JUDGMENT N.D. Ojha, J. - Respondent No. 2 Narain Prasad Gupta is the landlord of a building which was let out to the petitioner. A suit was instituted by respondent no. 2 in the court of Judge, Small Causes, for ejectment of the petitioner from the aforesaid building and for arrears of rent etc. On the allegation that the petitioner was a tenant of the building on a monthly rent of Rs. 37/- that he was in arrears of rent from 1st April, 1975, that he had not paid the said arrears which were for a period not less than four months not- withstanding a notice of demand and termination of his tenancy dated 11th August, 1977, having been served upon him and consequently he was liable to be evicted from the building in question under Section 20 (2) (a) of the U P. Urban Building (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act.) 2. The petitioner deposited in the court of judge, Small Causes, on 10th March, 1979, before the date of first hearing the entire amount contemplated by section 20 (4) of the Act in order to claim the benefit of the said section of being relieved against his liability for ejectment from the building in question. The arrears of rent with effect from 1st April, 1975, were deposited by the petitioner at the rate of Rs. 37/- per month as claimed by respondent No. 2 Subsequently the defendant filed his written statement on 20th February, 1980, wherein he inter alia took up the plea that the rate of rent was not Rs. 37/- per month but only Rs. 10/- per month and that he had already paid the rent at that rate and was not in arrears of rent. 3. The Judge, Small Causes, after taking into consideration the evidence produced by the parties held that the rate of rent was Rs. 10/- per month only as asserted by the petitioner and not Rs. 37/- per month as asserted by respondent No. 2 He further came to the conclusion that the petitioner had failed to prove that he had already paid the rent at the rate of Rs. 10/- per month and was not in arrears of rent. 10/- per month only as asserted by the petitioner and not Rs. 37/- per month as asserted by respondent No. 2 He further came to the conclusion that the petitioner had failed to prove that he had already paid the rent at the rate of Rs. 10/- per month and was not in arrears of rent. However, in view of the deposit made under Section 20 (4) of the Act, as aforesaid he relieved the petitioner of the liability for being evicted from the building. He directed the amount so deposited by the petitioner to be paid over to respondent No. 2 calculating the rent at the rate of Rs. 10/- per month and the balance to be refunded to the petitioner. 4. Respondent No. 2 preferred a revision under section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act against the aforesaid decree of the judge, Small Causes, before the District judge which was transferred to the court of respondent Nno. 1. This revision was allowed by respondent No. 1 on 18th November, 1981, and the suit was decreed for ejectment also of the petitioner from the building in question Benefit of Section 20 (4) of the Act was denied to the petitioner, notwithstanding the deposit made by him as aforesaid, in view of the plea subsequently raised by him in his written statement that he was not in arrears of rent. It was held by respondent No. 1 relying on the decision of the Supreme court in Mangal Sen v. Kanchid Mal, AIR 1981 Supreme Court 1726 that in view of the aforesaid plea raised by him in his written statement the deposit made by the petitioner under section 20 (4) of the Act. could not be treated to have been made "unconditionally" as contemplated by the said section 20 (4). It is this order dated 18th November, 1981, passed by respondent no. I which is sought to be quashed in this writ petition. 5. It was urged by counsel for the petitioner that the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Mangal Sen (supra) was not applicable to the facts of the instant case and respondent No. 1 has committed a manifest error of law in denying to the petitioner the statutory benefit of section 20 (4) of the Act which was couched in a peremptory language. For respondent No. 2 it has, on the other hand, been urged by his counsel hat the facts of the present case and those of the case of Mangal Sen (supra) were, in so far as denial by the tenant of being it defaulter in payment of rent, is concerned, identical and no exception can be taken to the finding of respondent No. 1 in this behalf. 6. Having heard counsel for the parties I am of the opinion that the view taken by the judge, Small Causes, in this behalf was correct on the facts of the instant case and the impugned order dated 18th November, 1981, passed by respondent No. 1 deserves to be quashed. 