Judgment :- 1. The appellant is the Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Malappuram, who was the sole respondent in O. P. No. 2963 of 19834, which was allowed by our learned brother P. C. Balakrishna Menon J. by his judgment dated 7th October, 1983. The Original Petition was filed by the respondent herein, namely, Ponnani PCC. Marketing Society Ltd., No. F. 1252, Ponnani, who is the petitioner in the writ petition. The writ petition was for quashing Ext. P7 proceedings No. 2206/83 H&H dated 29-9-1983 of the appellant-respondent, whereunder Ext. P2 resolution No. 22 dated 29-7-1982 of the petitioner society was rescinded. That resolution was to the effect that in the place of one Abdu, who was no more, one Sri Kunhi Mohammed was co-opted as a member of the Committee of the Society. The appellant having come to know about Ext. P2 resolution issued Ext. P5 notice dated 8-3-1983 to the society, requiring it to show cause why Ext. P2 resolution should not be cancelled in exercise of the powers of the Registrar under R.176 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules, (the Rules) for the reason that the bye-law providing for co-option was ultra vires S.28 of the Co-operative Societies Act (the Act). Though the Secretary of the Society submitted Ext. P6 reply dated 15-3-1983, raising the contention that bye-law 17, which permitted co-option to fill casual vacancies, was not repugnant to S.28 or for that matter any of the provisions of the Act or the rules framed thereunder, Ext. P7 order was passed by the appellant/respondent rescinding the resolution. 2. The respondent-petitioner challenged Ext. P7 order on the ground that the cancellation of the resolution by the appellant-respondent was without jurisdiction and is not in accordance with any provisions contained in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder. The learned judge upheld the contention of the respondent-petitioner and allowed the writ petition quashing Ext. P7 proceedings of the appellant-respondent. 3. In this appeal, the main question that arises for decision is, whether under the provisions of the Act or the Rules framed thereunder, the Committee of a Society is competent to co-opt a Member to fill up a vacancy caused in the Committee by death. It has to be noticed that in accordance with bye-law 17 of the bye-laws of the Society casual vacancies could be filled up by co-option by the Committee in office. It has to be noticed that in accordance with bye-law 17 of the bye-laws of the Society casual vacancies could be filled up by co-option by the Committee in office. It is purporting to exercise this power that the respondent-petitioner passed Ext. P2 resolution. 4. The appellant-respondent however thought that it was beyond the power of the Committee to co-opt the Member to fill up a vacancy caused by the death of a member of the Committee. Reliance was placed on the provisions contained in S.28 of the Act, which reads as follows: "28. Appointment of committee. (1) The general body of a society shall constitute a committee in accordance with the bye-laws and entrust the management of the affairs of the society to such committee: Provided that, in the case of a society registered after the commencement of this Act, the persons who have signed the application to register the society may appoint a committee to conduct the affairs of the society for a period of three months from the date of registration or for such further period as the Registrar may consider necessary; but the committee appointed under this proviso shall cease to function as soon as a committee has been constituted in accordance with the bye-laws: Provided further that where the bye-laws so provide, the Government or the Registrar may nominate all or of any of the members of the Committee for such period as may be specified in the bye-laws." S. 28, in terms, deals only with the constitution of the Committee without any reference to the method to be adopted for filling up the vacancies, casual or otherwise, that may occur. The first proviso to the section lays down only the procedure to be adopted at the formation of the Society. The second proviso is only to meet the contingency where the bye-laws so provide, the Government or the Registrar may nominate all or any of the members of the committee for such period as may be specified in the bye-laws. We are not satisfied that the appellant-respondent was justified in taking the view that S.28 of the Act prohibits the vacancy caused by the death of an elected member being filled up by co-option, and therefore, bye-law 17 of the bye-laws, which permits such co-option, was ultra vires S.28 of the Act. 5. We are not satisfied that the appellant-respondent was justified in taking the view that S.28 of the Act prohibits the vacancy caused by the death of an elected member being filled up by co-option, and therefore, bye-law 17 of the bye-laws, which permits such co-option, was ultra vires S.28 of the Act. 5. It was then argued by Shri Jose K. Kochu Pappu, Senior Government Pleader, appearing on behalf of the appellant, that by virtue of the provisions contained in S.29 of the Act, the only way a casual vacancy arising out of the death of an elected member could be filled up was by election. Sub-section (1) of S.29 of the Act reads: "29. Annual general body meeting. (1) A general body meeting of a society shall be held once in a year for the purpose of (a) approval of the budget with reference to the programme of the activities of the society prepared by the committee for the ensuing year; (b) election if any, in the prescribed manner of the members of the Committee other than nominated members; (c) ... The provision quoted above, in terms, only prescribes the matters which could be or which have to be considered at the annual general body meeting. It has absolutely no relevance whatsoever to the filling up of casual vacancies with particular reference to such vacancies arising out of the death of an elected Member. 