Ram Krishna Tewari Another v. D. D. C. , Faizabad Others
1983-04-27
K.N.MISRA
body1983
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT K.N. Misra, J. - This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is directed against the order dated 25.1.1982 passed by Deputy Director of Consolidation by which he refused to order abatement of proceedings pending in revisions before him. 2. Briefly stated facts of the case are as follows. The land in dispute is situated in three villages, namely, Dost Pur, Ragghoo Uparhar, Thareroo Ismail Nagar, Tehsil and District Faizabad. The land holdings situated in these villages were recorded in the name of the petitioner's father Ram Kuber, as tenureholder in possession. These villages were brought under consolidation operation under the old Act by notifications issued under Section 4(2) of U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act (old Act) as it stood prior to its amendment by U. P. Act No. 38 of 1958. It appears that Purvidin, father of opposite party no. 2, and Deoki Nandah, father of opposite parties nos. 3 to 7, in proceedings relating to revision and correction of records under Section 8 of the Old Act, claimed to have acquired Sirdari rights on the basis of their alleged possession. The Assistant Consolidation Officer recorded the dispute in C, H. Form No. 5 and ordered their names to be recorded as Sirdar tenants of the land in dispute. This order passed in summary proceedings under Sec, 8 of the Old Act is said to have been passed without notice to recorded tenure holder Ram Kuber, father of the petitioners, and his name appears to have been expunged on the basis of the said order. On publication of record under Section 11 of the Old Act, Ram Kuber filed an objection asserting that he is tenureholder and in possession of the disputed holdings and that his name was wrongly expunged in summary proceedings under Section 8 of the Old Act without notice to him. It was further asserted that Purvidin & Deoki Nandan have no concern with the land in dispute nor they are in possession over the same & that their names had been wrongly recorded. The objector Ram Kuber claimed to be Bhumidhar and Sirdar of the land holdings which were recorded in his name in the basic year Khetauni and prayed that his name be recorded as such. The case was contested by Purvidin and Deoki Nandan on various grounds.
The objector Ram Kuber claimed to be Bhumidhar and Sirdar of the land holdings which were recorded in his name in the basic year Khetauni and prayed that his name be recorded as such. The case was contested by Purvidin and Deoki Nandan on various grounds. They asserted to have acquired Sirdari rights on the basis of possession, as well as antecedent title. The Consolidation Officer, by his order dated 561959, held that Ram Kuber, Purvidin and Deoki Nandan are coSirdar tenants of the holdings in dispute which were recorded in Sirdari tenure and he referred the matter to arbitrator under Section 12 of the Act in respect of the disputed Bhumidhari holdings. Both the parties preferred appeal against the said order, which was allowed by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) vide order dated 2091961 holding that since the Consolidation Scheme in the villages in question was confirmed in the year 1959, hence the order passed by the Consolidation Officer dated 5659 was manifestly without jurisdiction and the same cannot be maintained. He, therefore, set aside the said order passed by the Consolidation Officer and stayed proceedings in accordance with the provisions of Section 22(2) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 as it then stood. Aggrieved by the said order, revision was filed, which was dismissed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation vide his order dated 1271962. The petitioners thereupon filed writ petition against the said orders and this Writ Petition No. 324 of 1962 was allowed by order dated 191966 and the case was remanded to the Deputy Director of Consolidation with the direction that it should be disposed of in accordance with law as the hearing in the case could not be stayed under Section 22 (2) of the Old Act, merely on the ground that the Consolidation Scheme was confirmed in the year 1958 while proceedings under Section 12 of the Old Act were pending awaiting decision on merits. After remand of the case, all the three revisions in question were restored but the same remained pending for a pretty long time. In the meantime the villages were denotified under Section 52 of the Act. 3. It appears that while the said revisions were still pending, the aforesaid villages were again brought under consolidation proceedings by notifications issued under Section 4A which was inserted by U. P. Act No. XXXV of 1976 with effect from 181176.
