RAMANTHALI P. P. SAMITHI v. UNION OF INDIA — 1983 DIGILAW 327 (KER)

Judgment :- 1. The short point that arises for consideration in these cases is whether a notification under S.3(1) of the Kerala Land Acquisition Act, 1961 invoking the emergency provisions contained in S.19(4) of the Act to dispense with the enquiry under S.5 be struck down simply because the notification does not contain any reason for invoking those provisions, when there are materials brought out in the case which indicate that the authority who issued the notification applied its mind to the materials on which it formed the opinion which could be reasonably formed on those materials and if there is no mala fides. 2. The petitioners belong to the Thadathil Chal area of Ramanthali Desom, Thalipparamba Taluk, included in the lands to be acquired for the Naval Academy proposed to be started at Ezhimala. The challenge is against the notification dated 7-2-1983 issued under S.3(1) of the Kerala Land Acquisition Act, 1961 for short the Act. The main grievance of the petitioners is against the invoking of the emergency powers under S.19(4) of the Act to take the acquisitions out of the purview of S.5. The petitioners' case, shorn of unnecessary details, is: Going by the reports, the proposal was to acquire 1700 acres for the Naval Academy at Ezhimala. This consists of Ettikulam which is a seaward projection on the southern side and Thadathil Chal, a plateau on the eastern side in between two mountain ranges. The former is predominantly inhabited by Muslims while in the latter the Hindus form the major section of the population. Both the communities clamoured for the exclusion from acquisition or areas where they are mainly the population. A high power committee headed by a Member, Board of Revenue, Kerala after visiting the area, submitted a tentative proposal to acquire 2700 acres including the entire coastal belt on the western side of the Ezhimala main ridge comprising of Ettikulam on the south-west, Ramanthali Thara on the north-west and the Peechal area lying on the western coast of Ramanthali Panchayat. This included the entire belt between the Ezhimala ridge and the sea and this was ideal for the Academy as the land sloped towards the sea from the ridge and it was a contiguous area without any pockets left out from acquisition. The Thadathil Chal which lies beyond the main Ezhimala ridge was not included. This included the entire belt between the Ezhimala ridge and the sea and this was ideal for the Academy as the land sloped towards the sea from the ridge and it was a contiguous area without any pockets left out from acquisition. The Thadathil Chal which lies beyond the main Ezhimala ridge was not included. But due to political pressure exerted on the Government certain areas were excluded because of extraneous considerations creating pockets in the land sought to be acquired for the Academy. In this matter, the Government yielded to the pressure exerted by the Indian Union Muslim Leage, excluded vast areas at Ettikulam near the Ettikulam Bay and included the Thadathil Chal area to compensate the deficiency. The Naval Academy being a defence installation the creation of pockets by large scale exclusion at Ettikulam was wrong from the security point of view. This happened because the petitioners have no godfathers in the ruling front. Though it was stated in the Parliament in reply to a question that the total extent required for the Academy is 1200 acres, now the actual extent of the land sought to be acquired is much more than that. Representations were made to the State and the Union Governments. But there was no favourable response. The petitioners were apprehending that the 2nd respondent-State Government will invoke S.19(4) of the Act to make it impossible for them to invoke S.5 of the Act and file objections to the proposal for acquisition. At last, this materialised and the notification Ext P9 (produced in OP. No. 3764 of 1983) dated 7-2-1983 was issued under S.3(1) of the Act and the acquisition was taken out of the purview of S.5 of the Act by invoking S.19(4). Going by the schedule to the notification, except a small strip of land on the western coastal line, the whole of Ettikulam area has been excluded from the acquisition while the Thadathil Chal has been included. 3. It was under the above circumstances that the petitioners approached this Court with these original petitions. The contentions raised in these original petitions are: This is not an acquisition which cannot brook a delay of 30 days. S.19(4) of the Act was invoked to deny the petitioners and others in the Thadathil Chal an opportunity to make representations against the acquisition. This is mala fide. The contentions raised in these original petitions are: This is not an acquisition which cannot brook a delay of 30 days. S.19(4) of the Act was invoked to deny the petitioners and others in the Thadathil Chal an opportunity to make representations against the acquisition. This is mala fide. The notification is significantly silent as to what is the urgency. S.19(4) cannot be invoked simply to suit the convenience of the Government. The Government should at