JUDGMENT ASHWINI KUMAR SINHA, J. 1. This appeal is by the plaintiffs against the judgment of affirmance. The plaintiffs brought a suit for recovery of a sum of Rs. 1106/88 Paise on account of arrears of the municipal taxes from the 4th quarter, 1962-63 to the 3rd quarter of 1968-69 in respect of holding No. 5, Ward No. 7, within the jurisdiction of the Chakaradharpur Municipality, as fully described in Schedules A and B of the plaint. 2. The plaintiffs/Municipality demanded the arrears of the taxes with regard to holding tax, education cess and the latrine tax. The case of the plaintiffs was that the aforesaid tax was payable in quarterly instilments and as the defendants had not paid the same, hence the suit. 3. The defendants filed a joint written statement and contested the suit. Their case was that the holding in question belonged to one Rameshwar Lal Marwari who was dead now and he was survived by his three sons, who were alive and the plaintiffs had not shown as to how the defendants became legal heirs of the deceased, Rameshwar Lal Marwari and further contended that as the names of the defendants do not occur in the demand register of the Chakaradharpur Municipality, the defendants were not liable to pay the tax, as demanded. Further defence was that no notice of assessment or notice of demand in respect of the holding in question was ever served upon the defendants and hence the defendants were not liable. 4. The defendants further pleaded that they had acquired the holding in question by a will dated 28.12.1956, which was duly probated and when the defendants applied for mutation of their names in respect of the holding in suit, as far back as in 1958, the Municipality refused to mutate their names and hence the defendants were not liable for the demands made and the demands were not recoverable from them. The defendants further pleaded that a portion of the claim was barred by limitation. 5. The trial court dismissed the suit holding that the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover the municipal taxes as claimed from the defendants. The defendants further pleaded that a portion of the claim was barred by limitation. 5. The trial court dismissed the suit holding that the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover the municipal taxes as claimed from the defendants. It also held that all efforts on the part of the defendants to get their names mutated on the basis of the probated will having failed and the, municipality having refused to mutate the names of the defendants, the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover the taxes as claimed. It further held that the claim of the plaintiffs from the 4th quarter, 1963-64 to the 3rd quarter of 1965-66 was, barred by time. It also held that the service of assessment notice upon Brijlal Agarwala was not binding upon the defendants and that no notice was served upon the defendant before or after the assessment and the enhancement of the municipal tax for the holding in suit. The trial court categorically held that the names of the defendants were not entered in the demand register of the municipality with respect to the holding in Suit. 6. The plaintiffs preferred an appeal. The court of appeal below dismissed the same and held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to a decree against the defendants who were not recorded as 'owner' by the Municipality and hence the defendants were not liable for the payment of the municipal taxes as claimed. On a perusal of the judgment of the lower appellate court it is obvious that it has refused to grant the relief to the plaintiffs on the ground that the defendants were not the "owners" of the holding the question, as contained in section 100 of the Bihar and Orissa Municipal Act, 1922, (hereinafter to be referred to as 'the Act'). It is desirable to quote from the judgment of the lower appellate court itself as to what did it mean by the word 'owner' as given in Paragraph 6 of its judgment. "The word "owner" contained in Section 100 of the Municipal Act, means a person or persons who are recorded as such by the Municipality. Admittedly, the defendants were the owners of the holding in question but they were not recorded as such by the municipality. "The word "owner" contained in Section 100 of the Municipal Act, means a person or persons who are recorded as such by the Municipality. Admittedly, the defendants were the owners of the holding in question but they were not recorded as such by the municipality. It has, therefore, been rightly argued before me that the plaintiffs–appellants arc not entitled to any decree against the defendants who were not recorded as such by the Municipality and that the defendants are not liable for the payment of municipal taxes imposed upon them." 7. The court of appeal below also held that the assessment notice (Ext–l) was nullity as it was sent to Rameshwar Lal Marwari who had died much before the notice was sent. The Court of appeal below, while deciding the legality of the notice (Ext–1) categorically held as follows:– "Smt. Mahadevi was the owner of the holding in question and the notice of assessment required to be served on her and not on her deceased father-in-law or husband's brother Brij Lall." It is pertinent to mention here that Smt. Mahadevi Agrawal is defendant no. 1 (respondent no. 1 in the present second appeal). 8. The court of appeal below further held that in the absence of a notice under section 107(2) of the Act, the plaintiffs were not competent to flue the defendants for any enhanced tax. 9. The court of appeal below also held that the claim of the plaintiffs for the period 4th quarter, 1962-63 and for the period 1st quarter to 3rd quarter, 1963-64 was barred by limitation. 10. Learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff appellants has submitted that the court of appeal below, on a totally wrong concept on of law has held that the defendants were not the owners of the holding in suit and hence on this ground alone the judgment and the decree of the lower appellate court needed to be interfered with. According to the learned counsel for the plaintiff–appellants the municipal tax, other than the latrine tax, payable by the owner of the holding was not dependent on his name being entered in the assessment list and that the liability to pay arose since the dare the defendants became owners of the holding in suit. 11 There is much force in the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel for the plaintiff–appellants. 11 There is much force in the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel for the plaintiff–appellants. The court of appeal below, it seems, on the basis of the decision in the case of the Patna Municipal Corporation vs. Ladley Saran, 1963 B.L.J.R. 124, (though there is no reference of this case in the judgment) held that the word 'owner' contained in section 100 of the Act, meant a person or persons who were recorded at; such by the Municipality. I have already quoted above the finding arrived at by the court of appeal below while considering the question of the legality of the assessment notice and this finding is that Smt. Mahadevi Agrawal (Defendant No.1) was the owner of the holding in question and that the notice of the assessment required to be served on her and not on her deceased father-in-law or husband's brother Brij Lal. 12. The question whether the municipal tax other then the latrine tax payable by the owner of the holding was dependent on his name being entered in the 'assessment list, being contentions question, the matter in view of the few contrary decisions, was referred to a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Nripendra Nath Roy Choudhary vs. The Commissioner of Chaibasaa Municipality, 1981 B.B.C.J. 1 (F.B.). On a consideration of the various cases this Court in the aforesaid Full Bench case (Supra) held that – (i) The municipal tax other than the latrine tax was payable by the owner of the holding; (ii) The liability to pay tax (other than the latrine tax) by the owner of the holding was not dependent on, his name being entered in the assessment list; (iii) The liability to pay arises since the date he becomes owner of the holding. This Court held that a person becomes owner of the holding not only after his name is entered in the records of the municipality but because of the transfer or devolution of the holding in his favour. This Court held that a person becomes owner of the holding not only after his name is entered in the records of the municipality but because of the transfer or devolution of the holding in his favour. It was further held that a question was posed in this case to this effect:– "But can it be said that till the formality of substituting the name of the person who has succeeded by transfer or otherwise to the ownership of the holding is completed he does not become owner for the purpose of this Act, so as to be liable to pay municipal taxes?" This question was answered in the negative. 13. The case of the Patna Municipal Corporation vs. Ladley Saran, 1963 B.L.J.R. 124, (supra), on the basis of which, it seems, the court of appeal below held that the word 'owner' contained in section 100, meant only a person or persons who are recorded as such by the Municipality, was also considered in the Full Bench case. It was further held in the aforesaid Full Bench case that a suit was maintainable against a person, who had become owner of the holding either by transfer or by devolution, although his name for one reason or the other had not been entered in the records of the municipality. It was further held that a person, who will be deemed to be the owner within the meaning of section 100 read with section 3(18) of the Act, cannot repudiate the liability in a suit for recovery of the arrears since the date he becomes owner of the holding on the ground that his name had not been mutated in the records of the municipality. Thus, the view taken by the court of appeal below to the effect that as the names of the defendants were not entered in the records of the municipality, the defendants were not the owners of the holding in suit was definitely an erroneous view in law, I hold, on the basis of the aforesaid Fun Bench case that the defendants are owners of the holding in suit; more so, when they themselves claim to be mutated as owners On the basis of the probated will. 14. The question then arises as to what extent the defendants are liable to pay taxes as claimed by the plaintiffs. 14. The question then arises as to what extent the defendants are liable to pay taxes as claimed by the plaintiffs. As Already held in the Full Bench Case of Nripendra Nath Roy Choudhary vs. The Commissioner of Chaibasaa Municipality (supra), that the municipal tax, other than the latrine tax, is payable by the owner of the holding the court of appeal below has not considered (and very rightly as the court of appeal below decided the main question of 'ownership' against the plaintiffs), the liability of payment of the holding tax, the education cess and the latrine tax separately. The liability to pay latrine tax has to be dealt with separately. 15. For the foregoing reasons I hold that the court of appeal below has taken an erroneous view of law on the question of 'ownership'. The judgment and the decree of the court of appeal below are set aside and the matter is sent back to the court of appeal below to decide the appeal afresh, after hearing the parties on the materials already on the record and in accordance with law. I refrain from giving any opinion on the point of limitation and on the point of notice. The court of appeal below while deciding the matter afresh, will also decide once again the question of limitation and also the effect of the absence of notice as required under section 107(2) of the Act. 16. In the result, the appeal succeeds, the judgment and the decree of the court of appeal below are set aside and the case is remanded to it for disposal afresh in the light of the observations as made above. Since no body has appeared for the defendant respondents, there will be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.