In the meantime the villages were denotified under Section 52 of the Act. 3. It appears that while the said revisions were still pending, the aforesaid villages were again brought under consolidation proceedings by notifications issued under Section 4A which was inserted by U. P. Act No. XXXV of 1976 with effect from 181176. The first notification no, 65 (4)/ILL77Rev8 dated 1351980 published in the U. P. Gazette Extraordinary dated 1551980 issued under Subsection (1) of Section 4A of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, was in respect of Tehsil Sadar of Faizabad District, which was brought under consolidation operations as it was found expedient in the public interest to bring it again under consolidation operations since ten years had elapsed after the consolidation operations had closed in that part of Faizabad District. Subsequently vide notification no. 3988/G4054 dated July 10, 1980, published in U. P. Gazette, Par IKa, dated 3081980, issued under Subsection (2) of Section 4A of U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, the aforesaid three villages were again brought under consolidation operations. The result was that consolidation operations again started in the said villages in pursuance of this notification dated 3081980. The petitioners, thereupon, filed fresh objections under Section 9 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, claiming to be tenure holders in possession over the land in dispute and at the time of hearing of the aforesaid revisions, which were pending on the date of notification under Section 4A(2) of the Amended Act, a preliminary point was raised that the said revisions stand abated in accordance with Section 5 (2) (a) of the Act. After hearing parties on the said matter, the Deputy Director of Consolidation by order dated 2511982, held that proceedings in these revisions are not liable to be abated under Section 5 (2) (a) of the Act which according to him are not covered by the said provision. He took the view that the revisions, which arose out of proceedings under Section 12 of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act and which were pending on the date the villages were again brought under consolidation operations by notification under Section 4A(2) of the Act, would not be covered by Section 5 (2)(a) of the Act & cannot abate. The petitioners have challenged this order in the present writ petition. 4.
The petitioners have challenged this order in the present writ petition. 4. Sri I.D. Dwivedi, learned counsel for the petitioners, contended that upon publication of the notification under section 4A (2) of the Act, every proceeding for the correction of records and every suit and proceeding in respect of declaration of rights or interest in any land lying in the area, or for declaration or adjudication of any other right in regard to which proceedings can or ought to be taken under this Act, pending before any court or authority whether of the first instance or of appeal, reference or revision, shall, on an order being passed in that behalf by the court or authority before whom such suit or proceeding is pending, stand abated. His argument was that no distinction can be made in respect of proceedings which are pending before the consolidation courts because the words 'pending before any court or authority' are wide enough to cover the eases which are pending even before consolidation authorities for the determination and declaration of rights in the land lying in the area in respect of which notification has been published under Section 4A (2) of the Act. He thus asserted that the view taken by the Deputy Director of Consolidation is altogether erroneous and the present revisions should have been ordered to abate. In support of his argument, learned counsel referred to unreported decision in C.M. Writ petition No. 489 of 1983 (Suraj Bali Singh & another v. Deputy Director of Consolidation Ghazipur & another decided on 10.3.1983 wherein Hon'ble K.P. Singh, J., after considering in detail the arguments advanced before him and particularly referring to Section 5 (2) of the Act, observed : I am not agreeable to the contention of the learned counsel for the opposite parties that the consolidation operations shall not be deemed to have been closed regarding the disputed land. As a fact, when denotification has taken place, the consolidation operations have ceased in pursuance of the Notification under Section 4 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. Only for the purposes of giving effect to the orders passed in pending proceedings, the consolidation operation will be deemed to have not been closed.
As a fact, when denotification has taken place, the consolidation operations have ceased in pursuance of the Notification under Section 4 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. Only for the purposes of giving effect to the orders passed in pending proceedings, the consolidation operation will be deemed to have not been closed. Due to the aforesaid provision, I do not think that it is the intention of the Legislature that the proceedings before the consolidation authorities should go on under the previous notification under Section 4 of the Act as well as proceedings regarding the disputed land should go on in pursuance of the notification under Section 4A of the Act. The practical view is that earlier proceeding arising out of the title proceedings should abate & the parties may be asked to agitate their claims in proceedings consequent upon the notification under Section 4A of the Act. 5. In reply, learned counsel for the opposite parties, Sri A.N. Verma, contended that Section 5 (2) (a) of the Act envisages publication of a notification under Subsection (2) of Section 4 of the Act and not a notification published under Section 4A (2) of the Act. His argument was that since in the present case notification was issued under Section 4A (2) of the Act, hence provisions of Section 5 (2) (a) of the Act would not be attracted and the revisions before the Deputy Director of Consolidation cannot be ordered the abate. He further contended that the words 'pending before court or authority occurring in Section 5 (2) (a) of the Act have to be construed keeping in view the object for enacting such provision. He submitted that since the consolidation courts were invested with the power to determine the question of the concerning land, lying in the area which has been brought under consolidation operations on publication of notification under Section 4 (2) of the Act, the proceedings for correction of records and every suit and proceedings in respect of declaration of rights or interest in the land lying in the said area were to abate under the said provision so that all the disputes concerning land situated in the village, lying in area which has been notified, be determined finally and expeditiously.