least place before the court materials to justify their action in invoking the emergency provisions in the Act. In this case, it cannot be said that there was a proper consideration of the relevant aspects of the matter before issuing the notification. There was no application of the mind and an opinion was not formed that it was necessary to dispense with the provisions of S 5 by invoking S.19(4) of the Act. S.19(4) was invoked with the sole purpose of stifling the objections regarding the inclusion of Thadathil Chal and to hide the extraneous considerations which weighed with the Government in excluding vast areas in Ettikulam. The notification is hence vitiated by mala fides. To justify the invoking of S.19(4) at least the file must show the existence of something to be done within thirty days of the notification. The burden is heavily on the Government to prove this. The Navy was not very happy about the exclusion of Ettikulam. 4. A counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the 1st respondent-Union of India. In the counter-affidavit it is stated: The Government of India on 24-5-1982 announced that the Naval Academy will be located at Ezhimala. Then a reconnaissance board was constituted. The board ultimately decided that the Academy should have approximately 2500 acres and should border the sea. The board recommended that hill feature 208 which overlooks the southern end of the backwater and the flat lands and gentle slopes to its west, north and east appear to be the most suitable. According to the board, overlooking hill features close to a defence establishment should not be open to the public for security reasons. The board also decided to exclude heavily populated areas and important places of worship as far as possible. The originally demarcated area was 2700 acres. In August 1982 itself 24 acres each in Ramanthali and Ettikulam were excluded to avoid thickly populated areas. The board also decided to exclude heavily populated areas and important places of worship as far as possible. The originally demarcated area was 2700 acres. In August 1982 itself 24 acres each in Ramanthali and Ettikulam were excluded to avoid thickly populated areas. A second exclusion of about 100 acres was made on 3-12-1982. Both these exclusions were made well before the notification (Ext. P9) was issued. The statement that Thadathil Chal was included after making the exclusions is wrong. It was originally included. The land requirements of a Naval Academy has to be decided by experts. There has been no arbitrary inclusion or exclusion of any land. 5. A counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the 2nd respondent-State of Kerala. In the counter-affidavit it has been stated: The acquisition is for a defence installation of major national importance. A natural boundary is also necessary for security reasons. The exclusions were made as agreed to by the Navy. The petitioners' lands were included originally by the Navy, they are inside the demarcated boundary and the exclusions had nothing to do with the inclusion of their lands. Thadathil Chal area is one of the useful strategic plots necessary for the Academy. It is wrong to state that the exclusion was politically motivated. Persons following different religions were benefited incidentally. The Government of India wanted the survey, demarcation, transfer and acquisition and completion of all records within six months. Handing over possession of land without delay was demanded by the Navy as well. If possession was to be taken after enquiry, it will consume a lot of time and it will defeat the very purpose of the acquisition. As the entire land demarcated by the Navy is required by them, there cannot be any enquiry in respect of each bit of land based on objections. The question as to the location and extent of land required by the Navy cannot be the subject matter of the proceedings under Art.226 of the Constitution. Acquisition proceedings are taken only according to law. 6. In both the cases, additional documents were produced by the petitioners. In OP. No. 3764 of 1983 an additional relief was also added by an amendment. In OP. No. 3733 of 1983 the petitioners' counsel filed a CMP. to call for certain records of the case. Acquisition proceedings are taken only according to law. 6. In both the cases, additional documents were produced by the petitioners. In OP. No. 3764 of 1983 an additional relief was also added by an amendment. In OP. No. 3733 of 1983 the petitioners' counsel filed a CMP. to call for certain records of the case. It seems, pending the original petitions, the Deputy Minister for Defence made a statement in the Lok Sabha about the Naval Academy, Ezhimala. The petitioners' counsel filed a CMP. for direction to place before the court the relevant files producing a photostat copy of the report of the statement that appeared in the Malayala Manorama Daily dated 8-8-1983. The Vice-President of the Ettikulam Muslim Jamath filed a CMP. to implead himself as the additional 5th respondent in in OP. No. 3764 of 1983. In the above CMP. the court passed an order that he will be heard at the final hearing. 