7. As is apparent from paragraphs 3, 9. and 10 of the report in the case of Mangal Sen (supra) a sum of Rs. 1,980/- had been deposited by the tenant on some date prior to his filing his written statement. The plea taken by the tenant in his written statement was that since the landlord had required him to stand surety for some sales tax dues after the service upon him of the notice of tenancy, there could be no further question of any arrears of rent being outstanding as due by him to the landlord. It was, however, not his case that he had actually made any payment towards the sales tax dues payable by the landlord. Benefit of Section 20 (4) of the Act on the basis of the deposit of Rs. 1,980/- aforesaid was not claimed by the tenant either before the judge, Small Causes, or the District Judge. It was for the first time claimed by him in the appeal before the Supreme Court. He was found not to be entitled to the aforesaid benefit on the following grounds: (1) There is absolutely no material available on the record to show that the alleged deposit of Rs. 1,980/- was made by the tenant on the first date of hearing. (2) What is more important, that there is absolutely no material available on the record that the said deposit was made by way of unconditional tender for payment to the landlord. 1,980/- was made by the tenant on the first date of hearing. (2) What is more important, that there is absolutely no material available on the record that the said deposit was made by way of unconditional tender for payment to the landlord. (3) Subsequent to the making of the deposit the tenant filed his written statement and one of the principal contentions raised by him therein was that since he had stood surety for the landlord for arrears of sales tax, there was no default by him in the payment of rent and that in the face of the said plea taken in the written statement, disputing the existence of any arrears of rent and denying that there had been a default, it is clear that the deposit even if it was made on the date of the first hearing, was not an unconditional tender of the amount for payment to the landlord. (4) Further, there is also nothing on record to show that what was deposited was the correct amount calculated in accordance with the provisions of section 20 (4). 8. Coming to the facts of the instant case it would be seen, as is apparent from the order of the judge, Small Causes, a copy whereof has been filed as annexure "2" to the writ petition that it was admitted even to respondent No. 1, that the entire amount contemplated by Section 20 (4) and that too calculating the rent at the rate not of Rs. 10/- per month which was found to be the agreed rate but at the rate of Rs. 37/- per month as claimed by respondent no. 2 had been deposited by the tenant at the very first hearing of the suit. The first and the fourth grounds on which benefit of section 20 (4) of the Act was refused in the case Mangal Sen (supra), therefore, do not exist in the instant case. 9. 37/- per month as claimed by respondent no. 2 had been deposited by the tenant at the very first hearing of the suit. The first and the fourth grounds on which benefit of section 20 (4) of the Act was refused in the case Mangal Sen (supra), therefore, do not exist in the instant case. 9. As regards the second ground of denial of benefit of section 20 (4) in the case of Mangal Sen (supra) neither the Judge, Small Causes, nor respondent No. 1, has pointed out that while making the deposit under section 20 (4) of the Act the petitioner had made any prayer or placed any condition to the effect that the amount so deposited may not be paid over to respondent No. 2 till the plea about rate of rent and being in arrears of rent proposed to be taken subsequently in the written statement is decided. A deposit coupled with a prayer that it be kept in court till decision of the suit was held to be conditional by a Division Bench of this court in paragraph 22 of the report in Mahendra Pratap v. Vijai Laxmi, 1982 AWC 731 . 10. On the other hand it has been specifically stated in paragraph 10 of the writ petition that "the petitioner had deposited the whole amount as claimed by the landlord opposite party No. 2 without any condition or protest". Reply to paragraph 10 of the writ petition is contained in paragraph 17 of the counter affidavit of respondent No. 2 and it reads : "17. That the contents of paragraph 10 of the writ petition are denied. The Lower Appellate Court has taken into consideration the fact that the petitioner had deposited the entire disputed amount on the first date of hearing." 11. It would thus be seen that except making a general denial it has not been stated in the counter-affidavit in reply to paragraph 10 of the writ petition that the deposit which had been made by the petitioner under section 20 (4) of the Act was made either under protest or subject to any condition on account of which there was any impediment in its being paid over to respondent No. 2. 12. 