He further contended that no useful purpose will be served in ordering abatement of the proceedings pending before the Deputy Director of Consolidation, because the parties will have to agitate again before the consolidation authorities in respect of that very land about which the matter is already awaiting adjudication on merits by the consolidation authorities. The argument appears to be attractive, but on close scrutiny and careful consideration of the matter, I find it difficult to accept. 6. No doubt, it is correct to say that the provisions of clause (a) of subsection (2)of Section 5 of the Act will be applicable only up n the publication of notification under subsection (2) of Section 4 of the Act. Section 4A of the Act, which was inserted by U.P. Act No.35 of 1976 with effect from 18.11. 1976, runs as follows: 4A(l) Where the State Government is of opinion that in the case of a district or part thereof in respect of which a notification has already been issued under Section 52, it is expedient in public interest so to do, it may make a declaration by notification in the Gazette that such district or part thereof may again be brought under consolidation operation; Provided that no such declaration shall be issued within ten years from the date of the notification referred to in the said section. (2) The provisions of this Act shall mutatis mutandis apply to every notification issued under subsection (1) as they apply to a notification under Section 4. 7. The aforesaid notification dated 15.5.1980 was issued under Section 4A(l) of the Act and it is not disputed that the villages were brought under consolidation operations after the expiry of ten years from the date of notification under Section 52 of the Act. The said notification was, therefore, validly issued. The second notification dated 30.8.1980 indicates that it was issued under Section 4A (2) of the Act. No doubt it is correct to say that subsection (2) of Section 4A of the Act does not contemplate issuing of any notification under that provision for starting consolidation operations in a particular village, but subsection (2) of Section 4A of the Act, however, provides that the provisions of this Act shall mutatis mutandis apply to every notification issued under subsection (l)as they apply to a notification under Section 4.
It is thus, clear that after issuance of notification under Section 4A( I) of the Act, a notification can be issued under Section 4(2) of the Act in respect of area for which a notification under Section 4A(l) of the Act has been issued. The provisions of Section 4 (2) of the Act shall mutatis mutandis apply to the notification issued under subsection (1) of Section 4A of the Act by virtue of the provisions of sub section 4A of the Act. That being so, the provisions of Section 5(2)(a) of the Act will apply to the area covered by notification under Section 4A of the Act. I also do not find any substance in the argument of the learned counsel for the opposite parties that since notification dated 30.8. 1980 was not issued under subsection (2) of Section 4 of the Act but the same was issued under subsection (2) of Section 4A of the Act and, as such, the proceedings are not to abate. No doubt, it appears to be correct that notification dated 30.8.1980 should have been issued under subsection (2) of Section 4 of the Act, under which it could be validly issued on the strength of the provisions contained in subsection (2) of Section 4A of the Act, but this would not make the notification invalid because such notification issued in exercise of powers under subsection(2) of Section 4A of the Act would relate to subsection (2) of Section 4 of the Act under which said notification could validly be issued. It is well settled that merely by a wrong reference to power under which certain action has been taken by the government, would not, per se, invalidate the action so taken if they are justified under some other power under which government can lawfully take that action. 8. In Hukumchand Mills Ltd. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh and another ( AIR 1964 SC 1329 ) the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while considering certain amendments made in the Indore Industrial Tax Rules, 1927 by a notification issued on 28.12.1949 by the Madhya Bharat Government, under Rule 18, observed that : The Government had the power to amend the rules under S. 5(1) read with S. 5(3) of the Act, for that was the law in force in one of the merged States.
