Order Both these petitions have been filed by the petitioner. The two petitions are connected and they raise allied questions of law for consideration. Hence, they are being disposed of by a common order. In Crl M.P.No.5251 of 1980, the petitioner prays for quashing of the proceedings in C.C.No. 9424 of 1980 on the file of the XIV Metropolitan Magistrate, Madras filed by the 1st respondent therein. In Crl M.P.No.5117 of 81 the petitioner seeks quashing of the proceeding in Crl M.P.No.586 of 1981 on the file of the XVI Metropolitan Magistrate, Madras. 2. The facts which require mention are as under. The petitioner gave a complaint against two persons viz., Madanlal Sonigaraha and Sohanraj Sonigara, to the Deputy Commissioner of Police Crime, Madras, on 20-7-1978, alleging that in respect of a partnership business carried on by him and his brother with the above-mentioned persons, the latter had committed misappropriation of partnership money. The police authorities registered a case and investigated the report and, in the course of investigation, arrested the two persons. Subsequently, they were released on bail by the Second Additional Sessions Judge, Madras. On fuller investigation of the case, the police authorities came to the conclusion that the dispute was of a civil nature and therefore, they referred the complaint of the petitioner as mistake of fact and sent a report to that effect to the XVI Metropolitan Magistrate. Thereafter, the first respondent in Crl M.P.No.5231 of 1980 filed a private complaint against the petitioner herein under Section 190, Criminal Procedure Code, for offences punishable under Sections 211 and 500, Indian Penal Code on the ground that the report given by the petitioner to the police authorities contained false charges made with a view to defame him and his brother. The Magistrate took the complaint on file in C.C.No.9424 of 1980 under Sections 211 and 500, Indian Penal Code and issued process to the petitioner. It is at that stage of matters, the petitioner has come forward to this Court with this petition. His contention is that in respect of an offence under Section 211, Indian Penal Code, Section 195, Criminal Procedure Code, enjoins that no Court shall take cognizance of a case unless the complaint is made in writing by the Court before which the offence was committed, or some other Court to which that Court is subordinate. 3. His contention is that in respect of an offence under Section 211, Indian Penal Code, Section 195, Criminal Procedure Code, enjoins that no Court shall take cognizance of a case unless the complaint is made in writing by the Court before which the offence was committed, or some other Court to which that Court is subordinate. 3. In the other petition, Crl.M.P. No. 5117 of 1981, the first respondent Sohanraj (brother of the complainant in the first petition) filed a petition in M.P.586 of 1981 moving the XVI Metropolitan Magistrate, to hold an enquiry against the petitioner under S. 340, Crl.P.C., and then file a complaint against the petitioner if the Court was satisfied that he had committed an offence punishable under Section 211, Indian Penal Code. In order to have those proceedings quashed, the petitioner has filed Crl. M.P.No. 5117 of 1981. 4. Mr. K. Alagumalai, learned counsel for the petitioner states that if any complaint is to be made in respect of an offence punishable under Section 211, Indian Penal Code, then the mandate contained in Section 195, Criminal Procedure Code must be respected and since, in this case the complaint has not been filed by a Court, the complaint filed by a private party is not maintainable. His further argument is that the complaint cannot seek to get over the embargo contained in Section 195, Criminal Procedure Code in this case. According to the learned counsel, the offence of defamation is alleged to have been committed by reason of the commission of an offence under Section 211, Indian Penal Code, and as such, the complaint has no legs to stand independently, in so far as the alleged commission of the offence under Section 500, Indian Penal Code is concerned. In the other case, Mr. Alagumalai's contention is that what the complainant cannot achieve directly, i.e., by filing a complaint for an offence under Section 211, Indian Penal Code by linking another offence, he cannot seek to achieve indirectly by filing a petition before the trial Magistrate for an enquiry being held under Section 340, Criminal Procedure Code and the Court taking action thereafter against the offender by the Court itself filing a complaint. 5. In support of his contention, Mr. Alagumalai cites three decisions. The first case is Profulla Kumar Ghose v. Harendra Nath Chatterjee Profulla Kumar Ghose v. Harendra Nath Chatterjee (1917)21 C.W.N. 253. 5. In support of his contention, Mr. Alagumalai cites three decisions. The first case is Profulla Kumar Ghose v. Harendra Nath Chatterjee Profulla Kumar Ghose v. Harendra Nath Chatterjee (1917)21 C.W.N. 253. In that case, a party who had been wrongly accused of having committed an offence under Section 409, Indian Penal Code, applied to the Magistrate for sanction under Section 195 , Criminal Procedure Code to prosecute the opposite party under Section 211, Indian Penal Code, or in the alternative, to issue process for an offence under Section 500, Indian Penal Code. The Magistrate refused to grant sanction under Section 195, Criminal Procedure Code, but directed issue of process under Section 500, Indian Penal Code. The accused took the matter to the High Court and the Calcutta High Court held that once the Magistrate had refused to grant sanction for prosecution under Section 211, Indian Penal Code he was not entitled to issue process under Section 500, Indian Penal Code because the Court held that when on the same facts an application for sanction to prosecute under Section 211, Indian Penal Code, had been rejected, the accused could not be proceeded under Section 500 or. Section 500 read with Section 109. 