12. In regard to the third ground on which the tenant in the case of Mangal Sen (supra) was found not entitled to the benefit of Section 20 (4) of the Act it may be pointed out that it has not been held in that case that even if the total amount contemplated by Section 20 (4) of the Act has been deposited on the first hearing of the suit and no condition in regard to its payment to the landlord has been attached at the time when the deposit is made, such an unconditional deposit would automatically and invariably be converted into a conditional deposit if in the written statement subsequently filed by him the tenant disputes the existence of any arrears of rent and denies that there had been a default. I find it difficult to accept this submission that the ratio decided in of the decision in the case of Mangal Sen (supra) is that if a tenant wants to avail of the benefit of section 20 (4) of the Act he should not only deposit the entire amount contemplated by it on the first hearing of the suit, he should give up even his legitimate defence and forego amounts of rent already paid by him. If section 20 (4) of the Act is interpreted in this manner it will permit victimisation of the tenant by the landlord. It would permit the landlord to make as fantastic and exaggerated a claim as he chooses in his whim in the notice of demand and the suit for ejectment of the tenant both in regard to the rate of rent and the period for which rent is alleged to be due and the tenant if he seeks the benefit of section 20 (4) of the Act would be compelled to deposit the amount as claimed by the landlord without liberty to contest in his written statement even such a claim of the landlord, because the moment he does so the deposit even though unconditional when made would automatically become conditional on a written statement being filed subsequently contesting the claim of the landlord. Further, such an interpretation would be in the teeth of sub section (6) of section 20 of the Act which reads : "6. Further, such an interpretation would be in the teeth of sub section (6) of section 20 of the Act which reads : "6. Any amount deposited by the tenant under sub section (4) or under Rule 5 of order 15 of the first schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 shall be paid to the landlord forthwith on his application without prejudice to the parties pleadings and subject to the ultimate decision of the suit." 13. On its plain language sub section (6) aforesaid while providing for payment of the amount deposited under section 20 (4) to the landlord, by necessary implication permits the tenant to raise all legitimate pleas in his written statement including the plea that the rate of rent alleged by the landlord was wrong or that the period for which rent is asserted by him to be due was wrong, and requires such a plea to be decided by the court In case the total amount deposited by the tenant under Section 20 (4) of the Act has been withdrawn by the landlord even before adjudication of a pica of the a foresaid nature taken by the tenant in his written statement, the landlord on the said plea being decided at the final hearing of the suit in favour of the tenant would either be required to refund the excess amount or adjust it in future. rent. This in my opinion seems to be the proper interpretation of sub section (4) of section 20 of the Act read with sub section (6) thereof. 14. At this place it may be pointed out that the Division Bench of this court which decided the case of Mahendra Pratap (supra) has held in paragraph 22 of the report that the "Decision in Ram Kishan's case. (supra) to the effect that pleadings do not have any relevance to the unconditionality of the deposit is correct." In regard to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Mangal Sen (supra) it was pointed out by the Division Bench in the case of Maherdrn Pratap) (supra) in paragraph 25 of the report that the "attention of the court was not invited to sub section (6) of Section 20 which was more material for this purpose. If the court had considered the effect of sub-section (6) of section 20, the result may have been different." 15. If the court had considered the effect of sub-section (6) of section 20, the result may have been different." 15. Counsel for respondent No. 2 has in this connection brought to my notice the decision of a Bench of three Hon'ble Judge of the Supreme Court in B M. Lakhani v. Malkapur Municipality, AIR 1970 Supreme Court 1002, where it was held that a decision of the Supreme Court is binding on the High Court and it could not ignore it because in its view "relevant provisions were not brought to the notice of the Court." On the basis of this observation it has been urged that it was not open to this court in the case of Mahendra Pratap (supra) to take the view that the decision of the Supreme court in Mangal Sen's case (supra) was not binding on it because the provisions of subsection (6) of section 20 of the Act were not brought to the notice of the Supreme court. Suffice it to say so far as this submission is concerned that the Division Bench of this Court in Mahendra Pratap's case (supra) has said nothing of the kind. In my opinion it has only pointed out that the observations made by the Supreme Court in Mangal Sen's (supra) could not be read in isolation and had to read in the background and context of that case. 16. Counsel for respondent No. 2 then urged that it was not open to this Court in Mahendra Pratap's case (supra) not to follow the decision of the Supreme Court in Mangal Sen's case (supra) even on this ground that the said case is an authority on its actual facts and has placed reliance in support of his subission on the observations made by a Bench again of three Hon'ble Judge of the Supreme