7. The Additional Central Government Pleader made available to the court a copy of the proceedings of the R. E. C. C. E. Board constituted to determine the area and boundaries of the land required for the Naval Academy at Ezhimala. As Appendix Q to the above proceedings, a sketch of the site of the Academy is included. As per Appendix Q, the maximum distance from the western seashore to the eastern end is 1.25 miles. In para 47(c)(ii) at page 17 dealing with northern boundary it has been stated: "Ideally the Board would have preferred a straight line boundary from the northern end of Survey No. 165 to the northern end of Lourd Matha Church Hill feature (Points (A) & (B) in Appendix Q). In para 47(c)(ii) at page 17 dealing with northern boundary it has been stated: "Ideally the Board would have preferred a straight line boundary from the northern end of Survey No. 165 to the northern end of Lourd Matha Church Hill feature (Points (A) & (B) in Appendix Q). However in view of the Sastha Temple and the Sankaranarayana Temple the northern boundary was altered to exclude these areas." Again, in para 47(e) at page 18 dealing with the southern boundary, the report says: "Ideally the board would have liked to acquire the whole water front along Ettikulam Bay but in view of the densely populated areas and some Mosques the board has again altered the boundary to exclude the areas as shown in Appendix Q." In para 50 at pages 19 and 20 of the report it is stated: "The area is marginally more than what was offered by the Government of Kerala which is indicated by the black line at Appendix 'Q. However, it will be observed that from the very outset the heavily populated areas of Ramanthali and Ettikulam had been offered to the Navy by the Government of Kerala. These areas have been excluded to the extent possible by the board itself. While selecting a site one cannot disregard the dictates of geography. The area and boundaries recommended by the board are based primarily on the requirements of the Naval Academy but have been marginally adjusted to heed to the demands of the geography of the site." 8. The Government Pleader appearing for the 2nd respondent-State of Kerala made available to the Court two files. File No. I contains the correspondence with the Central Government and also the preliminary reports submitted by the Member, Board of Revenue and other connected papers. In his report to the Chief Secretary dated 19-10-1982 the Member, Board of Revenue has pointed out that the Naval authorities have prepared their plan to start work at Ezhimala on the basis that the land will be handed over to them by February, 1983 (para 6 at page 63 of the file). File No. II contains papers which lead to the issue of Ext. P-9 notification for the acquisition of land for the Academy. 9. The learned counsel for the petitioners contended that there was no justification for invoking S.19(4) of the Act for the acquisition in question. File No. II contains papers which lead to the issue of Ext. P-9 notification for the acquisition of land for the Academy. 9. The learned counsel for the petitioners contended that there was no justification for invoking S.19(4) of the Act for the acquisition in question. According to the learned counsel, only incases where a delay of 30 days cannot be brooked, the emergency provisions in the Act can be invoked. It was then contended that, in this case, the emergency provisions were invoked to shut out valid objections the petitioners and others in the Thadathil Chal have against the inclusion of that area which was not originally included. According to the learned counsel, this is a clear case of mala fides which vitiates Ext.P-9 notification issued. The learned counsel pointed out that no reasons are given in Ext. P-9 notification for invoking the emergency provisions and hence there was no application of the mind of the authority to form an opinion whether the emergency provisions in the Act ought to have been invoked in this case and the enquiry under S.5 be dispensed with. According to the learned counsel, for this reason alone Ext. P-9 has to be set aside. The learned counsel relied on Narayan v. State of Maharastra (AIR. 1977 SC. 183) wherein the Supreme Court considered some appeals against the decision of the High Court of Bombay striking down a notification under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 where enquiry under S.5A of that Act was dispensed with by invoking the emergency provisions in S.17. In the said notification also there was only a simple statement that the acquisition was urgently necessary and no reasons were given. The acquisition was for development of the land as a residential and industrial area. The High Court of Bombay in its judgment held that: "When the formation of an opinion or the satisfaction of an authority is subjective but is a condition precedent to the exercise of a power, the challenge to the formation of such opinion or to such satisfaction is limited in law, to three points only. The High Court of Bombay in its judgment held that: "When the formation of an opinion or the satisfaction of an authority is subjective but is a condition precedent to the exercise of a power, the