by us is supported by a Full bench decision of Hon'ble High Court in Shakal Singh and others v. Smt. Devi and others 1979 A.L.R. 383. The Full Bench aforesaid was followed by a Full Bench of High Court in case of Smt. Sarojan Mati Devi (supra). Accordingly, we hereby disagree with the view taken by our learned colleague Shri R.S. Varma, Member. 70. Now this brings us to another question raised by learned colleague Shri R.S. Verma, Member which is based on the interpretation of rule 182 of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules. In connection with the aforesaid our learned colleague has placed reliance upon decision of the Hon'ble High Court Kedar Nath Singh v. Board of Revenue and others Unreported Revenue Cases 95 for the preposition that rule 182 of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules Chapter 10 of U.P. Land Revenue Act and paragraphs 170. In connection with the aforesaid our learned colleague has placed reliance upon decision of the Hon'ble High Court Kedar Nath Singh v. Board of Revenue and others Unreported Revenue Cases 95 for the preposition that rule 182 of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules Chapter 10 of U.P. Land Revenue Act and paragraphs 170. 170-A and 190 of the U.P. Revenue Court Manual do not certain any express provision regarding review and that provisions regarding appeal, revision and review contained in Chapter 10 of U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901 would not apply to the review petition in view of specific use of word 'under this chapter' occurring in rule 182(i) and (ii) of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules. The word under this Chapter "occurring in Rule 182 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules was construed to mean that applicability of Part 1 and IV of the U.P. Land Revenue Act meant for proceedings contemplated in Chapter 8 of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and Chapter 8 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules only. 71. We have anxiously given our consideration to the view taken by our learned colleague Shri R.S. Verma, Member but upon close scrutiny of the matter we are not in a position to agree with him and accordingly, we respectfully express our disagreement with the view taken by him. In this regard we fully agree with the view taken in the joint judgment prepared by Shri S.K. Sehgal, Chairman Board of Revenue and Shri M. Prasad, Member Board of Revenue. 72. The main problem before the High Court in the case of Kedar Nath Singh (supra) was whether on account of above provisions of Sections 7, 8 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act and para 170 of the U.P. Revenue Court Manual second appeal filed before the Board could or could not be decided without the concurrence of another member. It was in this context that Hon'ble High Court held that concurrence of another member was no more required. Against the judgment of the learned single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court, special appeal No. 734 of 1969 in Kedar Nath Singh v. Board of Revenue was filed and the same was decided on November 20, 1975 by a division bench of Hon'ble High Court consisting of Hon'ble Mr. Justice G.C. Mathur and K.N. Seth, JJ. Against the judgment of the learned single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court, special appeal No. 734 of 1969 in Kedar Nath Singh v. Board of Revenue was filed and the same was decided on November 20, 1975 by a division bench of Hon'ble High Court consisting of Hon'ble Mr. Justice G.C. Mathur and K.N. Seth, JJ. Their lordships held that Section 8 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act having been amended no concurrence of another member was necessary for allowing appeal, revision or review. With regard to interpretation of sub-rules (1) and (2) of rule 182 their lordships of the division bench of Hon'ble High Court were pleased to observe as follows:- "Sub-rule (1) of Rue 182 provides the procedure for the hearing of suits, applications or proceedings and to these, procedural provisions of parts I and IV of the Revenue Court Manual have been made applicable. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 182 provides that the provisions regarding appeals, revisions and review contained in Chapter X of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901, as amended by that Act, shall apply to the orders passed by revenue courts. It will thus be seen that the provisions of the Revenue Court Manual were applied to all suits applications and similar other proceedings only and the provisions of Chapter X of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901 to appeals revision and review. 73. That both at the time of deciding the writ petition and the special appeal in case in Kedar Nath Singh (supra) amendments of Sections 7 and 8 of U.P. Land Revenue Act, amendments of Sections 7 and 8 of U.P. Land Revenue Act, amendment of rules 170 and 190 of U.P. Revenue Court Manual and the insertion of rule 170-A of U.P. Revenue Court Manual were not brought to the notice of the Hon'ble High Court yet independently the division bench of the Hon'ble High Court has taken the view aforesaid which is more substantiated on independent reading and appreciation or amended provisions of law with reference to controversy involved in the present case. We bow down to the view taken by the division bench in the special appeal in the case of Kedar Nath Singh v. Board of Revenue (supra). 74. This being the legal position we have to only find out its applicability in revenue proceedings before the Board. We bow down to the view taken by the division bench in the special appeal in the case of Kedar Nath Singh v. Board of Revenue (supra). 74. This being the legal position we have to only find out its applicability in revenue proceedings before the Board. The note to rule 163 of U.P. Revenue Court Manual clearly states that rule relating to appeal, reference and revision is embodied in Chapter 7 of part I of U.P. Revenue Court Manual would mutatis mutandis apply, in dealing with application for review under U.P. Tenancy Act 1939 and U.P. Land Revenue Act 1901. The procedure aforesaid would obviously become applicable to review application filed before the Board in the proceedings under U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and the Rules framed therein by virtue of rule 182/339 of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules. 75. Thus we are of the considered opinion that when two members of review bench disagree, the review application shall be disagree, the review application shall be referred to a 3rd member for his decision who shall choose to either agree with the view of the either of the disagreeing member or shall refer the matter to a larger bench. We are therefore, of the opinion that upon disagreement between two members hearing, review petition it would also be open to the Chairman/Seniormost member of Board of Revenue to either nominate a 3rd member or straight-way refer the matter to a larger bench.