The fact that in the opening part of the notification of 28.12.49 instead of S. 5 it was mentioned that the amendments were made under R. 17, would not vitiate the amendments, for the mere mistake in the opening part of the notification in reciting the wrong source of power does not affect the validity of the amendments made. 9. In another decision in The Amritsar Improvement Trust v. Baldeva Inder Singh and others 1972 (1) Supreme Court Cases 165 similar question cropped up for consideration and in Para 13 of the Report it was observed by the Supreme Court that : If an authority has a valid power to do a particular act, the fact that it purported to do that act under a provision of law which did not confer power to do that act, would not invalidate the act. In Deviprasad Khandelwal & Sons v. Union of India (AIR 1969 Bombay 163) Hon'ble Nan, J. in Para 16 of the Report observed that : It is well settled principle of interpretation that as long as an authority has the power to do a thing, it does not matter if he purports to do it by reference to a wrong provision of law. The order made can always be justified by reference to the correct provisions of law empowering the authority making the order to make such order. 10. In view of the above, I am of opinion that the notification dated 30.8.1980 would be deemed to be issued with reference to provisions of subsection ) of Section 4 of the Act under which such notification could validly be issued relating to area covered by notification already issued under subsection(l) of Section 4A of the Act and the provisions of Section 5(2) (a) of the Act would apply to the area covered by aforesaid notification dated 30.8.1980. 11. So far as the second limb of the argument of learned counsel for the opposite parties in concerned, I find it difficult to accept that the proceedings pending before the consolidation court on the date of publication of notification dated 30.8.1980 would not be covered by Sect on 5 (2) (a) of the Act, because in my opinion the words pending before any court or authority occurring in clause(a) cannot be construed in restricted sense so as to exclude the proceedings pending before the consolidation authorities. 12.
12. These villages were notified under Section 4(2) of the Act as it stood prior to U.P. Act No. 8 of 1963 and as such the proceedings were to be conducted and concluded in accordance with the provisions of unamended Act. Under the old Act, as it stood prior to its amendment by U.P. Act No. VIII of 1963, the question of title in respect of the land in dispute could be raised at the stage of section 12 of the Act. The orders which were passed in proceedings under Section 8 of the Act were summary in nature and did not operate to debar a person from raising dispute regarding title on publication under Section 11 of the Act. The objection filed by the petitioners' father under Section 12 of the Act claiming to be tenureholder in possession over the land in dispute was, therefore, maintainable and the dispute concerning title in respect of the land could be adjudicated upon in those proceedings. But as luck could have it, the case remained pending for several years on the basis of order passed by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) who erroneously took the view that the proceedings deserved to be stayed as Consolidation Scheme in all the villages, where land in dispute was situated, were confirmed in the year 1958. This view was found to be erroneous in view of Full Bench decision in Sita v. U.P. State and others (1968 ALJ 144) (FB) and the case was remanded to the Deputy Director of Consolidation for decision on merits by order dated 1.9. 1966 passed by this Court in Writ Petition No. 324 of 1962. Even after remand of the case the Deputy Director of Consolidation kept the revision pending for several years and in the meantime the villages came to be again notified under Section 4A of the Act as stated above.
1966 passed by this Court in Writ Petition No. 324 of 1962. Even after remand of the case the Deputy Director of Consolidation kept the revision pending for several years and in the meantime the villages came to be again notified under Section 4A of the Act as stated above. Since the villages were again brought under consolidation operations by notification under Section 4A of the Act and, as such, the question of title in respect of the land in dispute can be raised and decided in a fresh objection under Section 9A(2) of the amended Act, in view of the provisions contained under subsection (2) of Section 4A of the Act which provides that the provisions of this Act shall mutatis mutandis apply to every notification issued under subsection(l) as they apply to a notification under Section 4. The result is that the fresh objections under Section 9A(2) of Act concerning land in dispute situate in aforesaid villages, have got to be decided on merits in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the pending proceedings in the revisions before the Deputy Director of Consolidation shall stand abated in view of the provisions contained in Section 5(2)(a)of the Act which is fully applicable to the instant case. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the impugned order dated 25.1.1982 passed by Deputy Director of Consolidation deserves to be quashed and the pending revisions deserve to abate under Section 5 (2) (a) of the Act. 13. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is hereby allowed and the impugned order dated 25.1.1982 passed by Deputy Director of Consolidation, opposite party no. 1, is hereby quashed and the revisions pending before him are ordered to abate. 14. The parties will, however, get their title determined in respect of the land in dispute, situate in aforesaid three villages, in fresh objections under Section 9A(2)of the Act, and the consolidation authorities will decide their title regarding land in question, after giving them full opportunity to lead their evidence in support of their respective cases uninfluenced by the decision recorded in abated proceedings. 15. The parties are directed to bear their own costs. (Petition Allowed)