challenge to the formation of such opinion or to such satisfaction is limited in law, to three points only. It can be challenged, firstly, on the ground of mala fides; secondly, on the ground that the authority which formed that opinion or which arrived at such satisfaction did not apply its mind to the material on which it formed the opinion or arrived at the satisfaction and, thirdly, that the material on which it formed its opinion or reached the satisfaction was so insufficient that no man could reasonably reach that conclusion. So far as the third point is concerned, no Court of law can, as in an appeal, consider that, on the material placed before the authority, the authority was justified in reaching its conclusion. The Court can interfere only in such cases where there was no material at all or the material was so insufficient that no man could have reasonably reached that conclusion. It is not necessary to refer to the authorities which lay down these propositions because they have by now been well established in numerous judgments and they are not in dispute before us at the Bar. In this case, however, there is no challenge on any of these three grounds. The dispute in this case therefore narrows down to the point as to the burden of proof. In other words, the dispute is whether it is the petitioner who has to bring the material before the Court to support his contention that no urgency existed or whether, once the petitioner denied that any urgency existed, it was incumbent upon the respondent to satisfy the Court that there was material upon which the respondents could reach the opinion as mentioned in S.17(4) The affidavit only states that the authority, i. e. the Commissioner of the Bombay Division, was satisfied that the possession of the said lands was urgently required for the said lands was urgently required for the purpose of carrying out the said development. Even Fr. Setalvad conceded that the affidavit does not contain a statement of facts on which the authority was satisfied or on which it formed its opinion. Even Fr. Setalvad conceded that the affidavit does not contain a statement of facts on which the authority was satisfied or on which it formed its opinion. It is, therefore, quite clear that the respondents have failed to bring on record any material whatever on which the respondents formed the opinion mentioned in the two notifications. The notifications themselves show that they concern many lands other than those falling in the said first and third groups. It is not possible to know what was the development for which the lands were being acquired, much less is it possible to know what were the circumstances which caused urgency in the taking of possession of such lands. We have held that the burden of proving such circumstances, at least prima facie is on the respondents. As the respondents have brought no relevant material on the record, the respondents have failed to discharge that burden. We must, in conclusion, hold that the urgency provision under S.17(4) was not validly resorted to." (paras 11,12) Dismissing the appeals, the Supreme Court held: "We find that, although the High Court had stated the question before it to be one which 'narrows down to the point as to the. burden of proof', yet, it had analysed the evidence sufficiently before it to reach the conclusion that the urgency provision under S.17(4) had not been validly resorted to The High Court had rightly referred to the absence of any statement of circumstances which could have resulted in such urgency that no enquiry under S.5A of the Act could reasonably be held." (paras 24, 25) The Supreme Court further held: "Indeed, even if a recital in a notification is defective or does not contain the necessary statement that the required conditions have been fulfilled, evidence can be led to show that conditions precedent to the exercise of a power have been actually fulfilled It is also clear that, even a technically correct recital in an order or notification stating that the conditions precedent to the exercise of a power have been fulfilled may not debar the Court in a given case from considering the question whether, in fact, those conditions have been fulfilled. And a fortiori, the Court may consider and decide whether the authority concerned has applied its mind to really relevant facts of a case with a view to determining that a condition precedent to the exercise of a power has been fulfilled. If it appears, upon an examination of the totality of facts in the case, that the power conferred has been exercised for an extraneous or irrelevant purpose or that the mind has not been applied at all to the real object or purpose of a power, so that the result is that the exercise of a power could only serve some other or collateral object, the Court will interfere." Paras 38 and 39 of the judgment reads: "Now, the purpose of S.17(4) of the Act is, obviously, not merely to confine action under it to waste and arable land but also to situations in which an inquiry under S.5A will serve no useful purpose, or, for some overriding reason, it should be dispensed with. The mind of the officer or authority concerned has to be