6. The second case is Durgacharan v. State Durgacharan v. State (1967) MLJ. (Crl.) 535: (1967)2 S.C.J. 75: (1966)3 S.C.R. 636 : A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1775. The Supreme Court observed in that case as follows: “….But we must point out that the provision of Section 195 cannot be evaded by resorting to devices or camouflage. For instance, the provisions of the section cannot be evaded by the device of charging a person with an offence to which that Section does not apply and then convicting him of an offence to which it does, on the ground that the latter offence is a minor one of the same character, or by describing the offence as one punishable under some other section of the Indian Penal Code, though in truth and substance the offence falls in the category of Sections mentioned in Section 195, Criminal Procedure Code. Merely by changing the garb of label of an offence which is essentially an offence covered by the provisions of Section 195, prosecution for such an offence cannot be taken cognizance of by mis-describing it or by putting a wrong label on it.” 7. Merely by changing the garb of label of an offence which is essentially an offence covered by the provisions of Section 195, prosecution for such an offence cannot be taken cognizance of by mis-describing it or by putting a wrong label on it.” 7. Even the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the above case cannot lend support to the contention of Mr. Alagumalai, because the facts herein are different. But, before coming to the facts, I can appositely refer to the decision that was rendered in the abovesaid case. Certain persons were charged for offences under Section 143 read with Section 402, Indian Penal Code and Sections 186 and 353 Indian Penal Code. The Trial Court acquitted them. But on appeal, the High Court convicted them under Section 353, Indian Penal Code. It however acquitted them under Section 143 read with Section 402, Indian Penal Code and further held that the prosecution under Section 186, Indian Penal Code was barred by Section 195, Criminal Procedure Code, because a complaint in writing had not been made by a public servant. The convicted persons took the matter in appeal to the Supreme Court and the argument was that since the High Court had held that as Section 195, Indian Penal Code acted as a bar to a prosecution under Section 186, Indian Penal Code it must have likewise held that even a prosecution under Section 353, Indian Penal Code would not lie. The Supreme Court did not accept this contention and held that Sections 186 and 353, Indian Penal Code, relate to two distinct offences and Section 353 is not referred to in Section 195, Criminal Procedure Code and hence there was no bar for the accused being tried and convicted for a distinct offence disclosed by the same set of facts, if that distinct offences was not within the ambit of Section 195, Criminal Procedure Code. Therefore, what is to be seen is whether the two offences complained of are integrated or distinct and whether one of the offences falls outside the ambit of Section 195, Criminal Procedure Code. 8. The third case cited, is Kamalapathi v. State of W.B. Kamalapathi v. State of W.B. (1979) Crl.L.J. 679: (1979)2 S.C.R. 717: A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 777. There in an aggrieved person filed a complaint against another for offences under Sections 211 and 182, Indian Penal Code. 8. The third case cited, is Kamalapathi v. State of W.B. Kamalapathi v. State of W.B. (1979) Crl.L.J. 679: (1979)2 S.C.R. 717: A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 777. There in an aggrieved person filed a complaint against another for offences under Sections 211 and 182, Indian Penal Code. The Court took the case only file only in respect of an offence under Section 211, Indian Penal Code and issued process to the accused. The accused moved the High Court for quashing the proceedings on the ground that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the case violation of the provisions of Section 195(l)(b), Criminal Procedure Code. The High Court dismissed that petition for quashing and hence, the accused took the matter to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the complainant against the accused was in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed in relation to a proceedings in Court and as such, the Magistrate, while taking cognizance of the case, had acted in contravention of the bar contained in Clause (b) of Section 195(1) as there was no complaint in writing either of the Magistrate or of a Superior Court. Even this decision is not of any relevance here, because the complaint now in question has not been taken on file under Section 211 Indian Penal Code, but only under Section 500, Indian Penal Code, and for taking cognizance of such an offence, the filing of the complaint by a Court is not a pre-requisite. Hence, none of the authorities cited by Mr. Alagumalai really lends support to his contention. 