6. The election of the Committee always has to be done at the annual general body meeting; and there might be annual meetings during which apart from approving the budget, it might be necessary to elect members of the Committee also. It may also be for the purpose of election of Members in the place of those who resigned, or were removed from the Committee as contemplated in R.38. Sub-rules 3,4 and 5 of R.38 of the Rules read as follows: "(3) Any member of a committee, whether elected or nominated may tender his resignation to the President of the Committee. (4) The President, on receipt of a resignation, shall within seven days from the date of receipt thereof place it before the committee of the society for consideration if the member is an elected person or send it to the authority who nominated the member, if he is a nominee. (4) The President, on receipt of a resignation, shall within seven days from the date of receipt thereof place it before the committee of the society for consideration if the member is an elected person or send it to the authority who nominated the member, if he is a nominee. The resignation shall have effect only from the date of its acceptance by the committee or the authority who nominated the member concerned as the case may be. The fact of its acceptance or otherwise shall also be communicated to the member concerned. In the case of nominees the fact of acceptance or otherwise shall be communicated to the society also." (5) Vacancies arising due to the resignation of any elected member of the Committee shall be filled up by election in the manner provided in the rules. In the case of nominated members the vacancies will be filled up by fresh nomination subject to the provisions in R.37." 7. The framers of the rules, who made elaborate provisions as to the manner in which vacancies caused by resignation should be filled up and are categoric that it should be by election, could not have lost sight of the fact that that provision should be extended in the case of vacancies arising on account of death of a member, had it been the intention of the Legislature or the framers of the Rules that in the case of vacancies arising out of death also, it should be filled up only by election. R.38 is an indication that it was not in the mind of the framers of the Rules that vacancies arising out of death of a member shall be filled up only by election as provided in the rule. If the real object behind S.28 and 29 of the Act is to ensure that vacancies arising out of death of a member of the Committee of the Society shall be filled up only by election, it could be done by clarifying the position by amending the relevant rules incorporating a provision similar to that contained in Clause.3 to 5 in R.38 of the Rules, that in the case of vacancies arising out of death of a Member shall also be filled up only by election. In the absence of any such provision and in the face of the specific provision made for the filling up of vacancies caused by resignation by the process of election, it could not be said that bye-law 17 of the bye-laws of the Society is ultra vires S.28 of the Act or that the respondent-petitioner acted beyond his power and against the provisions of law in co-opting a member in the place of a deceased member of the Committee. 8. It has to be noticed that the bye-laws have been approved by the Registrar. The expression'bye-laws is defined in S.2(b) thus: "(b) 'bye-laws' means the registered bye-laws of a co-operative society for the time being in force." S.7 of the Act empowers the Registrar to register the bye-laws of the Society. S.12 enacts that "no amendment of any bye-law of a society shall be valid unless such amendment has been registered under this Act." So far as the bye-laws of the respondent-petitioner society is concerned, it is the admitted case that the bye-laws were registered and was actually amended in 1966 and was duly approved by the Department on 12-3-1966 as could be gathered from Ext. P7 order itself. The position therefore is that there is total absence of any provision positively requiring that the filling up of a vacancy arising out of the death of a member of the Society shall be by election of prohibiting the filling up of such vacancy by co-option by the Committee of the Society. Filling up of casual vacancies, which in our view are in the context of filling up of vacancies with particular reference to the provisions contained in R.38 of the Rules, appears to us to include casual vacancies arising out of death. S.28(1) speaks only about the constitution of the committee, which may have direct application only to the position on the formation of the society. Exigencies have to be met by resort to provisions of the bye-laws and it has to be reasonably construed that in the absence of any provision to the contrary contained in the Act or the Rules, filling up of vacancies to the extent which has not been specifically provided for in the Act and the Rules has to be done in accordance with the provisions contained in the bye-laws of the society. 9. 9. It was then contended by the Government Pleader that the bye-laws were registered before the Act came into force and therefore such bye-laws could not be given effect to even if the bye-laws could govern the method to be adopted for filling up of the vacancies, arising out of death of an elected member. In this context, it has to be noticed that under S.110(2) (ii) there is a saving provision which reads: "(2) Notwithstanding the repeal of the Madras Co-operative Societies Act, 1932, and the Travancore-Cochin Co-operative Societies Act, 1951 and without prejudice to the provision of S.4 and 23 of the Interpretation and General Clauses Act, 1125. (i) x x x x (ii) Any society existing in the State on the date of the commencement of this Act which has been registered or deemed to be registered under any of the aforesaid repealed Acts shall be deemed to be registered under this Act; and the bye-laws of such society shall, so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, continue in force until altered or rescinded". 10. For the foregoing reasons, we find no merit in this appeal and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Dismissed. Immediately after the judgment was pronounced, the Government Pleader made an oral request for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. We find no substantial question of law of general importance which, in our opinion, requires to be decided by the Supreme Court, is involved in this case. Hence the request is declined. Issue carbon copy of this judgment to counsel for the appellant on usual terms if applied for in that behalf and to the Government Pleader free of charge. Leave refused.