applied to the question whether there is an urgency of such a nature that even the summary proceedings under S.5A of the Act should be eliminated. It is not just the existence of an urgency but the need to dispense with an inquiry under S.5A which has to be considered. S. 17(2) deals with a case in which an enquiry under S.5A of the Act could not possibly serve any useful purpose. Sudden change of the course of a river would leave no option if essential communications have to be maintained. It results in more or less indicating, by an operation of natural physical forces beyond human control, what land should be urgently taken possession of. Hence it offers no difficulty in applying S.17(4) in public interest. And, the particulars of what is obviously to be done in public interest need not be concealed when its validity is questioned in a court of justice. Other cases may raise questions involving consideration of facts which are especially within the knowledge of the authorities concerned. Hence it offers no difficulty in applying S.17(4) in public interest. And, the particulars of what is obviously to be done in public interest need not be concealed when its validity is questioned in a court of justice. Other cases may raise questions involving consideration of facts which are especially within the knowledge of the authorities concerned. And, if they do not discharge their special burden, imposed by S.106, Evidence Act, without even disclosing a sufficient reason for their abstention from disclosure, they have to take the consequences which flow from the non-production of the best evidence which could be produced on behalf of the State if its stand was correct." In Para.40 of the judgment the Supreme Court pointed out: "In the case before us, the public purpose indicated is the development of an area for industrial and residential purposes. This, in itself, on the face of it, does not call for any such action, barring exceptional circumstances, as to make immediate possession, without holding even a summary enquiry under S.5A of the Act, imperative. On the other hand, such schemes generally take sufficient period of time to enable at least summary inquiries under S.5A of the Act to be completed without any impediment whatsoever to the execution of the scheme. Therefore, the very statement of the public purpose for which the land was to be acquired indicated the absence of such urgency, on the apparent facts of the case, as to require the elimination of an enquiry under S.5A of the Act." In Damodara Menon v. P.A. (L. A) to District Collector (1975 KLT. 537) a Division Bench of this Court quashed a land acquisition notification issued invoking S.19A of the Act and dispensing with the enquiry under S.5 of the Act on the ground that the authorities showed no urgency for taking possession and no material had been placed before court from which a possible view could have been taken that there was such an urgency that could possibly justify action being taken under S.19 of the Act. In the above case, the Division Bench held: "If no urgent steps will be taken under the Act and if the authorities can act leisurely there can be no justification for dispensing with the enquiry under S.5. In any view this is an aspect to which the mind has to be applied before enquiry is dispensed with. In the above case, the Division Bench held: "If no urgent steps will be taken under the Act and if the authorities can act leisurely there can be no justification for dispensing with the enquiry under S.5. In any view this is an aspect to which the mind has to be applied before enquiry is dispensed with. As was said earlier, the urgency must be such that it is not possible to allow the time that may be reasonably required for an enquiry under S.5. If such time that may be required for the enquiry is available before the date on which possession has to be taken or can be taken it cannot be said that there is an urgency which calls for dispensation with the enquiry under S.5. This aspect has to be seriously borne in mind. These two aspects of urgency and dispensation cannot be treated separately as if there is no link between the two." (para.11) In State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh ((1980) 2 SCC. 471) the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal from a judgment of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana striking down a notification invoking the emergency provisions under S.17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The facts are interesting. A piece of land was selected for building a mandi. Notifications under the Land Acquisition Act were issued and a foundation stone for the building was laid. But, in the next year, the proceedings were denotified and, instead, another land was notified to be acquired for the same purpose. The owners of the land challenged the proceedings before the High Court alleging male fides on the ground that the notification was issued under the influence of a Minister who was a relative of the owner of the land first sought to be acquired. The High Court quashed the proceedings. After several years, the State once again sought to acquire the