9. It has to be pointed out that Section 211, occurs in Chapter XII of the Indian Penal Code under the heading ‘Of false evidence and offences against the public justice’. On the other hand, Sections 499 and 500 occur in Chapter XXI, under the heading ‘Of defamation’. While the former offence relates to a public wrong the latter offence relates to a private injury. Section 211 refers to ‘a person instituting or causing to be instituted any criminal proceeding against a person or falsely charging a person with having committed an offence, knowing that there is no just or lawful ground for such proceeding or charge against that person, with intent to cause injury to that person’. Section 211 refers to ‘a person instituting or causing to be instituted any criminal proceeding against a person or falsely charging a person with having committed an offence, knowing that there is no just or lawful ground for such proceeding or charge against that person, with intent to cause injury to that person’. But in so far as Section 499, Indian Penal Code, is concerned, it contemplates a person making or publishing any imputation concerning any person by words either spoken or intended to be read or by signs, or by visible representations, intending to harm or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will have the reputation of that person’. Therefore, the mens rea for committing an offence under Section 211 and Section 499, Indian Penal Code is quite different, though there may be an apparent area of over-lapping. Such being the position, it cannot be said in this case that the offence complained of will fall only under Section 211 Indian Penal Code and that it does not have a distinct character severable from the offence under Section 211 Indian penal Code and therefore, de hori Section 211, a complaint cannot be filed for an offence under Section 499, Indian Penal Code. The position in law is that if on the same set of facts, two distinct offences are contained, one falling within the ambit of Section 195, Criminal Procedure Code and the other failing outside the ambit, then there can be no bar for a person filing a private complaint in respect of the commission of that offence, which falls outside the ambit of Section 195 Criminal Procedure Code. This position of law has been laid down by this Court as well as by the Calcutta High Court and the Federal Court and Supreme Court in the following cases. As early as in 1921, A Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court has held in Satish Chandra v. Ram Dayal De Satish Chandra v. Ram Dayal De (1921) I.L.R. 48 Cal. 388: 24 C.W.N. 982: A.I.R. 1921 Cal. 1 at page 14 (F.B.), as follows: “Now, the maker of a single statement may be guilty of two distinct offences, one under Section 211 (which is an offence against public justice) and the other an offence under Section 499 wherein the personal element largely predominates. 388: 24 C.W.N. 982: A.I.R. 1921 Cal. 1 at page 14 (F.B.), as follows: “Now, the maker of a single statement may be guilty of two distinct offences, one under Section 211 (which is an offence against public justice) and the other an offence under Section 499 wherein the personal element largely predominates. The Legislature has provided, in the Criminal Procedure Code that the sanction of the Court, where the offence is committed, is essential, in the former case for the institution of criminal proceedings. In the latter case the Legislature has omitted to make a similar provision. This diversity, for ought we know, may have been deliberate, and plainly affords no reason why the Court should struggle to hold that the statement does not fall within the mischief of the rule embodied in Section 499. The two offences are fundamentally distinct in nature, as is patent from the fact that the former as made non-compoundable while the latter remains compoundable; in the former case, for the initiation of the proceedings, the legislature requires the sanction of the Court under Section. 195 of the Criminal procedure Code, in the latter case, cognizance can be taken of the offence only upon a complaint made by the person aggrieved under Section 198 of the Criminal Procedure Code.” 10. A Full Bench of this Court had to consider in Narayana Ayyar v. Veerappa Pillai Narayana Ayyar v. Veerappa Pillai (1950)2 MLJ. 586: 64 L.W. 1040: I.L.R. 1951 Mad. 661: A.I.R. 1951 Mad. 34: (1950) M.W.N. 878 (F.B.) the question whether an alleged defamer, who had given false evidence in a Court could be prosecuted under Section 499, Indian Penal Code, without a complaint by the Court before whom he gave evidence. After an exhaustive review of the decided cases of the different High Courts in India, the Full Bench held that in such cases, it was open to the party defamed to take proceedings under Section 499 Indian Penal Code, without the Court filing a ‘complaint in accordance with the provisions laid down in Section 195, Criminal Procedure Code. After an exhaustive review of the decided cases of the different High Courts in India, the Full Bench held that in such cases, it was open to the party defamed to take proceedings under Section 499 Indian Penal Code, without the Court filing a ‘complaint in accordance with the provisions laid down in Section 195, Criminal Procedure Code. The Court held that if the offence of giving false evidence in a judicial proceeding and defamation do not belong to the same genus, but are distinct and separate in their characteristics and ingredients, it was difficult to perceive any serious inhibition by the Criminal Procedure Code for initiation and trial of one of these offences independently of anterior resort to fulfilling the conditions necessary to commence a prosecution for the other. 