Court in paragraph 10 of the report in Fuzlumbi v. K. Khadar Vali, AIR 1980 Supreme Court 1739.. As regards this submission, firstly, it is to be kept in mind, already pointed out above, that in Mangal Sen's rase (supra) it has not been held the Supreme Court that in order to claim the benefit of section 20 (4) of the Act the tenant had not only to deposit the entire amount contemplated by it on the first hearing of the suit he has to give up all the legitimate pleas available to him in his defence and must submit to the claim of the landlord, howsoever fantastic and exaggerated it may be and that even if no condition is attached to the deposit when made it automatically and invariably gets converted into a conditional deposit if the tenant in this written statement filed subsequent to the making of the deposit disputed the existence of any arrears of rent and denies that there had been a default. 17. Secondly in Fuzlunbi's case (supra) it has not been held that the facts of the case are wholly irrelevant in finding out the ratio decidendi of the decision of that case. On the other hand a Bench of five Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme Court in S.V. Kandeakar v V.M. Deshpande, (1972) 1 SCC 438 held that "in order to understand and appreciate the binding force of a decision it is always necessary to see what were the facts of the case in which the decision was given and what was the point which had to be decided." 18. At this place it may be pointed out that as to whether an otherwise valid and unconditional deposit would automatically and invariably get converted into a conditional deposit on a plea being raised by the tenant in his subsequently filed written statement whereby he disputed the existence of any arrears of rent and denied that there had been a default, not withstanding the fact that sub-section of Section 20 of the Act, as already pointed out above by necessary implication permits such a plea being raised by the tenant was not the point which fell for consideration in the case of Mangal Sen (supra). 19. 19. In Madhav Rao Scindia v. Union of India, AIR 1971 Supreme Court 530 it was hold by Bench of eleven Hon'ble Judges : "It is difficult to regard a word, a clause or a sentence occurring in a judgment of this court, divorced from its context, as containing a full exposition of the law on a question when the question did not even fall to answer in that judgment." 20. In Raval and Co. v. K.C. Ramchandran, AIR 1974 Supreme Court 818 it was held by a Bench of five Hon'ble judges that the general observations in earlier cases should be confined to the facts of those cases. 21. In view of what has been pointed out above I am of opinion that there is no conflict in the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Fuzlunbi (supra) on the one hand and its decision in the cases of S.V. Kandeakar, Madhav Rao Scindia and Rajpal & Co. (supra) on the other on the question as to whether facts of the case are relevant or not in finding out the ratio decidendi of the case. But even if there was a conflict the view expressed in the latter category of cases which are of larger Benches than that of Fuzlunbi's ease (supra) will have to be followed in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Mattu Lalu Lal v. Radhey Lal, AIR 1976 Supreme Court 1596 and State of U.P. v. Ram Chandra, AIR 1965 Supreme Court 1887. 22. At this place it would be useful to keep in mind one more principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in regard to its decisions. In Rarjeshwar Prasad v. State of West bengal, AIR 1965 Supreme Court 1887 it was held : "These arguments disclose a tendency to read the observations of this Court as statutory enactments. No doubt, the law declared by this court binds courts in India but it should always be remembered that this Court does not enact." 23. In Mamleshtwar v. Kanhaiya LaL, AIR 1975 Supreme Court 907, it was held : "Certainty of the law, consistency of rulings and comity of courts- all flowering from the same principle-converage to the conclusion that a decision once rendered must later bind like cases. In Mamleshtwar v. Kanhaiya LaL, AIR 1975 Supreme Court 907, it was held : "Certainty of the law, consistency of rulings and comity of courts- all flowering from the same principle-converage to the conclusion that a decision once rendered must later bind like cases. We do not intend to detract from the rule that, in exceptional instances, where by obvious inadvertance or oversight a judgment fails to notice a plain statutory provision or obligatory authority running counter to the reasoning and result reached, it may not have the sawy of binding precedents." 24. It is in view of the foregoing discussion that I am of opinion that respondent No. 1 committed a manifest error of law in denying to the petitioner the benefit of Section 20 (4) of the Act and that the impugned order dated 18th November, 1981 passed by him deserves to be quashed. 25. In the result the writ petition succeeds and is allowed and the impugned order dated 18th November, 1981, passed by respondents no. I is quashed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.