same land by invoking the emergency provisions, but the High Court again quashed the proceedings. It was against this decision that the State moved the Supreme Court with a special leave application. Dismissing the special leave application, the Supreme Court held: "If the purpose is corrupt the resultant act is bad. It was against this decision that the State moved the Supreme Court with a special leave application. Dismissing the special leave application, the Supreme Court held: "If the purpose is corrupt the resultant act is bad. If considerations foreign to the scope of the power or extraneous to the statute enter the verdict or impel the action, mala fides or fraud on power vitiates the acquisition or other official act Here a slumbering process, pending for years and suddenly exciting itself into immediate forcible taking, makes a travesty of emergency power." (paras 1, 2) 10. The learned Additional Central Government Pleader referred to the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the 1st respondent-Union of India and contended that there is no scope for interference with the notification for acquisition. According to the learned counsel, there is no truth in the contention that the Thadathil Chal was included because of the exclusions made at Ettikulam and Ramanthali North. It was pointed out that Thadathil Chal was included as per the alignment originally fixed by the Naval authorities and there was no arbitrary inclusion. 11. The learned Government Pleader appearing for the 2nd respondent-State of Kerala contended that the emergency provisions under S.19 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1961 were invoked because the Navy wanted the lands to be handed over to them immediately and this could be done only by dispensing with the enquiry under S.5 of the Act by invoking S.19(4). It was pointed out that the Navy wanted to start work on the land in February 1983 and Ext. P-9 notification was issued in February 1983. So, according to the Government Pleader, it is evident that without invoking the emergency provisions, possession of the land could not be taken in time. The learned Government Pleader submitted that the decision to invoke S.19(4) of the Act was taken after an application of the mind of the authority to the relevant facts and the decision was based on materials available in the relevant files of the State Government. According to the learned Government Pleader, there is no reason for interfering with the notification for want of reasons for invoking the emergency provisions in the notification, in view of the materials made available to the court which will make it clear that the powers were validly exercised in issuing the impugned notification. According to the learned Government Pleader, there is no reason for interfering with the notification for want of reasons for invoking the emergency provisions in the notification, in view of the materials made available to the court which will make it clear that the powers were validly exercised in issuing the impugned notification. It was also pointed out that S.19(4) was invoked not to shut out the objections of the petitioners and others belonging to Thadathil Chal. 12. The learned counsel for the Vice-President of the Ettikulam Muslim Jamath refuted the allegations made in the original petitions against the Muslim community. He pointed out that by the exclusions made from the area originally demarcated not only Muslims but Hindus were also benefited. He also pointed out that in the Thadathil Chal also there are Muslims. The learned counsel supported the contentions of the counsel for the petitioners that the exercise of the powers to invoke the emergency provisions of S.19(4) of the Act is not valid in the facts and circumstances of the case. 13. Going by the scheme of the Kerala Land Acquisition Act, 1961 a land notified for acquisition under S.3(1) of the Act can be taken possession of only after the award is passed under S.11 or S.16. Before that, as per S.5 the objections of the person interested in the land have to be heard. He need only file the objections within thirty days of the S.3(1) notification. After that, a declaration under S.6 that the land is needed for a public purpose has to be made. Thereafter, individual notices to the persons interested have to go under S.9 and it is only thereafter the award can be passed. It goes without saying that possession can be taken only after the award. But all acquisitions cannot bear the above time consuming process. In cases where the land is required urgently if the normal course insisted by the Act is resorted to, the very purpose of the acquisition will be defeated. It is because of this that provision is made in S.19 of the Act for emergent acquisition. Under S.19, not only the enquiry under S.5 can be dispensed with, but the possession of the land can be taken within fifteen days of the notification under S.3(1) without even an award passed. It is because of this that provision is made in S.19 of the Act for emergent acquisition. Under S.19, not only the enquiry under S.5 can be dispensed with, but the possession of the land can be taken within fifteen days