11. The Federal Court also had to consider a somewhat similar question as the one on hand in Hori Ram Singh v. The Crown Hori RamSingh v. The Crown (1939)2 MLJ. (Supp.) 23: 50 L.W. 95: (1939) F.C.R. 159: A.I.R. 1939 F.C. 43. The appellant in that case was charged with offences under Sections 409 and 477-A, Indian Penal Code. The offence under Section 477-A could not be taken cognizance of without the previous consent of the Governor under Section 270(1) of the Constitution Act, while the consent of the Governor was not required for the institution of proceedings under Section 409, Indian Penal Code. The charge was that the accused dishonestly misappropriated or converted to his own advantage certain medicines entrusted to him in his official capacity as a Sub-Assistant Surgeon in the Punjab Provincial Subordinate Medical Service. He was further charged that being a public servant, he wilfully and with intent to defraud omitted to record certain entries in a stock book of medicines belonging to the hospital where he was employed and in his possession. Proceedings under Section 477-A were quashed by the Federal Court for want of jurisdiction, the consent of the Governor not having been obtained; but the case was sent back to the Sessions Judge for hearing on merits as regards the charge under Section 409, Indian Penal Code and the order of acquittal passed by the Sessions Judge under that charge was set aside. Two distinct offences having been committed in the same transaction, on an offence of misappropriation under Section 409, Indian Penal Code, and other an offence under Section 477-A Indian Penal Code which required the sanction of the Governor, the circumstance that cognizance could not be taken of the latter offence without such consent was not considered a bar to the trial of the appellant with respect of the offence under Section 409, Indian Penal Code. 12. All the above three decisions were considered by the Supreme Court in Basir-ul-Huq and others v. The State of W.B. Basir-ul-Huq and others v. The State of W.B. (1953) S.C.J. 405: (1953)1 MLJ. 775: (1953) S.C.R. 836: A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 293 and were approved. In the Supreme Court case, the accused lodged information at a police station that × had beaten and throttled his mother to death and when the funeral prove was in flames he entered the cremation ground with the police, the dead body was examined and the complaint was found to be false. On the complaint, of X, the accused was charged with offences under Section 297 Indian Penal Code (trespass to wound religious feelings) and Section 500 Indian Penal Code (defamation). It was contended that, as the complaint disclosed offences under Sections 182 and 211 Indian Penal Code, the Court could not take cognizance of the case except on a complaint by the proper authority under Section 195, Criminal Procedure Code. The Supreme Court held that the facts which constituted the offence under Section 297 were distinct from those which constitute an offence under Section 182, as the act of trespass was alleged to have been committed after the making of the false report, so Section 195, was no bar to the trial of the charge under Section 297, and as regards the charge under Section 500, where the allegations made in a false report disclose two distinct offences, one against a public servant and the other against a private individual, the latter is not debarred by the provisions of Section 195, Criminal Procedure Code from seeking redress for the offence committed against him. 13. 13. In view of the decisions in all these cases the petitioner cannot be heard to say that the trial Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 500, Indian Penal Code, inasmuch as the commission of an offence under Section 211, Indian Penal Code, has also been alleged and for taking cognizance of an offence under Section 211 Indian Penal Code the complaint must have been filed by the Court in which the offence was committed. Therefore, the petition for quashing the proceedings does not lie and has to be dismissed. 14. As regards Crl. M.P.No. 5117 of 1981, the contention of the petitioner that the complainant is not entitled to file a petition under Section 340, Criminal Procedure Code is wholly untenable. The very wording of Section 340 is as follows: “340. Procedure in cases mentioned in Section 195: (1) When, upon an application made to it in this behalf or otherwise, any Court is of opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice that an inquiry should be made into any offence referred to in Clause (b) of sub- section (1) of Section 195……” Therefore, the section itself envisages a Court holding an enquiry under Section 340, Criminal Procedure Code either suo motu or upon an application made by a party. As such, the petitioner can participate in the enquiry under Section 340, Criminal Procedure Code, and put forth his case that a complaint under Section 195(1)(b) is not called for. If he fails before the Magistrate, he is not left without a remedy, for he can file an appeal under Section 341 , Criminal Procedure Code and canvass the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate under Section 340, Criminal Procedure Code. The petitioner has, therefore, no right to contend that the complainant cannot move the Court to hold an enquiry under Section 340, Criminal Procedure Code. On that ground, this petition has to fail. 15. In the result, both the petitions will stand dismissed. R.S.R. ----- Petitions dismissed.