of the notification under S.3(1) without even an award passed. But only if the land is urgently required for a public purpose S.19 can be invoked. It is better that the notification itself gives the reasons for invoking the emergency provisions under S.19. But simply because it does not contain the reasons and there is only a bald statement that the land is urgently needed for a particular public purpose, for that reason alone, the notification cannot be struck down as bad in law. If materials can be made available to the court that the authority who invoked the emergency provisions applied its mind to the facts and circumstances of the case and formed an opinion, which could be reasonably formed in the facts and circumstances of the case, the invoking of the emergency provisions contained in S.19 cannot be interfered with as an invalid exercise of the power. But if mala fides is established, then, of course, the exercise of the power will be vitiated and the notification will have to go for that reason. In this case, the notification Ext. P9 could be finalised and issued only in February, 1983. The Navy had already made it clear to the State Government that the land for the Naval Academy should be given possession of in February 1983 so that they could start work according to the programme fixed. Though the notification simply states 'in view of the urgency of the case', the fact that the matter was really urgent is borne out by the files and papers made available to the court by the respondents. It cannot be said that the State Government did not apply its mind to the materials before it and formed an opinion that the matter was really urgent. It cannot be said that a defence installation like a Naval Academy should not be established in accordance with the schedule fixed by the experts. So, the fact that the notification does not give the reasons for invoking the emergency provisions of S.19 of the Act cannot be a reason to strike down the same as bad in law. It cannot be said that a defence installation like a Naval Academy should not be established in accordance with the schedule fixed by the experts. So, the fact that the notification does not give the reasons for invoking the emergency provisions of S.19 of the Act cannot be a reason to strike down the same as bad in law. Then the further question is whether there is any mala fide exercise of power in issuing the notification. The petitioners have a case that S.19 was invoked to shut out the valid objections they have got against acquiring the lands at Thadathil Chal. Their case that Thadathil Chal was not originally included in the lands earmarked for the Academy but was included later because of the exclusions made at Ettikulam and Ramanthali North under pressure, stands disproved by the materials brought out in the case. It is seen that from the very beginning Thadathil Chal, only 125 miles from the seashore, was included in the lands selected by the Navy. Valid reasons are also given for this in the report of RECEE Board. Not only that it is for the experts to decide which are the lands that should be included. In the above facts, the allegation of mala fides can only be rejected. Hence the challenge against Ext. P 9 notification fails. 14. The learned counsel for the petitioners vehemently contended that it was highly improper on the part of the authorities to have yielded to pressure and excluded large areas at Ettikulam in the south and Ramanthali in the north. According to the learned counsel, this has virtually created two pockets and this is going to affect the security of the Academy which is a defence installation. It was pointed out that the areas excluded at Ettikulam are within a furlong from the bay where the ships for training have to be berthed. 15. The allegation that authorities yielded to pressure and excluded certain areas may or may not be correct. But it is a fact that two pockets are created in the Academy area because of the exclusions. It is clear from the extracts of the RECEE Board given in Para.7 of the judgment that the Navy is not very happy about the exclusions made. It seems the Defence Ministry also did not very much appreciate the exclusions. That is the indication in Ext. It is clear from the extracts of the RECEE Board given in Para.7 of the judgment that the Navy is not very happy about the exclusions made. It seems the Defence Ministry also did not very much appreciate the exclusions. That is the indication in Ext. P-9, a photostat copy of the report in Malayala Manorama produced in OP. No. 3733 of 1983. Exclusions were made mainly on two grounds, namely, to save temples, mosques and churches, and to avoid thickly populated areas. Should these be the considerations which should weigh with the authorities in the matter of a defence installation like a Naval Academy? Thickly populated areas and cost of acquisition should not stand in the way in the case of a defence installation of national importance. It is for the authorities to have a rethinking on the exclusions made if the Defence Ministry really wants. The Court can leave the matter there. 16. In the result, the original petitions are dismissed. No costs.